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Abstract 
HIV testing is an example of the separation between public health policy guidelines and practices 
of medical providers in urban Indian hospitals. An action-centred policy framework and 
interpretivist analytical approach was adopted to investigate problems of policy-practice gaps and 
identify strategies to resolve them. I conducted depth interviews with 61 respondents representing 
different groups of involved actors, including medical practitioners from public and private 
hospitals in five Indian cities, administrators, public health officials, regulators, educators, 
representatives of civil society organizations and international agencies, and with key informants. 
Respondents' perspectives on their participation in implementing the policies and on interactive 
processes between different groups were explored. There was a concentration on four aspects of 
HIV testing - selectivity in testing, pre-surgical testing, infonned consent, and confidentiality. 
I found that the actions of medical practitioners and other actors, and their respective interactions 
with each other, frequently diverged from expected nonns . of policy implementation. 
Explanations for divergences in actions included ambiguities around roles, conflicting value-
orientations and practical considerations such as workplace relationships and systemic 
inadequacies. The nature of existing interrelationships between groups of actors was often 
inconsistent with a 'rational' top-down process of implementation. Irregularities in conveying 
meanings of policies also contributed to problems in their implementation. 
Different groups of actors are observed to inhabit discrete 'systems of meaning' and be guided by 
differing senses of purpose in their actions. This raises questions of the sufficiency and 
appropriateness, in isolation, of conventional prescriptions of strengthening regulations towards 
aligning implementers' practices with policymakers' intentions. In India's complex health policy 
ecosystem, the need for greater attention to the quality of interactive processes is identified. A 
renewed understanding of 'rationality' in the implementation of public health policies, based on 
good communicative practices and inclusion of different fonns of knowledge, is suggested as a 
standard for change. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1. Introduction: the Policy-Practice Gap in HIV Testing 
1.1 HIV/AIDS IN INDIA 
The HIV I AIDS epidemic in India is heterogeneous, in tenns of the demographic subgroups and 
the regions it has affected, and the modes of transmission. The southern and north-eastern states 
report the majority ofHIV infections and AIDS cases, and there is considerable variation between 
different states. Heterosexual transmission is known to be the commonest mode of transmission 
of infection nationwide. In the North-Eastern states, shared needles are the commonest route of 
transmission (NACO 2006).1 Like some other diseases, and especially because it is linked to sex, 
HIV is often stigmatised, and the secrecy around knowledge of HIV status have made it difficult 
to control, and to estimate the extent of the epidemic (Bharat 2001). Since the discovery of the 
first case of HIV infection in 1986, the number of HIV infection has risen to a count of millions of 
individuals (MOHFW 2005b). The most recent formal estimate of prevalence of infection in the 
country was between 2 million and 3.1 million (NACO 2007d). Although this amounts to a 
relatively low prevalence of less than 1 %, it is still the second largest absolute burden of any 
country after South Africa. More than 60,000 full-blown AIDS cases were reported nationwide, 
in the most recent official estimates (Solomon et a1. 2004). 
HN testing is a critical aspect of HIV/AIDS care. Testing is often the first point of contact and 
entry into formal systems of health care for People Living with HN I AIDS (PLHA). The 
processes around diagnosis, including prior preparation of the patient, the manner of disclosure, 
and advice imparted, potentially have a role in determining patients' further help-seeking 
behaviour, safe sex practices, access to care, continuity and adherence to treatment (Moss et a1. 
1996; Sastry et a1. 2004). 
1 National prevalence figures are collated from data of 1122 surveillance sites conducting unlinked 
anonymous testing on "high risk" (STI clinic attendees, intravenous drug users, and men who have sex with 
men) and "low risk" (ante-natal clinic attendees) groups (NACO 2006). 
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1.2 GUIDANCE ON HIV TESTING FOR MEDICAL PROVIDERS 
Issues around HN testing are ethically complex and it is widely recognized that practitioners 
require guidance on how to address different aspects of the process. A prototypical process for 
diagnostic HN testing involves the following steps (NACO 2004): 
- Informed consent for the test is obtained from the patient and pre-test counselling is undertaken. 
- If the patient gives consent for the test, venous blood is extracted and the serological tests for 
diagnosis are conducted. Three reactive ELISA / Rapid / Simple tests with different antigens / 
principles are required to establish a positive HN test result.2 
- The test results are disclosed to the patient, maintaining full confidentiality. 
- Post-test counselling is undertaken. Proper follow up for management is arranged. 
There are clearly stated national policies published by the National AIDS Control Organization 
(NACO) to guide the behaviour of medical care providers, and assist them in making the 
appropriate decisions. The aspects of these guiding policies which apply specifically to the 
behaviour of medical practitioners, i.e. doctors who advise the tests, can be broadly summarised 
under four themes: selectivity in deciding to advise the test, proscription of mandatory testing as a 
pre-condition for providing a service, specific written informed consent for a HN test, and strict 
confidentiality of the HN test result. NACO's policy guidelines are intended to be applicable in 
all private and public healthcare institutions involved in overseeing and conducting HN tests. 
1.2.1 Selectivity in testing 
The National Guidelines for HN testing (NACO 2003a) advise the 'highest specificity' in HIV 
testing. The guidelines do not identify specific criteria for deciding to test; however these are 
touched upon in NACO's guidelines for Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTC) 
(NACO 2004) state that: 'a health care provider may ... recommend a test based on a patient's 
behavioural history and/or clinical fmdings such as STOs or opportunistic infections'. However 
the same document emphasizes 'the importance of the client's free will and conscious decision to 
get tested'. The National AIDS Prevention and Control Policy document (NACO 2003b) offers 
the following guidance: 'The question which must be asked before a testing procedure is 
2 These tests involve detection of serological markers by ELISA technique. ELISA results are available 
within a few hours, and it is the favoured test for use in most Indian laboratories, although Rapid and 
Simple serological tests - which give results within minutes and do not require special equipment or trained 
staff - are also widely used (NACO 2004). 
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undertaken is how this result will be used for the benefit of individual or of the community; if 
there is a policy and means to support the group under testing following the test result. .. ' There 
is no indication of routine testing being advised for any group of individuals. 
1.2.2 Proscription of 'mandatory' testing 
Mandatory testing is a term commonly used to describe the practice of HIV testing as a pre-
condition for receiving a service or being granted a privilege. NACO's stance is to categorically 
oppose mandatory HIV testing on any individual. According to the National AIDS Control 
Policy statement, ' ... considerable thought has been given to this issue. The government feels that 
there is no public health justification for mandatory testing. (On the contrary) such an approach 
could be counter-productive as it may scare away a large number of suspected cases from getting 
detected and treated.' (NACO 2003b) 
1.2.3 Specific informed consent 
NACO's Guidelines for VCT Centres (NACO 2004) define consent as being 'a deliberate and 
autonomous permission given by a client to a health care provider to proceed with the proposed 
HIV test procedure'. National policies clearly support specific informed consent for HIV testing. 
The National AIDS Control Policy states that: 'in the case of diagnosis of clinically suspected 
cases, the testing will be done ... with informed consent of the individual' (NACO 2003b), and 
according to national HN Testing Guidelines, the 'testing procedure must offer pre and post test 
counselling to the client and involve explicit consent' (NACO 2003a). Essential elements of the 
consent process are listed in the Guidelines for VCT Centres as follows: 'This permission is 
based on an adequate understanding of the advantages, risks, potential consequences and 
implications of an HIV test result, which could be both positive and negative' (ibid). It is 
recommended that discussions around these subjects be held in a counselling process prior to 
obtaining informed consent. Further, the guidelines state that 'this permission is entirely the 
choice of the client and can never be implied or presumed' and 'informed consent to HIV testing 
should be obtained from the client in writing, on a standardized consent form, prior to proceeding 
for HIV testing' (ibid.). In summary, the policy stance is that consent is meant to be fully 
informed - given after receiving adequate information; specific and explicit, not implied; and 
written, not merely verbal. 
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1.2.4 Confidentiality 
The national Guidelines for HIV Testing stress on the importance of the strictest confidentiality: 
, ... even health care workers who are not directly involved in care of the patient should not be told 
about the result' (NACO 2003a). Disclosure of HN status to the spouse or partner is however 
encouraged, with the consent of the client. 
1.3 DIVERGENT PRACTICES IN URBAN HOSPITALS 
Numerous studies and infonnal reports have indicated that NACO's policy guidelines are 
frequently not followed by doctors who advise HIV tests, both in government and in private 
institutions in India. Insisting on HIV tests before hospital admission or surgery, denial of care 
(either of specific services or complete denial) based on test results, breaches of confidentiality 
and testing patients without their pennission are common and widely acknowledged infractions of 
doctors in India.3 
In a review of discrimination and stigma around HIV/AIDS in India conducted in urban private 
and public hospitals, Bharat reported multiple instances of testing without proper consent, routine 
"mandatory" testing of pregnant women and patients before surgery (Bharat 2001). Patients 
interviewed in this qualitative review reported that HN tests were frequently used by hospitals to 
screen patients for eligibility to receive care, and those who tested positive would be turned away 
or denied care. Test results were widely accessible to uninvolved healthcare staff and disclosure 
was often made to family members and spouses without the patients' consent. 
Furthermore, since the formal publication and promulgation of the national policy in 2003, a 
number of studies have shown a continuing trend of such transgressions in HN testing (Kurien et 
al. 2007, Mahendra et al. 2006, MAAS-CHRD 2006, Sheikh et aI. 2005b, Grover et al. 2003). In 
a multi-centre study of 2200 healthcare professionals in the private and public hospitals and health 
centres, Kurien et al (2007) found that 65% of practitioners were aware of the presence of national 
policy guidelines for HIV testing and 38% reported having read them. Only 14% of respondents 
were aware that screening for HN before surgery was not recommended in the national policies 
(49% believed that it was recommended and the remaining 37% did not know), 67% reported that 
3 Authors Paul (2005) Agarwal (2002), Abraham (2002), Thomas (1998), Pandya (1996) in separate 
commentaries corroborate this point. 
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they screened patients for HIV before elective surgery, and 92% felt that universal pre-surgical 
HIV screening was a desirable policy. As many as 18% of doctors reported having refused care 
to HIV infected individuals. Identification and labelling of HIV positive individuals in care was 
common (47%), 19% of doctors never infonned their patients before getting them tested for HIV, 
and only 30% reported obtaining written consent for the test regularly. 
Mahendra et a1. (2006) in a study of urban Indian government and private hospitals reported that 
79% of doctors supported the use of HIV tests on patients before surgery (to allow surgical staff 
to take greater precautions), and 66% supported mandatory testing of pregnant women. Sixty-
seven percent of doctors did not regularly take consent from their patients before a HIV test. 
Several instances of breaches of confidentiality were reported in which doctors infonned health 
workers not directly involved in caring for the patients, without the explicit consent of patients. 
Fifty-eight percent of doctors in the baseline survey reported that they never asked patients' 
consent for disclosure of their test result to a family member. 
A study on access to HIV care conducted by the MAAS group among PLHA in Andhra Pradesh, 
Orissa and Maharashtra states revealed that 27% of PLHA were not asked for consent before they 
were tested for HIV in private and public facilities (MAAS-CHRD 2006). Fifty-two percent of 
respondents reported that doctors had infonned other individuals (usually family and immediate 
kin) of their HIV positive status. 
Sheikh et a1. (2005b), from their study of private sector practitioners in clinics in Pune city, 
Western India observed that private practitioners (PPs) prescribed HIV tests in large numbers and 
often indiscriminately. Forty percent of the PPs reported that they routinely required a HN test 
result before conducting invasive procedures. Of the private laboratories surveyed, 39% reported 
that they disclosed test results to individuals other than patients. 
Widespread mandatory pre-admission testing and public labelling of hospital beds of HIV 
positive patients were also reported by Grover et al. (2003). Rao (2004), Nandakumar (2005) and 
Maya (2006) have separately reported on widespread pre-surgical HIV screening, denial of care 
and prenatal HIV testing without consent in government and private hospitals. 
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1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND AIMS 
Research problem 
The separation between national policies and practices of medical practitioners in hospitals 
in the respect of institutional HN testing is a clearly established phenomenon in India. In spite of 
the public promulgation of formal national policy guidelines, there is a continuing trend of 
inconsistency on the part of doctors in both government and private institutions, in adopting and 
applying nationally prescribed guidelines. 
Aims of research 
This research was undertaken with the aims of understanding the nature of policy-practice gaps 
in HIV testing in urban Indian hospitals and identifying opportunities to bridge these gaps. A 
policy analysis approach was applied and field-based research undertaken towards addressing 
these aims. 
1.5 PLAN OF THE THESIS 
In this opening chapter I have introduced the research problem of policy-practice gaps in HN 
testing in urban Indian hospitals and the aims of the study. In Chapter 2, I set the context for an 
exploration of the problem by 1) presenting an overview of the formal medical sector and health 
systems in India, emphasising the organizations and structures involved in implementation 
processes, and 2) reviewing the existing literature on policy-practice gaps in public health in 
India, focusing on the explanations for gaps suggested by different researchers and commentators, 
and their engagement with strategic questions. 
Chapter 3 is a review of theories and frameworks of policy analysis and the policy-action 
relationship. In Chapter 4 on Methodology I start by introducing the 'action-centred' policy 
analysis framework that is used to conceptualise the research problem in this study, and outlining 
the research questions. The data-collection process involving interviews with medical 
practitioners and other policy actors, the interpretivist approach of analysing the data from 
interviews, and methods for organizing and presenting the data are elaborated. I conclude the 
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chapter with reflections on research quality, methodological limitations and ethical 
considerations. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present data from participants' accounts of their experiences of participation 
in the implementation of HIV testing policies and interactions with other groups of actors. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on medical practitioners' accounts and Chapter 7 on accounts of actors 
other than medical practitioners. In Chapter 8 I synthesize major observations from the previous 
three "results" chapters, and present the key diagnostic findings of the study explaining the 
policy-practice gaps. 
In chapter 9, I discuss the findings in the context of the literature on public health policy in India, 
and identify the contributions of the thesis to an understanding of health policy implementation in 
developing countries. I then discuss strategic opportunities for change towards bridging policy-
practice gaps, and conclude with recommendations for planners and reflections on future 
directions in the implementation of public health policies. 
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Chapter 2. Background and Review of Literature 
This chapter focuses on key areas of knowledge which fonn the context for the research problem. 
In the first section I have profiled urban Indian hospitals and medical professionals, existing 
structures of policy implementation in health in India, and relevant legal frameworks supporting 
implementation. The second section (2.2) reviews the literature on the problem of policy-practice 
gaps in public health in India, in genera1.4 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
2.1.1 Medical practitioners and hospitals in urban India 
The government of India officially recognizes medical qualifications for five systems of medicine 
including allopathy (western biomedicine), three indigenous systems (Ayurveda, Siddha, and 
Unani) and Homeopathy (Department of A YUSH 2006). Hence the tenn "fonnal" could actually 
have wider application to include medical providers from these specialities. However for the 
purposes of this study, only recognised practitioners in the allopathic system and hospitals which 
employ allopathic doctors have been considered. The doctorsS who staff hospitals which 
constitute the "formal" allopathic medical sector hold at least the basic M.B.B.S. degree, and in 
some instances diplomas or degrees of postgraduate specialization. Their professional 
qualifications and right to practice medicine are conferred by the Medical Council of India (MCI). 
4 For the literature review, internet database searches were undertaken on Google Scholar, PubMed, and 
catalogues of major libraries including the British Library and the libraries of the London School of 
Economics and University College London, using keywords "India" in conjunction with "health policy" 
with the Boolean operator AND, and then separately with "India" AND "medical providers". The resulting 
index of books and articles from both searches was examined, and relevant articles sourced, and used to 
develop this review. A systematic review of the tables of contents of a relevant list of peer-reviewed 
journals was conducted to supplement this index. Additionally relevant chapters in books, non-indexed 
journal articles, project reports of different academic and public health organizations, and news reports, 
were identified through further internet searches, and through cross-references from the articles already 
sourced. 
S The terms "medical practitioners" and "doctors" are used interchangeably throughout the text of the thesis 
to refer to doctors trained in the allopathic system of medicine, unless specified otherwise. 
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According to the Central Bureau of Health Intelligence, there were 696,747 qualified allopathic 
doctors registered with medical councils in India in 2007 (CBHI 2007). Allopathic doctors are 
disproportionately located more in cities and developed areas than in rural areas. Significantly 
more of them work in private (75-80%) than in public (20-25%) facilities (MOHFW 2005a; 
Peters et a1. 2002). Apart from any institutional systems of accountability, allopathic doctors are 
officially subject to disciplinary procedures of their respective state Medical Councils in case of 
negligent behaviour or violation of the Council's Code of Ethics (MCI 2002). 
Medical institutions in cities in India are diverse. Government hospitals in cities cater to large 
numbers of people from all sections of society, but particularly the poor, including populations 
from urban slums, neighbouring villages, and even from distant states. They are frequently 
overcrowded, with a high rate of bed occupancy, and overflowing out-patient departments (Gupta 
and Mitra 2002, Gawande 2003, Sahni 2002). They are funded largely by governmental income 
from taxes, and offer either free or highly subsidized health care (MOHFW 2005a). Government 
hospitals in cities include the following types (from Gupta and Sood 2005, Mel 2008): 
- Teaching institutions which are governed (usually) by State Directorates of Medical Education 
and Research (DMER), universities, or by specific central social insurance schemes for 
government employees such as the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS). 
- Some specialist or research-oriented hospitals, which are governed by a University, or centrally 
by the Directorate General of Health Services. 
- Municipal Hospitals run by municipalities. 
- District hospitals under the charge of district Chief Medical Officers (CMO). 
A typical teaching hospital contains outpatient departments, in-patient wards with 500-1500 beds, 
different speciality departments, emergency care units and operating theatre facilities (Gupta and 
Sood 2005), staffed by allopathic doctors among other staff, and is under the executive 
management of a Dean or Medical Superintendent. Non-teaching hospitals usually have fewer 
beds and may have fewer sub-speciality departments, but are otherwise similar in their 
administrative structure. 
Private hospitals can be found in a wider variety of organizational arrangements. Establishments 
run by individuals or household businesses are the most common type accounting for 82% of all 
private institutions and 62% of those in urban areas. The remaining 38% of urban private 
institutions which employ staff, range from small nursing homes with 1-20 beds, to large multi-
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speciality hospitals run by private trusts or corporate houses. The type of executive management 
within these hospitals varies considerably (MOHFW 2005a). 
Non-profit healthcare institutions account for 1.3% of the total health care enterprises in India, 
and similarly vary in organizational structure, from small clinics to large hospitals (MOHFW 
2005a). Charitable hospitals offer either free or low-cost treatment, although their fee structures 
are usually not under any form of regulatory control (ibid.). Management of non-profit hospitals 
varies from faith-based organizations to non-profit trusts and societies. A number of charitable 
hospitals are involved in HIV IAIDS treatment and care in India (MAAS-CHRD 2006). 
In Indian cities, by a number of accounts, linked HIV tests6 are frequently conducted in 
institutional (hospital or clinic) settings at the behest of medical practitioners (Shinde et al. 2007, 
Kurien et al. 2007, Solomon 2006). Testing facilities for laboratory diagnosis ofHIV are widely 
available in private and government hospitals in Indian cities. Many government hospitals offer 
HN testing services either in separate departments of microbiology or pathology, or through 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTC) or Integrated Counselling and Testing 
Centres (ICTC) which have been instituted in their premises (NACO 2007e).' HN testing 
facilities are widely available in private diagnostic laboratories, and a number of anti-retroviral 
drug formulations are available in the private market. It is likely that a growing number of private 
hospitals are involved in advising HN tests and treating patients with HN I AIDS (Sheikh et al. 
2005a, Sheikh et al. 2005b). 
Utilization and costs of hospital care 
Urban hospitals are important sites of health care delivery. According to the report of the 
National Commission for Macroeconomics and Health, in the year 2000 there were 15,888 
hospitals in India with a total of 719,861 beds. A majority of all hospitals (68%) are private; but 
63% of all hospital beds are found in government hospitals. There are nine times as many 
hospital beds in cities, per capita, as in rural areas (MOHFW 2005a, CBHI 2007). 
A World Bank study showed that 82% of outpatient visits occur in the private sector, and this 
dominance of the private sector in outpatient care is similar across income groups. The volume 
(incidence) of hospitalization is shared almost equally by private and public hospitals, but is 
6 "Linked testing" is testing in which patients are made aware of the outcome of the test, as opposed to 
unlinked testing for purposes such as surveillance. 
7 This is linked to the availability of free anti-retroviral therapy in the same hospitals 
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skewed across income groups with public hospitals accounting for 61 % of hospitalization among 
the poorer quintiles, and only 33% among the richest quintile (Mahal et al. 2001). 
The average expenditure for treatment of an illness episode in different facilities was compared, in 
a study by the Institute of Economic Growth (lEG) in Delhi (Gupta and Dasgupta 2000). Private 
hospitals were three times as costly as a government hospital, and care in charitable hospitals was 
the most economical. 
Type of Care Provision Average Health Expenses (Rs./ 
Private Hospitals 2892 
Government Hospitals 809 
Charitable Hospitals 275 
Table 2.1 Average Total Expenditure for mness Episode by Type ofProvider9 
Government hospitals usually offer free consultation, investigations and treatment. However 
sometimes drugs, equipment and investigations are not available, and have to be purchased in the 
market at patients' expense. Other associated costs for a patient such as transportation, can also 
be high. The clientele of private hospitals is usually skewed towards more affluent sections, 
although costs of care in private hospitals also vary considerably. Poor people in cities often visit 
private practitioners initially and for lesser complaints, but can seldom afford hospitalization in 
private hospitals (Gupta and Dasgupta 2000). Health insurance coverage is very low in India, and 
to a large extent expenditure for hospital care is out-of-pocket (MOHFW 2005a; Uplekar et al 
2001). 
2.1.2 Systems for health policy implementation 
The health policy environment in India is complex and populated by a diverse range of public and 
private actors. India's parliamentary democracy has a federal structure and areas of operation are 
divided between the Union and 28 States. In the Constitution, the subjects "Public Health" and 
"Hospitals" are assigned to State government, although some related areas such as "Medical 
8 One US dollar is approximately Rs. 47 
9 From Gupta and Dasgupta (2000) 
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Education" are included in the concurrent list (GOI 200Sb). However in operational terms, bodies 
at Central and State levels both tend to be involved in the administration of health systems. 
At the national level the Department of Health of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is 
the primary authority, and is supported in technical matters by the Directorate General of Health 
Services (DGHS). Numerous national programmes of health, including the National AIDS 
Control Programme (NACP), and regulatory bodies such as the Medical Council of India (MCI) 
are also nominally subordinated to the Department of Health, although they enjoy different 
degrees of autonomy in their operations. Other national level public health institutions of 
relevance include technical agencies such as the National Institute of Communicable Diseases 
(NICD), under the parentage of the DGHS; the National AIDS Research Institute (NARI), and its 
parent body the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), and the National Institute of Health 
and Family Welfare (NIHFW) (MOHFW 200Sa, Gupta and Sood 2005). 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 
------------~------------r " 
Department of Health Other Departments 
-----------~----------------------------------------r ~ I 
Health Programmes, .... ------, 
Including I NACP I I ICMR I I NIHFW Councils, Including Other Offices, DGHS Agencies MCI 
Other Offices, ~ 
Agencies, Hospitals 
Other Institutes 
Figure 2.1 Departments under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfarelo 
Typically, policy guidelines for the care and control of diseases, such as the HIV testing policy 
are published and promulgated by National Programmes of Health. Several such Programmes 
exist under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, including for tuberculosis, 
reproductive and child health, malaria, leprosy, and HIV/AIDS. The National HIVIAlDS 
prevention and Control Programme (NACP), launched in its third phase in 2006, is coordinated 
by a nodal body - the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) at the national level, and by 
10 d A apted from MOHFW (2005a, p 106) and Gupta and Sood (2005) 
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State AIDS Control Societies (SACS) at state level. The programme is involved in setting up and 
administering Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTC) and Anti-retroviral Therapy 
Centres (ARTC) in government hospitals, and is the official source of national policies and 
guidelines for various aspects ofHIV care including for HIV testing. 
At a central level, NACO collaborates with various bilateral and multilateral partners in 
administering the HIV/AIDS programme, including United Nations technical agencies, the Global 
Fund for AIDS TB and Malaria (GFATM), overseas development departments of the Amerkan, 
British and Gennan governments, the World Bank (which is the major donor partner for the 
NACP) and independent international philanthropic agencies such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the William Clinton Foundation (NACO 2007b). 
At State Level, the Department of Health and Family Welfare oversees two Directorates - of 
Health Services (DHS), and of Medical Education and Research (DMER). The DHS runs 
numerous hospitals, implements certain state and national health programmes and is responsible 
for tasks like registration of private medical establishments. Many government teaching (tertiary) 
hospitals are under the jurisdiction of the DMER, whereas secondary level hospitals usually fall 
under district level administrations (Gupta and Sood 2005). State Medical Councils are quasi-
governmental bodies which are charged with regulation of medical practices, including 
registration of physicians and maintenance of a Code of Ethics. 
Until the past decade, the system of medical education in India was dominated by government-
run medical colleges, and the majority of doctors practicing in India as of now have had their 
formative education in government colleges. In 2000 there were 61 private and 115 government 
colleges, in 1990: 41 and 102 respectively, and in 1980 only 14 private colleges in five states, 
compared to 96 government colleges spread across the country (MCI 2008, Mahal and Mohanan 
2006). However, in recent years, the number of recognized private medical colleges has increased 
(see Table 2.2 for numbers of government and private medical colleges). Seventeen out of the 35 
States and Union Territories in the country have private medical colleges in 2008 (Mel 2008). 
Continuing Medical Education (CME): A few states have initiated rules for fe-registration of 
medical degrees, based on credits obtained from CME. However these lack legal backing and 
have not been stringently implemented (De Sarkar and Kumar 2004). Voluntary agencies, 
medical colleges and Medical Councils are other actors involved in conducting CME and in-
service training programmes, with funding support variously from government and international 
organizations (ibid.). Pharmaceutical companies in India are a thriving industry, and other than 
supplying drugs and materials, they are also active in supporting training programmes and CME 
• 
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for doctors. Representatives of phannaceutical companies have been reported to have a major 
role in informing doctors of developments in medical knowledge, particularly doctors in the 
private sector (Greenhalgh 1987, Lal2001, Sheikh et a!. 2005a). 
STATUS 
Recognized I recommended Permitted to offer under- Total SECTOR for recognition graduate medical degree 
Private 83 51 134 (50%) 
Government 117 17 134 (50%) 
Total 200 (75%) 68 (25%) 268 
Table 2.2 Private and Government Medical Colleges in India in 200811 
Voluntary accreditation is a relatively new area for healthcare in India. According to Nandraj et 
al in 1999, accreditation schemes promoted by the Indian Hospital Association and the National 
Institute of Health and Family Welfare (NIHFW) had met with lukewarm responses. Certification 
from bodies such as the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), and the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) was pursued by private hospitals to a limited extent, however are regarded not 
to have wide acceptance (Nandraj et a!. 1999). More recent developments are the emergence of a 
healthcare specific accreditation agency - the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and 
Healthcare Providers (NABH), an autonomous body under the umbrella of the Quality Council of 
India (QCI); and the increased emphasis on medical laboratories by the National Accreditation 
Board for Laboratories (NABL) (an office of the Government's Department of Science and 
Technology) (Dogra 2005). 
Medical insurance is available in India through government schemes, and from public and private 
insurance companies. Government health insurance include employee schemes such as the 
Employees State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS), 
schemes for Railways and Defence employees, ex-servicemen and others; and voluntary 
insurance through public sector companies such as New India Assurance Company Limited 
(NlACL) and the National Insurance Corporation (NIC) (Gupta and Trivedi 2005). Private 
insurance companies were permitted to enter the market in 1999. Voluntary insurance was 
reported to be availed of by 11.2 million citizens (less than 1 % of the population) in 2005, of 
which 10% held private insurance (MOHFW 2005a). Only an estimated 3-5% of Indians are 
covered under any form of health insurance (ibid.). Claims settlement by the mediation of Third 
II Data from Mel (2008) 
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Party Administrators (TP A) was introduced in 2001. However a study in 2005 revealed that their 
role was limited, due to low awareness on the part of policyholders, and poor acceptance by 
medical providers (Bhat et al. 2005). 
Voluntary associations are significant actors in health policy in India. Professional associations 
such as the Indian Medical Association and its regional and local chapters have very large 
memberships, and are active in organizing training programmes and conferences, running 
scientific journals, and occasional large scale mobilization of medical care, such as for 
immunization drives and emergency relief (park 2005). Other organizations such as the Rotary 
and Lions Clubs are also active in mobilizing physicians (particularly in the private sector) for 
voluntary work (Gupta and Sood 2005). 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) playa multitude of roles in the biosphere of Indian 
health systems. Gupta and Sood's typology of NGOs (2005 p2.26) distinguishes organizations 
based on their role or purpose: 
Service providers: the "traditional" role of NGOs of offering affordable health services to the 
poor, particularly in underprivileged and poorly developed areas. 
Capacity building and support NGOs: offer know-how, expertise and training to medical 
service providers, an example being the Population Services International which is involved 
in social franchising of private providers in order to promote standardized STI care (Solomon 
et aI2004). 
Empowerment and advocacy NGOs: actively engaging in policy advocacy and social 
mobilization for rights-related or specific health concerns of communities. 
Umbrella or network NGOs: coordinating roles in bringing different groups together to work 
on common issues. 
Many NGOs pursue more than one of these functions. In the first category of service provider 
NGOs, independent philanthropic societies, trusts and faith-based organizations have a long 
history in healthcare in the country. Some non-profit organizations run full-scale charitable 
hospitals in different parts of the country. 
Private trusts and corporations which run large hospitals or chains of hospitals are now 
prominent actors in the healthcare world (Matthew 2006). While a majority of beds in the for-
profit private sector are to be found in small practices and nursing homes, there is a relatively 
more rapid growth of larger hospitals in this sector. 
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2.1.3 Relevant Acts and legislations 
In some cities or states there are specific legislations requiring private nursing homes to comply 
with certain standards in order to be registered and allowed to function. These include the 
Bombay and Delhi Nursing Homes Registration Acts of 1949 (GOM 1949) and 1953 (GOI 1953) 
respectively, the West Bengal Clinical Establishments Act 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Upcharya 
Griha tatha Rujopchar Sambandhi Sthapnaye Adhiniyam 1973, and the Nagaland Health Care 
Establishments Act 1997 (Clinical Establishments Bill 2007). Typically these Acts require 
medical establishments to employ suitably qualified staff, to periodically register their facilities 
with authorities and to report the occurrence of births and deaths. Other than these, there is little 
by the way of mandatory regulations for health care establishments. Recently proposed 
amendments to these Registration Acts contain more specific criteria such as norms for utilization 
of space, ratio of providers to patients, and other technical criteria. The newly drafted national 
Clinical Establishment (Registration and Regulation) Bill 2007 (ibid.), which is awaiting Cabinet 
approval at the time of writing, recommends separate criteria for different types of establishments 
(Clinical Establishments Bill 2007, CEHAT 2006). 
Consumer courts are an important forum for clients of health care in hospitals to exert their 
influence on the policy process. Litigation in civil courts has been noted to be a notoriously time-
consuming and inefficient avenue of redress for many clients (Jesani et al. 1997), in which context 
the inclusion of for-fee medical practices under the purview of the Consumer Protection Act 
(CPA) in 1995 was a landmark step to reduce inefficiencies in obtaining justice (Bhat 1996a). 
This move was initiated to ease the process of litigation for consumers by reducing time and 
costs, and it can be expected that the increased likelihood of litigation is likely to lead to greater 
cognizance of, and adherence to recommended procedures and standards, on the part of 
practitioners. Consumer courts (forums) are organised in a hierarchical fashion, with a District 
Forum in each respective district, a State Commission in state capitals, and an apex National 
Commission at country level (NCDRC 2006). However, it is probable that the impact of this 
reform in influencing the quality of patient care in hospitals is yet relatively limited. A recent 
study showed that the proportion of cases relating to medical complaints were very few, and over 
90% of cases filed in Consumer Forums took over a year to reach judgement. Most of the 
complaints were related to adverse outcomes of treatment, in some cases including loss of 
physical function and death (Misra 2000). 
A recent Supreme Court judgement to the effect that disclosure of a patients' HIV status to their 
spouse did not amount to violation of confidentiality or the right to privacy, has led to increased 
attention on issues around partner notification and safety (Dr Tokugha Yepthomi vs. Apollo 
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Hospital Enterprises Ltd. 1998, Mudur 1998b, Kumar 1998). This judgement has been widely 
publicized and might be expected to have an impact on doctors' practices (Iyer 2002). 
The HIVIAIDS Bill (2005) is an initiative which aims, among other things, to bring legal sanction 
to the implementation of HN testing policies. The Bill widely addresses issues of discrimination 
against people with HN / AIDS, of which requirements of infonned consent and confidentiality in 
the context of hospital care is but one component. Provisions of the Bill which would bear on the 
implementation of HN testing policies in hospitals are outlined in Box 2.1. The Bill is still under 
consideration at the time of writing, and has not attained the status of a law. 
Prohibition of discrimination related to HIV/AIDS in public and private spheres, 
including in healthcare facilities 
Requirement of specific free informed consent for testing, treatment and research 
Guarantee of confidentiality of HIV related information, including in healthcare 
settings 
Provision of right to access comprehensive HIV/AIDS related treatment including 
diagnosis 
Institution of new implementation mechanisms including: 
o HIV-specific grievance redress machinery in institutions, including hospitals. 
o Appointment of District Health Ombuds for arbitration of complaints. 
o Instituting HIV/AIDS Authorities at Central and State level with statutory powers 
for implementation of provisions of the Act 
Special court procedures to facilitate speedy and confidential judgements for HIV 
related complaints 
Box 2.1 UIV/AIDS Bill 2005 - Pertinent Features 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: POLICY-PRACTICE GAPS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
IN INDIA 
The problem of policy-practice gaps is not unique to HN testing. There is a significant body of 
public health literature which documents that doctors' practices in India do not always correspond 
with standard policies for care of HN / AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, sexually transmitted 
infections and diarrhoeal diseases and other major public health problems. 
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Singla et al. (1998) in a study of general practitioners in Delhi reported that only 12% used the 
recommended sputum smear investigation for the diagnosis of tuberculosis, and treatments widely 
diverged from the recommended DOTS regimen. Variations in tuberculosis treatment among 
private practitioners have also been reported by Uplekar and Shepherd (1991) and Uplekar et al 
(1998), among others. Mertens et al. (1998) observed that the recommended syndromic 
management of sexually transmitted infections was not followed by a majority of doctors in the 
private and public health facilities in Madras.12 Das and Hammer (2004) used observational 
methods to assess medical professionals' practices in treating infant diarrhoea, pharyngitis, 
tuberculosis, depression and pre-eclampsia, observing significant deviations from recommended 
standards of practice among private and government doctors in Delhi. 
Kamat (2001) observed widespread instances of presumptive treatment of malaria by private 
practitioners in a Mumbai suburb, and insufficient use of the peripheral blood smear investigation 
that is recommended for diagnosis. Chakraborty and Frick (2002) have reported shortcomings in 
private practitioners' treatment of acute respiratory infections in children, evaluated against a 
standard of WHO-recommended guidelines. Sheikh et al. (200Sa) documented the use of non-
recommended regimens for HIV/AIDS treatment by private practitioners in Pune city, including 
monotherapy with a single anti-retroviral drug, the use of non-allopathic drugs and the irregular 
treatment of opportunistic infections. Studies documenting divergences in HIV testing practices 
have already been listed in Chapter 1 (page 18). 
Evidently, the separation of public health policies and practices of frontline medical providers is a 
widespread phenomenon and one that represents a significant area of concern in public health 
circles. Uniform guidelines of practice 13 are widely seen as benchmarks of the quality of care and 
compliance with these guidelines by frontline providers is understood as a requisite for the 
success of public health initiatives (Mahapatra 2003, Peters 2003, Brugha 2003, Das and Hammer 
2004, Mills et al. 2002, Brugha and Zwi 1998). In the Indian context, concerns over policy-
12 Now known as ChelUlai. 
13 Other than for HIV testing and care, examples of such policies include the DOTS approach for 
tuberculosis involving direct observation and treatment using a short-course multi-drug regimen, the 
syndromic approach for the control of sexually transmitted infections, assessment and treatment guidelines 
including the use of oral rehydration solution (ORS) for childhood diarrhoea, syndromic management of 
acute respiratory infections in children, and others. There is a significant body of literature on the global 
context in which these policies are developed and "transferred" to national governments. Lush and 
colleagues (2003) report that such policies are usually based on existing clinical norms or guidelines for the 
care of the disease in question, but are consolidated and "marketed" as a package of interventions for the 
control of a particular disease, by international health organizations such as the WHO. Global public 
health policies are often tailored specifically towards the requirements of developing countries, and are 
adopted by the governments of many of these countries (Ogden et a1. 2003, Cliff et a1. 2004). 
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practice gaps have largely focused on private medical providers, although there is now an 
increasing recognition of the problem in the government sector as well. 
In the following pages I review relevant studies and commentaries which seek to explain the 
problem of policy-practice gaps in medical care in India and the strategic directions that they 
suggest. 
2.2.1 Providers-focused explanations 
Ignorance of policy guidelines on the part of doctors is a common explanation for gaps, and one 
which also implicates existing systems of education, particularly continuing education. In other 
instances however, doctors have been shown not to comply with regulations in spite of being 
aware of them. In a study of private and government practitioners in Delhi, Das and Hammer 
(2004) noted that doctors' awareness of recommended guidelines of practice did not necessarily 
lead them to practice in accordance with the guidelines. While not actually canvassing doctors' 
perspectives on the issues, the authors suggest market-based explanations for these distinctions 
between knowledge and practice, inferring that private sector doctors are more liable to be unduly 
influenced by paying patients' demands than by approved nonns of practice ("errors of 
commission"), whereas government doctors are liable to commit "errors of omission" since there 
is no economic pressure on them to perfonn up to standards. The authors assign a strong negative 
value to divergences in practice, characterizing them variously as being "depressing" and 
"troubling" (ibid.). 
Much of the literature on health policy in India including principal texts (Duggal 2001, Peters et 
al. 2002, Yazbeck and Peters 2003, Gangolli et al. 2005) assumes such economic factors as the 
dominant influence on doctors' actions, and does not engage in other elements of providers' 
occupational realities around values and ideation, social and political factors and contingencies of 
resource constraints, or relationships with administrative and educational structures and 
contiguous stakeholders. Only a few studies and commentaries exist which explore medical 
practitioners' behaviour first-hand and/or offer more nuanced explanations for divergent practices. 
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Government providers 
Das and Hammer (2004) paint a picture of indifference to their roles on the part of Delhi-based 
government doctors, based on low scores on quantitative indicators such as amount of time spent 
with patients, and number of investigations and drugs prescribed (which they characterize as 
errors of omission - see above). Baru (2005) has commented on how increasing 
commercialization of medicine in general and the growth of the private medical sector has 
impacted on attitudes of doctors in the public sector. Her study was based on personal histories of 
doctors who retired from serving in a prominent government hospital, and includes strong themes 
of supposed erosion of altruistic values among their peers in the face of the growing profile of the 
commercialized private sector. Even as these personal views of retired doctors may not represent 
factual evidence of declining values among government doctors, they convincingly illustrate a 
trend of demoralization of public sector practitioners, in the face of growing institutional and 
financial insecurity and loss of social prestige. 
Bhat and Maheshwari's study (2005) on human resource management concerns in district health 
facilities in Chhattisgarh state is another example of recent empirical research involving 
government sector doctors. Using quantitative measures for commitment and skill, they reported 
that doctors had high levels of affective commitment to their profession, good team spirit, and 
were also highly skilled, which appears to present a different picture from that given by Das and 
Hammer and by Baru. The doctors' sense of commitment to their departments and institutions 
however was not reported to be as high as professional commitment. Das Gupta et al. (2003) in a 
World Bank study report strong esprit de corps, professional commitment and affective 
engagement with tasks among frontline medical providers in Karnataka state, while observing that 
problems in commitment were linked to low financial remuneration and job insecurities. 
Also testifying to high levels of affective commitment among government doctors, Singh (2002), 
Gawande (2003) and others identify constraints such as heavy patient loads, resource shortages 
and time constraints which prevent government hospital practitioners from always adhering to 
recommended norms. Singh emphasizes how doctors in busy government hospitals make 
utilitarian decisions around maximising the number of patients they can see, at the cost of the 
quality of their interactions and the amount oftime spent with each patient (ibid.). 
Miljeteig and Norheim (2006), in a study of decision-making by government doctors in neonatal 
care, highlight that Indian doctors often tend to refer to a different set of values in making clinical 
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decisions, from the ones popularized in a Western understanding of clinical ethics. 14 
Considerations of wider consequences for patients and their families guide decisions around 
treatment for critically ill neonates,IS in contrast to Western doctors who focus more on individual 
rights and care processes, say the authors. Other contingent factors such as resource shortages 
(e.g. of ventilators in their study of neonatal care) are also cited as an important context for these 
decisions. The manner of decision-making by doctors sometimes appeared to compromise 
autonomy of patients (in this case patients' parents), but the authors emphasize that such 
decisions are made in the context of values which are specific to the culture, and cannot be 
evaluated through conventional, globally sanctioned bio-ethical frames (ibid.). 
Private providers 
In separate commentaries, Phadke (1994), Nandraj (1994), Jesani (1997), Yesudian (1994) and 
others have critiqued the excessively commercially driven practices of private medical 
practitioners. However even as they document instances of corruption, over-prescription and 
rent-seeking, these commentaries provide little by way of systematic analysis of doctors' practices 
and their underlying motivations. T.N. Madan's seminal work on Indian doctors' social roles, 
including studies on private practitioners in a north Indian city (1972), and subsequently on 
doctors in a prominent government tertiary care and teaching hospital (1980) also touches on 
issues of moral deterioration attributed as an explanation of medical behaviour. He places the 
problem of doctors' apparent non-interest in public health concerns in the larger context of Indian 
social structures. Belonging as they do largely to the aspiring middle classes, achievement of 
personal social goals is cited as the dominant macro-context for doctors' actions, more than 
identification with broader goals of social welfare (a prerequisite for following public health 
policy nonns) (ibid. 1980).16 
Depth studies such as those of Kamat (2001), Kielmann et aI. (2005), and Datye et al. (2006), in 
their respective studies of private practitioners acknowledge the role of market factors in 
14 Which are also reflected broadly in the national HIV testing policies 
IS For example, decisions around withdrawing treatment for a critically ill neonate was influenced by 
considerations of the lifelong burden a disabled child may place on poor parents, with implications for the 
welfare of the child's siblings. ' 
16 Madan attempts to qualify the negative tone of his observations of doctors by iterating that doctors do do 
"professionally competent and socially useful work" (1980 p 302), and are "a qualified and motivated 
category of people concerned with the alleviation of human suffering" (ibid p 299). According to him, 
doctors should not be scapegoated for sharing the "failings" of the larger social class that they are members 
of, and he does not discount the capacity of doctors to enhance their participation in social development. In 
the epilogue of his book, he emphasizes that his intent is not to undermine the role of the medical profession 
but to "ask for a fuller realization" of doctors' potential contribution to Indian society. 
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determining doctors' behaviour, but also account for the influence of wider social and political 
factors. The inferences around private doctors' practice being unduly subject to patients' 
expectations are supported by Kamat in his study of private practitioners' malaria treatment 
practices in a Mumbai suburb. The unregulated and highly competitive nature of the market is 
cited as a context for these divergences (Kamat 2001). Kielmann et al. (2005) conducted a series 
of interviews with private sector practitioners in Pune city in Western India. In the report of this 
study, divergences of private doctors' practices from national recommendations are explained in 
tenns of reactions to varying market, policy and social pressures, and underlined by the challenge 
of keeping abreast with knowledge in a rapidly changing field (ibid.). Datye et aI. (2006), 
reporting findings from the same study, observe that practitioners are influenced by social norms 
such as the close involvement of families in patient care and decisions, and moral prejudice 
around sexually transmitted diseases, which cause their practices in communicating with patients 
to diverge from policy norms. 
Examples of research on the nature of private doctors' actual interactions with public health 
programmes are very limited. Uplekar et al. (1998), Vyas et al. (2003) and De Costa et al. (2008) 
have separately commented on the role of mutual distrust between private practitioners' and 
government health officials as a factor affecting private doctors' uptake of tuberculosis care 
guidelines. 
It bears noting that most of the studies and commentaries on private medical providers relate to 
solo private practitioners or small practices - there is little substantive literature attempting to 
understand the practices of private doctors in hospitals, which can be expected to be guided more 
by organizational norms, and less directly susceptible to client agency. 
Providers-focused explanations,' summary 
In summary, studies and commentaries seeking to explain the divergent behaviour of medical 
providers from nonns are limited, but (apart from the convention of regarding medical 
practitioners as solely economically motivated individuals, assumed in most health policy texts) 
address a number of possible factors including ignorance of guidelines, overriding concerns of 
financial security in unstable markets, and contingent factors such as uncertainties of patient 
response and resource shortages. The role of "process" factors - such as the nature of interactions 
between policy implementation agencies and practitioners - on the uptake of guidelines have 
received very little attention. Ambiguities around financial and job security are seen to be 
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important contexts for government practitioners, even as professional interest and commitment 
have been reported to be strong. On the other hand, moral decline, poor engagement with public 
concerns and overriding social and commercial self-interest have also been suggested as contexts 
for deficiencies in practices of private doctors. In one instance, doctors' divergent beliefs and use 
of ethical frames other than those which underlie policies or which are otherwise widely 
recognized, has been documented. 
2.2.2 Systemic explanations 
There are several accounts of the roles of medical educational systems, governing and regulatory 
organizations, professional bodies, and to a lesser extent, of administrative structures in hospitals, 
in the context of the non-implementation of public policies around health care. Critically 
however, few of these essays contain systematic analyses or are based on empirical research. 
Furthermore, the perspectives of the individuals who constitute these institutions and 
organizations largely do not find expression in these analyses. 
Governance and accountability systems 
The role of health governance mechanisms has been examined in the context of divergent 
practices. Das Gupta et al. (2003) reported that local health authorities are often not even aware 
of the policies and regulations that they are expected to enforce. Resultantly they (health 
authorities) do not routinely assess whether regulations are being followed, the norm being to 
pursue such tasks only when concerns are raised by citizens or civil society organizations (ibid.). 
Poor awareness of relevant acts and codes of practice among private practitioners has been 
documented by Bhat (1996b). Bennett and Muraleedharan (1998) have also highlighted the 
critical area of lack of communication between departments of health and professional medical 
councils in coordinating regulatory activities. 
Within the government sector context, Bhat and Maheshwari (2005)17 describe interrelational 
gaps between health systems actors in terms of "rigidities" in management systems, which 
support a convention of mechanistic and centralized decision-making. Hierarchies were reported 
to be strong within the departments of health they studied, with limited freedom for frontline 
providers to communicate with peers and superiors. Assessments of performance tended to focus 
11 In their study of district health services in Chhattisgarh state - also see previous reference. 
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around compliance with norms and meeting the targets of various health programmes, rather than 
on meeting the needs of patients; an observation that is also reported by Singh et al. (2002) in a 
study of TB treatment centres. The doctors in Bhat and Maheshwari's study felt that the highly 
centralized nature of management systems prevented them from attempting field-level 
innovations to improve the delivery of services (ibid.). 
There is little account of the nature of interactions between government health departments and 
private hospitals, in the context of implementing public health policies. However, Rangan and 
colleagues (2004) have documented experiences of participants in voluntary public-private 
partnerships aimed at promoting private practitioners' use of government DOTS regimens for 
tuberculosis care. Habituated as they were to mechanized and hierarchical relationships within 
the government sector, working with autonomous private practitioners represented unfamiliar 
terrain for general health and TB programme officials. Problems in motivation of these public 
officials, not of the participating private practitioners, presented the major obstacle to the 
initiatives, and it was only the mediating role played by a NGO that allowed these partnerships to 
be sustained (Rangan et al. 2004). Bhat and Maheshwari (2005) have also highlighted 
vulnerabilities and problems in the capacity of government departments to undertake partnerships 
with private sector actors. The theme of mistrust between government and private providers has 
already been introduced (see above). In a recent paper, De Costa and colleagues (2008) suggest 
that this mistrust between private doctors and public functionaries is rooted in prejudicial 
perceptions about the other sector, which have social, moral, and economic bases. Mutual 
assumptions of poor competence, jealousies and value conflicts between the actors underlie 
difficulties in establishing partnerships, observed the authors (ibid.). 
According to Nandraj (1994) and Muraleedharan and Nandraj (2003), the roles of administrators 
in private hospitals tend to be largely focused around encouraging doctors to maximise revenues 
from patients, and typically give little attention to public health concerns. There are a few well-
documented instances of private hospitals taking the lead in public health programmes such as for 
eye health (Samandari et al. 2001) and tuberculosis care (Murthy et al. 2001), which contradict 
this mercenary image of private hospitals. Other than these examples however, there is little 
generalized knowledge on what role administrations of private and trust hospitals play in 
propagating public health policies, if any. 
Avenues of accountability to clients include institutional redress and recourse to medical councils, 
consumer form or courts. Misra's study on consumer redress facilities in 81 hospitals (2000) 
found that only 33% of private hospitals and 22% of government hospitals had complaint boxes 
or books, and even fewer (17% private and 15% government hospitals) had guidelines for 
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reviewing and processing complaints. The author has also highlighted deficiencies in the process 
of institutional redress including unresponsive attitudes of hospital authorities, and significant 
delays in processing complaints (ibid). The legal machinery in India is notoriously slow and 
laborious, with significant costs to plaintiffs, which often act as a deterrent for clients of medical 
services seeking formal redress. Significant delays and obstacles in the functioning are reported 
even in consumer forums, which have been promoted as more expedient avenues for official 
redress (Misra 2000). Aggrieved clients were reported by Misra to take legal recourse only in 
case of serious grievous injury and financial loss (ibid.), an indication that threat of litigation may 
be of limited efficacy as a deterrent to divergent practices of doctors (at least in non-grievous 
aspects of care). 
Muraleedharan and Nandraj (2003) also implicate the absence of, or lack of detail in, legal 
frameworks for medical care standards (nationally and in different states and municipalities), as a 
context for "perverse" practices in the private medical sector (p 240). The inadequacy of such 
relevant laws is widely attributed to political factors. Historically, there have been numerous 
instances of medical professional groups such as the Indian Medical Association taking advocacy 
positions opposing new legislations and regulations of government aimed at increasing regulatory 
control over private providers, with varying success (Maru 1985, Jeffery 1988, Mudur 1998a, 
Muraleedharan and Nandraj 2003). 
The failings of Medical Councils in performing their professional regulatory functions have been 
the subject of extensive documentation, and are an important context for the apparent freedom 
with which doctors are reported to flout regulations. Several instances of corruption (Pandya and 
Nundy 2002, Sharma 2001) and of non-responsiveness to client complaints (Nandraj 1994, Singhi 
1997, Tavaria 1997) on the part of state and national councils have been reported. Gonsalves 
(1997) and others have conjectured that there is a systematic subversion of the roles of medical 
councils away from their envisaged functions in upholding professional and ethical standards, 
towards the protection of doctors' interests. 
Academic structures and culture 
Ramachandran (2006) implicates the system of medical education in what she regards as an 
emerging crisis in human resources for health in India. She observed that there is a dominance of 
an approach in which students are trained in knowledge of the sciences but not helped to become 
aware of the broader roles within the health profession and society, nor given a framework within 
39 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
which to develop ethical understanding and decision-making skills. Ravindran (2008) reported 
that medical ethics is not a separate subject in the Medical Council of India's recommended 
curriculum for undergraduate medical education, and that few medical colleges teach ethics 
routinely. Academic indifference to ethics is cited by both these authors as an important context 
for a declining interest in social engagement and public health concerns among medical 
professionals. Public health as a sub-discipline of medicine has widely been reported to have a 
particularly low status in teaching institutions as well as among the Indian medical community in 
general (Jeffery 1988, Uplekar and Rangan 1993, Dandona 2004). Dandona et a1. (2004) further 
supports this perspective by observing that public-health related articles constitute only 3-4% of 
the output of medical academic research, although there is no indication of trends over time in this 
regard. 
Failures of continued medical education (CME) and limited opportunities of academic exposure 
for practicing doctors have also been reported. Ramachandran (2006) highlights that continued 
medical education programmes in India are highly fragmented, available only sporadically to 
practicing medical providers, and the contents of instruction are determined by narrow interests of 
the agencies which finance or conduct the programmes. For example, training programmes 
financed by vertical programmes for disease control tend to be focused solely on these areas 
(ibid.). Greenhalgh (1987) and Phadke (1994) have written extensively on the dominant role of 
pharmaceutical companies in conveying knowledge about advances in medicine to doctors, which 
is problematized as a result of the vested interests of the companies, in doctors' prescribing 
behaviour. 
In earlier accounts, Madan (1972, 1980) has commented on the lack of an academic culture and 
exchanges of knowledge between doctors, in the context of a highly competitive market and fears 
of the loss of clientele. Jeffery observed that medical professional associations (while active in 
protecting the political interests of doctors) have historically not played a significant part in 
providing opportunities for academic activity. According to him, outside of immediate workplace 
environments, practicing doctors are largely isolated from their colleagues in the profession 
(Jeffery 1988). 
Systemic explanations: summary 
With a few exceptions, the existing literature tends to highlight failings of the numerous 
institutional mechanisms involved in implementation of health care policy in India. Apathy and 
indifference of government departments and medical councils to their mandated regulatory 
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functions, problems in legal frameworks and in accountability systems, lack of regulatory 
mechanisms in the private sector, technical bias in medical education, and insufficient and 
fragmented academic opportunities for in-service doctors have all been proposed as diagnoses for 
policy-practice gaps. A few studies have highlighted process issues, such as the inhibiting 
influence of hierarchy and rigid management structures on communications within government 
departments, and interrelational problems in dealings between government and private actors. An 
important adjunctive observation is that there is a widespread lack of clarity on the nature of 
official mechanisms of implementation and putative roles of different offices and institutions of 
government in implementing regulations, which prevails even among the individuals who work 
within these structures. 
2.2.3 Debates around policy content 
There is also an area of the literature which deals with questions around the quality and 
appropriateness of policy guidelines - an oft-cited reason for practitioners' divergent behaviour. 
Universal policy guidelines for the care of different diseases have been debated, including the 
intermittent DOTS regiment for tuberculosis care, and guidelines for opportunistic infections and 
highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) for the management of AIDS (John 2004). 
Mertens et al. (1998) has identified the need for more research to validate the utility of STI 
syndromic management guidelines in India. A number of authors have criticized the Indian 
government's policy to introduce free HAART in public hospitals. The lack of preparedness of 
public health systems to monitor and disburse treatments and ensure completion of treatments 
(Kumar 2004), and the likely emergence of drug resistance (Maniar 2006, Patel and Patel 2006) 
are the main concerns cited by the critics. 
Porter and Ogden (1999) critiqued the DOTS strategy as applied in the Indian context, on ethical 
grounds. They argued that the "direct observation" component of the strategy assumed that 
patients were basically untrustworthy, and contained the potential for coercion and adverse impact 
on patient-provider relationships. The strategy was not respectful to providers and patients, they 
averred, and treated them primarily as means to achieve programme targets for case detection and 
treatment completion. Vyas et al. (2003) and Uplekar et al. (1998) have documented that doubts 
around the efficacy of DOTS underlie government providers' and private providers' non-
utilization of the regimen. 
Debates around the contents of HN testing policies have been discussed in detail in Appendix 1. 
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2.2.4 Prescriptions for change 
Authors writing on policy-practice gaps have traditionally focused on prescribing interventions to 
improve the functioning of governance mechanisms and regulatory systems. Duggal and Nandraj 
(1991) proposed a comprehensive legislation for medical regulation, including various parameters 
such as physical standards as well as quality of care. In a more recent context, Muraleedharan and 
Nandraj (2003) too suggested that legal reforms are an imperative, and proposed the introduction 
of new regulations for standards of quality, and revamping of outdated existing laws. Misra 
(2003) has suggested amendments in existing consumer laws to bring free government services 
under its purview. The introduction of greater detail in the provisions of various regulatory acts 
including the Consumer Protection Act, Nursing Home Acts and the Medical Council Act, 
towards addressing issues of quality of health care more comprehensively, has been proposed by 
Bhat (1996a) and by Muraleedharan and Nandraj (2003). 
There is scant engagement in the health policy literature with specific proposals for reform in 
government health departments; which is in keeping with a general trend of inadequacy of 
empirical research and analysis in this area. Bhat and Maheshwari in their study of government 
doctors (2005) argued that the doctors' affective commitment to their work should be leveraged 
by giving them greater administrative duties, and argue for greater attention to fairness in human 
resource management, and for linking non-monetary rewards and benefits to competence in 
performance. Bennett and Muraleedharan (1998) have highlighted the importance of better 
communications between government health departments and professional councils, although 
they do not indicate how such communicative processes could be enabled. 
Muraleedharan and Nandraj (2003) have proposed the decentralization of regulatory structures to 
the local level and the provision of additional funds and resources to regulatory bodies. Iyer and 
Jesani (1999) have also contributed to the debate on reforms in medical councils, recommending 
enhancing the autonomy of councils from government control IS , improving transparency in their 
functioning, increasing lay representation in their disciplinary committees, and decentralization 
and strengthening of disciplinary functions (also Nandraj 1994). Bhat (1996b) suggests that 
medical councils' role of regulating medical education be separated from that of regulating 
medical practice. Duggal (2001), Bhat (1996b) and Nandraj (1994) have separately suggested 
18 Medical councils are constituted partially by elected members and partially by nominees from 
government, and they are financed largely by the government. 
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upgrading and standardization of continuing medical education (CME) schemes, and the linking 
ofCME credits to renewal of medical licences. 19 
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in alternatives to state-centred approaches to 
regulation, a trend - according to Muraleedharan and Nandraj (2003) - motivated by concerns 
around failed governance, inadequate legal frameworks and government incapacity to enforce 
existing regulations, particularly in the private sector. In a recent article, Peters and 
Muraleedharan (2008) have highlighted the limitations of legal and bureaucratic approaches to 
regulation, arguing broadly that these approaches are tokenistic and unlikely to be successful in 
the context of the highly dispersed and complex nature of the health care market. They instead 
advocate "experimentation" with market-oriented approaches such as the promotion of 
accreditation as a device to improve marketability, competitive contracting out of medical 
services~ emphasis on self-regulation and enhanced collaboration with non-state stakeholders such 
as consumer and civil-society organizations, medical providers' organizations and the media. 
They argue that Ministries of Health (state and central) would be more effective if they reoriented 
their roles from that of combined inspectorate and provider in health care, to a role in facilitating 
the participation ofthese non-state actors (ibid.). 
Modification of the economic environments in which practitioners work is a key area of interest 
for economists, although (apart from Das and Hammer 2004) there is a deficiency of first-hand 
research on the micro-economics of health care provision in India. In an introductory chapter of a 
book on health policy research in South Asia published by the World Bank, Peters (2003) 
emphasizes the importance of better "understanding and manipulating incentives" for health 
service providers, and recommends the production of research exploring such mechanisms (p 
28).20 In another World Bank publication, Peters et al. (2002) make recommendations (to the 
Government of India) for broad reforms including the improvement of oversight, decentralization 
of health schemes to states, contracting out of curative services to the private sector, and 
emphasising the role of private health insurance (ibid., also Hammer and Jack 2001). Bhat 
(1996b) has also emphasized the importance of alternatives to dominant out-of-pocket modes of 
payment for medical services in the private sector, which are known to create perverse incentives 
for the medical providers. 
19 This has now been undertaken on a provisional basis in some states. 
20 In the same mechanistic vein of conceiving policy processes, Peters enlists financing, payment 
mechanisms for health providers, organization (of health services and regulatory structures), regulation 
(including writing rules and enforcing them), and persuasion (of frontline providers to change their 
behaviour, involving communicative means) as the five "control knobs" for policymakers to improve the 
performance of a health system (2003.). 
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A number of voluntary approaches have also been proposed by various authors, such as 
accreditation, social franchising and field level partnerships between government health 
departments and private providers.21 The role of independent agencies in monitoring standards of 
care in hospitals is suggested by Duggal (2001) in his review of health policy trends in India. 
Nandraj et al. (1999) have suggested the institution of voluntary accreditation systems to 
encourage better standards in public and private hospitals. Another model which has gained 
popUlarity in the context of influencing practices in the private sector is social franchising which 
has been tested in different states in India in the context of STI management and reproductive 
health (PSIIAvahan 2007, Gopalakrishnan 2008, Mavalankar et al. 2008). 
Field-level collaborations between government health departments and private medical 
practitioners to promote the use of recommended treatment guidelines for tuberculosis were 
proposed by Uplekar and colleagues in 1998. A model of voluntary partnership, without 
monetary implications, was proposed for the sharing of diagnostic and treatment responsibilities 
between government and private clinics, supported by a documentation trail. Voluntary models 
such as these has since been operationalized more widely with qualified success in sustaining the 
partnerships and aligning private medical providers' practices with policies (Dewan et al. 2006, 
Ambe et al. 2005, Rangan et a1. 2003) 
2.2.5 Viewing the policy practice gaps: summary 
The multitude of varying, sometimes conflicting, explanations of policy-practice gaps suggested 
by different authors reflect the difficulty in making generalized characterizations of a medical 
sector and health system as large and diverse as in India. There is a lack of consensus on some 
core areas such as the level of moral engagement of medical practitioners, the roles of government 
health departments and avenues for reform and strategic change. However some distinct themes 
are identifiable in the different approaches which have been adopted to examine the problem of 
policy-practice gaps. 
There is a strong normative inclination in the existing literature towards adopting the perspective 
of (actual or hypothetical) policy planners, and the views or perspectives of health care providers 
and other relevant policy actors are seldom documented, leave alone used to defme an 
understanding of health policy. The individuals and organizations that constitute these 
21 In actuality, the practical testing and application of such alternative approaches and innovations have 
often preceded the publication of articles supporting them. 
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"subordinate" groups in policy implementation are typically conceptualized in instrumental terms 
as a means for implementing policies, not as purposive or expressive entities in their own right. 
There are very few accounts or analyses of the actual processes of policy implementation, of the 
way in which participating groups and individuals interact with each other, and the dynamics of 
these relationships (De Costa et al. 2008, Bhat and Maheshwari 2005). 
In most analyses, the nature of the response 0/ actors involved in implementation is assumed to 
be defined by self-interest, within fairly narrowly conscribed parameters of economic or social 
gain (Das and Hammer 2004, Peters 2003), and considerations such as their values, motivations 
and goals are seldom given attention. In general, there has been little interest in understanding 
policy processes from the perspective of the individual participant. While there are a few 
empirical studies seeking to understand medical providers' practices in sociology and 
anthropology (Madan 1980, Kamat 2001, Kielmann 2005), there are hardly any such studies on 
the other individuals and organizations that make up the rest of health systems - regulatory 
councils, government departments and hospital authorities. There is also little evidence of efforts 
to link the micro-perspectives of individual participation with a larger understanding of the 
functioning of institutions and health systems. 
Policy prescriptions suggested by analysts are typically aimed at aligning practices and processes 
with the original intentions o/these po/icymakers (Peters 2003, Muraleedharan and Nandraj 2003, 
Jesani 1999, DuggaI2001). It appears that much of the writing on which the broad presumptions 
about the Indian health sector are derived is inherently focused around explaining divergence in 
terms of lack (of resources, capacity, commitment and morals) and culpability (of systems, 
individuals and organizations). A dominant rationalist focus tends to ascribe a negative character 
to divergence and difference from norms, in the actions of the individuals and organizations 
designated to implement policy. 
There appears to be a distance between diagnostic and strategic interests, as they are addressed 
by authors writing on the subject of implementation of public health policies in India. Typically, 
the authors who have conducted depth studies of medical practitioners and health systems (e.g. 
Madan 1980; Baru 1998 and 2005) do not accompany their diagnostic analyses of field level 
issues with a substantive engagement in strategizing change.22 On the other hand, the 
contributions of these authors are generally not cited or utilized by the influential authors who 
discuss policy options (Muraleedharan and Nandraj 2003, Das and Hammer 2004, Peters 2003). 
Disciplinary boundaries and differences in the lenses adopted for understanding the problem may 
22 A possible exception to this being the study on government health functionaries by Bhat and Maheshwari 
(2005) 
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underlie this distancing of interests and lack of exchange of knowledge. Variously, public health 
scientists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, ethicists and medical 
professionals have variously been involved in analysing the problem of policy-practice gaps. 
Finally, most of these studies reviewed only touch upon specific aspects or segments of the larger 
problem of policy-practice gaps. There are no examples of a holistic approach to the problem 
which addresses the roles of policy-planners, frontline medical providers and the gamut of 
involved organizations, including non-state organizations, in the Indian context. 
Rationale for undertaking this study 
From my personal experiences as a doctor in an urban government hospital, and subsequently as a 
researcher studying the behaviour of private medical practitioners, I found these readings to be 
insufficient, in descriptive terms as well as prospectively - in not accounting for the productive or 
expressive capabilities of the organizations and the individuals who constitute health systems in 
India.23 I undertook this research project with the intention of contributing to an empirically 
supported understanding of field-level processes, specifically focusing on the perspectives of 
medical practitioners and other health systems actors. A policy analysis framework is adopted 
which is comprehensive and accommodates the coexistence of multiple perspectives of different 
actors, and also the potential role of these actors in strategic change. 
The topic of HIV testing is a good illustration of the broader problem of policy-practice gaps in 
public health. The separation between HIV testing policy and practice is particularly marked, and 
is also relatively well documented in the literature, which was helpful in defining the boundaries 
of the research problem. HIV / AIDS care, and in particular the response of private medical 
providers to national policies for HIV testing and management, have been the subjects of previous 
research initiatives I was involved in (Sheikh et al. 2005a, Sheikh et al. 2005b, Kielmann et al. 
2005; Sheikh et al. 2006, Datye et al. 2006) and as such this thesis also represents a continuation 
of my interests in studying the ethics ofHIV testing. 
23 Even as the readings do deal with many critical concerns of a broader nature. 
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Chapter 3. Policy Analysis Frameworks 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 The policy approach 
Public policy analysis per se is not a new field of activity. As long as there have been 
governments and governance, policies have been scrutinized infonnally and fonnally. However, 
as a distinct entity, the field has seen an increase in interest in the second half of the 20th century 
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Policy approaches accommodate different disciplinary contributions 
in order to achieve a more complete understanding of actors and real-life policy processes. These 
include concepts from the political and management sciences, psychology, sociology, and 
economics (Walt 1994, Sabatier 1998), and in its more recent applications, from philosophy and 
critical theory (Fischer 2003). Further, its wide adoption in the literature of specific sectors 
(health policy, education policy, environment policy) also emphasises the status of policy analysis 
as a sub-constituent of each of those areas of study - i.e. within health studies, education studies 
etc. (parsons 1995). 
Analytical approaches vary based on the intended purpose of enquiry. The function of public 
policy analysis in its original conception was to generate specific knowledge to evaluate, support 
or contribute to government programmes or interventions. Such analyses "for" policy typically 
use targeted methods such as operational research and economic analysis to infonn policy 
decisions (Parsons 1995). Subsequently however, research "on" policy, an approach with a more 
reflective orientation concerned with understanding the processes of fonnation and 
implementation of policy, has received increased attention. This approach was built on existing 
traditions of research into the functioning of government institutions, public administration and 
the role of interest groups. Hence analyses "for" policy and "of' policy collectively constitute the 
field of policy studies (Gordon et al. 1977, Lasswell 1970 cited in Parsons 1995). 
In a contemporary sense however, distinctions of analysis of or for policy are no longer seen to be 
so clear. There is an increasing recognition of the diversity of roles of policy analysts in society 
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and the variability of processes through which research influences policy change (Parsons 1995, 
Yanow 2000). Ritchie and Spencer (1994) identify four types of questions that are usually asked 
in applied policy research - contextual, diagnostic, evaluative or strategic questions - and stressed 
that most research, in intent or effect, addresses more than one of these types of questions. 
Another important dichotomy in the policy sciences is between positivist frameworks, which are 
typically deductive and seek causal explanations for phenomena; and less definitive approaches 
which may be exploratory or inductive, and are often broadly categorized as post-positivist or 
post-modem (Guba 1990, Fischer 2003). The positivist approach requires policy analysis 
frameworks to have the attributes of scientific theories, fulfilling such conditions as 
comprehensiveness, allowing empirical testing, and generating falsifiable hypotheses (Sabatier 
1998). In contrast, post-positivist paradigms hold that social and political realities cannot be fully 
understood or explained through deductive lines of reasoning. Furthermore social knowledge is 
multidimensional and subject to human interpretation, and hence not always provable or 
"falsifiable" in a scientific sense (parsons 1995). Inductive methodologies which are linked to 
post-positivist approaches focus on multi-dimensional explanations of, and associations between 
phenomena, rather than on establishing linear causality (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
The analysis in this study is both of policy and also for policy. The constructivist or interpretivist 
approaches used in the study seek to provide an understanding of the mUltiple perspectives of the 
constituent actors engaged in policy processes. This is critical in informing not just an 
understanding of reality (or of multiple realities), but also of the possibilities of change, since it is 
the actors themselves who are involved in shaping change (Yanow 2000). 
3.1.2 The pollcy-action relationship 
In the early years of the emergence of policy studies, the focus was largely on understanding the 
nature of policy formation, in which context implementation, or the link between policy and 
action, was "assumed to be a series of mundane decisions and interactions" and not seen to have 
distinct significance as a subject of study by policy scientists (Van Meter and Van Hom, 1975 
p450). Implementation was widely seen as a managerial function, and not integral to the study of 
policy, or to the policy process. 
Pressman and Wildavsky's study of implementation of a federal programme for economic 
development in the USA in 1973 heralded the beginnings of the new sub-discipline. Since then, 
the literature on implementation has burgeoned and textbooks on implementation studies have 
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been published, drawing on ideas from the political sciences, public administration and 
organizational behaviour (Grindle 1980, Barrett and Fudge 1981, Williams 1982, Younis 1990, 
Hill and Hupe 2002). "Implementation studies" developed as an umbrella under which academic 
thinking on the policy-action relationship was consolidated. 
In its original conception implementation studies was conceived to address policymakers' 
concerns about the ineffectiveness of policies, a problem variously described as "implementation 
deficits" (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) "the implementation gap" (Dunsire 1978), and "policy 
failure" (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). The implementation process is viewed explicitly from the 
perspective of policy-makers, as part of a sequence following, and separate from policy 
formulation (Buse et al 2005). The notions of policy accomplishment, responsibility and 
accountability are central to these "top-down" conceptualizations of the policy-action relationship 
(Lane 1987). ''Top-down'' theorists have generally been preoccupied with identifying approaches 
and conditions which can lead field-level practices to more closely approximate original policy 
intentions (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, Hood 1976, Hogwood and Gunn 1984). 
The top-down conception of the policy-action relationship has widely been contested and an 
alternative movement in implementation studies has also taken root, which is often collectively 
bracketed as "action-centred" or "bottom-up" approaches. Barrett and Fudge (1981) argued that 
there is no reason that the perspectives of policymakers should automatically be adopted by policy 
analysts, since in many instances action precedes or predates policy. Policy may be a response to 
pressures and problems experienced on the ground, or may be developed to control or build on an 
existing practice or phenomenon (ibid.).24 
Along with Barrett and Fudge (1981), Elmore (1982), Lewis and Flynn (1979), Hjern and Hull 
(1982) and Lipsky (1980) have made fundamental contributions to this alternative perspective. 
According to Lane (1987), considerations of trust, freedom of choice and learning typically 
underlie the normative position adopted in action-centred approaches. The two perspectives -
top-down and action-centred - represent alternative ways of framing the problem of policy-
practice gaps, and also reflect differing concerns and interests. Bottom-up and action-centred 
approaches are discussed in detail in section 3.2.1. 
In summary, discourse around implementation is no longer concerned with questioning the 
legitimacy of the approach but with differences in addressing its specificities, including 
understanding the roles of different actors, the contexts that guide their actions and interactions, 
24 This is particularly so in the case of health policy, since health care practices often precede policy 
formation, definitely so in a historical sense. 
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the nature of processes in the policy-action relationship (Walt and Gilson 1994), and consequently 
in the manner of prescriptions and recommendations for change. These different aspects are 
elaborated in the following sections, with an emphasis on the frameworks and approaches used in 
this study. 
3.2 ACTORS IN THE POLICY·PRACTICE CONTINUUM 
"Actors" is a term used to defme the individuals and collectives of individuals who participate in 
policy processes. Policy processes are widely defined or influenced by their actions (Buse et al. 
2005). Actors can be classified in terms of their membership of "groups" - metaphorical 
collectives of individuals or organizations delineated by structural, functional or organizational 
parameters (parsons 1995). Examples include service providers, resource providers, 
administrators, coordinators, demand groups, etc. (Benson 1982). From a "top-down" 
perspective which emphasizes functional roles, actors each have their designated positions in 
implementation of policies. For example: 
- Policy-planners are involved in formulating and disseminating policies. 
- Street-level operatives (in this study, medical practitioners) are involved in the provision of 
services to recipients. 
- Intermediary actors such as regulators, educators, and administrators direct or organize the 
actions of street level implementers through various means and instruments. 
There is an implicit assumption in this perspective, espoused by many influential implementation 
theorists25 (Sabatier 1998, Hogwood and Gunn 1984, Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) that 
decision-making is the function of policy-makers and hence decisional processes end with the 
formulation of policies by policy planners, and are then instrumentally "put into effect" by 
designated implementers. However there may be inconsistencies in this view of the policy 
process, and action-centred approaches offer an alternative view of actors' participation in policy 
implementation. 
2' And by many health policy experts (peters 2003, Dugga12001) 
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3.2.1 Action-centred approaches 
Reality may be more complex than is implied by a top-down model of a unitary central locus of 
decisions. According to Elmore (1982 p.20, also Lewis and Flynn 1979), the view that 
"policymakers control the organizational, political and technological processes that affect 
implementation,,26 is a fallacy which is often not borne out by experience, observation and 
research. Groups who are designated as implementers continually reinterpret, modify and change 
policies in the process of implementing them (Barrett and Fudge 1981, Lipsky 1980). Further, 
groups and organizations involved in implementation are often autonomous or semi-autonomous, 
and not in direct hierarchical relationships with those making policy (Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
This makes it necessary, in exploring policy-practice gaps, to consider distinctly the decision-
making processes and capabilities of all involved actors, not just those of designated policy 
planners. 
Core characteristics of action-centred approaches in studying the policy-action relationship are: 
They emphasise action as the focal point of study, rather than policy, focusing on "observing 
what actually happens or gets done, and seeking to understand how and why" (Barrett and 
Fudge 1981 p.12) 
They view communication in policy as bi-directional, emphasising the interactive nature of 
relationships between actors in the implementation process. 
They are often oriented on the perspectives of actors involved in policy implementation, other 
than policy-makers. They may explicitly address the view from the "bottom" i.e. that of street 
level implementers 
The "groups" metaphor is useful in action-centred research. Yanow (2000) indicates that 
membership of a group is not just linked to common instrumental functions, but to individuals' 
use of similar cognitive mechanisms, language, and forms of expression and action. Group 
processes of working together reinforce these similar ways of seeing and acting.27 However, it is 
also important to understand that groups are not fixed or exclusive, but represent fluid and 
overlapping categories. The implementation process can be seen in terms of interactions between 
different groupS.28 
26 Also known as the "noble lie" of conventional public administration and policy analysis (Williams 1982) 
27 Hence Yanow uses the term "communities of meaning" to describe groups. 
28 Discussed further in section 3.3.1 
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Focus on service providers 
While the perspectives of all actors in the implementation continuwn are given importance in the 
action-centred perspective, actions at street-level have been proposed as a suitable point for 
initiating research enquiry into implementation processes (Williams 1982). Elmore (1982, p2l) 
proposed a research orientation which starts "not with a statement of intent, but a statement of the 
specific behaviour at the lowest level of the implementation process" and works upwards through 
the different layers of the organizational hierarchy. This "backward mapping" approach29 
potentially accounts for a more comprehensive range of explanations for policy-practice gaps than 
a narrow search for reasons for the non-fulfilment of intentions of policymakers (Elmore 1982). 
Michael Lipsky's seminal theories of street-level bureaucracy (1971,1980) similarly emphasized 
attentiveness to the actions of service providers30, by observing that "governments may be most 
salient to citizens where there is frequent interaction with its representatives" (1980, p2l0). 
Lipsky reasoned that it is not the initial statements of intent by policymakers, but the altered and 
adjusted decisions and actions of public servants (representing a balance between upholding 
service values and making concessions for circumstantial factors) which are relevant for the 
recipients of services (1980 p.xii).31 
There are very few examples of such approaches being adopted in the health policy literature, 
particularly in the context of developing countries. Walker and Gilson's (2004) investigation of 
the perspectives of South African primary health nurses implementing new policies for free health 
care, is one such example. 
29 Backward mapping was proposed as a tool for policy analysts, and also as a prescription for policy 
planners. Since Elmore worked for an American government programme, in his case these two proposed 
functions for backward mapping may have overlapped 
30 Lipsky's theories pre-date the emergence of implementation as a distinct sub-discipline of policy studies, 
a widely regarded benchmark of this being the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky's book 
Implementation in 1973 
31 Lipsky observed that public servants were often subject to large case loads and inadequate resources 
which, in combination with uncertainties of method and unpredictability of clients made it impossible to 
achieve the high service ideals that they were set, and instead they adjusted by developing alternative 
patterns and routines (creating policy). The typical managerial (top down) prescription for such deviation 
and discretion on the part of implementers is increased administrative control, which however acts only to 
intensify the pressures on street level bureaucrats already burdened by considerable limitations and 
uncertainties, and has the effect of increasing their tendency to stereotype at the expense of their regard for 
the needs of clients (1980). 
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3.2.2 Understanding the individual actor's response 
If, as is suggested by the action-centred framework (Figure 4.1), all actors in the implementation 
continuwn are regarded to have decision-making capabilities, then it becomes important to 
understand how individual human beings involved in policy processes make decisions around 
action, and what guides their response. 
In a typical top-down or managerial perspective, individual action is usually seen simply in terms 
of adherence to or deviation from institutional/organizational rules or norms (Parsons 1995). 
Approaches which have been adopted by economists to explain human action, such as the rational 
choice approach reduce actors' decisions to expressions of narrow self-interest (Ostrom 1998, Das 
and Hammer 2004) Political economy approaches too tend to revolve around considerations of 
rational choice, while acknowledging that these choices occur within political contexts (Walt 
1994). Even as these approaches claim accuracy in predicting human action on a large scale 
(John 1998), solely self-interest based models do not offer insight into how decisional processes 
occur in the minds of actors, or how ideas get translated into action. They do not provide an . 
account of individual volition, purpose, or capacity for change and learning. 
More nuanced approaches have been suggested which include considerations of different forms of 
human cognition and expression, and of the importance of internal values, beliefs and ideational 
processes. 
Cognition, expression and meaning 
Cognition and expression are actors' forms of interactions with the outside world (Lewis and 
Flynn 1979). Cognitive inputs are manifold and potentially limitless, and in the context of 
implementation, include apperceptions of contextual and situational factors, and of the direct and 
indirect communications of other actors (Yanow 2000). Individual expressions of actors can take 
the form of their enactment of roles, within the framework of the organizational channels 
available to them; and also other forms of ideational and communicative expression including the 
conveyance of ideas which represent solutions for problems, and of the meanings ascribed to 
problems (Fischer 2003). But how are cognitive inputs processed by actors, and how are 
decisions made around how to act? 
The hwnan mind is complex and different theorists have tried to explain its workings in different 
ways. Theories and taxonomies of human psychology have been applied to better understand the 
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policy process. Human values, beliefs, needs, feelings and intellectual activity have been 
variously understood to be the bases of internal decisional processes. Simon's influential model 
of bounded rationality includes a consideration offeelings, in perceiving policy decisions as being 
made by a combination of intellectual reasoning and human feelings or affect. In this model, 
affect is regarded broadly in negative terms as a reason for departures from an intellectual-rational 
ideal of political action (Simon 1957, cited in Buse et al. 2005). Lasswell (1936, cited in Parsons 
1995) had earlier introduced an emphasis on affective values in decision-making (although not 
necessarily in a negative sense), by classifying individuals on the basis of their possession of 
different types of political values. He divided these into two groups which he respectively called 
deference values - relating broadly to power, productivity and efficiency, and welfare values -
relating to well-being, skill and respect. He postulated that policy decision-making by different 
actors was based on perpetuation and protection of their respective types of values (ibid.). 
Concepts such as "systems of meaning" (Yanow 2000). "frames" (Rein and SchOn 1993). or 
"appreciations" (Vickers 1965) help to understand how different actors process knowledge in the 
contexts of their own beliefs and interests. According to Rein and Schon (1993, p.145), frames 
represent different actors' ways of understanding the world. Frames are the way in which "facts, 
values, theories and interests are integrated" by particular actors or groups of actors to construct 
their realities, define problems and identify solutions for the problems. In the interpretive 
approach, cognitive, expressive and internal decisional processes are seen to occur within the 
same system of "sense-making" or interpretation by relevant policy actors (Yanow 2000). Actors 
interpret information through the lens of the frame or system of meanings that they function in. 
Collectives of actors belonging to the same groups may share systems of meaning and hence 
share cognitive mechanisms, engage in similar acts and use similar language to discuss policy 
problems (ibid.). Concepts such as meanings and appreciations are widely utilised by sociologists 
and anthropologists, but have seldom been applied to understand the experiences of health policy 
actors. 
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Vickers proposed a simple model to explain the individual experience of making 
decisions in a policy context. According to him, policy actors make an appreciation of a 
given problem, by balancing their judgements around the "facts of the problem" (reality 
judgements) with value judgements answering the question ·what ought to be?" in order 
to arrive at action judgments (what to do, and how to do it?). 
Reality Judgements 
"What is' 
"APPRECIATION" --+ 
t 
Value Judgements 
"What ought" 
Action Judgements 
"What to do" 
"How to do it" 
The concept of "appreciation" here is analogous to "systems of meaning" (Yanow 2000) 
or "frames" (Rein and SchOn 1993) discussed above, defining the lenses through which 
policy actors define problems and pursue courses of action. Through this mental map 
of judgements, Vickers illustrated that policy decisions are determined by complex and 
specific intemal processes of policy actors.32 It provides a categorical framework on the 
basis of which individual actors' accounts of their experiences, and their explanations of 
the experiences, can be thematically organized. In proposing this model, Vickers 
continued the emphasis on the role of values, which he regarded as a key component of 
political judgment, but also included considerations of pragmatism and common-sense 
in decisions made by individuals. Actors may change their appreciations and their 
actions through the repeated exercise of judgements in the course of their work -
constituting a "Ieaming cycle" (ibid.). 
Box 3.1 A Model of Individual Decision-making 
Contexts of action 
Organizational entities and structures such as hospitals, government departments, private finns, 
and voluntary associations are the settings for the actions of the individuals involved in 
implementation (Lewis and Flynn 1979). Conventionally, government apparatus such as the 
legislature, executive and bureaucracies were seen as neutral instruments and public policy was 
seen as being essentially constituted by their activities. Although these ideas have widely been 
32 This model was originally proposed to explain decision-making by designated policy-planners. However, 
in a more democratic understanding of policy decision-making suggested by action-centred approaches, the 
model is applicable to all relevant actors. 
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refined,33 the contextual importance of organizational structures, including government bureaus, 
private firms and other associations in guiding action is still widely recognized. Organizations 
defme the nonns for actors to work within systems, and provide (or constrain) their channels of 
cognition and expression (John 1998). Workplaces such as hospitals and departmental offices 
routinize and reinforce patterns of action. The way in which professions are structured allows 
them to exert a strong nonnative influence on actors' behaviour, particularly relevant in the 
context of medical providers (Freidson 1986). However the relationship between nonns and 
structures and the actions of those involved in implementation is seldom linear or predictable and, 
given the diversity of organizations involved in implementation processes, does not lend itself to 
generalized theories. 
Ambiguities around contextual influences 
Sources of policy are often multiple, which is a cause of ambiguity for implementers. 
Implementers' actions are rarely based exclusively around the fulfilment of unitary policy 
objectives. In implementation, say Lewis and Flynn (1979, p 125), there are "frequent 
disagreements about policy goals and objectives; vagueness and ambiguity about policies and 
uncertainty about their operationalization in practice; (and) inconsistency between powers 
available and existing problems". The theme of ambiguity is developed by Hjem and Porter 
(1981), who make the salient observation that multiple organizations are involved in the 
implementation of programmes, and organizations participate in several programmes. The 
requirements of different programmes, and of the involved organizations, are not necessarily well-
coordinated or mutually commensurate. Implementers hence often face dilemmas between 
serving the goals and objectives of a particular programme - the "programme rationale", or of the 
organization they work in - the "organizational rationale". 34 
How then does action take place in the context of such ambiguities? According to Lewis and 
Flynn (1979), considerations of feasibility in given circumstances, and adjustments and 
compromises between two or more competing sets of priorities and policy areas, are often truer 
guides of action than the formal constitutions of organizations. Dynamics of power, social 
33 The neutral perspective on state institutions has widely been challenged in the political sciences, with the 
growing recognition that their purposes and functions are often unclear, and that they may themselves be 
vehicles for the exertion of social power and expressions of hidden interests (John 1998). 
34 "Organization rationale" is a synthesis of values and goals adapted from those of the programmes within 
the organization and perceptions of the niche that the organization fills in its environment. It is embedded 
within organizations and usually followed and endorsed by administrators. 
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relations, conflicting interests and value systems in interactions between different groups all may 
be important in shaping action (Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
Other perspectives include those of economists who typically conceive contexts for action in 
terms of market factors, in which organizational arrangements and structural and environmental 
factors are interpreted in terms of their economic value, and opportunities or threats to 
maximization of self-interest for the relevant actors (Das and Hammer 2004, Peters 2003). 
Sociologists have identified how health care organizations may function as social systems, or 
within social contexts (Nichter 1996, Madan 1980). 
Need for empirical exploration 
Much of the literature on the policy-action relationship in health presumes the dominant influence 
of particular set of contextual factors - administrative, economic or social. In truth, all these 
formulations represent different ways of contextualizing action, but none in isolation captures the 
multidimensional reality of the worlds which policy actors inhabit. While acknowledging that 
there are various Wlderstandings of contextual influences, Hjern and Hull (1982) warn against 
presuming the ways in which the influences shape action, suggesting that these equations are 
unique to different policy milieux, and best Wlderstood through empirical research, from the 
perspectives of the relevant actors. This inductive view is mirrored in the interpretivist policy 
analysis approach (used in this study)3s, which seeks to Wlderstand different participant actors' 
meanings of policy problems and processes, without predetermination of contextual factors 
(Yanow 2000). 
3.3 POLICY-ACTION PROCESS 
Early approaches influenced by public administration (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Van Meter 
and Van Hom 1975) conceived policy implementation in a classically "top-down fashion", as a 
series of instrumental tasks designed towards putting policy into effect. The alternative to a 
purely instrumental view, and one that corresponds to the action-centred view of implementation 
used in this study, is an interactive perspective in which the continuum from policy to practice 
can be visualised as a series of interactions or communications between the promulgators of 
3S See Chapter 4 (4.4.1) 
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policies, the groups and organizations involved in an intennediary role, and street level 
implementers of policies (Barrett and Fudge 1981, Yanow 2000). 
3.3.1 Interactive processes 
Barrett and Fudge (1981), in their book "Policy and Action", were among the first to emphasise 
the hi-directional nature of associations in the context of implementation. In this interactive 
perspective, the authors emphasised that a range of issues can be highlighted including power, 
dependence, interests and motivations, which guide behaviour and interactions. Discourse 
theories, and in particular the interpretive policy analysis approach proposed by Yanow (2000) 
further develop the theme of the interactive approach, by regarding policy processes as being 
essentially communicative, and crucially including the place of ideas and meanings, as well as of 
power and interests in defining interactive processes. It is apparent that decisions in policy are 
primarily enacted through communicative means, involving the use of linguistic and symbolic 
devices. Many acts overtly involve the transfer of ideas - for instance policy guidelines are 
essentially a set of ideas which are conveyed to doctors, and doctors' enactment of the guidelines 
too involves communication with patients. However, even the most instrumental of processes36 
can be viewed in communicative terms, in terms of how they are carried out and what they 
represent to stakeholders (Yanow 2000). 
Hjem and Hull point out that actual relationships and associations between individuals in different 
organizations may not confonn to formally expected norms of group functions, and emphasize the 
importance of understanding the nature of "living" (as opposed to "written" or formally expected) 
processes of interaction (Hjem and Hull 1982). These living processes of interactions between 
groups of actors have a functional or instrumental dimension, and also a less defmable ideational 
dimension (Fischer 2003, also Yanow 2000). 
36 Such as infrastructural changes, or the institution of documentation systems, in examples given by Yanow 
(2000) 
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3.3.2 Functional and ideational dimensions of interaction 
Functional dimension 
The functional dimension of interactions refers to the enactment of approaches and devices for the 
instrumentation of policies, guided by the written rules and norms of organizations. The use of 
these devices depends on the type of policy being implemented, and the preferred methods and 
intents of executives in putting the policy into effect. John (1998) classifies policy 
implementation instruments as being legal, fmancial, organizational or personal. Legal 
instruments include laws and statutes; fmancial instruments link role performance to 
remuneration; organizational instruments are exertions of bureaucratic power; and personal 
instruments include various forms of persuasion including education. The literature on health 
policy implementation in India has focused variously on financial (Peters 2003, Muraleedharan 
and Nandraj 2003), instructional and organizational instruments (Grimshaw et al. 2001 McColl et 
a1. 2000, Uplekar et a1. 1998, Mertens et al. 1998), although in some instances legal (statutory) 
changes have been made or suggested to add weight to policies guiding medical practice (Bhat 
1996, Grover et a1. 2001).37 
In an interactive framework, all instrumental processes can be seen as acts of interaction or 
communication between the groups (authorities or executives) who enact the laws and regulations 
or make educational, organizational or financial arrangements, and the groups (functionaries or 
implementers) responding to these official arrangements. 
Ideational dimension 
The movement of ideas has increasingly received recognition as an important element of policy 
processes in general, and the policy-action relationship is no exception. Discursive theories of 
policy state that political action per se can be characterised in terms of the movement of ideas, or 
in other words, that ideas represent the substance of policy (Fischer and Forester 1993). Policy 
statements such as those for HIV testing are an example of ideas which represent solutions for 
problems. Other such ideas for policy too may circulate in the policy environment (March and 
Olsen 1989), and their success in filtering through to the consciousness of formulators of policy 
depends on a number of factors. Other than the persuasiveness of the ideas themselves, power 
relations between groups of actors, "entrepreneurial" efforts to promote particular ideas and 
31 See Chapter 2 for details. 
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propitious political and socio-economic conditions are factors which influence the uptake of new 
ideas (Hall 1997, Kingdon 1984). 
The other type of ideational interaction which is of significance in the policy-action relationship is 
of the mutual conveyance of "meanings". As discussed earlier (3.2.2), different policy actors 
have different ways of perceiving and interpreting issues and problems, and interactions between 
members of different groups necessarily involve communication across systems of meaning.38 
Policy controversies often persist as a result of different ways of framing realities and problems 
(Rein and SchOn 1993). In a policy milieu, actors variously choose to convey their respective 
meanings to each other (or not), and particular systems of meaning may dominate popular 
consciousness at the expense of others (Yanow 2000). 
3.4 STRA TEGIZING CHANGE 
Conceptions of rationality in human action underlie most frameworks seeking to explain policy 
processes and are particularly relevant in the context of making prescriptions for change. Herbert 
Simon advocated how organizations should function, by maximising rationality in decision-
making by means of a systematic step-wise process consisting of intelligence, design and choice 
(Simon 1957, cited in Parsons 1995). This represents a dominant strand of thought in policy 
studies (including health policy), in which scientific and objective rationality is seen as an ideal 
standard to be achieved, and the actual behaviour of individuals perceived as a divergence from 
that ideal (Parsons 1995).39 In these approaches, a problem-solving approach is usually implicit, 
in seeking how implementation processes can more closely approximate a rational end-point, and 
prescriptions typically tend towards increasing or maintaining control over processes and 
individuals and minimizing deviation from initial goals as stated in policies.4o,41 
According to Yanow (2000) it is the rhetorical power of such ends-oriented approaches which 
apply scientific principles to social science contexts to produce objective solutions for policy 
38 See previous explanation of the concepts of frames, systems of meaning and appreciations on page 53 
39 According to Miller (1984, also Parsons 1995) this is evidenced by the pre-dominance of solution-
oriented approaches and techniques in the field, such as cost-benefit analysis, economic forecasting and 
determination of social indicators. 
40 For instance Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) attributed policy failure to the erosion of the original intents 
of policy in each successive step of implementation, and emphasised streamlining systems to enhance 
cohesiveness 
41 Such approaches have also dominated in prescriptions around health policy in India - see Chapter 2 
(2.2.4) 
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problems, which has led them to dominate the field of policy studies, in spite of a narrow view of 
rationality that they represent. 
Process-oriented view of change 
Alternative perspectives of positive change do exist which focus on improving processes rather 
than on developing solutions, and are not necessarily recent in their articulation. The importance 
of better conununication and deliberation between policy actors has been emphasised in the work 
of seminal policy theorists Lindblom, Lasswell and Vickers. Charles Lindblom (1959) was of the 
belief that the need for agreement and consensus was not replaceable by rational analytical 
techniques in making policy decisions, especially complex ones. Lasswell proposed the use of 
"decision-seminars" as a participatory and deliberative technique for policy development with an 
emphasis on personal development and learning (Laswell 1971, cited in Parsons 1995). Vickers 
(1965) too believed that mechanistic rational models of human regulation needed to be adapted to 
take individual and social considerations into account. He emphasised the importance of 
adjustment, adaptation and learning - over goal-seeking - as movers of human action in politics. 
In more contemporary contexts, the importance of conununicative practices in policy-planning 
has been explored and developed by theorists such as Healey (1993) and Fischer (2003). 
In the health policy context, there is an increasing interest in elements such as trust and respect, in 
the context of patient-provider relations as well as relations between health workers and 
employers (Gilson et al. 2005, Green 2004). A process-orientation is implicit in this literature, 
which emphasises the importance of recognizing the relational nature of health systems (Gilson 
2003). Porter and colleagues (1999) have argued for a shift in the approach to policy for 
infectious diseases towards more attention to process, and to an appreciation of how health 
systems actually function in the context of socio-economic realities. They contend that existing 
public health progranunes for disease control need to be re-examined in terms of the roles they 
play in conununities, and not just in terms of the targets they are focused on achieving. 
In sununary, solution-oriented and process-oriented perspectives are complementary in their view 
of the policy process, and suggest different and often conflicting prescriptions for change. In the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, I discuss strategies and reconunendations for change focused on 
improving the quality of interactive processes in implementation. 
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3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The field of policy analysis provides a consolidated way of looking at the policy-practice 
relationship as a whole. However different theories and frameworks of the policy-practice 
relationship differ in their conceptualizations of: 
the manner of participation of different actors and the contexts of their actions 
the nature of policy-action processes 
ways of strategizing change 
In this study, an action-centred framework (Barrett and Fudge 1981) is used to conceptualize the 
policy-practice continuum and investigate the gaps. Within this broad framework, other concepts 
and theories from the policy literature too find application and help to understand the complexity 
of the problem (Hjem and Hull 1982, Elmore 1982, Yanow 2000, Ritchie and Spencer 1994, 
Vickers 1965, Hjem and Porter 1981, Healey 1993). The conceptual framework, research 
questions and methodology are elaborated in the following chapter. 
62 
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4. Methodology 
4.1 RESEARCH ORIENTATION 
4.1.1 Conceptual framework 
In this study, the relationship between HN testing policy and practice is conceptualized as an 
action-centred framework focused on understanding "what actually happens or gets done", and 
how and why (Barrett and Fudge 1981). In this framework, actors involved in implementation are 
seen to have decision-making capabilities and power to take action and effect change, and are 
linked together through interactive processes (Figure 4.1). 
FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION CHANNELS 
r-----------------~---------------~ 
Policy 
Promulgators 
/t 
t 
POLICY CONTENT 
HIV testing pOlicies 
Selectivity 
No mandatory testing 
Informed consent 
Confidentiality 
DeSignated, Designated Other t ~~~ £~~ t yi-u:_;-(!a_)'_ ...... DIRECTION OF 
RESEARCH 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
GROUPS OF ACTORS 
Functional dimension of 
enactment of policies 
Ideational dimension: 
conveyance of meanings 
Medical Practitioners i 
In Hospitals 
t 
r-----------------I 
: Patients In Hospitals : 
I (not induded as study : 
: participants) I 
I I 
._---------------_. 
ACTIONS OF 
PARTICIPANT ACTORS 
Shaped by their distinct 
decision-making processes 
Figure 4.1 Polley-Practice Continuum as a Web of Decision-makers 
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Participant Actors 
Actors involved in implementation of policies are differentiated into groups broadly based on the 
designated functions of the organizations to which they belong (John 1998): 
Policy-planners and promulgators 
Street level implementers - the medical practitioners 
Groups which are formally designated to have roles in implementation such as hospital 
administrators, the HIV / AIDS programme, and professional regulatory bodies 
Groups which do not have designated roles in implementation, but are otherwise 
influential, such as civil society organizations, international organizations and 
professional associations 
These actors' participation in policy implementation is understood to be shaped by their 
respective internal decision-making processes. The manner and contexts in which these decisions 
are made are explored through the process of empirical research, and not presumed (Hjern and 
Hull 1982). 
Interactive Processes 
The links between different groups are conceived as interactive or communicative processes 
(Barrett and Fudge 1981, Yanow 2000). Interactive processes are bi-directional and have 
functional and ideational dimensions, corresponding respectively to the enactment of roles in 
policy implementation, and to the mutual communication and conveyance of ideas and meanings. 
Inferring from the conceptual map (Figure 4.1), gaps between policies and practices may result 
from divergences or irregularities in either of two sets of phenomena: the nature of actors' 
participation in policy implementation, and the interactive processes. The research questions for 
the study are focused on understanding these two core aspects ofthe policy-practice continuum. 
64 
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1.2 Research questions 
Research Question 1 How do medical practitioners in hospitals in India respond to national 
policies around selectivity in HIV testing. mandatory testing. informed consent and 
confidentiality, in practice? Why do they respond as they do? What are the factors which 
determine their behaviour? 
Medical Practitioners , 
in Hospitals II 
! 
r-----------------. 
: Patients in Hospitals : 
• (not included as study • 
: participants) : L ________________ ~
Figure 4.2 Orienting Point - Action at the Level of Service Delivery 
Actions at the level of service delivery are taken as the orienting point for the research, and the 
research process proceeds "upwards" from this initial point, drawing from bottom-up principles 
(Elmore 1982, Hjem and Hull 1982). The first research question is based on understanding 
medical practitioners' responses to national HIV testing policy guidelines in the real life contexts 
of their practices.42 
Research Question 2 What is the nature of the different arrangements through which national 
HIV testing policies are expected to be implemented in urban government and private 
hospitals? 
There is insufficient information in the public domain about the designated roles of different 
organs of government and other influential organizations in ensuring the implementation of public 
health policies in hospitals, and of how they are expected to interact with each other. This second 
question is focused on establishing the details of these putative arrangements, providing a context 
for understanding the actual performance of roles by these actors, and their interrelationships. 
42 See Chapter 1 (1.2) for NACO's policies. 
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Research Question 3 Who are the various policy actors involved in the implementation of HIV 
testing policies? What are the different policy actors' roles in implementing HIV testing 
policies? 
FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION CHANNELS 
,-
~ 
--.... 
Policy t Promulgators 
DeSignated t DeSignated t Other i Implementer Implementer Influential Group A Group B Group(s) 
Figure 4.3 Groups Formally and Informally Involved in Implementation 
Apart from the groups who are involved in the fonnal arrangements of implementation, other 
actors too may be directly or indirectly involved in the implementation process. Furthermore, 
groups who are formally designated as implementers may not enact their roles as they are 
officially required to do. This question is focused on establishing the identities of the different 
groups formally and infonnally involved in implementation, and understanding their actual roles 
(as opposed to their putative roles) in the implementation process (Hjem and Hull 1982). 
Research Question 4 How do practitioners and other policy actors interact with each other in 
the process of implementing HIV testing policies? 
Policy i Promulgators 
/ t ~ 
Designated i DeSignated t Other t Implementer .. ~ Implementer .. ~ Influential Group A Group B Group(s) 
~ t / 
Medical Practitioners t 
In Hospitals 
Figure 4.4 Interactions between Groups 
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Understanding functional and ideational interactions between different groups of actors 
participating in implementation processes forms the basis of this fourth question. 
Research Question 5 How can medical providers and other policy actors contribute to 
reconciling the gaps between policy and practice? 
The final question focuses on the capabilities of, and opportunities for different groups of actors 
to contribute to a process of bridging policy-practice gaps. 
4.1.3 Methodology overview 
In exploring the policy-practice relationship in this study, the interpretivist approach of policy 
analysis is adopted, in which events and phenomena are viewed through the lens of the 
apperceptions and intetpretations of participant actors (Yanow 2000). Action-centred 
implementation theorists have emphasised the importance of establishing participating 
"individuals' definitions of a policy system" (Lewis and Flynn 1979), and of "policy problems as 
defmed and addressed by relevant actors" (Hjern and Hull 1982). The intetpretivist approach is 
derived from constructivist epistemologies in social research which aim to "include multiple 
voices and views in their rendering of lived experience" (Charmaz 2000 p525). The intent is not 
to establish a singular objective reality of the policy-practice relationship, but understand the 
multiple realities of the different groups of actors who participate in the system. 
Social science research methods are used to investigate the problem. Starting with medical 
practitioners and moving up through the echelons of the health system, different actors' views 
around their participation in implementation processes, and interrelationships with other groups 
are obtained through depth interviews, and analysed in order to understand and explain policy 
processes. Intetpretivism requires the analyst to be immersed in the beliefs of participants to try 
and understand their real pUIposes and motivations for actions, and convey these to the reader 
(Yanow 2000). The approach is elaborated in section 4.4.1. 
Table 4.1 is a tabulation of research questions against the methods used to address the respective 
question and the chapter or section in which relevant findings are presented. 
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Research question Methods used43 Relevant chapter/section 
1 Depth interviews with medical practitioners, 
thematic analysis 44 
Chapter 5 and 8 (section 8.1) 
2 Review of policy documentation, interviews Chapter 7 (section 7.1 ) 
with policy actors other than medical 
practitioners 
3 Depth interviews with policy actors other than Chapter 7 and 8 (section 8.2) 
medical practitioners, thematic analysis 
4 Depth interviews with all actors, thematic Chapter 6, 7 and 8 (sections 8.3, 
analysis 8.4) 
5 Depth interviews with all actors, thematic Chapter 9 
analysis 
Table 4.1 Research Questions, Methods and Corresponding Chapters 
Different themes emerged as data from respondents' narratives were generated and processed in 
the qualitative research process. Some model~ and theories which had not been applied pre-
emptively were found to be pertinent in organizing or understanding some of these emergent 
themes,45 complementing the framework which was initially used to structure the research 
process. This process of a combined inductive and deductive approach towards developing a 
unified thematic framework is based on principles of the "framework" approach for applied 
policy analysis (Ritchie and Spencer 1994), and is described in detail in section 4.4.2. A thematic 
framework was developed on the basis of which the data from depth interviews were analysed.46 
Details of selection of study subjects, organization of data collection and analysis are elaborated 
in the following sections. 
43 In addition to the methods cited, key informants' opinions and contextual insights were utilized in the text 
where relevant, to provide contextual information. 
44 See thematic analysis framework on page 80. 
45 These included Vickers' heuristic of value, reality and action judgements to characterize the internal 
process of decision-making by individuals in policy (1965); and the distinction of organizational and 
programme rationales (Hjern and Porter 1981) to interpret individuals' ambivalence between different 
affiliations. In prescribing change, a lens of communicative rationality was applied (Healey 1993). The 
applications of these different frameworks are highlighted in the relevant parts of the thesis. 
4 The thematic framework is presented later in this chapter on page 80. 
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4.2 DEFINING THE FIELD AND SELECTING SUBJECTS 
4.2.1 Delineating the groups 
The identification and delineation of different groups was initially determined by common 
taxonomies found in Indian health policy texts (Gupta and Sood 2005, Park 2005), and from 
discussions with key infonnants. These classes were based broadly on the putative functions of 
different organizations or offices (Benson 1982). As the interviews proceeded, respondents 
identified organizations who were potentially involved in implementation processes, which were 
then included in the classification of groups. This reflects an iterative empirical approach for 
identifying relevant actors (Hjem and Hull 1982). The eventual listing of involved groups of 
public and private actors is presented below. 
1. Medical Practitioners47 
a. Government sector 
b. Private for-profit sector 
c. Voluntary sector 
2. Institutional (Hospital) Authorities48 
a. Government sector 
b. Private for-profit sector 
c. Voluntary sector 
3. Government General Health Authorities 
4. HIV I AIDS programme Authorities49 
5. Medical Professional Regulatory Authorities (Councils) 
6. Educators 
7. International Organizations 
a. United Nations technical agencies 
b. Donor agencies 
8. Civil Society Actors, subdivided into two groups 
a. Those engaged primarily in legal and policy advocacy 
b. Those engaged primarily in field level activities 
9. Medical Professional Associations 
10. Accreditation Agencies 
47 Also referred to interchangeably as "doctors" or "medical providers" 
48 Also referred to as "hospital administrators" 
49 HIV/AIDS programme authorities are sometimes referred to simply as "Programme authorities" or 
"Programme officials" in the follOwing chapters. 
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There is a particular concentration on medical practitioners as a group, in this study. See Chapter 
7 (7.1) for details of the putative roles of these different groups in the process of policy 
implementation. Representative individual actors from each group were selected and interviewed 
(see below). The participation of each different group of actors in implementation processes was 
viewed through a similar analyticallensso, without predetermining assumptions about prevailing 
structures and hierarchies (Hjem and Hull 1982). 
4.2.2 Hospital-based participants 
Principles of maximum variation sampling (Silverman 2004) were applied in respect to 
identifying hospitals for the study, based on two criteria: type of hospital and geographical zone. 
Nine urban hospitals were selected with representation from the government, private, and 
charitable sectors; and located in five cities, one each from the North, West, South, East and 
Central Zones of the country. Four government hospitals, three private hospitals (including one 
large hospital and two private nursing homes), and two charitable hospitals were identified. Once 
the parameters of sampling had been established, the actual hospitals were selected purposively, 
based on suggestions from colleagues and key informants. 
Individual participants from the hospitals were identified from departments likely to be associated 
with HIV testing and distributed across these departmental specializations, using the maximum 
variation principle (Silverman 2004). Apart from two counsellors, all these participants were 
medical professionals. Table 4.2 depicts the distribution of the participants across hospital types 
and specialities. This sample also included institutional authorities: participants with 
administrative responsibilities within the hospitals, either as superintendents, or heads of 
departments, but who were also medical professionals in their own right. A total of thirty-nine 
hospital-based respondents were interviewed, this fmal number being determined by adequate 
representation from different specialities. Of these, 12 were women and 27 were men. The least 
experienced of these were residents or postgraduate students, and the most senior were Professors 
and Heads of Department with as much as 40 years of experience. 
so See section 4.4 
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Gynaecologists 
Physicians Surgeons Venereologists I Obstetricians Microbiologists Counsellors Total 
Government 
Hospitals (4) 8 3 4 4 2 1 
Private 
Hospitals (3) 5 3 1 - 1 1 
Charitable 
Hospitals (2) 3 1 1 1 - -
Total 16 7 6 5 3 2 
Table 4.2 Hospital-based Participants by Hospital Type and Speciality 
4.2.3 Participants in other settings 
Participants representing different public and private organizations and government bureaus were 
selected for interviews. In most instances one or two individuals were interviewed per 
organization. Typically the participants were senior members (unless specified otherwise) with 
adequate experience and an awareness of the goals and objectives of their respective organization, 
and of its internal functioning. There were a total of 22 participants from non-hospital settings. 
An indicative map of the groups with the number of respondents interviewed from each group is 
presented below. A comprehensive listing of all study participants including dates on which they 
were interviewed is presented in Annexure 1. 
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Figure 4.5 Study Participants Representing Different Groups51 
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Professional 
Associations 
Indian Medical 
Association 
1 
Accreditation 
agencies 
Hospital and 
Laboratory 
Boards 
2 
51 Several precautions are taken here to protect the anonymity of respondents. For state level institutions (State Medical Council, Directorate of Health Services, SACS), 
the name of the state is not disclosed. The names of particular organizations are withheld, such as the donor organization, the hospitals and NGOs, either on the requests 
of respondents, or to prevent the identification of particular individuals. In instances where an organization's name is mentioned (with the consent of the respondent), 
care was taken to eJl&ure that the descriptive label used for that respondent could apply to any of five or more individuals. 
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4.3 FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION 
The fieldwork included depth interviews with study participants, discussions with key infonnants 
and a review of policy documents, and was conducted over one year, and involved my travel to 
each of the five cities included in the study. 
4.3.1 Depth interviews with study participants 
Appointments were sought from prospective participants telephonically, by email or by personal 
visits to their places of work. A number of individuals who were approached declined to 
participate, or indicated that they did not have the time to meet. In other instances, individuals 
were unavailable in spite of numerous attempts to establish contact with them. In most instances 
replacement participants were found and the resultant gaps in the overall body of data were not 
significant. In one instance, a potentially significant group may have been under-represented: 
functionaries of the State Directorate of Health Services were unavailable in spite of numerous 
telephonic attempts, and visits to the Directorate. A telephonic interview with an official advisor 
to the Directorate was arranged toward bridging this gap. 
Appointments were typically arranged in the participants' place of work. In the case of medical 
practitioners, all interviews were conducted within hospital premises. Within the hospitals the 
sites of interviews varied, and included doctors' offices, consulting rooms, duty rooms, and in one 
instance in the preparation room of an operation theatre. Other participants were typically 
interviewed in the offices which were their usual places of work. I was the sole investigator in the 
study, and conducted all interviews personally. A total number of 61 interviews were conducted, 
including 39 with hospital-based participants, 22 with participants from other settings. 
Face-to-face depth interviews (Grbich 1999, Yin 2003) with the study participants were 
conducted using a topic guide (see annexure for topic guides). The topic guide consisted of 
queries around respondents' participation in the implementation of HIV testing policies, and their 
interactions with other groups of policy actors. Respondents were encouraged to discuss the 
topics at length, and interviews were guided by probes (Britten 2000). 
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All interviews were preceded by the presentation of an infonnation sheetS2, after which verbal 
consent was obtained. No respondent declined interview after the presentation of the infonnation 
sheet. However respondents indicated varying preferences for the way in which they would be 
quoted, and the anonymity that their respective organizations would receive. 
As an investigator, I had prior experience of the field of study, having been a student and medical 
practitioner in a government hospital in India. This offered the advantages of an insider's status 
while interviewing medical practitioners. Respondents were possibly freer to volunteer sensitive 
infonnation, and saw me as a non-judgmental insider. In other settings, I frequently experienced 
prejudice, scepticism about the relevance of my research or the quality of my methodology, and 
distrust around my intentions. In all interviews, and during preliminary introductions and 
discussions, I attempted to identify and build on points of common experience. The aim of this 
was to gain the trust of the respondents so as to access "real" rather than official accounts and 
explanations (Fischer 2003), and also to personally achieve an appreciation of the inner 
motivations and impulses of the participants (Yanow 2000). Many non-hospital actors were also 
medically qualified, which was often an ice-breaker. As an erstwhile government employee 
myself, this identity was a way of establishing a connection with other public servants. 
In many instances, such markers of identification could not be established beforehand, but the 
process of conducting the interviews often allowed mutual trust to develop. It was on rare 
occasions that I felt unable to achieve appreciation of a respondent's viewpoints, or the sincerity 
of their responses. Most respondents had strong feelings and opinions around the subjects of 
inquiry, which they put across with compelling arguments, often illustrated by accounts of real-
life events. A number of respondents remarked on how the interview had been an unburdening 
and even a therapeutic process for them. 
Data collection was concluded when representatives of all the groups identified as being involved 
in implementation processes (pre-emptivelyand iteratively by respondents and key infonnants), 
had been interviewed. At the point of closure of data collection, no "new" names of organizations 
were being identified by respondents (Yanow 2000). 
S2 Information sheet is attached in Annexure 5 
74 
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
4.3.2 Key informant discussions 
Face-to face methods were also employed in conducting loosely structured discussions with key 
informants (Grbich 1999). Phenomena in the policy process which are publicly accessible are 
often best captured through key informant interviews, according to Yin (2003). Key informants 
were identified on the basis of their status and reputed knowledge in particular areas which were 
of relevance (Patton 2002), drawn from a list of academicians, experts, commentators, programme 
and public health officials, and civil servants. Loosely structured topic guides were developed 
depending on the areas of the informant's special knowledge. Interviews were conducted with an 
emphasis on eliciting descriptions and explanations of processes, such as influences on doctors' 
actions, or roles and interactions of policy actors (Yin 2003). Nine key informant interviews were 
conducted. A list of Key Informants is attached in Annexure 2. 
All interviews were electronically recorded or comprehensive hand-notes taken, depending on the 
respondent's preference. The recordings were transcribed verbatim into text in the computer 
programme Microsoft Word and entered in the qualitative data analysis programme Atlasffi 4.2. 
4.3.3 Contents of policy documents 
The constitutions of various institutions which are officially mandated with the task of 
implementing policies are often not easily accessible, or even available in the public domain. 
Often different policy documents from the same organizations contained contradictory 
information on the organizations' constitutional or putative roles. 
Relevant details of the constitutions of various groups were obtained from records and reports of 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; and from perusal of the official internet websites of 
government and private agencies. Visits to the offices of these institutions in the course of 
conducting the research study also allowed me to access some relevant official information which 
was not available widely. In the course of conducting the interviews, wherever possible, I 
collected relevant documentation which was germane to the topics being discussed. Documents 
included policy statements, reports of organizations or hospitals, circulars and minutes of 
meetings. The content of these materials was also sometimes useful in clarifying the context for 
respondents' accounts, and in guiding the discussions. 
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4.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data from interviews with study participants was analysed from an interpretivist perspective 
(Yanow 2000), which seeks to understand policy processes from the perspectives of the 
participant actors. Data from Key Informant interviews and from policy documents was 
thematically categorised on the basis of content, and not subjected to analysis. Data from policy 
documents too were taken at face value, and extracts were used to prepare section 7.1. 
4.4.1 Reading the data: the interpretivist approach 
Interpretivist policy analysis methodology offers an integrated way of understanding the nature of 
the policy-action relationship, in considering all processes to be essentially communicative 
(between individual actors or groups of actors), and contingent on their respective apperceptions 
and interpretations (Yanow 2003). Interpretivism is built on an understanding of the coexistence 
of multiple realities of different policy actors.53 Exchanges between policy actors are essentially 
viewed as communicative, either in verbal or symbolic terms. All actors in a policy situation, 
says Yanow, "interpret issue data as they seek to make sense of the policy". 
The aim for the analyst is to achieve an appreciation of the rationales within which policy actors 
think and act, by immersing himlherself in the values and beliefs of the respondents. The 
emphasis is not so much on describing policy processes, as on elaborating the meanings actors 
attach to those processes (Yanow 2000).54 Interpretive analysis is done by focusing on actors' 
expressions of real reasons and motives for actions, "as opposed to those officially offered" 
(Fischer 2003 pp.141-142). In accessing the apperceptions and interpretations of actors through 
depth qualitative methods, interpretive approaches may account for the role of various factors 
including beliefs, assessments of realities, values, self-interest and dominatory power in shaping 
53 Interpretivism is linked to relativist conceptions of the social construction of reality, but such ontological 
presumptions are not given pre-eminent importance. In Yanow's terms "the interpretive approach is less an 
argument contesting the nature of reality, than one about the human possibilities of knowing the world 
around us, and the character of that knowledge" (Yanow 2000, p7). This knowledge can then be used to 
understand opportunities for change on the part of different actors. 
54 Yanow (2000) identifies three roles of the interpretive policy analyst: 
Clarifying the varying interpretations of policy meanings made by different groups 
Understanding the various elements through which these meanings are communicated 
- Ensuring that underrepresented groups are enabled to make their interpretations heard 
The role of the interpretive analyst may involve generating new ideas, synthesizing opposing arguments and 
reframing debates; and is hence different from the traditional role of a policy analyst of advising designated 
policy decision-makers on making choices between available options (Yanow 2000, pp18-19). 
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actions and interactions. The knowledge of actors' motivations and systems of understanding 
derived from interpretivist research can be used also to understand their capabilities for change. 55 
The data from transcripts of participants' interviews was read through such an interpretivist lens. 
Themes that had emerged during the interviews were refreshed, and numerous new themes and 
interpretations came to light. In instances where I had difficulties in achieving an appreciation of 
respondents' viewpoints in the course of the interviews, re-reading their transcripts and relating 
this to the experience of the interview was an important step in achieving an appreciation of their 
interests and motives. 
4.4.2 Organizing the data 
For organizing the textual data from transcripts of interviews, the "framework" approach for 
applied policy analysis, combining inductive and deductive approaches was used (Ritchie and 
Spencer 1994).56 In policy analysis, an entirely generative approach is not appropriate (Pope et a1. 
2000), and in this case there are fairly narrow criteria defining the boundaries of the research. 
"Framework" allows the researcher to retain focus on the core areas of interest, without 
sacrificing the depth of inductive or grounded approaches. 57 The following sections elaborate the 
steps I followed in analysing the data, on the lines of the "framework" approach. 
Developing the thematic framework 
Following an intensive process of familiarizations with the data, a thematic framework or index 
was developed, corresponding with the second step of the framework approach (Ritchie and 
5S A communications-based approach is not simply a way of describing and explaining processes, but is also 
attuned to addressing strategic or prescriptive questions. The conscious use of debate in policy-planning 
has been regarded as having a potentially liberating influence on the policy process (Fischer and Forester 
1993). Healey (1993) argues that policy planning can and should be a "communicative enterprise", 
wrought through deliberative and respectful debate and argument between stakeholders (also Lasswell cited 
in Parsons 1995 p 445). Fischer (2003), developing the ideas of the philosopher Habennas, assert the 
positive and productive aspects of "communicative" power, in organizing action through discourse (also 
Dryzek 1987). For further discussion and application of these concepts, see Chapter 9 (9.2). 
S6 The approach was developed by the UK's National Centre for Social Research. 
S7 The steps in analysis recommended in the "framework" approach are: 
Familiarization with raw data 
Identifying a thematic framework, based on pre-determined objectives, and field level issues 
Indexing - by applying the thematic framework systematically to the data. 
Charting - rearranging the data into distilled summaries of views and experiences. 
Mapping and interpretation - using the charts to locate concepts, phenomena, typologies, and 
associations between themes. 
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Spencer 1994). Three layers or levels of thematic codes were developed and applied to the data: a 
priori themes determined by the topic guide, emergent issues arising from interviewees' responses 
and analytical themes based on prominent patterning of emergent themes. 
At the broadest level, all transcripts were indexed into two overlapping coding categories or 
super-codes, corresponding with the core areas of enquiry. 
- Category A: Relating to their own participation in implementation of policies 
- Category B: Relating to interactive processes between groups 
Levell or surface themes (see Box 4.1 below): this level of codes corresponded to the a priori 
themes raised in the topic guidess8, and hence differed slightly between different groups 
corresponding with the variations in the topic guide. For instance, medical practitioners were 
asked specifically about implementing different aspects of the HIV testing policies, and other 
actors were asked for a general description of their involvement. 
Category A: Participation in policy implementation 
Subcategory: general account of involvement (aI/ respondents except medical 
practitioners) 
1.1 Organization's expected role in implementing policies 
1.2 Description I account of actual experience 
Subcategory: account of experience for each aspect of policy (only medical 
practitioners) 
1.3 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
Selectivity in testing 
Mandatory testing 
Informed consent 
Confidentiality 
Category 8: Interactive processes between groups 
Subcategory: Description of interactions with respective groups 
1.7 Institutional Administrators 
1 .8 Govemment and Legislature 
1.9 HIVIAIDS programme 
1.10 Professional Regulatory Authorities 
1.11 Educational and Academic Platforms 
1.12 International Organizations 
1.13 Civil Society Organizations 
1 .14 Professional Associations 
1.15 Accreditation Agencies 
1.16 Others 
Box 4.1 Levell (A PriOri) Index of Codes 
58 Topic guides are presented in Annexures 3 and 4 
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The second layer of analysis dealt with emerging themes from the respondents' accounts. 
Emerging themes were broadly divided along the lines of their perceptions and actions around 
implementing policies. Both conscious (overtly stated) and unconscious expressions of 
respondents' perceptions were noted (Silverman 2001). Under Category A (roles in 
implementing policies) emerging themes were classified into subcategories based on respondents' 
reports of their actions in the process of implementing policies, and their explanations for these 
actions. Likewise, data under category B was categorized in terms of respondents' experiences of 
interactions with other groups and their explanations for the nature of these interactions. 
Respondents' opinions and feelings about the relevant aspect of policy implementation or about 
interactions with the other groups were also classified (see Table 4.3). 
In developing the analytical theme categories, respondents' explanations for actions, and the 
meanings they attached to processes were given particular importance, in keeping with the aims of 
the interpretivist approach (Yanow 2000). Vickers' formulations (1965) of the appreciative 
dimensions of the individual response: reality judgements, value judgements and action 
judgements were useful in classifying respondents' explanations of their actions, particularly in 
the case of medical practitioners (see discussion of Vickers' model, page 55). Other important 
themes that emerged were ambivalences around roles and "rationales" as a guide to action (see 
discussion on page 56, particularly Hjern and Porter (1981». Functional and ideational 
dimensions were subcategories used to classify codes relating to interactions and relationships 
between actor groups, drawing from Yanow (2000) and Fischer (2003) (see page 59). 
Communicative intent and efforr9 were analytical themes used to evaluate the "rationality" of 
policy processes and suggest strategic change, drawing from Healey (1993). 
Table 4.3 summarises the thematic subcategories used for organizing the data from participant 
interviews. 
59 These themes are discussed in detail in Chapter 9, and criteria of communicative rationality are outlined 
in section 9.2.1 
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Category A: Participation In Category B: Interactive Processes 
Implementation of Policies between Groups 
A priori themes Organization's expected role in implementing General description of interrelationships 
policies (all except medical practitioners) with other groups 
General description of actual experience (all 
except medical practitioners) 
Experience of implementing each aspect of 
HIV testing policy (only medical practitioners) 
Emergent themes Account of actions in implementing policies Experience of interactions with other 
(or not) groups 
Explanations for actions Explanations for the experiences 
Related opinions and feelings Related opinions and feelings 
Analytical themes Role perceptions and rationales Functional dimension 
Judgements of reality (what is) Ideational dimension 
Value orientations (what ought) Communicative intent and effort 
Action judgements (what to do, how to do it) 
Table 4.3 Thematic Framework for Participant Interviews 
Indexing and charting 
The thematic framework, once developed was applied systematically to the data (Ritchie and 
Spencer 1994). First, a priori codes were attached to the relevant segments of text, using the 
computer programme Atlas Ti. These coded chunks of data were then retrieved and copied into 
separate files (Microsoft Word documents). A separate file folder was created for each group, 
containing several of these documents, corresponding to each a priori theme. Hence ten file 
folders were created corresponding to the ten groups in the study, each with between three and 
fourteen documents containing data of their accounts of their participation in implementing 
policies and on interrelationships with other groups. 
The second layer of the index was then applied to each of these documents separately, and the 
textual data from each group was organized into matrices or charts with the columns representing 
the emergent theme categories (actions or experiences / explanations for actions / opinions and 
affect), and the rows representing different respondents. These matrices were used as the 
templates for writing up the fmdings, as in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. A section of one such matrix -
from the accounts of three medical practitioners on the topic of mandatory testing policies -is 
presented as an illustrative example as Table 4.4. 
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Matrices of emergent themes enabled intra-case and cross-case comparisons, which helped in the 
development of analytical themes. Once the analytical code categories were determined, they 
were similarly applied to each initial document and chunks of text corresponding to the analytical 
themes were retrieved, and written up as a report (analytical themes are found mainly in Chapter 
8). In some instance diagrams and tabulations were used to illustrate particular findings. 
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Respondent Actions Explanations for actions Opinion and affect Notes for analytical themes 
# 19 Do not do it Obedience to government policy Agree with policy generally Routine screening described as a policy: 
Gynaecologist "Even a Gynae "as far the government set-ups are "nothing should be compulsory" "we don't have any policy of routine screening 
surgical patient that we concemed we are all bound by the for HIV in any of our population either Obs or 
operate we do not get governments directions, which we Gynae." 
their HIV test done as receive, and for us there is no 
a routine screening" policy of routine screening for all 
patients" 
#29 Do it sornetimes Compliance Disagree with policy Fear of HIV among surgeons and OT staff 
Surgeon "when we have clinical "I think the Government of India "By and large I think most people Adapting to ensure continuance of core 
suspicious situations, regulation wants that the person would like to know if somebody is functions: 
we do it but it is not a has to be counselled for HIV even HIV positive .. : 
"I can take a view that if something is not done routine" before he is informed, and 
screening for HIV is not allowed." then we will not do this case, but at the end of 
the day it is the patient who is not getting any Public health logic care so that is not the situation which is 
Co-worker factors "by not screening them ... I am acceptable at the end of the day." 
sure that we are losing out quite a 
"whenever we had to do surgery bit (on diagnosing HIV)" 
on one such or even the Clinical logic -maximizing knowledge of 
contemplation of surgery, it condition: 
produces a lot of reaction ... and 
"By and large I think most people would like to the theater staff they all feel as if it 
is an invitation to death or Emotive importance know if somebody is HIV positive .. : 
something and they really resist 
"it is a big issue for us!" 
any such effort." 
"nobody is ready to make way for 
them (HIV+ patients)" 
#24 Do it sometimes Pressure from clinicians to do Disagree with policy Secrecy culture around rnandatory testing: 
Microbio/ogist (under pressure from mandatory testing "I think they are justified," (in "This is something people try to keep hush-clinicians) 
'We are actually not supposed to testing) hush. I don't know why we are not openly 
'We are actually not do pre-operative HIV checking discussing this issue" 
supposed to do pre- ... but we do get requests again 
operative HIV and again and again .... " Discretion: 
------
---- ------_ .. _-----
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checking ... but we do "You shouldn't test everybody" but Adapting to accommodate clinicians: 
get requests again and "let the doctor decide when it is 
"We are actually not supposed to do pre-again and again .... so required" 
we tick them under the operative HIV checking ... but we do get 
schedule of referred "We should assess if the person is requests again and again and again .... 
client." high-risk" 
Subversion of rules: 
Against HIV exceptionalism: 
" ... so we tick them under the schedule of 
"When you can order a syphilis referred client." 
serology, then why can't they 
order a HIV?" 
Beneficence assumption: 
"It is for the patient's benefit after I 
all! We are not doing to protect , 
ourselves. All the time, it has 
been projected as though if we get 
the HIV testing done, 
its not for the benefit of the patient, 
but it is to protect us. That is not 
the issue!" 
Table 4.4 Section of a Matrix of Emergent Themes60 
60 From government medical practitioners' narratives on mandatory testing 
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Transcripts of discussions with Key Informants were coded on the basis of the content of their 
accounts into three categories: Indian medical providers' behaviour, perceptions and influences; 
roles of various groups in implementing policies; and nature of associations between different 
groups. Coded segments were retrieved and organized by category. 
4.4.3 Interpreting and presenting the fmdings 
There are many ways in which interpretations can be made from the data, according to Ritchie 
and Spencer, which are guided by the research questions and by the themes and associations 
which have emerged from the data.61 The interpretive process is not mechanistic but requires 
intuition and imagination on the part of the analyst (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). The four 
succeeding Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are oriented around presenting the findings from the analysis of 
participants' accounts.62 Chapters are divided on the lines of the group that the participants 
belong to, and on the thematic layer or level of analysis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are constructed in tenns of narratives of medical practitioners interviewed, 
organized on the basis of Levell themes and emergent themes. Chapter 7 outlines the putative 
roles (the written constitutions) of different groups63 (hence addressing the focus of research 
question 2)64, and then traces accounts of participants representing each of the other groups. In 
these three chapters, quotations are liberally used in the presentation of the respondents' accounts, 
especially those of medical practitioners (Roe 1994, Yanow 2000). Verbatim narratives, as were 
obtained by recording and faithfully transcribing the interviews, are useful in interpretive analysis 
because they convey ftrst hand, actors' words and phrases in the interpretation of policies and 
processes. These three chapters (5, 6 and 7) are focused largely on the "how" and "what" aspects 
of the research questions, particularly questions 1, 3 and 4; "How do medical practitioners in 
hospitals in India respond to national policies", "What are the different policy actors' roles in 
implementing HN testing policies?" and "How do practitioners and different policy actors 
interact with each other?". Ranges and natures of phenomena (actors' experiences of their 
participation in implementation, and their interactions) are presented, the aim being to describe 
61 Examples of interpretations defined by Ritchie and Spencer include: identifying concepts as defined by 
respondents, mapping the range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, 
providing explanations and developing strategies (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
62 Serial numbers of respective respondents (in parentheses) are attached to their quotations and in instances 
where they are cited in the text. Annexure 1 contains a full serialised listing of respondents with dates and 
venues of interviews, for reference. 
63 Drawing on data from the contents of policy documents 
64 Research questions in Chapter 4 (page 65) 
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and illustrate the "living" processes of implementation, from the perspectives of the actors 
themselves (Hjern and Hull 1982). 
Chapter 8 synthesizes the analytical themes, and the resultant discussions are structured on the 
lines of the subcategories of analytical themes (see Table 4.3). In this chapter the emphasis is on 
"why" questions - demonstrating associations and providing explanations for the behaviour of 
different groups, and for the nature of communicative processes. The development of strategies 
toward the convergence of policies and practices (corresponding to research question 5) are 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
4.5 QUALITY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Credibility, system and fair dealing 
In the constructivist approach, according to Fischer, it is presumed that the world is constituted of 
multiple realities of different actors, and hence "validity" in the sense of an objective assessment 
of the truth, is not of paramount relevance. Instead, credibility or trustworthiness, defined as "the 
compatibility of the constructed realities that exist in the minds of respondents, with those that are 
attributed to them" may be a more relevant standard (Fischer 2003 p.154). Such credibility can be 
assessed by determining whether the descriptions developed through the research inquiry "ring 
true". According to Erlandson et al., a credible inquiry is "".typically imprecise in defining 
boundaries and specific relationships ... but rich in providing depth of meaning and richness of 
understanding" (Erlandson et al. 1993 p.30). It is desirable for this assessment to be made by 
individuals from the setting where the research was conducted. I presented preliminary 
hypotheses and findings to key informants, and to study participants in the course of collecting 
data, for their opinions on the credibility of the accounts. Adjustments to the lines of 
interpretation were made iteratively in the course of the study, based on their feedback. 
Reflexivity is sensitivity to of the role of the researcher and the research process in influencing the 
way the data is collected or interpreted (Mays and Pope 2000). Previous sections contain details 
about my role in the research process, and my personal antecedents and motivations in 
undertaking the research. Annexure I contains a full timeline of the interviews as they were 
undertaken. 
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The framework approach for analysis allows the investigator to explicitly demonstrate that the 
research process was systematic (Ritchie and Spencer 1994), which is an important criterion for 
assuring reliability (Mays and Pope 2000). The stepwise process of developing a thematic 
framework, applying it and interpreting the results has been presented in previous sections.. In 
that the entire study, including data collection and analysis, was undertaken by a single researcher, 
a high degree of unifonnity and internal validity in the collection and interpretation of the 
research can be assumed. 
"Fair dealing" is the process of ensuring that the views of particular groups are not presented as 
the sole truth about a situation (Dingwall 1992). The inclusive nature of the research design and 
the range of actors who are interviewed ensure that a multiplicity of perspectives is represented, 
even as the views of particular actors, specifically medical practitioners, are represented more 
than others. 
Limitations of the methodology 
The study adopts a lens of looking at policy processes through the perspectives of individual 
actors. The research is substantively based on individual accounts, and objective criteria such as 
the transfer of funds and management structures are not examined independently but are of 
relevance only as contexts for the narratives of the participants. This focus could be said to be 
biased towards seeking micro-level and individualized explanations, and relatively neglecting 
broader structural factors and contexts. 
Organizations have complex and multiple roles in the larger policy environment, and often may 
not fit perfectly within the delineation of groups that has been used. It is also recognized that 
these individuals may not be "perfect" representatives of their respective organizations, although 
efforts were made to select respondents who had positions of authority, and significant experience 
and knowledge of organizational objectives and functions. Furthennore, participants often had 
affiliations to more than one organizational entity - for example the HIV / AIDS programme and 
the hospital they work in - and were subject to the logics and rationales of these different 
affiliations.65 These themes are addressed in depth as part of the analysis, particularly in Chapter 
8 (8.1.2). 
Medical professionals formed the main core of the study, and it is likely that the themes around 
other actors' perspectives are not equally well developed and supported. Also, the perspectives 
65 See related discussion on page 56 
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of patients are not explored. Patients and PLHA rights groups are represented among the civil 
society organizations however, and their perspectives may be seen to have some reflection in 
those of patients. 
Whereas urban hospitals. the focus of this study, are a very important context for health service 
delivery in India, there are other segments of the health sector which may have different dynamics 
of policy-action relationships. There are also considerable regional differences in India, culturally 
and in tenns of the HN epidemiology. These regional differences are not explored, primarily 
because the geographical reasons where hospitals are located are not identified, for pwposes of 
confidentiality of respondents. Crucially the north-east region of India, where there is high HN 
prevalence in some states, and the characteristics of the HN epidemic are distinct from other 
areas, is not represented. 
The process of organizing and analyzing the data, including developing and applying the thematic 
framework reflect a more messy and uncertain reality than is apparent in the preceding sections of 
this chapter. Analysis did not proceed in a straightforward and time-bound fashion, and 
modifications and adaptations were made in the thematic framework, based on fresh insight and 
information gained in the process of the research. Incorporating this "messiness" in the write-up 
would, however, have entailed losing clarity in describing what are complex processes in any 
case. 
Ethics review 
Local institutional ethics review was conducted with the help of the collaborating institution, the 
Sexual Health Resource Centre, New Delhi. A panel of local experts and stakeholder 
representatives formed the review committee. The committee reviewed and passed the research 
proposal. The LSHTM ethics review committee also deliberated on and passed the proposal. The 
official form of clearance from the LSHTM, and the text of the email from the local committee 
are attached in Annexure 6. 
Interviews were conducted and (in some instances) recorded following verbal consent. A 
standardized information sheet (approved by local and LSHTM ethics review committees) were 
presented to respondents before obtaining verbal consent. The information sheet is attached in the 
Annexure 5. Respondents were specifically advised to inform the interviewer if they wished any 
part of their exchanges not to be quoted. 
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In keeping with LSHTM committee recommendations, considerable care had to be taken to mask 
details of certain characteristics or affiliations of individuals and institutions which may have 
allowed them to be identified. Instances of these precautions have been footnoted throughout the 
text of the thesis. On occasion, these measures may have detracted from the quality of the 
inferences that could be made about a particular actors' role or relationship with other actors. 
Transcripts of interviews and recordings were accessible only to me. The anonymity of 
respondents and institutions was protected by not revealing the names of individuals, hospitals, 
and cities. In some instances when organizations are cited by name, it was with the prior approval 
of the respondent. In quoting individuals, it was ensured that there could never be less than five 
people who matched a particular identifier (e.g. "senior scientist in a national research institute" 
or "junior surgeon in a government hospital"). Prior approval was obtained from respondents 
about the personal and institutional identifiers to be used while quoting them. 
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Chapter 5. Medical Practitioners' Accounts: Implementing Policy 
Guidelines 
This chapter is based on the accounts of medical practitioners from the nine hospitals in the study, 
around their actions in advising HIV tests. to clients and patients, focused specifically on 
implementing NACO's policies for HN testing. Data from key informant interviews was also 
used to provide contextual information. In keeping with recommendations of the LSHTM ethics 
committee, care has been taken to exclude details about interviewees which may have allowed 
them to be identified. 
5.1 HOSPITAL SETTINGS 
General facilities and admission procedures at the hospitals 
The four government hospitals, two charitable hospitals and one private hospital are all multi-
speciality multi-department institutions, with outpatient departments (OPD), emergency services 
and ante-natal care (ANC) departments. The two private nursing homes saw outpatients and also 
admitted some patients for indoor care. One of the nursing homes also had a surgical department 
with operating theatres and post-operative facilities. 
In the government and charitable hospitals, newly arriving out-patients were required to queue at 
a registration counter where they received OPD cards, and were directed to the appropriate 
department, where they then awaited their turn to meet a doctor. Following consultation and 
assessment, patients were either treated on an out-patient basis or admitted to in-patient wards. 
Returning outpatients were required to produce their OPD cards, upon which they were admitted 
directly to the appropriate departmental waiting rooms. Ante-natal clinics were run in a similar 
fashion to the OPDs. The emergency ward in the Government Hospital and Charitable Hospital 
was typically fronted by a casualty desk where patients were screened and directed to the 
appropriate emergency room - medical, surgical, orthopaedic etc. 
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The private hospital and the two private nursing homes were all fronted by a reception, which 
issued appointments to clients to meet the consultants, based on their consulting hours. 
HIV related facilities and programmes 
Doctors in all the hospitals were actively diagnosing and treating HIV positive patients, for HIV 
related illnesses as well as for unrelated illnesses and health needs. All four government hospitals 
and one of the charitable hospitals ran Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres (VCTC) , 
staffed by counsellors. The private hospital had HIV counsellors on staff. All four government 
hospitals, both charitable hospitals and the private hospital had diagnostic science departments 
with laboratories with the facilities to conduct HIV tests by the ELISA method. The two private 
nursing homes did not have laboratory facilities in-house to diagnose HIV. All the government 
hospitals had free or subsidised anti-retroviral therapy (ART) programmes, with the drugs being 
prescribed and dispensed at the respective hospitals. One charitable hospital had facilities to 
arrange low cost ART for poor patients. Three of the four Government hospitals and one 
Charitable hospital also had operational Prevention of Parent to Child Transmission (PPTCT) 
programmes, with counsellors, either instituted as regular programmes or running on a pilot basis. 
Outpatient I HIV Treatment HIV TestIng Lab VCTCI 
Inpatient and Care In-House Counsellor 
Government Hospital 1 Both Yes Yes VCTC 
Government Hospital 2 Both Yes Yes VCTC 
Government Hospital 3 Both Yes Yes VCTC 
Government Hospital 4 Both Yes Yes VCTC 
Charitable Hospital 1 Both Yes Yes VCTC 
Charitable Hospital 2 Both Yes Yes No 
Private hospital 1 Both Yes Yes Counsellor 
Private nursing home 1 Both Yes No No 
Private nursing home 2 Both Yes No No 
Table 5.1 Services and Facilities in the Nine Hospitals66 
66 Further details of facilities available are not revealed to protect confidentiality of the hospitals 
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Profile of clientele 
All the government hospitals are general hospitals and cater to a large clientele with a variety of 
illnesses and health needs. The clientele come from different parts of the cities in which the 
hospitals are located, and also from outlying areas in the home state and neighbouring states.67 
Patients travel long distances, sometimes for days from their homes, and wait in long queues 
before they can be admitted to see the doctor. 
[For a patient] to get seen [by a doctor] is a big thing, because it takes 
time. You know, to get your [registration] paper made, and hang on 
Junior venereologist, government hospital (27) 
The two charitable hospitals and the private hospital were also general hospitals, and similarly 
received a clientele from a wide geographical area across more than one state. The two nursing 
homes reported having a predominantly local clientele.68 Government hospitals were either free 
or charged a small registration fee. A large proportion of patients accessing government hospitals 
are from the lower socio-economic strata69, while a minority were reported as being from "the 
middle or upper middle classes".7o According to one internist from a government hospital,71 
many of their patients were illiterate, particularly those from rural areas and women. Both 
charitable hospitals also provided low cost care, and received a similar clientele from the poorer 
and middle socio-economic classes. The private for-profit hospital and nursing homes received a 
relatively more affluent "middle-class to upper middle-class" clientele.72 
5.2 SELECTIVITY IN TESTING 
NACO policies require practitioners to exercise specificity in selecting patients for diagnostic 
testing.73 The statement contains an implicit note of caution and opposes indiscriminate testing. 
The decision to go for a HIV test, in a clinical setting, and the final act of performing the HN test 
67 S everal respondents (02, 14,41) 
68 Respondent 67: physician, private nursing home 
69 S everal respondents (14, 21, 23) 
70 Respondent 27: junior trainee venereologist, government hospital 
71 Respondent 13: senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
72 Respondent 67: physician, private nursing home 
73 See Chapter I (1.2.1) for the wording of the NACO policy 
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usually involves the participation of both the practitioner and the patient. In the following 
section, we look at the practitioners' part in these decisions.74 
5.2.1 Different aims of testing in a clinical setting7S 
Clinical case management 
Counsellors in government hospital VCTCs reported that numbers of clients who were internally 
referred by hospital doctors with the aim of making a clinical diagnosis exceeded those who 
voluntarily accessed the VCTCs.76 Clinical management of HIV & AIDS had steadily grown as 
ail area of interest for clinicians, receiving a significant boost in parts of the government sector 
where ART is available, and increasing numbers of patients were being actively treated for 
HIV/AIDS and HIV related illnesses.77 
Doctors in all the hospitals were involved in clinical management of patients with HIV/AIDS. 
Broadly speaking, the bulk of clinical management was shared between departments of internal 
medicine and venereology, while gynaecologists and obstetricians were involved mainly in 
diagnosing patients and referring them on to the other two departments for management. Doctors 
in seven of the nine hospitals were involved in prescribing HAART. In one private nursing home 
and one charitable hospital where ART was not widely used, patients were managed for 
opportunistic infections and incident illnesses.78 In some of the bigger hospitals, government, 
charitable and private, ART-based care has become an established practice, and teams of 
physicians are involved in HIV care for in-patients and outpatients.79 
We are seeing many more cases, and certainly my and my unit's 
involvement has been because of physically looking after lots of patients 
and understanding the need, and feeling in some way part of it. .. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
74 Since the precise criteria for specificity are not spelt out, it cannot be detennined categorically whether 
policy is being followed or not. Practitioners' approaches to selecting clients / patients for HIV testing can 
however be subjectively assessed. 
75 Testing for public health surveillance or scientific research are not included since they are not 
traditionally aims of a routine doctor-client interaction. 
76 Respondent 42: counsellor, government hospital voluntary testing and counselling centre 
77 Respondent 30: senior physician, government hospital 
78 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
79 Several respondents (13, 15,38) 
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Unanimously, the physicians felt that HN testing was a vital step and knowledge of HN status 
was an essential element in clinical management of the patient. 
It helps you in making the medical diagnosis ... there is a huge difference 
between somebody is breathless with HN, or without HN - the 
diagnosis differs greatly. 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
A patient comes normally I suspect garden-variety pneumonia. In HIV 
there is a good chance this may be PCP.80 I can't test for PC - you know 
what it's like, the microbiology department have other things to do. 
Unless I test for HIV, how will I know how to treat him? 
Senior physician, government hospital (33) 
Even in contexts where medical treatment was not always available or follow up could not be 
ensured, respondents noted other benefits of HIV testing for the patient and the community, 
including counselling, partner protection and opportunities for behaviour change.S1 
If I am not able him to give the care then at least I can refer for the better 
care. Even the smallest possible effort in India can help the person. 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
Safer maternity and prevention of transmission 
Women attending Ante-natal clinics in government hospitals were routinely tested for HIV, 
usually following group pre-test counselling. If they were found to be HN positive, they would 
generally be offered individual post-test counselling, and advice on prevention of transmission, 
breastfeeding, contraception. They are offered ante-natal prophylaxis in late pregnancy. They 
would also be referred to another department (either Medicine or Venereology) for assessment 
and management, including ART if they met requisite clinical criteria.82•83 
Practitioners' self-interest 
Another aim of HIV testing, and one which goes against policy recommendations is self-interest, 
to enable the doctor to take steps to avoid acquiring the infection from the patient. This rationale 
80 Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, an opportunistic infection found in PLHA but rare in non-HIV patients. 
81 S everal respondents (13,14, 17,36) 
82 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
83 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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for testing is found in the common practice of pre-surgical HIV screening of patients. This topic 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following section on mandatory testing.84 
5.2.2 Criteria for selecting patients for testing 
The table below lists criteria commonly cited by doctors in selecting patients for HIV testing. 
Major Minor 
-
Tested for HIV before 
-
History of high risk behaviour 
-
HIV in spouse, parent 
-
History of septic abortion 
-
Tuberculosis 
-
Fever of unknown origin 
-
STls 
-
Chronic diarrhoea 
-
Recurrent Herpes 
-
Weight loss 
- Reactive arthritis - Cough and pneumonias 
- Non-response to treatment with - Candidiasis 
antibiotics 
-
Skin manifestations 
Table S.2 Criteria for Identifying Patients for HIV Testing 
Tuberculosis and STIs were the most commonly cited clinical risk factors. 85•86 Many HN 
positive patients who came to hospitals for treatment had already been tested for HIV elsewhere 
(a phenomenon which is discussed in detail in Appendix 2 of the thesis), and this would 
commonly be grounds enough for repeating and conflrming the test result, according to one 
government venereologist' .. .if he comes (from a private practitioner) with one ELISA test - I am 
not going to take that as positive, I am going to repeat him for the HN test for sure. ,87 
In government and charitable hospitals, patients were reported to come at late stages, with a 
spectrum of OIs found in advanced HIV infection. Testing spouses and children of HIV positive 
patients was seen as a way of detecting patients earlier in the progression of the disease.88 
84 According to one respondent (08), private hospitals also used HIV testing as a money-making 
opportunity by charging excessively for tests although this was not widely supported, since the costs of HI V 
testing are quite low and profit margins likely to be small compared to other investigations commonly 
advised in the private medical sector. 
85 Respondent 27: Junior trainee venereologist, government hospital 
86 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
:: Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
Several respondents (13, 20, 37) 
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Nonnally the infections which are suspected are opportunistic infections 
like TB, MDR TB and all those typical infection, like candidiasis. You 
know in India most of the patients come at a very late stage. . .. most 
patients are stage three or four disease - they walk in late. And very often 
we get a very low CD4 count. The ones which are picked up earlier are 
the spouses. There may be children. 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (37) 
Physicians reported that it was often difficult to elicit histories of risk-taking, and they sometimes 
resorted to indirect queries around sexual history. Combinations of different risk factors were 
usually implicated in suspicion ofHIV - see Table 5.2.89 Most physicians in all the hospitals used 
either one or more suspicion criteria and exercised their individual clinical judgment in selecting 
candidates for testing. 
In some cases, however, algorithms were used to identify patients, or patients were tested 
universally. In one government hospital, and a charitable hospital the doctors reported that all 
patients with STDs were sent for HIV tests.90 Another government hospital doctor reported that 
'scoring systems' were used to support a decision to test. These approaches were based on shared 
clinical experience according to the respondent. 
.. .it is something that has evolved in the unit, and it is not just me. All 
the people in my unit think that way. Their eyes are tuned because we 
have been doing this for many years now. And they have seen as a 
reference, our seniors and consultants doing that. 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
In the case of ante-natal HIV testing, obstetricians in a government hospital reported that they 
aimed to offer counselling and testing to all pregnant women, but were sometimes unable to do so 
because of a shortage of counselling staff and testing kits to cope with the large numbers of ANC 
attendees.91 •92 
5.2.3 Growing knowledge and awareness around HIV 
Compared to the present day, in the 1980s and 1990s HIV medicine was still a new and poorly 
understood science. In the absence of a defmitive treatment for HIV, confidence and interest 
around HIV management was reported to be at low ebb. Discrimination and denial of treatment 
89 S everal respondents (14, 16,24,67) 
90 Several respondents (18, 23, 27, 28) 
91 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
92 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
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around HIV were prevalent, even in the more well appointed urban hospitals, according to some 
respondents.93•94 
Acquiring skills and confidence 
Doctors said that they had grown in confidence over time, thanks to greater clinical experience, 
training and investments by their institutions in improving and upscaling HIV care. 
We have come to a point that every senior faculty and junior teachers, 
residents and postgraduate students... they are all engaged in HIV and 
STD care. So it has become a team effort. 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (13) 
A key element of greater clinical confidence around HIV was the impulse to identify more 
patients with HIV. Making a diagnosis of HIV was felt to be an important new skill by 
physicians and venereologists, and widening of the 'index of suspicion' diagnose more patients 
with HIV was seen as a sign of scientific progress.95 Opportunities to enhance their skills and 
learn about HIV were not available to all doctors however. According to respondents from the 
private nursing homes, in-service training courses were usually available only to government 
employees and opportunities for private sector doctors were limited.96 In the large private 
hospital, interest in HIV care was not widespread and was limited to a few motivated 
consultants.97 
Heightened awareness of personal risk 
As the epidemic spread and more people were detected with HIV, doctors also acquired a 
heightened consciousness of the risk of acquiring HIV in a clinical encounter. According to a 
number of respondents this was one reason for a rise in HIV tests advised by doctors.98 HIV 
testing is commonly used as a screening test before patients are admitted for treatment or invasive 
93 Respondent 65: Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
94 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
95 S everal respondents (02, 13, 14,67) 
96 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home and trainee in intensive HIV educational programme 
97 Respondent 41: Venereologist, 15 years experience, private hospital 
98 Several respondents (08, 21, 23, 24, 67) 
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procedures (see Chapter 1). For some doctors however, awareness about HIV was equated with 
little more than knowledge of their own vulnerability, and the need to screen their patients.99,IOO 
[speaking of colleagues] ... some of them do not know too many things 
about HNIAIDS so they are not thinking about that kind of vulnerability . 
. . . to some extent they are using the precautions, not in the fonn of 
universal precautions, but general precautions. They are advising the tests 
before surgery. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
The phenomenon of mandatory screening before surgery is discussed in detail in section 5.3. 
5.2.4 Zeal for clinical investigation 
Once doctors acquired a certain degree of confidence around HIV management, their regular 
impulses of advising diagnostic tests freely tended to assert themselves. The impulse to make a 
diagnosis is part of a clinician's role identity, and the idea of consciously not advising a 
diagnostic test, or reducing the number of tests advised, was difficult to comprehend for some 
respondents. 101,102 
[If we don't test] then we will not come to know where we stand! And 
unless and until we know where we stand, we cannot take all the 
measures. 
Microbiologist, 13 years experience, Private hospital (39) 
The enthusiasm for HIV testing however was not just driven by altruism, Doctors expressed 
feelings of accomplishment in diagnosing HIV103,104 were indicative of a growing interest in the 
science of HIV medicine, as described before. The keenness in advising HIV tests was also 
described as characteristic of an inclination of doctors towards all things technological. 
Common precautions like say hand-washes between the patients, very 
few doctors would do it but when it comes into ordering ELISA test or a 
sophisticated immunological test or a high tech test for TB they would 
not hesitate in ordering. 
Senior physician, charitable hospital (36) 
99 Respondent 08: Senior physician, private nursing home 
100 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
101 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
102 Respondent 37: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
103 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
104 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
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In some instance this zeal for investigation may have been excessive and exceeded the utility of 
the test as a tool for management, and subordinated the rights and interests of patients. 
You also still have senior persons in the faculty when they get a 
suspected [HN] sero-positive, or maybe a sero-positive, and the entire 
interview is diverted towards it as though Sherlock Holmes is trying to 
find out how you got the infection! 
Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (16) 
5.2.5 The "HAART" effect 
Doctors from the government and charitable hospitals reported a shift in their attitudes towards 
HN and HIV testing, after free or low cost anti-retroviral therapy became more freely available in 
the government sector since 2004. In the 1980s and 1990s, ART was available in the private 
market but was expensive. Treatment choices for HIV / AIDS were limited in the charitable and 
voluntary sectors with a mainly low-income clientele. In the absence of effective low-cost 
treatment specifically for HIV, and what were perceived as limited opportunities to improve 
patients' lives, levels of motivation to manage HIV were low. In some quarters, there was a 
feeling that it was not essential, and even possibly damaging for some patients to advise a HIV 
test, given the highly stigmatized nature of the disease. 
ARV access was very poor at the time [the 1990s], it was mainly a 
private sector affair, and the cost of the drugs was very high. 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (13) 
[The mindset was that] you are going to treat the OIs anyhow ... when he 
gets TB you will treat him... By testing [for HIV], you were creating 
stigma around the disease which was worse than the disease itself. So we 
were going with a very conservative stance of testing. There was a 
reluctance [to test]. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
Impact of low-cost HAART on HIV testing 
In recent years conservatism around HIV testing has diminished, and tests are freely prescribed in 
the awareness that HAART is widely available at a low cost. Doctors now tend to value the 
opportunity to treat the patient. This physician from a charitable hospital said he tried to 
communicate this optimism to his patients. 
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Earlier I was reluctant to discuss this with a patient, I would not tell a 
patient, I would ask for risk factors for HIV, but I would never say that 
OK, you do an HIV test because TB is an indication. Today I am telling 
patients that TB can be associated with HIV, if we can diagnose HIV 
then you can live longer. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
In the era of HAART, doctors' notions around the untreatability of HIV have faded, and even in 
hospitals where HAART was not available, more HIV tests were being conducted, with a view to 
other benefits to the patient and community at large. lOS 
5.2.6 Role ambivalence in government hospitals 
Government hospitals as institutions have a dual role in fulfilling certain public health roles, and 
also providing curative services. Sometimes these institutional roles overlapped and conflicted, 
and the practitioners experienced that ambivalence. 
In the early years of the HIV epidemic, the thrust of the Natipnal AIDS Control Programme was 
on the prevention of HIV infections, and on setting up systems for surveillance to estimate the 
extent of the epidemic. Government hospitals were often centrally involved in these public health 
activities with HIV sero-surveillance centres being set up, but, given the small number of patients 
with HIV infection at the time, the staff were not experienced in curative care for PLHA. 106 
However, over time, growing numbers of patients with HIV related illnesses seeking care 
increased and hospital staff had to adapt to an additional care-providing role. One respondent 
reported how the nomenclature for the HIV testing centre in the hospital changed to reflect these 
changing roles of the hospital. 
lOS 
Our testing centres changed their names from sero-surveillance centres to 
HIV testing centres. And one day, when I was attending a meeting 
everybody was talking about vcr. And I asked "yeh kya hai, VCT?" 
[what is this VCT?] and they got very annoyed with me. You have been 
testing for the last so many years, you don't know what is VCT? It is 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing. So it became VCT. Then later 
somebody said that, no, it is VCCT, Voluntary Confidential Counselling 
and Testing ... the names changed, but the thing remains the same. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
Several respondents (13, 14,36) 
106 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
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In clinical departments, practitioners continued to feel the pressure of enacting two different roles, 
that of the public health functionary and the clinician, both with essentially different sets of aims 
and goals. Sometimes, the doctors appeared to confuse the contrasting aims of public health and 
clinical medicine, when it came to selecting patients for HN testing. 107 
My argument for (routine) testing is very simple - I think we are not 
aware about our numbers and this would help to make us aware of 
numbers. . 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
In the confusion around which role to adopt, doctors tended to opt for an indiscriminate approach 
aimed at detecting more patients, than a more specific approach as recommended by national 
policies. 108.109 
5.2.7 Selectivity in testing: summary 
HN tests are advised freely and prolifically across all sectors, not always in fulfilment of the 
criteria laid down in the national policies. Broadly, doctors' reasons for testing more patients 
predominated over reasons for selecting fewer clients for testing (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). 
The NACO policy requires doctors to consider the question of the usefulness of conducting the 
test for the community and for the patient and whether there is a continued source of support (see 
page 16). In spite of the increased availability ofHAART, these messages may still be important 
in the context of deficits in health systems' capacity for providing uninterrupted treatment (Grover 
2006, Sheikh 2004). However the consideration of withholding the test appeared to be largely 
inimical to doctors' sense of identity and purpose, and to their conception of learning and skill 
development. 
Amid the upsurge in HN testing, the policy may have a partial role in deterring indiscriminate 
testing, in the public and voluntary hospitals, through the medium of internal checks and controls 
instituted for ensuring counselling and consent. However, even when official procedures 
prevented government surgeons from performing "mandatory tests", they frequently bypassed the 
procedures by referring their patients to private diagnostic laboratories for testing. 
107 S 
everal respondents (19. 21, 23) 
108 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
109 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
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MORE PROPENSITY 
LESS SPECIFICITY 
-Awareness· of 
HIV (surgeons) 
LESS PROPENSITY 
LESS SPECIFICITY 
Propensity to test 
MORE PROPENSITY 
MORE SPECIFICITY 
Training and Greater 
clinical knowledge 
"SpecifiCity" In testing 
LESS PROPENSITY 
MORE SPECIFICITY 
Figure 5.1 Factors Influencing Selectivity in HIY Testing (Government and Charitable Hospital 
Practitioners) 
) 
, Propensity to test 
MORE PROPENSITY 
LESS SPECIFICITY I Availability I MORE PROPENSITY 
of lests MORE SPECIFICITY 
II 
I Fear of Il "Awareness' of I I experience, Confidence I acquiring HIV HIV (surgeons) in handling HIV 
II 
l P.Uents' willingness I I Greater clinical I to buy tests knowledge 
"-
"Specificity" In testing , 
I Patients' I .... rtiveness 
LESS PROPENSITY LESS PROPENSITY 
LESS SPECIFICITY MORE SPECIFICITY 
Figure 5.2 Factors Influencing Selectivity in HIV Testing (Private Hospital Practitioners) 
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5.3 PRE-SURGICAL (MANDATORY) HIV TESTING 
This section details doctors' perspectives on the widespread practice of requisition of HIV tests 
before undertaking surgery on patients, the most conspicuous form of mandatory testing in health 
care settings.1\O 
While the national HIV testing policy prohibits the practice of mandatory testing, III there are 
however different possible interpretations of what constitutes mandatory testing. Literally, the 
word mandatory is defined as "obligatory" or "compulsory"ll2, and semantically speaking, it 
means no more than that the test is compulsory for the client or patient. However its connotations 
and associations in real-life settings extend beyond the literal meaning of the word. The national 
policy itself describes it as testing without 'explicit' consent of the patients (NACO 2005). 
Frequently also, there is an implication that undergoing the test is a precondition, either for 
accessing a service or undergoing some procedure. Key features of mandatory testing in health 
care settings are listed in Box 5.1. 
Non-voluntary, often coercive or under coercive circumstances 
- Often indiscriminate, in that there may be no indication for suspicion of HIV in the 
person being tested 
- Often a condition to determine subsequent availability, quality or type of care 
Box 5.1 Characteristics of Mandatory Testing in Healthcare Settings 
Among the community of medical practitioners under study, the term "mandatory testing" was 
generally synonymous with pre-surgical HIV screening. The terms "mandatory testing" and "pre-
surgical screening" for HIV are used interchangeably in the text. Pre-surgical HIV testing is often 
conducted as a condition for surgery to take place, and the main purpose of conducting the test is 
not to initiate treatment or to advise the patient, but to provide reassurance of knowledge of the 
patients HIV status to the surgeons. 
110 The teon "mandatory testing" has wider connotations extending to pre-employment and pre-marital HIV 
testing, testing of immigrants, and mass testing to detect HIV in specific populations. In clinical facilities 
(the setting for this study) the teon was invoked mainly in the context of (i) screening patients as a 
condition for admission to a facility or a reason for expulsion (ii) screening patients before surgery and 
invasive procedures. 
111 See Chapter 1 (1.2.4) for the wording of the NACO policy 
112 Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Retrieved October 24, 2008, from Dictionary.com website: 
http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/mandatory 
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5.3.1 Process of pre-surgical screening 
Basis for selection of patients 
As discussed in the previous section, selection of patients for pre-surgical screening was often 
unmethodical or indiscriminate, given that surgeons are rarely interested in or well infonned 
about HIV and its related risk factors. 1I3•1l4 Decisions to test were often made ad hoc by a 
surgical team or individual surgeons. l1S•1l6 Personal prejudices of surgeons may have played a 
part: 'in surgeries, mandatory testing is very biased ... you look at a guy and feel that something is 
wrong, you test him', said a government physician. I17 Selection of patients for pre-surgical 
testing in private and government hospitals was often a discretionary decision of individual 
doctors, and in government hospitals it was marked by secrecy.118.II9 In private nursing homes, 
specificities of the doctor-patient relationship were likely to influence pre-surgical screening. A 
physician from a private nursing home observed, 'the patient can ask "why are you doing this 
test?" ... but if the doctor has 15 or 20 years experience, whatever he or she is writing, the patient 
is accepting' yo 
In other instances, there was a more organized basis for mandatory testing. In one charitable 
hospital, universal pre-surgical HIV screening was endorsed by hospital policies (contrary to 
national policy guidelines) and practiced before all major surgeries. In the private hospital too, 
universal pre-surgical testing was (unofficial) hospital policy. In government hospitals where 
mandatory testing was not permitted officially, some heads of surgical units took it upon 
themselves to sanction the use of pre-surgical HIV screening in their units. I2I 
Performing the test 
In the charitable hospital and private hospital where pre-surgical screening was nonnal, these 
tests were performed in-house in the hospitals' respective departments of diagnostics. 
113 Respondent 16: PhysiCian and HN specialist, government hospital 
114 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
115 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
116 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
117 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
118 Respondent 19: Gynaecologist, 15 years of experience, government hospital 
119 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
120 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home and trainee in intensive HIV educational programme 
121 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
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Reportedly, patients were infonned that they were to be tested, but pre-test counselling was not 
provided. 122,123 
In government hospitals, the introduction of compulsory procedures such as the use of consent 
forms reportedly acted as a partial check on unofficial practices of pre-surgical testing: 'you have 
to take consent, it is a big jhanjhat [hassle]' said a junior venereologist.124 In an attempt to 
sidestep consent procedures, clinicians in government hospitals sometimes pressured their 
colleagues in the diagnostic departments to conduct the tests unofficially without taking consent 
and undergoing due procedures for a HN test.125 In these instances, 'people are not sent for 
testing, samples are sent', reported a public health specialist. 126 Hospital microbiologists 
sometimes bent the rules to accommodate HIV testing of pre-surgical patients by their surgeon 
colleagues. 
Every patient from [a particular surgical department] used to come along 
with a requisition for HIV test. 1 thought - they don't need this. But they 
[the patients] would say "the doctors are saying that if there is no test, 
there will be no operation" ... [The head of a surgical department] is my 
classmate from college. So 1 thought of a way. [I told him] ... don't 
record HIV test in the requisition. Just give me a call, and 1 will do the 
test, and you can do your operation. I am guilty of doing this process for 
many years. 127 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
In other instances, doctors referred their patients to private diagnostic laboratories located near the 
hospitals, for testing (see Appendix 2, page 322 for a description of this common practice of 
'outside testing'), whereupon patients would be expected to return with the test results. In either 
case patients were not asked to consent to the test. Sometimes patients may have been told that 
undergoing the test was obligatory before surgery, even if it was not made clear if a HIV negative 
test result was required for surgery to continue. 
We don't tell them what we are testing. We say get these four tests done. 
Haemoglobin, blood sugar. blood urea and this ... [HIV] 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
In the case of private nursing homes, patients were sent to private diagnostic labs to be tested, 
which, generally speaking, did not have facilities for counselling. 
122 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator. charitable hospital 
123 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
124 Respondent 27: Junior venereologist. government hospital. 
12S See Appendix 2 (A2.2) for a description of recommended procedures around a HIV test. 
126 Respondent 48: Public health specialist, consultant to UN technical agency 
127 Several particulars. including name of hospital, department and precise designations are withheld to 
prevent identification 
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Outcome of a HIV positive test on surgery 
What happened after a test varied greatly in different circumstances. Reportedly, pre-surgical 
screening resulted, at worst, in mv positive patients being denied care or otherwise discriminated 
as a result of their mv status, or at best, in surgeons' simply adopting greater safety precautions 
while operating on a HN positive patient, without actively compromising on the type or quality 
of the intervention. 
Often, in cases where the decision to test was secretive or discretionary, further action was also 
determined by individual discretion. In some instances, there was flat-out refusal, and in other 
instances reluctance or poor preparedness on the part of surgeons to operate. 'In the middle of the 
night there is less chance of operating if the patient is HN positive. They will be hesitant and 
more likely to put them on conservative management', reported an HN specialist.128 There was 
also reported resistance on the part of other surgical staff to participate in surgery on known HN 
positive patients. By other accounts surgeons were reported to be operating on PLHA, but with 
the use of greater personal protection and precautions. 129 
In the charitable hospital which officially permitted pre-surgical screening, there was also an 
accompanying provision that all those diagnosed with HN would be operated on, or cared for. 
'The policy is that there will not be discrimination on the basis of positive or negative or 
indeterminate test. .. ' said a charitable hospital administrator.130 Respondents from the private 
hospital reported that surgery on HN positive patients was common, and that doctors took 
additional precautions to protect themselves from infection.131.132 
5.3.2 Risk and self-protection 
Notions of risk 
Most surgeons had a heightened awareness of the risks of acquiring HN from an infected patient 
in surgery. The perils of conducting surgery on HN positive patients and the likelihood of being 
injured by infected surgical instruments were highlighted by a number of respondents, as also 
128 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 129 Several respondents (20, 21, 32, 66) 
130 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
131 Respondent 35: Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital 
132 Respondent 40: Counsellor, private hospital 
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were the dangers for supporting staff. Needle-stick injuries were reported to be very frequent in 
government hospitals. 
Sometimes, you will fmd that the tissue is not holding, we will press a 
finger on to it, here it is bleeding immediately, we will stop it with a 
finger and put a needle in the same place ... 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
[Sometimes] a staff nurse gets an injury today, and ART is started 
tomorrow. In between, again she gets an injury ... In our hospital setup, 
it is quite common. 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
According to this officer, the incidence of occupational "needle-stick" injuries was very high, and 
a recent study had reported extremely high prevalence of hepatitis B infection among surgeons in 
the hospital, (which is more easily transmissible than HIV). The fear of acquiring HIV is 
considerable among surgeons, and emotionally charged, even as official figures of occupational 
transmission belie the notion of great risk. 133,134 
It is more of a psychosocial issue, it is not a scientific issue for the 
surgeons ... that [the risk of acquiring HIV from a] needle-stick injury is 
0.1 % really doesn't mean anything. The point is that I can be that "0.1 % 
guy". If it is me, then it is 1 00% for me. 
Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (16) 
Save ourselves! The patient comes later ... There is a saying in Hindi 
"bhookhe pet na hoye bhajan fs0pala" [I can't express my devotion to 
God, with an empty stomach].1 S If we are hungry, if we are sick, if we 
are down, then how we will serve? 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
Fear appeared to have a far-reaching impact on the psyche of surgeons, and led them to focus on 
risk avoidance and self protection. Ways of doing this included conducting pre-surgical 
mandatory tests andlor taking greater precautions during surgery. In some instances however, the 
fear of HIV even led surgeons to delay surgery or refuse to operate on HIV positive patients. An 
administrator expressed consternation over this rejection by surgeons of their primary 
professional role: 'he is a surgeon, he wants to operate, he has come to the hospital to operate, so 
why is he refusing?' .136 
133 Respondent 26: Senior surgeon and administrator, private hospital 
134 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
135 The metaphor is of a bard who sings devotional songs (bhajans). 
136 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
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In the case of one charitable and one private hospital, it was pressure from surgeons that had led 
to the creation of hospital policies endorsing pre-surgical screening. In one of these instances, 
reports of a health ~orker being infected with HIV from a patient precipitated a concerted push 
for protection of practitioners' rights. The "package" of interventions and provisions for 
practitioners that was introduced in these two hospitals included mandatory pre-surgical HIV 
screening, universal precautions in surgery, assurance of post-exposure prophylaxis, and treatment 
with HAART in case of infection. 137 ,138 
Awareness equals fear 
For surgeons, the relationship between knowledge about HNIAIDS and their response to it was a 
complex one. Surgeons had little scientific interest in HIV and were not generally motivated to 
learn about developments in HIV medicine. Their standards of knowledge about all aspects of 
HIV I AIDS were variable, and when awareness about HIV did manifest, it was synonymous with 
awareness of the risk of acquiring HIV from patients. 
HIV and the fear ofHIV, was not necessarily a prominent theme in surgeons' professional lives. 
The response to HIV among surgeons in some hospitals, especially in areas which were known to 
have low HIV prevalence, was limited. HIV did not feature in these surgeons' compass of 
attention. 139 For some, anxieties around H1V were present but latent and not acted upon. 
Reportedly government surgeons may have regularly operated on HIV positive patients without 
knowing or ascertaining their status beforehand. 140 
In this context of initial inattention to the likelihood of HIV, reactions were extreme whenever the 
status of a HIV positive patient was somehow made known to the surgeons or operation theatre 
staff. Surgeons' anxieties and lack of preparedness surfaced when met with referrals from a 
physician known to be dealing with HIV positive patients. Surgeries were delayed or denied to 
patients, or clients were refused admission to nursing homes and hospitals, reported the physician . 
. .. the surgeons generally operate on individuals without bothering about 
the HIV status. But once they come to know that this individual is HIV 
positive, suppose they get a referral from me, then the story begins. 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (13) 
137 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
138 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
139 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
140 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
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In other hospitals however, a greater consciousness had evolved among the surgeons about the 
presence of HIV and the risks to themselves. 
We have been seeing the cases of HIV for very long ... They would come 
to us and whether we found them HIV positive or not, we would treat 
them. But then awareness came... and we wanted to take precautions. 
Medical superintendent, private hospital (38) 
According to respondents, in parts of the private sector the response of doctors has shifted from a 
general disinterest to a more HIV -cognizant attitude accompanied by rhetoric around being aware 
and "taking precautions". Mandatory testing was one of the "precautions" which were taken, the 
others being the use of protective equipment and specific procedures while performing surgery 
and handling the patient. 141.142 
The use of routinized pre-surgical testing in the private sector (followed by the use of greater 
protective precautions for HIV positive patients) was seen by some as a manifestation of a greater 
awareness and acknowledgement of HIV, an improvement on the previous state of affairs, of 
denial and active exclusion of HIV positive patients.143.144 For some it signified a greater 
preparedness, necessary for the establishment of a comfort level on the part of practitioners to 
deal with HIV. In its most benign form, pre-surgical testing was accompanied by policies 
requiring surgeons to undertake surgery on HIV positive patients irrespective of the outcome of 
the test (see section 5.3.1). In other instances however, mandatory testing may have still been 
used as an instrument to discriminate against HIV positive patients and deny them care. 
In some government hospitals too, "awareness" had spread and most government surgeons stated 
that they would prefer to know the HIV status of their patients. However the government's 
policies carry more weight in government hospitalsl4S, and pre-surgical testing remained a 
secretive, if widespread, practice in these hospitals. 
141 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
142 Perceptions about "Universal Precautions" are discussed in the following section 
143 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
144 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
145 Officially, government surgeons are required to accept HIV positive patients, not to screen patient before 
surgery and to treat every surgery as potentially being on a HIV positive patient, by adopting universal 
precautions. 
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Understanding "universal precautions " 
The question, "Why don't practitioners use standard precautions for all surgeries, and thus offset 
their need to know the HIV status of the patient?" has many answers, related varyingly to the 
availability and costs of protective equipment, practitioners' lack of trust in the equipment when 
available, and uncertainty around what constitutes standard or universal precautions (UP). 
Government surgeons said that they were asked to use universal precautions, but that this was not 
always feasible, when protective equipment was not available. They unanimously held the 
opinion that arrangements for equipment were inadequate, and cited this as a explanation for 
choosing to screen their patients to eliminate HIV infection.146.147 Contrarily however, the 
occupational health administrator in the same government hospital reported that there was 
actually an adequate supply of protective equipment, and cited attitudinal problems among 
surgeons in accessing these facilities. 148 It was apparent that surgeons' and administrators' ideas 
of equipment to be used in surgery on HIV positive (or potentially HIV positive) patients did not 
match. Surgeons' expectations of adequate precautions extended to more sophisticated and 
expensive protective equipment than proposed by government policies.149 Their focus of attention 
generally tended to be on the equipment involved ('visors', 'gumboots', 'special gowns') rather 
than on safer procedures and practices.150,151 
Given their heightened expectations - focused around expensive equipment - of what 
constituted adequate precautions, surgeons paradoxically felt that the expense of procuring them 
was not justified in resource-strapped government hospitals with lower-income clientele. 
We are not averse to treating these [HIV positive] people, whether 
conservatively or surgically. But the thing is - are we in a position to 
justify that we get what we deserve ... in terms of precautions and 
barriers etc. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (29) 
146 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
147 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
148 Respondent 68: Infection control officer, government hospital 
149 Government guidelines for prevention and care of occupational exposure include a list of universal work 
precautions and algorithms for post-exposure prophylaxis. The work precautions include instructions on 
hand-washing, disposal of sharps and body substances, reporting of injuries and the use of protective gear 
including gloves for low-risk exposures and additionally gowns, aprons, masks and eyewear for medium to 
high risk exposures including surgical procedures and vaginal delivery. 
ISO Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
lSI Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
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Universal precaution will be a good thing, and we eventually have to 
follow it, but ... where you don't even have proper medicines, are you 
going to take the investment of universal precautions? 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
In this context, mandatory pre-surgical screening was seen by government surgeons as a virtue, as 
a low-cost alternative to procuring expensive protective equipment. On the other hand, in the 
private sector, protective equipment was usually purchased at the expense of the patients. 
Respondents from the private nursing homes indicated that patients' inability or unwillingness to 
pay for expensive equipment was a prohibiting factor that prevented the use of UP: 'in the private 
sector, we have to think about cost to the patient' said one respondent. 1S2 Again here, mandatory 
testing (also at patients' expense) was seen to be a cheaper alternative. In the private hospital, the 
practice of mandatory screening was supported by the argument that greater. precautions were 
taken only when patients were HN positive, thus keeping costs down for a majority of patients. IS3 
According to a HN specialist in a government hospital, surgeons were misled in the belief that 
highly sophisticated equipment was required to practice universal precautions. He blamed a 
general 'mindset of deprivation' as the reason for surgeons' stubbornness over this issue. 
Universal Precautions sounds very hi-fi [sophisticated] like its only 
applicable for a New York hospital, but if you go through the details, you 
can apply it in any district hospital of India... We don't feel we are big 
resourceful people working in a huge medical college ... we feel we are a 
deprived lot - "we don't have this and we don't have that, so how will I 
work?" 
jhysician and HIV specialist, government hospital (16) 
It was also widely reported that surgeons were poorly informed about Universal Precautions and 
unwilling to change their habitual practices. IS4,15S An underlying disinterest in low-tech 
interventions and inertia around changing simple practices was typified by surgeons' behaviour in 
this regard.156 An administrator reported that even after needle-stick injuries, practitioners were 
reluctant to be tested and access post-exposure prophylaxis. Taking precautions against risk was 
seen by them as an unwanted chore and even as an active distraction from clinical tasks. IS7 
The core theme that emerges is that doctors are uncertain and under-confident about what 
precautions they have to take to protect themselves. It was felt that training and exposure to 
152 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
IS3 Respondent 26: Senior surgeon and administrator, private hospital 
IS4 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
ISS Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
IS6 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
IS7 Respondent 68: Infection control officer, government hospital 
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issues around HN, and above all demonstration of UP by peers was required in order to instil 
confidence. ISS 
5.3.3 Pre-surgical testing and professional values 
The practice of mandatory screening was often defended by respondents. Usually this extended 
simply to "justification" of the practice - as a concession to surgeons to alleviate their anxieties, 
and as a low-cost and convenient alternative to uniformly using special protective gear in surgery. 
However, further exploration revealed that some practitioners held values which led them to 
regard mandatory pre-surgical screening as a positively meritable or desirable practice. 
Often pre-surgical screening was characterized as a "policy", whereas government policies were 
simply"recommendations".ls9 HN screening was regarded as a valid option, and even as a good 
habit for surgeons to adopt. Government doctors envied their counterparts in the private sector 
who did not face procedural constraints (such as informed consent) placed on them by their 
hospitals, and had relatively greater freedom to screen their patients.160 
Pre-surgical testing was often conflated with the use of other precautions for hygiene and safety 
and its practice was seen as a sign of thoroughness and professionalism. 161 In one private 
hospital, it was included as part of an in-service training curriculum for doctors: 
Now we are not doing [HN screening] routinely for all pre-operative 
patients ... but I think that we should do it. I am interested and I tell my 
residents to do the HIV test. One thing [benefit] is that we will be more 
careful with these patients. Also, we can prevent hospital infections -
like we know that this is a positive patient so [it helps in] the disposal of 
waste. 
Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital (22) 
This was a part of high-risk virus training for Hepatitis B, C and HIV. 
Any patient who is going to the OT, they are screened for these things 
irrespective of suspicion. 
Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital (35) 
158 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
159 Respondent 19: Gynaecologist, 15 years of experience, government hospital 
IWRespondent32:JurUorsurgeon,governmenthospital 
161 According to one HIV specialist, doctors' conception of precautions being for the purpose of self-
protection was a distortion of the original professional ethic, which required precautions to be taken 
primarily to avoid the spread of infection from one patient to another (via the surgeon), and only 
secondarily to protect the surgeon from infection (08). 
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In other instances, arguments around the rights of practitioners and professional solidarity were 
invoked to support the practice of mandatory screening. 162 
It was felt by the profession that the doctors have every right to be 
protected as well. Otherwise, who will protect us? 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (34) 
While respondents generally agreed that the screening was primarily conducted for the benefit of 
the practitioners, some insisted that there could be only advantages for patients and for public 
health in pre-surgical HIV screening. Respondents cited the absence of contestation by patients, 
and argued that screening was a valid approach to detect the disease, an opportunity for patients to 
enter into the ambit of medical care, and a step in preventing further spread of the infection. In 
the eyes of some, a diagnostic procedure such as HIV testing was innately beneficent and they 
could not comprehend the idea that such a procedure could potentially contain hazards rather than 
benefits for patients. 163 
Hence in summary, some perceived professional values (or distortions of the same) conflicted 
with the HIV testing policies. 
5.3.4 Primacy of the surgical act 
A generalized fmding around mandatory screening is that surgeons were primarily focused on the 
task of performing surgery, and rarely prepared to deal with the eventuality of a patients being 
HIV positive and the exigencies of HIV care. Surgeons perceived their work to be of a 
particularly critical and demanding nature, justifying unique requirements and close-to-ideal 
working conditions. 
Surgery is a different field ... This is not a physician's group, that are 
hands-off. They will be happy with universal precautions. For us, who 
are playing in pools of urine, pool of faeces, pool of blood, inside the 
body cavities of the patient, our situation is different... This 
microbiology doctor and the surgeon, is there no difference? 
Administrators, all these people: different pedestal; and surgeons who are 
actively handling: different pedestal. Their requirement is different. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
Mandatory testing for some was one of many necessary steps in preparing for the surgery, and 
regulations preventing mandatory testing were regarded by surgeons as obstacles in the way of 
162 Several respondents (17, 34, 26) 
163 Several respondents (24, 29, 40) 
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perfonning their deftning role. According to surgeons, patients usually shared this approach of 
focusing on the surgery, and were not concerned with what were perceived as the niceties of 
consent and counselling for a HIV test (see section 5.3.6) 
The patient is only interested in their own illness. They are sick patients, 
and it's difficult for them to go to the VCTC, which is full of patients. 
To go and to get a time [appointment], for them it's a waste of time. They 
say, our main aim is surgery, not HIV testing. [In terms of] the testing, 
whatever you require, we will do. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
1. Pre-surgical testing is done to facilitate the successful completion of surgery. In the 
surgical departments, the energies of those involved were ostensibly wholly directed 
towards the act of surgery. In such a context, pre-surgical HIV testing in these settings 
was one of many "supporting" investigations conducted in order for surgery to proceed. 
2. Pre-surgical testing is usually done to eliminate, not diagnose HIV. The normal 
sequence of events was for a HIV negative diagnosis to be established so as to proceed 
with surgery. The eventuality of a HIV positive test result is a deviation from this norm for 
which surgeons are not always well prepared (dashed lines in the figure). Surgeons had 
little interest in the science of HIV medicine, and a diagnosis of HIV would not normally 
influence the type of surgical management. 
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When a patient was found to be HIV pOSitive, the issue was "foregrounded" to the extent 
that surgeons ineVitably responded actively to protect themselves, either by the use of 
more protective equipment or by reportedly delaying or denying surgery to HIV positive 
patients. Hence while pre-surgical HIV screening did not usually influence howthe patient 
is to be managed Clinically, it may have influenced whether or not patients received timely 
and appropriate surgical management. 
Box 5.2 Purposes and Outcomes of Pre-surgical HIV screening 
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5.3.5 Working in teams 
In these highly tuned and regimented environments, all actions were geared to the successful 
completion of the actual act of surgery. Different actors took the stage each with their designated 
roles in a sphere of activity insulated from external disturbances. The role of support staff in the 
operation theatre (OT) was felt to be critical to the progress of the surgery, and the needs of other 
team members were often taken into account in decisions by surgeons. 
The surgeon has right to order a test if he thinks there is a large team - lot 
of trainee physicians and trainee nurses and there are lot of sharps 
handled, so he wants to take extra precautions." 
Administrator, charitable hospital (17) 
A number of surgeons from all sectors spoke of fear and resistance on the part of their support 
staff to participating in surgery on HIV positive patients. 
The noise started coming from the OT [staff], you are bringing in HN, 
you are bringing in HBsAgl64. You are bringing in all these people, what 
the hell ... 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (34) 
The theatre staff they all feel as if it is an invitation to death or something 
and they really resist any such effort. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (29) 
Close knit loyalties and affiliations characterize the formation of OT teams. Co-worker protection 
was an imperative according to one government surgeon, citing this as a reason for mandatory 
screening. 
My view is that suppose you are with me, should I protect you or not? ... 
and when I can't do that, then every one should be screened, and we must 
do it. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
In another instance, a private surgeon narrated how he refused to avail of protective vaccinations 
unless his staff received them too. In this context of close and interdependent OT teams, surgeons 
were particularly resistant to being influenced to change their practices. 16S 
164 Hepatitis B 
165 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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5.3.6 Patients' responses to pre-surgical screening 
According to many respondents (17, 67, 34), clients in general were accepting and cooperative in 
their practice of mandatory pre-surgical screening and, as a surgeon remarked 'most people take it 
in their stride,.166 However it was rarely specified if the option to refuse to be tested was 
available to patients. With the exceptional case of one charitable hospital, it was also not 
specified to patients whether the perfonnance of the operation was conditional on the patients' 
taking the test, or on any particular outcome of the test. It is likely that the patients were at the 
receiving end of considerable tacit and situational pressures to undertake the test. One physician 
pointed out that even eminent and influential persons were screened for HIV when admitted to a 
private speciality clinic, and did not object to it.167 
In the view of a counsellor in a private hospital, patients did harbour fears and apprehensions 
around being tested, but seldom acted upon them 
They [patients] may have queries. That, "Doctor Saab why are you 
getting it done? What is this test?" But they do not refuse. Dar to sabke 
man me hai [everyone has apprehensions], that if the doctor has said, 
then may be [I could be HN positive]? ... but nobody goes to the extent 
of refusing. 
Counsellor, private hospital (40) 
Some doctors said that they expected patients to understand doctors positions, and make 
concessions for their (doctors ') benefit, given the purportedly exceptional circumstances 
ofHIV risk. 168 
5.3.7 Surgeons isolated 
While mutual loyalties were strong within surgical teams and shared notions of risk and self 
protection characterized the response to HIV, the same was not always true of interactions 
between surgeons and other departments and specialities, especially within the large multi-
speciality hospitals. In a number of hospitals, there were conflicts and divergences between 
surgeons and non-surgeons over the issue of mandatory screening.169 
166 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
167 Respondent 37: Senior physician, HIV specialist and administrator, government hospital 
168 S everal respondents 
169 Several respondents (16, 37, 17) 
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Right now, we are actually leading to positions of no-win between the 
people who are saying that consent is really crucial and the people who 
are saying that the rights of the care-giver are far more important. 
Administrator, charitable hospital (17) 
Administrators and physicians on their part were ambivalent about the issue of mandatory testing. 
As fellow-doctors, they empathised with the surgeons' predicament. On the other hand, some of 
them (who were engaged in developing HIV services in their hospitals) were concerned with the 
profile ofHIV care in their institutions, which they felt would be tarnished by the knowledge that 
pre-surgical screening was practiced. Others disagreed with mandatory screening in principle. In 
government hospitals, administrators were also bound by policies which did not permit mandatory 
testing. However generally speaking, the issue of non-performance of surgery on HIV positive 
persons predominated over that of pre-surgical HIV screening. In the context of such 
occurrences, mandatory screening was felt to be a "soft" issue, for which administrators generally 
adopted the route of persuasion and not of enforcement. 170.171 
Nevertheless, in the light of the ambivalent stance of administrators and their non-surgical peers 
over this issue, some surgeons expressed feelings of isolation and lack of support. They believed 
mandatory testing to be an essential step toward ensuring their personal safety and even survival, 
and felt that unilateral action to continue screening was justified on their part. In government 
hospitals mandatory testing was not openly admitted to, and it sometimes took on the character of 
an underground practice. 'This is something that people are trying to keep hush-hush', said one 
microbiologist from a government hospital.l 72 
5.3.8 The impact of institutional policy 
Many of the themes around surgeons' response to the issue of mandatory testing resonated across 
both public and private sectors. These included their perceptions of risk of acquiring HIV, desires 
for more protective gear, close bonds with their respective OT teams, and preoccupation with the 
act of surgery over other facets of practice. However clearer distinctions emerged between the 
responses of surgeons, based on the stance taken by the respective hospital administrations around 
mandatory testing. (See Table 5.3) 
170 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
171 Respondent 35: Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital 
172 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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In government hospitals where mandatory testing was officially banned, surgeons continued to 
conduct screening tests, if to a lesser degree than in some private hospitals. However, since these 
tests were conducted "unofficially", the outcomes of the test were similarly unofficial, and 
management decisions following a HIV positive test result were usually made secretively and on 
a discretionary basis by the surgeons. These variably involved either the use of greater protective 
equipment in surgery or, in instances, delays and refusals of surgery. 173. 174,17S 
In contrast, in the charitable hospital where mandatory screening was official policy and practiced 
openly and universally, processes following a HIV positive diagnosis were also more transparent. 
According to administrators surgeries were regularly performed on such patients with greater 
protective equipment, and in the instance of the charitable hospital channels for continued medical 
management ofHN were also well established.176 
Thirdly, in institutions with no specific policies (one charitable hospital and private nursing 
homes), there were no checks either on mandatory HN testing or on subsequent management of 
patients. Decisions to screen were made independently by the surgeons, and HIV positive 
outcomes reportedly led to delays and refusals of surgery, and in covert biases towards 
conservative (as opposed to invasive surgical) management. 177 
173 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
174 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
175 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
176 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
117 Respondent 36: Senior phYSician, charitable hospital 
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DECISION TO SCREEN PROCESS OF SURGERY ON HIV+ SCREENING PATIENTS 
1. Hospitals with policy Pre-surgical screening: 
In-house unoffiCially. no Discretionary decision: 
counselling Surgery with greater 
AGAINST mandatory Independent, sometimes OR protection 
secretive decision testing (al/ government 
against hospital policy Sent out to private labs, OR hospitals) no counselling Delays, refusals 
2. Hospitals with formal 
HIV policy Universal pre-surgical In-house, signed Ostensibly, regular PERMITTING pre- screening, supported by surgery with greater 
surgical testing (one institutional policy consent, no counselling protection 
charitable hospital) 
3. Hospitals with NO In-house, no consent or SPECIFIC POLICY on Delays, refusals, 
pre-surgical testing Pre-surgical screening: counselling preference for 
(one charitable Usually independent OR conservative 
hospital, private decision In private diagnostic labs, management 
nursing homes) no counselling 
Table 5.3 HIV Screening and Outcomes in Hospitals with Different Policies 
In conclusion, while the presence of institutional policies permitting screening may have led to 
screening in greater numbers, post-diagnosis procedures were also more regularised in these 
hospitals. In environments where the practice was prohibited but widely practiced, the initial 
occurrence of mandatory testing was less prolific, but there may have been a greater risk of 
unaccountable outcomes for patients following a positive diagnosis. 
5.3.9 Pre-surgical HIV testing: summary 
Across the board, most of the surgeon respondents favoured mandatory testing and opposed the 
national policies in this regard. A majority of surgeon respondents interviewed said that they 
practiced pre-surgical HIV testing, either universally on all their patients or on a discretionary 
basis on patients who they suspected were more likely to have the infection. Two private 
hospitals (one for-profit and one charitable) had policies permitting mandatory pre-surgical 
testing, and universal HIV screening was carried out by surgeons. 
Explanations 
Among those who did not practice pre-surgical screening or practiced it to a limited extent, 
usually those in the government sector, obedience to government (and institutional) policies was 
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cited as the main reason for the same. 178, 179 In some other instances, surgeons may not have been 
sufficiently apprehensive about HIV or motivated to conduct screening tests. When probed, 
almost all surgeons expressed a fear of contracting HIV and a desire to conduct mandatory tests, 
but in some cases these anxieties may have been latent, or not considered sufficient to act on. In 
contrast, a number of explanatory or mitigating factors were cited in surgeons' practice of 
mandatory pre-surgical testing. (Table 5.4) 
For mandatory screening Against mandatory screening 
Growing fears of HIV and notions of risk 
-
Govemment policy against mandatory testing 
Poor confidence and awareness around HIV/AIDS (govemment hospitals) 
Lack of trust and confusion around protective - Low awareness of HIV and associated risks 
equipment 
-
Latency of anxieties around HIV 
Simplicity and low cost of HIV testing 
Centrality of act of surgery in surgeons' role 
performance 
Professional ideals of thoroughness, utilitarian 
ideals 
Co-worker fears and pressures 
Total compliance on the part of patients 
Administrative support for pre-surgical screening (in 
two hospitals: private and charitable) 
Table 5.4 Surgeons' Reasons For and Against Mandatory Screening 
The principal reason for conducting pre-surgical mandatory tests was the doctors' fear of 
acquiring HIV and notions of the risks of surgical procedures. There was a considerable 
emotional element to the surgeons' fears of contracting HIV, and frequently these notions were 
not driven by scientific understanding of the risks of transmission. 
Surgeons as a rule did not display great scientific interest in the field of HIV, other than the 
cognizance of personal risk. Knowledge and "awareness" of HIV tended to be equated with little 
more than awareness of the risk of acquiring HIV. In some contexts, mandatory testing was a 
sign of a more "HIV -cognizant" culture or attitude among surgeons, and hence associated with 
better preparedness for dealing with HIV positive patients. However in other contexts, especially 
those associated with arbitrary or secretive practices of mandatory testing, there was poorer 
178 Respondent 19: Gynaecologist, 15 years of experience, government hospital 
179 Respondent 28: Senior venereologist, government hospital 
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preparedness for HIV positive test results, which led to surgeries being delayed or denied to HIV 
positive patients. 
In certain contexts such as in government hospitals and smaller private sector outfits, problems 
with the (high) costs and (poor) availability of protective equipment were cited as justifications 
for mandatory testing. Surgeons generally distrusted the capacity of basic protective equipment to 
guard them from HIV infection, and in government hospitals, there were disagreements between 
surgeons and administrators as to the type of equipment required to protect against HIV. 
Surgeons mistrust and lack of confidence around Universal Precautions (UP) was also linked to 
lack of knowledge on the subject, and to a general preference for the reassurance of material 
barriers, as opposed to changes in procedure and adoption of preventative practices. To a large 
extent, surgeons considered the performance of technical clinical tasks (in general), and the act of 
surgery (in particular) to be their predominant role, as opposed to procedural and precautionary 
tasks such as taking consent from patients, and adopting safer surgical practices. 
Surgeons also regarded the field of surgery to be uniquely different and occupying a special 
status, and felt that its critical nature justified the fulfilment of special demands and requirements. 
The need to know the HIV status of their patients was one such demand made by surgeons in 
order for surgery to proceed. Faced with the calamitous threat of non-performance of surgery -
the immediate and main concern of all involved, surgeons, patients and administrators - the 
ethical hazards of mandatory testing were considered to be of less significance and the practice 
was seldom actively opposed. In some contexts, the practice of pre-surgical screening was 
aggrandized and held up as a sign of greater professionalism and thoroughness among surgeon 
peers. Additionally, in a stance at odds with the tone of the national policy, many doctors also 
believed that HIV screening was innately beneficial for patients and the community, and served 
utilitarian goals of detection of more HIV infections. 
As much as surgeons, other surgical staff too feared acquiring HIV from patients, and voiced 
these fears openly. With large teams working in tandem in the operation theatres, surgeons were 
at pains to ensure that the demands of all staff were met, in order for surgeries to proceed. 
Mandatory HIV screening was often conducted on the basis of collective pressure from surgical 
staff. While patients may have had apprehensions about being tested for HIV, these were seldom 
voiced. The environment around surgery was not conducive for such assertiveness on the part of 
patients. Also, given the critical nature of the intervention and the collective focus on the 
performance of surgery, patients were not encouraged to regard the HIV test as more than a minor 
detail. 
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Discussion 
National policies against mandatory testing may have little impact on practices in the private and 
charitable hospitals. Screening was often conducted unchecked and in large numbers by surgeons 
in these institutions, in some instances leading to adverse outcomes for patients detected with 
HIV. 
In government hospitals the situation was more complex. Some surgeons did follow the policies 
and conduct regular surgeries without screening their patients, but this compliance was marked by 
continuing unease and apprehensions on their part over the perceived risks of acquiring HN. In 
other instances surgeons disobeyed the policies and conducted HIV screening tests. In such cases 
there were reported impediments to the completion of surgeries and proper medical follow-up for 
patients diagnosed with HIV. 
The requirements of ensuring ethical HIV testing are clearly vital, especially in the private sector, 
where mandatory tests are conducted widely and indiscriminately. However it is apparent that 
other health care processes and outcomes are interconnected with HN screening - surgery, 
continued care for HIV - which are vitally important to the actors, and it becomes important to 
balance the quality needs of all these aspects. This involves addressing shared goals of all actors 
involved, patients, medical practitioners and administrators. Sense of personal security, harmony 
and efficiency of procedures remain particularly important concerns given the critical and 
exacting nature of surgery. 
5.4 INFORMED CONSENT 
The NACO's policies and guidelines require that specific written informed consent should be 
obtained when testing for identification of HIV positive individuals. ISO In reality however, 
practices of doctors in this regard vary from obviously coercive HIV testing to fully informed 
consent before a HIV test. Doctors' experiences of implementation of the consent procedure, and 
their perspectives on the processes of obtaining informed consent from patients are discussed in 
this section. Chiefly, informed consent in the context of HIV testing for clinical diagnosis is 
discussed here. Specific themes around (lack of) informed consent in the context of pre-surgical 
HIV screening have been dealt with in the previous section on pre-surgical testing. 
180 See Chapter 1 (1.2.4) for the wording of the NACO policy 
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5.4.1 Institutional procedures 
Different hospitals had different procedures and policies around infonned consent. A number of 
service providers were involved in the process and varyingly, counsellors, treating doctors and 
microbiologists were responsible for providing pre-test infonnation, obtaining consent and 
managing consent fonns. 
In the government hospitals, there were fonnal procedures instituted for obtaining written 
infonned consent. Infonned consent was to be obtained by the doctors who advised the HIV test 
or coupled with pre-test counselling in a counselling centre / VCTC. A standardized consent fonn 
was in use which patients were required to sign after receiving relevant infonnation. 
Obstetricians, venereologists and physicians more closely involved or interested in HIV care 
reported that they followed these fonnal procedures.181.182 
In one of the charitable hospitals, there was a VCTC which had a policy of obtaining oral consent 
before HIV testing for clinical diagnosis. However in the case of HIV screening before surgery, 
patients were infonned but not asked to consent to the test. 183 In the other charitable hospital, 
there were no fonnalities of obtaining written consent for a diagnostic HIV test. 184 
The private hospital however, had implemented the use of a consent fonn for HIV testing: 'We 
have got a requisition form on one side, the back of the fonn has consent', said an 
administrator. ISS Respondents from private nursing homes reported that consent was rarely taken 
for a HIV test. 186 
To a great extent patients reportedly gave permission for HIV testing when asked, whether for 
diagnostic purposes, as part of ante-natal investigations or before surgery. Patients' responses to 
mandatory pre-surgical screening are further detailed in the previous section (page 115). Refusal 
of consent to be tested, by a patient, was a rare occurrence across all sectors of care, especially in 
government hospitals. In the charitable and private hospitals too, refusals were very infrequent. 187 
'Out of thousands of pre-test counselling in three years, we had 2 such cases [of refusal]' said a 
government hospital counsellor. 188 
181 Respondent 12: Senior physician, government hospital 
182 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
183 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
184 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
185 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent (and physician), private hospital 
186 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home and trainee in intensive HIV educational programme 
IS7 Respondent 13: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
IS8 Respondent 42: Counsellor, government hospital VCTC 
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GOVERNMENT CHARITABLE PRIVATE PRIVATE 
HOSPITALS HOSPITALS HOSPITAL NURSING HOMES 
Diagnostic I Pre- Written Informed Oral Informed Written Informed No procedures 
natal HIV Testing Consent Consent Consent 
Pre-surgical HIV NA189 Patients informed, Written Informed No procedures 
Screening no consent Consent 
Table 5.5 Institutional Procedures for Informed Consent 
S.4.2 Adherence to policy 
Only seven ofthe 33 doctors interviewed, mainly surgeons from both private and public hospitals, 
said outright that they did not take specific consent before advising HIV testsl90 (this aspect is also 
discussed in more detail in the previous section on pre-surgical testing). Many of the other 
respondents reported that they 'normally' took consent, often citing the binding influence of their 
respective hospital pOlicies. 191 ,192.193 However it was revealed that consent procedures were often 
not followed wholly or in the manner prescribed, and sometimes principles of free informed 
consent were not adhered to. 
In government hospitals, formal written consent was sometimes not obtained by physicians, as in 
the case of indoor patients.194 In the private hospital too, the consent form was not always used by 
doctors, nor were patients always fully informed about the test, especially in the context of pre-
surgical HIV testing. 19S When consent was taken, there were often overtones of coercion or 
suggestion involved in obtaining patients' signatures on consent forms, in both private and 
government hospitals. Patients' consent was often presumed, and attitudes of practitioners were 
not favourable for patients to give "deliberate and autonomous permission", as recommended by 
policy (NACO 2005). This was especially so in instances of pre-surgical HIV screening where 
HIV testing was initiated specifically for the (perceived) benefit of practitioners. As one 
government doctor seemed to imply, consent was seen as a formality to get out of the way, before 
pursuing core tasks of testing the patient for HN as a routine. 
189 Not applicable: pre-surgical HIV screening was officially not permitted in government hospitals 
190 Several respondents (29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 26, 34) 
191 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, government hospital 
192 Respondent 23: Venereologist, government hospital 
193 Respondent 39: Microbiologist, Private hospital 
194 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
19S Respondent 38: Medical superintendent, private hospital 
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All the patients who come with the sexually transmitted diseases, their 
consent is taken and pre-test counselling is done, then we do the test for 
each and every patient who walks into the STD clinic. 
Senior venereologist, government hospital (28) 
Even where formal protocols for written consent were in place, the process of signing consent 
forms may not always have been conducive for patients to make considered choices. 
All that [consent forms and protocol] is there. See, in the government 
setup, patients are not choosers; they do whatever you tell them to do. 
They don't have any choice. 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
In the private hospital, patients were required to 'agree to be tested' before surgery, rather than 
consent to it, in the words of a counsellor.196 In other instances there were deficiencies in the 
information provided to patients before taking consent. Especially in the case of pre-surgical HN 
screening, patients were unlikely to be adequately informed about the test. \97 One counsellor 
reported the problems of imparting infonnation about a test which was not essentially performed 
for the patients' benefit (also see Box 5.2). 
There is nothing that you have to say. What do we tell them, that we are 
doing this for the doctor's safety? They will say "let the doctor test for 
it! Why should I test for it?" 
Counsellor, private hospital (40) 
On rare occasions when patients refused to be tested, this was sometimes viewed with suspicion 
by doctors. Refusal of HN tests was a cause of suspicion for this private sector surgeon, who 
characterized such individuals as not being 'genuine' in their intents. 
One or two people who have already known it [their HIV status] from 
somewhere else, and they try to pull a fast one. They try to sneak in. 
Otherwise if somebody is a genuine recipient, or a genuine donor, or a 
genuine patient for dialysis, all of them quite happily accept it [being 
tested for HIV] 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (34) 
In government hospitals too, refusal of consent was often regarded as an unwanted probleml98 and 
in some instances doctors were of the opinion they should go ahead with the test even if the 
patient did not consent. l99 
196 Respondent 40: CounselIor, private hospital 
197 Respondent 37: Senior physician, HIV specialist and administrator, government hospital 
198 Respondent 28: Senior venereologist, government hospital 
199 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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In summary, with the exception of surgeons, most doctors were in the habit of obtaining specific 
informed consent from their patients for HIV tests, yet there appeared to be gaps in enacting 
consent, in both private and public sector hospitals. 
Not taking consent 
- Taking oral consent where written consent is the policy 
- "Coerced consent" - pressurizing or obligating patients to give consent 
Not conveying complete and comprehensible information 
Not honouring patients' decisions to refuse consent 
Box S.3 Common Types of Deviations from Consent Policy 
5.4.3 Rationale for DIV -specific consent 
Doctors differed in their understanding of the reasons or rationales behind taking specific 
informed consent for a HIV test. . While a few cited specific reasons related to the necessity of 
preparing a patient for a HIV diagnosis, equal knowledge sharing with patients and ensuring non-
discrimination, others expressed their uncertainty over the possible rationales for specific consent. 
Yet others believed that there were insufficient reasons to justify specific consent for HIV testing. 
Some respondents cited reasons in favour of specific infonned consent related to the need for 
information and preparedness of the patient, given the psychological blow of a HIV test result and 
the long term health and social implications of the diagnosis.2oo,2ol HIV specialists and doctors 
engaged specifically in HN care were more likely to cite these explanations, and in general to 
offer contentions in support of specific informed consent. 
Another reason cited for specific informed consent was the need for knowledge and assurance (for 
patients) of the beneficence of the practitioners' motives for conducting the test. This was 
considered to be necessary in the light of the stigma surrounding HN test results within 
healthcare environments, and the frequent utilisation ofHIV test results by doctors to discriminate 
200 Respondent 13: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
201 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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against patients.202.203 Conversely, some doctors resented the implicit suggestion contained within 
the consent procedure, that their ability to treat patients without discrimination was suspect.204 
A number of doctors (mainly non-HIV specialists) were uncertain around the rationale of taking 
specific informed consent for a HIV test. Some of them openly expressed their perplexity. 
I asked people [colleagues]: "Why do you have to do this? Why do you 
have to take written informed consent before doing a test?" And they all 
agreed with me - they said yes, there is no reason for it. But its there. 
Senior physician, government hospital (33) 
A majority of the doctors felt that there was no adequate basis or rationale for obtaining specific 
informed consent for HIV testing, or that opposing factors outweighed the utility of the procedure. 
These perceptions are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
5.4.4 A sign of "exceptionalism" 
The requirement of specific informed consent before a HIV test was widely seen as an example of 
HIV favouritism or "exceptionalism", i.e. the institution of special procedures and conditions in 
the care of HIV which were not universally applied for other conditions or investigations. 
Respondents' opinions differed over whether these special procedures and conditions, such as 
informed consent and pre- and post-test counselling, and the emphasis on confidentiality, were 
warranted. 
For and against "exceptionalism" 
Many doctors questioned the requirement of specific informed consent for a HIV test, and the 
implicit exceptional treatment ofHIV involved.20s ,206 
Why is it that I see a person who has HIV, I tell the person how is it 
transmitted, what is the treatment, what is the prognosis, what are the 
precautions around it, you tell me, for which other diseases will you do 
all this? And other diseases ... the biological consequences may be even 
more severe. Why is it that you can keep a patient with cancer and not 
202 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
203 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
204 Respondent 65: Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
205 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
206 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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tell them the diagnosis, because the family doesn't want them to know 
the diagnosis? TB has stigma too, but we don't take [consent]. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
In some instances doctors appreciated that general patient consent was necessary, but felt that 
patients' assent for individual diagnostic tests did not require repeated confirmation and could be 
inferred from their signing of admission papers on entry to the hospita1.207 Exceptionalism was 
criticized by some doctors as a cause of compartmentalization of the disease, which was seen to 
increase, not-diminish stigma. A charitable hospital consultant felt that by enforcing specific 
informed consent was 'creating certain notions around a disease which can actually, in a way, 
make it feel different'.2°8 Another physician felt that it 'created a mystery around HIV/AIDS,209, 
and a gynaecologist regarded it as a symptom of the excessive 'hype' around HIV.21O 
In government hospitals, the emphasis on HIV/AIDS was often seen as a divergence from the 
ethos of government service. In the context of overburdened clinics and pressing priorities of 
providing basic medical care to a largely impoverished clientele, the diversion of time and 
resources to "soft" interventions such as consent and counselling was often felt to be misplaced. 
You say we should do counselling! This is very funny ... For 
counselling, we need a man, a patient, a sofa and a cup of tea, and a 
room. And there in the emergency, you have three patients on one bed, 
one is alive, one is dying and one is dead. I am not against counselling. 
What I am saying is, the ground realities are entirely different. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
Notably, doctors who were specializing in HIV medicine or who had had a greater involvement in 
issues around HIV care were more supportive of the need for special procedures around HIV 
testing. To a large extent these respondents ascribed the value of specific informed consent for 
HIV testing to addressing concerns of HIV patients beyond the immediate bounds of the clinical 
encounter. These explanations ranged widely, from mitigation of the psychological trauma of 
HIV diagnosis, to the seriousness of a long-term prognosis and lack of a cure, and the impact on 
patients' familial, social and occupational lives.m .m In contrast, other doctors' critiques of 
specific informed consent tended to be focused around concerns located within the immediate 
207 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
208 Respondent 65: Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
209 Respondent 33: Senior physician, government hospital 
210 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
211 Respondent 13: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
212 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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context of the clinical encounter. (This is discussed in further detail in the following section 
5.4.5) 
A small number of the doctors interviewed (mainly venereologists and some physicians). 
in private and public hospitals were focused on HIV care more than on other aspects of 
their sub-discipline. The emergence of such specialist "HIV practitioners". some but not all 
of whom also had the formal training in HIV medicine, represented a larger trend in India, 
according to respondents and key informants. 
Right now there is a great hope in HIV ... you have a 
proliferation of people who are very committed and who want 
to do it, of providing only HIV care... If you are in the HIV 
business then people say that you are on a bandwagon, 
because there is money there or fame. 
Physician, charitable hospital (65) 
HIV practitioners tended to favour special procedures for HIV such as informed consent. 
Becoming an HIV practitioner or specialist represented not simply an addition to their 
clinical repertoire, but also an awakening to concepts beyond the narrow concems of 
clinical science. including ethical, human rights and public health issues.213 .214 
Box 5.4 Becoming a "HIV Practitioner" 
Ambivalent opinions 
The divergence of opinion over this issue was not simply between different individuals, but it also 
appeared to divide doctors internally. For many of them, the essential dichotomy around this 
topic was between supporting taking informed consent as a progressive measure on the one hand, 
and opposing the bias in favour of HIV to the disadvantage of other patients, on the other hand. 
Many respondents appeared to introspect and cite contrasting arguments when questioned by the 
interviewer around the value of specific informed consent. 
HBV, Hev are also equally life-threatening. HBV is far more likely to 
spread as a result of needle stick, than HN. We generally do not take 
informed consent for every other investigation, then why for HIV? If we 
are not taking consent for syphilis, why we are taking consent for HIV? 
The only reason is because HIV has long term implications, and 
somebody might be discriminating against the patient. So it is to prevent 
those things. VDRL does not have such long term implications. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
213 Respondent 09: Junior physician, private nursing home 
214 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
128 
CHAPTER 5. MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS' ACCOUNTS - IMPLEMENTING POLICY GUIDELINES 
One physician welcomed the greater attention around HN that policies such as those for specific 
informed consent represented, even while questioning the practical utility of always obtaining 
formal consent for the HN test.21S A physician from a charitable hospital pondered on some of 
the dilemmas around the special treatment of HN. 
At this moment in time, at this historical juncture, there may be use for it 
[exceptionalism]... But one also has to see further than that ... If you 
look at it in the long run, its like, why do we have informed consent for 
HN and not for anything else? Why have care homes for HIV?... All 
these moves, in a way make that disease seem different. It is separate; it 
is not well integrated into other health services. What kind of 
sustainability does it have? 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
In summary, specific informed consent for HN testing was widely seen as a sign of exceptional 
treatment of HN, and doctors were divided in their opinions as to whether this was justified. 
Some of these opinions are detailed in Table 5.6 below. 
Against Exceptlonallsm For ExceptionaU8m 
- Unfairness to other patients - Psychological, social and public health reasons 
- Compartmentalization of HIV, "stigma creation" - Long term (extra-clinical) considerations for the patient 
- Impediments in clinical care - Consent linked to progressiveness 
Table 5.6 Arguments For and Against HIV Exceptionalism 
5.4.5 Consent and clinical goals 
As noted before, while some doctors, notably HN specialist or those more actively engaged in 
HIV care, appeared to have an enhanced consciousness of social and public health concerns, 
others' perspectives tended to be focused around their role and significance of their tasks within 
the context of the clinic. Their arguments against specific informed consent were oriented around 
the task of effecting the provision of clinical care efficiently and equitably. 
This business of taking informed consent from a patient before doing a 
HIV test. .. I don't know where this has come from. A patient has come 
to you. He is sick, he needs your help. Will you be thinking about this or 
about treating him? 
Senior physician, government hospital (33) 
215 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
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I think it is just a question of the investigations that the doctors considers, 
and then orders it, that's all ... it [HIV testing] is just like getting any 
other investigation done, an X-ray chest or anything. If you feel it is 
required then you will get it done. If you treat it like any other disease, 
then you will not have these problems. 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
Priority for clinical tasks and outcomes 
Frequently, the performance of clinical tasks was prioritised over procedures such as consent 
taking and counselling, which were often regarded as encumbrances in the course of providing 
care in busy hospital environments. Clinical outcomes, such as the successful treatment of 
incident illnesses were valued greatly by doctors, usually more than ethical procedural 
requirements. This was especially found to be the case for doctors working in government 
hospitals. As one physician indicated, 'we are keen to do the [clinical] procedure rather than look 
at these things,.216 A microbiologist cited the problem of large caseloads and limited time, and 
felt that procedures around consent and counselling detracted from these primary tasks. 
Look at the number of patients - you have to see 200 cases in an OPD -
how can you follow these rules? Counsel him, even take informed 
consent, explain all of HIV to him, explain the whole story, and then 
counsel him - it's too much! When they have no time, their primary job 
may be to save the patient. .. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
Duty to test 
An HIV specialist explained how a typical clinician's mindset hypothesises an 'ideal' linear 
sequence of events cornmencing with diagnosis and culminating in the departure of a well patient 
from the bounds of clinical care. 
As a clinician your ideal thinking is that you have your patient, you will 
examine and get all your clinical clues, you will send the right 
investigations ... whatever you were suspecting the investigation will 
prove that you were right, and you will treat. Anything that comes in 
between is considered as an impediment. 
Physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (16) 
216 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
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This view was supported by the narratives of a number of other doctors. According to this private 
HIV specialist, patients expectations also corresponded with this perspective: 'when the patient 
comes to us, they come with the clear idea that they will be tested by us, managed by us, treated 
by us ... '.217 Hence diagnostic testing was seen to be an integral aspect of role performance, and a 
duty of the treating doctor rather than a privilege. Doctors' single-mindedness around testing and 
diagnosing was further heightened given the greater availability and accessibility of treatment for 
HIV/AIDS.218,219 This phenomenon is also dealt with in previous sections (see pages 97, 98). 
I do understand the trauma which a patient may undergo when he comes 
to know that he is HIV positive, but now with the availability of very 
good therapy, freely available, I would rather feel that the patient's 
diagnosis is made, rather than keeping him in the dark about that. 
Senior physician, government hospital (30) 
Consent procedures, as dictated by policy, are required to offer the patient an opportunity to 
refuse the HIV test. Although refusal was not a common occurrence, for some doctors the very 
idea of a patient refusing to undergo a diagnostic test represented an impediment in the 
performance of their roles. One physician expressed a fear that 'they [patients] will start saying 
"no"". Ifwe don't know the status of the patient how will we be able to treat them?,.220 Among 
government and charitable doctors in particular, there was a prevailing sensibility that doctors 
knew what was best for poor and illiterate patients, and that the possibility of refusal interfered 
with the likelihood of good care for these patients. 
Let me give you a frank opinion, if a patient has come to me with TB 
now finding if he is HIV positive or not is of a concern both to me and 
for him. We know that the response to therapy would be different in both 
these settings. So we tell him but many a time the patients general 
intellect is not enough, and the patient's physical and mental conditions 
may also not be fit enough [to understand the importance of taking the 
test]." so I will be rather sceptical about that point [the obligation of 
seeking consent from the patient]. And more so now when we have a 
proper, efficacious and comparatively safer medication. 
Senior physician, government hospital (30) 
Hence perceptions of clinical duties sometimes extended to a belief that the diagnostic test should 
be conducted in some instances, even when patients did not confer formal consent. 
211 Respondent 08: Senior physician, private nursing home 
218 Respondent 65: Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
219 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
220 Respondent 33: Senior physician, government hospital 
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A logical problem 
Doctors emphasised that health care was generally sought by the patient: 'A patient has come to 
you. He 'is sick, he needs your help,.221 The idea of seeking consent/rom a patient, to provide a 
service sought by the patient and ordered expressly for their benefit appeared to be a contradiction 
of logic, and was a basic source of confusion for doctors. 
Why do we have to seek the permission of the patient for HN (testing)? 
It is for the patient's benefit after all! 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
When a person comes to a clinic, and you ask their permission to do 
something, what does it mean for that person? 
Physician, charitable hospital (65) 
DIAGNOSIS 
provider 
seeker 
Patient Doctor 
provider seeker 
CONSENT 
Figure 5.3 Paradox of Seeking Consent to Provide a Service 
Hence doctors did not always perceive policies for consent to be beneficial or necessary for the 
performance of clinical tasks and the achievement of clinical goals, and in some cases they were a 
source of confusion or were seen as obstacles in performance of their roles. 
5.4.6 Conveying information before taking consent 
According to the national policies, patients should be informed about "advantages, risks, potential 
consequences and implications of an HIV test result, which could be both positive and negative" 
221 Respondent 33: Senior physician, government hospital 
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in order to help them make a choice to consent for the HIV test (NACO 2005). This section looks 
at themes around imparting information and communicating with patients before testing for HN. 
Informing vs. indUcing 
An emergent theme around practitioners' communications with patients before taking consent 
was that of the dual purpose of such communication. The roles of doctors appeared to be finely 
balanced between convincing patients to take the test and allowing them to make their own 
decisions. 
In my practice, sometimes I have to explain a lot. But really, I haven't 
come across anybody who didn't give consent, after I gave my 
counselling and I made him understand the reason, what is the benefit of 
the test? ... So if you can put this [the importance of testing] rightly into 
his mind, then nobody is going to refuse. 
Senior physician, government hospital (12) 
Some [patients] feel that it is a waste of time because they feel we have 
come for something else [clinical care] but something else is happening 
[counselling, information before consent] ... sometimes they are busy and 
want to go back earlier. .. But it is job of the counsellor to understand the 
problem and convince them. 
Gynaecologist, government hospital (22) 
Often, practitioners tended to be biased towards prevailing on patients to undergo testing, 
especially in the context of better treatment opportunities for HIV / AIDS, rather than on enabling 
informed but free choice (as required by policy). 
Comprehension and interpretation 
A common refrain of doctors when discussing the relevance of consent procedures was that 
patients seldom appreciated the content of the information provided, or the significance of making 
an informed choice around the HIV test. In most cases, this related to lack of comprehension and 
gaps between the language and constructs used by doctors and patients. While in government 
hospitals, this was linked to poor educational status of patients,222 private doctors too reported 
problems of comprehension among their more affluent clientele. This was ascribed to conflicts of 
222 Respondent 19: Gynaecologist, government hospital 
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'culture'; principles of autonomy on which testing policies are based were said to not be 
appreciated by patients.223 
For many doctors this perceived lack of comprehension was a source of frustration in wasting 
time over a process that was not felt to be fruitful. Imparting information was sometimes 
regarded as an unwelcome chore, and doctors felt that they could not ensure that the patients 
comprehended all the information. 
We have always taken informed consent. How much information the 
clients have understood is a separate issue. How do we validate or verify 
that? Humne to bata diya [We did what was required]. Now how much 
they have ingested, understood, we cant say that, we cant guarantee that. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
Notwithstanding the perceived problems of comprehension, a number of doctors, especially those 
engaged in HIV care voiced their opinions in favour of imparting information and preparing 
patients before a HIV test. A few doctors said they attempted to work their way through the 
communication gaps, for which they sought the help of counsellors and patients' families.224.225 
Hence, the existence of the policy may have played a role in highlighting and remedying existing 
deficiencies in doctors' communications with their patients. 
Scaring and offending patients? 
Some doctors cited specifically negative implications of the formal consent procedure. 
Reportedly, the information on HIV provided during the consent procedure sometimes served to 
frighten patients away. Having to sign a form for consent was also believed to have unpleasant 
connotations for patients. 
Their concept is that if it is informed consent, it is something horrible, 
which must be why you are taking my consent. So they really get scared 
to sign on any piece of paper. 
Senior physician, HIV specialist, government hospital (37) 
223 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
224 Respondent 12: Senior physician, government hospital 
225 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, government hospital 
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"Drop-out" related to patients' fatigue or impatience with lengthy procedures around HN testing 
was described as a common problem, especially in government hospitals, a phenomenon which is 
documented in detail in Appendix 2 (page 322).226.227 
The moment some people hear "HN", they just vanish. They go out, 
they go to some other hospital. . . . 
Trainee venereologist, government hospital (27) 
The special emphasis on HN was likely to offend particular patients' sensibilities and adversely 
affect their relationship with practitioners, according to some respondents. For private doctors, 
this was a particular concern given the primary importance of retaining their clientele.228 In order 
to avoid these adverse outcomes, some doctors felt that greater discretion could be exercised in 
the matter of taking formal consent. 
I think you should try to be flexible... If we feel a patient is too anxious 
we can maybe just do a HIV and then see what happens. Not all patients 
are HN ELISA positive, you know. 
Venereologist, government hospital (23) 
Further themes around patients' responses to the consent process are discussed in the following 
section. 
5.4.7 Patients' responses to informed consent procedure 
This section details respondents' accounts of their patients' responses to the process of consent 
taking. 
Consent in an asymmetric relationship 
A number of doctors reported that many of their patients' attitudes were not consistent with 
autonomous decision-making around their own treatment. Reportedly, many patients are either 
not willing, or are perceived to not to be equipped to make certain choices around treatment, even 
when provided with information. 
We hear a lot of times when the patients come to you and you tell them 
about different therapeutic choices, they tum around and say "why have 
226 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
227 Respondent 27: Junior trainee venereologist, government hospital 
228 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
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we come to you?" So that you can decide the best choice ... it is their 
implicit trust that you will do the best work. .. in our country, culturally, 
people believe that when you go to a doctor they will act in their best 
interests. 
Physician and administrator, charitable hospital (17) 
"Aap hi hamara bhala soch sakte hain" [only you can decide what is 
best for us] - these are the common words you get to hear [from 
patients]. So we just sort of become their decision makers. 
Senior physician, government hospital (30) 
One physician reported that he attempted to provide information and present choices to the 
patient, in spite of which decision~making processes were invariably asymmetrical, reflecting the 
respective social positions of the actors involved.229 In what is a traditionally paternalistic 
interaction, both doctors and patients often assumed their typical roles of the instructor and the 
instructed, respectively. It is possible that in clinical settings, the offer of testing was not always 
distinguishable from an order. 
Meaning of consent for patients 
According to respondents, the choice to consent to a HIV test was not of uniform relevance to all 
patients. In some instances patients may have had other goals and requirements of their visits to 
the hospital which were prioritised to a greater degree. Some doctors questioned whether the 
procedure was of value for all their patients. 
A poor rickshaw puller with chronic liver failure ... what is the point in 
telling him about choice... But then yes, if I go to a physician, I would 
like to give informed consent. 
Physician and administrator, charitable hospital (17) 
They [patients] take it as a part of their work-up. At times, they are not 
actually aware of what is being done. We try to explain to them, but they 
do not understand, because they just want to get their work done, the 
surgery done. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
A physician from a charitable hospital introspected on the significance of the consent procedure 
for the actors involved. He felt that there were significant gaps in the conceptualization of 
consent by doctors, and many patients. He questioned whether existing formal consent 
229 Respondent 65: PhYSician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
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procedures were always in tune with patients' expectations while seeking health care, or if they 
corresponded with patients' varied and (in an Indian context) unexplored ways of according 
pennission. 
We do it because we subscribe to it, but whether that actually reflects 
something that is grounded or lived ... Whether it has the same 
significance for the patient, I am not sure ... What is consent? What is 
the meaning of obtaining consent? They need much further exploration in 
the Indian context. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
. Hence, according to doctors' narratives, consent for a HIV test may not have been equally 
relevant for, or desired by, all patients. Different patients' needs from a clinical encounter were 
also highly individualized, and formal standardized consent procedures did not always correspond 
with patients' preferred ways of according or denying pennission. In some instances patients may 
have demonstrated dissent of HIV testing not by refusing the test, but by "dropping out" or 
leaving care altogether, (as detailed in Appendix 2). 
5.4.8 Responsibilities and liabilities around consent 
Paradoxically even while a number of respondents did not believe that the consent procedure was 
of much value, or opposed it altogether, yet most of them did at least nominally follow a consent 
procedure if their institutional policies so required.230 There were many reasons for this 
divergence between opinion and actions, of which simple compliance to rules and adoption of 
norms was the most obvious. Other reasons may have included recognition of the opportunity to 
share or disperse the responsibility of diagnosing a patient with HIV. 
Sharing responsibilities 
HIV diagnosis was seen to contain the possibility of adverse outcomes for patients, and 
resultantly for treating doctors in the fonn of blame for those outcomes and ensuing legal 
implications. The significance of infonned consent as a way of transferring the responsibility of 
diagnosis to patients did not go unnoticed by doctors.231 •232 
230 I th f ti' fi d' . . 1 . n e case 0 tes ng or lagnostic pwposes, not pre-surglca testmg. 
231 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
232 Respondent 27: Junior trainee venereologist, government hospital 
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Without this informed consent the entire responsibility of the impact is 
on the testing clinician. Having been through the process of counselling, 
and informed consent, it is a shared responsibility. The patient has some 
responsibility of accepting the test result... Maybe we are trying to be 
overcautious ... but it is always better to be like that. Whenever I speak 
to people [colleagues] I say there have been suicides after HN diagnosis, 
and without specific informed consent, the onus is yours. So why do 
that? 
Physician and HN specialist, government hospital (16) 
According to a private hospital administrator too, they were in favour of formal informed consent 
in order for patients to assume greater responsibility, and hence encouraged doctors to follow 
consent procedures.233 
There were differences of opinion as to the relative responsibilities of treating physicians and 
pathologists around a HIV diagnosis, with each indicating that responsibility for taking consent 
should be apportioned to the other groUp.234.235 
Hazards of taking signed consent 
As described before, patients were usually willing to sign consent even though they may not have 
been prepared for these responsibilities, or well aware of the implications of signing of a consent 
form. For these reasons, some respondents were especially critical of formalities of obtaining 
written informed consent.236 
With the NACO policy [for written informed consent], you can't prove 
that somebody is truly informed, you just take the signature... just 
ticking a checklist, whether he is being told this, told that ... whatever 
you write, the patient will sign. Just having that kind of formality is 
useless. 
Senior physician, private nursing home (08) 
These things will only be written on paper, on a piece of paper they will 
always have informed consent, and there will be forms for the patient to 
sign on the dotted line. But informed consent is not always a one point 
thing, like I read it out "blah blah" to you and you sign it. There is a 
process and this process requires inherent trust between the two parties. 
Senior physician, charitable hospital (36) 
233 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent (and physician), private hospital 
234 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, government hospital 
235 Respondent 39: Microbiologist, 13 years experience, Private hospital 
236 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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In these situations, standardised written consent procedures were felt to be an inappropriate 
signifier of the quality of the patient-provider interaction. It was believed by some respondents 
that enforcing policies for consent would lead to evasive or specious practices on the part of 
doctors, aimed at safeguarding their own positions. 
If the bottom line is just obtaining the papers, but despite that, if the 
patient doesn't know anything - and there are many such examples, that 
is not good. 
Senior physician, private nursing home (08) 
If you have informed consent for everything, then the doctors will 
practice very safe and doctors will get away with it. They will say it is 
not our responsibility. Nowadays what the labs are doing, they do a dot 
test and give the test also in your hand. They can always say "I don't 
have a record. I had given it to him [the patient]" And on those tests, 
below that they will write: "however that is not a confirmatory test, get 
the Western Blot done." So they are safe. 
Physician and administrator, government hospital (37) 
This respondent also narrated instances from private hospitals in which signatures were obtained 
coercively or without proper information by practitioners, for purposes other than the patients' 
benefit. 
Hence in some instances doctors may have used written consent as a way of abdicating their 
responsibility for the diagnosis, and the requirement of a signature from the patient may have 
served only to reinforce the existing asymmetry of the patient-doctor relationship. 
5.4.9 Informed consent: summary 
Institutional policies and procedures regarding informed consent for a HN test varied (see Table 
5.5 on page 123). The government, private and charitable hospitals in the study all claimed to 
have policies either for written or oral consent in the case of testing for clinical management. The 
private hospital also required patients to sign informed consent in the case of pre-surgical HN 
screening, while the charitable hospitals did not. The private nursing homes under study did not 
have any specific policies for informed consent. 
In the case of testing for clinical diagnosis or for reasons of safer maternity, a majority of the 
doctors in all the sectors (including physicians, obstetricians and venereologists) claimed to have 
taken informed consent regularly in concordance with their institutional policies, yet revealed a 
number of inconsistencies and deficiencies in their practices (see Box 5.3), Even while consent 
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procedures were usually outwardly performed, in some circumstances patients may have been 
coerced or obligated into signing consent forms, or not provided proper or complete information 
before testing. 
Perceptions 
Opinions around the importance and relevance of consent did not vary significantly between 
doctors working in public or private hospitals, or those from different departments or specialities. 
However there were significant differences in opinion between doctors who had had special 
training and orientation or otherwise focused specially on HN care, and those who did not. Some 
negative and positive value associations of taking informed consent are presented in Table 5.7. 
Against SpeCific Informed Consent For Specific Informed Consent 
Superfluity Consciousness of extra-clinlcal concems 
- Poor comprehension of information by patients - Social and public health concems 
- Low demand or appreciation of consent 
-
Psychological and long-term impact on patients 
requirement on part of patients Role in preventing stigma and discrimination in 
Active hindrance in duties healthcare settings 
- Seen as scaring or offending some patients, Informed consent as signitier of a "progressive" 
leading to drop-out, or affecting their relationship ethic 
- Delaying diagnosis: obstacle to perceived duty to 
expedite access to diagnosis 
Incomprehension of the rationale of informed consent 
- Paradox of taking consent for providing a desired 
service 
Table 5.7 Opinions For and Against HIV-Specific Informed Consent 
Policies for specific informed consent for a HN test were widely regarded as a sign of 
exceptional treatment of HN. Whereas a number of doctors opposed such "exceptionalism" on 
the grounds that it unfairly favoured HN over other conditions, and led to the 
"compartmentalization" of HN as a separate entity, there was also considerable ambivalence in 
opinion, with several respondents suggesting that HN warranted such special procedures. 
In making day-to-day decisions, hospital doctors across all sectors tended to value the completion 
of clinical tasks, which value system was sometimes at odds with the requirements of specific 
infonned consent. Informed consent, with its attendant possibility of delay or refusal of 
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diagnosis, was a potential impediment in doctors' role perfonnance. Many respondents expressed 
consternation at the apparent paradox of "seeking pennission to provide care". 
Signing a consent fonn or giving formal consent for a HIV test. was reported to be of varying 
significance for, and elicited different responses from patients. Frequently, patients may not have 
wanted to make the choice or considered it irrelevant, may have not comprehended the 
inforniation, or may have been scared away or offended by the procedure. Resultantly doctors 
doubted the utility of taking fonnal consent in the case of all patients. 
Explanations 
Compliance to their respective institutional policies was widely cited as a reason for taking 
infonned consent, as was the opportunity to allay the legal responsibility of making a diagnosis of 
HIV. These and doctors' explanations for their divergences from ideal consent policies are 
enlisted in Table 5.8. The varied responses and requirements of patients tended to playa role in 
doctors' enactment of consent. In providing information to patients before obtaining consent, 
doctors were driven by their "clinical role" of expediting access to treatment, and tended to induce 
patients to consent to the test, rather than presenting information and enabling patients' free 
choice, as recommended. 
The low value commonly attached to taking consent and their non-comprehension of its rationale 
are likely causes of the general disinterest on the part of doctors in enacting the procedure. This 
may have led to "shortcuts" and divergences from ideal practices. The performance of clinical 
tasks and outcomes were often prioritised over ensuring the integrity of consent procedures. 
Reasons for following consent policy Reasons for not following consent policy 
- Institutional requirement 
-
Variability of patient response and comprehension 
- Opportunity to relinquish responsibility 
-
Perceptions of low value of consent procedure 
-
Incomprehension of rationale of consent-taking 
-
"Clinical role" pressure and greater priority for 
clinical tasks 
-
Mitigation of personal risk (surgeons)237 
Table 5.8 Reasons for FoUowing / Not Following Consent PoUcy 
237 Add d' h . . resse In t e preVIOUS sectIOn 
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Discussion 
Informed consent policy is an example of the reforms wrought through the emergence of a HIV 
care movement in the country, perceived by some as a force for progress and emancipation. For 
many doctors it acted as a reminder of the need for ethical standards in providing care, and it had 
a role in raising consciousness about longer term concerns of HIV positive patients, and broader 
social and public health implications. The widespread policies for informed consent may have 
partially checked indiscriminate and "mandatory" testing, and played a role in improving the 
quality of provider-patient communications, and patients' preparedness for a HIV diagnosis, as 
expected. 
However in its practical application in busy hospital environments, the value of consent for HIV 
testing was sometimes not apparent to the actors involved, and many doctors perceived consent 
for HN testing to be disconnected from ground realities. Even while a majority of doctors 
reported that they followed consent policy at least nominally; improvement of the quality of that 
consent process becomes a key concern. Successful implementation of informed consent policy 
is hampered by conflicts between the roles that doctors are expected to enact: of providing 
efficient clinical care as well as ensuring ethical standards. Also, the imposition of standardized 
policy presents a fundamental problem when its utility and rationale are not apparent to doctors, 
the implementers of the policy. 
The benefits of written consent for practitioners as a safeguard against litigation - rather than for 
patients - did not escape the practitioners' attention, an observation which has also been made by 
Kalantri (2000) and by Shenoy (2002). Reportedly also, formal informed consent procedures 
(entailing the demonstration of autonomy and explicit sharing of responsibilities) may not have 
been in line with all patients' priorities and needs. Generation of knowledge on the unexplored 
area of patients' responses to consent procedures could assist in the adaptation of policies. 
Further, the push for wider enforcement of standards in HIV testing needs to be balanced by an 
appreciation of the unique nature of each provider-patient interaction, and the role of discretion on 
the part of practitioners in sustaining care processes and relationships. 
142 
CHAPTER 5. MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS' ACCOUNTS - IMPLEMENTING POLICY GUIDELINES 
5.5 CONFIDENTIALITY 
NACO's policies for HN testing call for adherence to a code of confidentiality around patients' 
HIV status or test results, requiring that health care workers who are not directly involved in care 
of the patient should not be told about the result.238 Certain concessions are made for the 
involvement of patients' spouses for their protection, and patients' families with the consent of 
the patient. Doctors' practices around confidentiality and their perspectives on the policy are 
examined in the following pages. 
5.5.1 Adherence to policy 
A number of respondents said that they held the principles of confidentiality in high regard and 
claimed to follow the policy faithfully. In the govenunent sector especially, doctors said they 
took special measures in case of patients with HN to ensure confidentiality. In some instances 
institutional procedures were specifically oriented toward maintaining confidentiality.239 
However, closer enquiry revealed a number of instances in which doctors could not or did not 
adhere to the policies entirely. Breaches of confidentiality ensued through deliberate or 
unintended disclosure of patients' test results to another individual or individuals without the 
patients' consent. 
Knowledge of patients' HIV status available to: 
- Health workers not immediately involved in care of the patient 
- Spouse, partner or family of the patient in the absence of the patients' consent or 
without proper counselling 
- Other patients, relatives and attendants present in the hospital 
Box 5.S Types of Breaches of Confidentiality Policy 
The parties commonly mentioned as gaining knowledge of patients' HIV status without patients' 
consent (i.e. those involved in breaches of confidentiality) are enlisted in Box 5.5. Other agencies 
such as employers and NGOs caring for HIV positive people were also reported to have asked 
238 See Chapter 1 (l.2.4) for the wording of the NACO policy 
239 S everal respondents (12, 16,20,28,42) 
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doctors to disclose patients' HIV status, which requests were generally rejected according to the 
respondents.24o .241.242 
5.5.2 Concepts of confidentiality 
Doctors had differing conceptions of the notion of confidentiality, in the context of patients with 
HIV infection. 
Professional norm of secrecy 
For some doctors, confidentiality policies reinforced their belief in professional nonns of secrecy 
of client information and sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship in general, not simply in case 
ofHIV. 
I will not tell. I think it is important to have a personal bond with the 
patient. It is not legal but it is something between you and that person. 
It's nothing to do with anyone else, even if it is his wife. 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
Confidentiality was also seen by some as a signifier of trust between doctor and patient, and 
essential for retaining the patient's custom.243 .244 Confidentiality or "professional secrecy" was 
widely regarded as a professional standard to strive for, even as doctors admitted that situational 
factors did not always allow for the high standards to be maintained. 
HIV - a special case 
In the case of patients with HIV, doctors' unique concerns and perceptions around HIV 
superimposed on their existing notions around professional secrecy giving rise to a different 
spectrum of opinions. On the one hand, some doctors supported the national policies in the view 
240 Respondent 12: Senior physician, government hospital 
241 Respondent 13: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
242 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
243 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
244 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
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that HIV warranted an increased emphasis on confidentiality, given the attendant problems of 
stigma and discrimination.245 
Reflecting the widespread fear of acquiring HIV from patients, there was also an opposite 
perception that rules of confidentiality should be relaxed, not strengthened, in the case of patients 
with HN. This feeling was especially strong in the context of health care workers' perceived 
right to protection from being infected. Many respondents were of the opinion that HN positive 
patients have duties and responsibilities toward health workers - 'the patient should understand 
that he can be a risk to others' , one surgeon opined246 - and should acquiesce to disclosure of their 
HN status?47.248 
Further, a larger number of doctors opposed the special emphasis on confidentiality in HN care, 
deriving from their disaffection with the "exceptional" treatment of HN. Some respondents felt 
that this was a retrogressive approach which would only promote excessive secrecy and prevent 
"normalization" of the epidemic. 
Through this confidentiality, you are spreading the disease. Tell me, 
what is the formula for smallpox or polio, these days? Inform the 
government, inform this and infonn that, so you are controlling it. If we 
say "bachalo, bachalo, chupaio, chupalo" [protect it, hide it] , then what 
will happen? It will keep spreading. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
There are so many diseases, and when confidentiality is not maintained 
about any particular disease then what is so great about HN that it has to 
be ... the same stigma and the same things was attached to tuberculosis 
50 years back and now nobody even bats an eyelid about it 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
Table 5.9 summarizes some of doctors' different conceptions of the policy of confidentiality for 
HN. The prominent theme of health workers' right to protection is explored further in section 
5.5.3. 
245 Respondent 12: Senior physician, government hospital 
246 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
247 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
248 Respondent 42: Counsellor, government hospital VCTC 
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General HIV-speclflc 
Favouring Congruent with medical professional Correctly emphasised in light of HIV 
Confidentiality norms of secrecy stigma and discrimination 
Against Convenience of involving family Obstacle in actualization of practitioners' 
Confidentiality members in patient care right to safety 
Liable to reinforce stigma and secrecy 
around the disease 
Table 5.9 Practitioners' Opinions For and Against Confidentiality Policy 
5.5.3 Health workers' knowledge of patients' status 
Disclosure of patients' HIV status to health workers not directly involved in the care of the patient 
was categorically proscribed in government policy. Respondents variously either followed policy 
closely or chose to involve more healthcare staff in knowledge of patients' HIV status; and 
correspondingly advanced explanations for their practices. 
On the part of more "HIV -aware" consultants, there were avowals that the text of policy was 
followed strictly, and that references to HIV status of the patient were carefully shielded from 
those not directly involved in patient care.249 The distinction of who was directly involved in 
patient care, and hence authorized to know patients' HIV status or not, was however open to 
variable and discretionary interpretation. 
The sister [nurse] would know, the doctor would know, all those 
handling the patient would know. It is essential for them to know ... 
Medical superintendent, private hospital (38) 
I will just disclose a report to my juniors, only to people who are 
concerned with the care. The sweeper has to dispose off the body fluids, 
and that is an issue. The intern has to take a sample - that is an issue. And 
I have to operate. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
In a number of other instances, doctors opposed outright the policy of shielding HIV test results 
from any healthcare staff, including 'guards and sweepers' and paramedical staff?SO,2SI In the 
249 S' 1 evera respondents (17, 28, 35, 70) 
250 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
251 Respondent 39: Microbiologist, 13 years experience, Private hospital 
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private hospital, patients' case files were marked to allow health care providers to recognize a 
HIV positive patient. 2S2 
Protecting health workers 
The primary justification for allowing healthcare staff access to knowledge of patients' HIV status 
was the workers' need to protect themselves from potentially being infected with HIV.2S3 
Maintaining confidentiality is one issue ... but at a lot of times, simple 
waste disposal becomes a problem. We are supposed to have segregated 
waste, but at times, we do not get the bags. If we look at a sweeper, 
taking away the waste from the hospital, you will realise how dangerous 
it is for him. He is carrying all that waste which has got a lot of fluids, 
lot of sharps, he is dripping the waste on the floor. How dangerous it is! 
Just because he is not aware of these things, and how dangerous it is for 
him. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
In government hospitals where there was active pressure to enforce the policies and , there was a 
commensurate opposition, on the part of doctors, to the policies. It was perceived as unfair for 
certain groups of providers to not have knowledge of patients' HIV status.254 
It would not be fair ifI knew and I did not tell my junior doctors, or I did 
not tell my nurse, that will not be fair because that means I am taking the 
precautions and she is not ... 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
Hence, many doctors believed that knowledge of patients' HIV status was a right of all healthcare 
staff, in the likelihood of their contact with a HIV positive patient. Some doctors testified to 
predicaments between following policies for confidentiality and supporting their co-workers.2ss 
The 'grapevine' among hospital staff 
Even among doctors favouring confidentiality for HIV, many pointed out the difficulties of 
enforcing policies aiming to confine such knowledge, especially in the context of busy hospital 
environments. In government hospitals, there was an air of acceptance that knowledge of 
252 Respondent 40: Counsellor, private hospital 
253 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
254 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
25S Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
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patients' HIV status was liable to be disseminated among hospital staff, to go with the tacit 
acknowledgement of workers' needs of self-protection. 
Strict confidentiality: this is often not possible in a government hospital. 
The health-care workers come to know about it. They don't make a fuss 
over it. 
Senior physician, government hospital (13) 
Initially we used to put a board behind the patients bed, but we don't do 
that now. But sparingly, what we noticed with the staff nurses, they still 
put a board for their own ... They put a board there saying HIV+. 
Venereologist, government hospital (23) 
In the private hospital however, a intra-hospital 'grapevine' about patients' HIV status was not 
just tolerated, but regarded as internal to the execution ofHIV care in the hospital.2S6·2s7 
People will alert you before the message gets back to the patient. 
Somebody or the other, registrar or somebody, somebody will phone, 
"there is a positive test", or "there is some gadbad [problem]" ... I think 
that the grapevine works quite well. 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (34) 
Health workers' attitudes 
Some doctors reported negative consequences of health care workers' awareness of patients' HIV 
status. One doctor told of a HIV positive patient who was a health worker in another hospital, 
who refused to take medication from the hospitals' ART centre, for fear that his colleagues would 
find out.2S8 Another respondent reported that workers would create obstacles in admission ofHIV 
positive patients: 'trolleys were withdrawn, the supplies becomes less and less ... ,.259 Other 
respondents however reported improving attitudes and greater acceptance ofHIV positive patients 
among healthcare staff, with increasing awareness of, and exposure to HIV.260.261 
While some doctors acknowledged some potential hanns to the patient of disclosure of HIV status 
to all health workers, this was countered by perceptions that knowledge of patients' HIV status 
was a right of all health providers, in order for self-protection. Advertisement or circulation of 
256 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
257 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent, private hospital 
258 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
259 Respondent 70: Senior medical educator, coordinator of intensive training programme in HIV 
260 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
261 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent (and physician), private hospital 
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patients test results among hospital staff through infonnal word-of-mouth routes was a practice 
that was often tolerated and (in the private hospital) even encouraged by doctors. The practice of 
labelling of patients' beds and case-sheets was also prevalent, although sometimes disparaged. 
5.5.4 Involvement of the spouse or partner 
The policy wording in regard of disclosure of a patients HIV status to their spouse or sexual 
partner contains two distinct themes. While stressing on the importance of strict confidentiality, 
the national policy (NACO 2005) also requires that disclosure of HIV status to a spouse or partner 
should be done only following proper consent and counselling of the patient. 
Conflicting policy messages 
The issue of informing patients' spouses and sexual partners about a patients HIV status was 
somewhat complex, and the messages available to practitioners were not always straightforward. 
While on the one hand, strict confidentiality was required, physicians were also encouraged to 
notify spouses I partners. Doctors had varying opinions around the issue of informing partners, 
with some clearly taking a stance one way or the other. 
Until and unless the patient wants, you can't discus this issue with 
anybody else... you tell your patient that she [his wife] is at risk, but if 
she is not your patient, she is somewhere else, I don't think that's right ... 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
Confidentiality should be absolute and complete. Except for 
circumstances where there is at risk an individual who is very near the 
patient, for example, a wife. There, confidentiality has to be breached. 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (25) 
Others expressed their confusion and ambivalence over this issue. 
Professionally, I don't really understand what should be done. There are 
issue when the spouse is informed and the consequences may be 
drastic ... Its very complicated whether the person has to be told or not? 
Telling is better, but also it has ramifications 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
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I really don't know ... it is a controversial issue that if a woman doesn't 
want her HIV status to be disclosed to her husband, what should we do, 
and how should we tackle this problem. 
Gynaecologist, 15 years experience, government hospital (19) 
It is truly a difficult issue. I am still struggling to cope with this issue and 
there is no answer. 
Senior physician, charitable hospital (36) 
In addition to the ambivalence around the content of the policy, respondents also revealed that 
more than one source of policy guidance on this aspect. Apart form NACO's policies, a Supreme 
Court ruling from 2002262 was also cited which emphasised the rights of the spouse to protection 
over the patient's right to confidentiality.263.264.26s 
Reluctance to approach partners 
The act of involving partners / spouses required an active effort on the part of the practitioners to 
identify partners and encourage them to attend the clinic. Some doctors were not entirely at ease 
with this extension of their duties beyond immediate clinical care. Said one physician266, 
'honestly speaking, we do not do it'. Additionally, the pracitioners reported practical problems in 
identifying and communicating with partners and spouses of patients. 
What are you going to do? Call up? Send a letter? Or call her and then 
discuss the test with her? Very difficult. Also, which partner are you 
talking about? Suppose you have got HIV from someone else? What 
about that partner? Here you are only talking about the spouse. What 
about any other partners there might be? 
Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital (14) 
Circumstances of disclosure 
Among doctors who did involve themselves with decisions around informing spouses / partners, 
many reported that patient's opinions and circumstantial factors dictated their actions. Gender 
asymmetry was often reported as a determining factor around partner notification. Women were 
perceived to be more likely to face discrimination and adverse outcomes from disclosure of their 
262 See Chapter 2 (2.1.3 Relevant Acts and legislations) 
263 Respondent 17: Physician and administrator, charitable hospital 
264 Respondent 23: Venereologist, government hospital 
265 Respondent 39: Microbiologist, private hospital 
266 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
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status to spouses, than men.267,268 Frequently, doctors said they took a personalized approach to 
the issue of involving partners, given the differences in patients' responses. 
We encourage the patient to disclose the status to their partner. Most 
people have the initial anxiety and then they bring along the partner but 
there are still few who neglect that. 
Senior physician, charitable hospital (17) 
I have never had a situation where a patient has not agreed to disclose the 
status to the partner or family, but it might have taken 3·4 visits at a time. 
You may need to give them time to deal with their problem rather than 
saying that it is major problem and I have to do this and that. 
Venereologist, 18 years of experience, charitable hospital (18) 
A physician from a charitable hospital described his subjective experience of making decisions 
around involving partners and relatives. 
So many times we make individual value judgments that may differ from 
case to case. " At times you play God. But at times I do feel that to enjoy 
a long tenn trust and rapport with the patients, you know your patient 
well and they trust you, over a period of time ... you know that I should 
tell [disclose the result] here, I shouldn't tell here. You go by your 
instincts, your gut feelings which are very difficult to quantify. 
Senior physician, charitable hospital (36) 
In summary, the issues around involving spouses / partners of HIV positive patients were 
complicated by somewhat conflicting policy directives. Doctors perceived a confusion of roles 
between established clinical nonns favouring absolute confidentiality, and the "HN .specific" 
push for involvement of partners. Some were not comfortable with the excess effort and 
intricacies involved in notifying partners. Among those doctors who did engage, their actions 
were often determined by perceptions of patients' personal circumstances and responses. 
5.5.5 Involvement of patients' families 
The national policy (NACO 2005) states that: "such (HN test) results should be given out to the 
person and with his consent to the members of his family ... The person should also be 
encouraged to share this information with the family." Families were reported to be often closely 
involved with the care of HIV positive patients in the hospitals. Frequently relatives were 
267 Respondent 36: Senior physician, charitable hospital 
268 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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allowed to have knowledge of the patients HN status, for a number of reasons, with or without 
the patients' consent. Doctors' varied approaches and perspectives on the subject are explored. 
Response of family members 
Family members' reactions to knowledge of patients' HIV status were variable and unpredictable. 
Serious adverse outcomes of disclosure of HIV -positive status to families and spouses were 
reportedly more common for women: 'Most common was the husband infecting the wife, the girl 
getting abandoned, or thrown out, back to mother's house', recounted a government 
microbiologist. 269 
Within hospitals, family members were seen to have considerable usefulness, in their role as 
attendants to administer closely to patients needs, as mediators for deliberating with doctors on 
the care of the patient, and in the case of government hospitals, even to perfonn errands such as 
delivering samples and picking up reports.2700271 As such, given relatives' close involvement; it 
was often not easy or expedient on the part of practitioners to hide knowledge of the patients' 
HIV status from them. 
Laissez-faire approach 
Across different sectors of hospitals, a laissez-faire approach prevailed with respect to the 
involvement of families, with no special effort being made either to shield patients' test results 
from them, or to systematically infonn them with the patients' cooperation. Neither government 
nor private hospitals ensured that test results were delivered specifically to the patients, and 
frequently relatives collected reports on behalf of patients. 
There is no policy, there is no system - sometimes the patient comes to 
collect it, sometimes the patient's relative comes to collect it - there is no 
clear cut guideline about the referred patients ... who do we give it to. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
If you give out a report, very often the relatives receive it. There are few 
instances in which confidentiality is maintained. The whole family is 
involved. 
Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital (35) 
269 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
270 Respondent 27: Junior trainee venereologist, government hospital 
271 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
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Often, no efforts were made to separate patients from accompanying family members and spouses 
at the time of consultation. Relatives' involvement in disclosure of HIV test results often 
occurred incidentally, because they were present or seen to be useful at the time. 
Then there is the question of disclosing the result to unsuspecting 
patients. I think that is a matter of tact. Like the patient just we saw. 
Suppose there is somebody with the patient. You identify unconsciously 
who is the more sensible of the two. This man was a duffer. Obviously 
his wife was the sensible person. You play it by ear, up to a point. 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (34) 
The involvement of family members was seldom undertaken systematically or supported by 
counselling. Decisions to involve families in knowledge of their HIV status were perceived to be 
the responsibility of the patients: 'Involving the family is up to the patient' said a government 
gynaecologist.272 
Summarily - while family members were often useful in caring for patients in the hospital, their 
responses and reactions in the long term may not always have been favourable, especially for 
women patients. In what could be construed as a lax approach to confidentiality, family 
members' were often not actively prevented from accessing patients' reports and clinical status, 
and were informed of patients' HIV status (often without patients' consent) when it was seen to 
be expedient. 
S.S.6 Confidentiality in uncontrolled environments 
According to some respondents. lack of time, space and resources were important factors in not 
being able to achieve high standards of confidentiality, especially in government hospitals. 
When you want to have confidentiality you must have a one to one 
relationship with your patient ... neither do we have the space nor do we 
have the manpower. When you have 100 patients coming to your OPD 
then where do you have place for one patient - one person [doctor]? The 
same thing goes for the ward and the labour room. We don't have the 
resources for it. .. 
Head, gynaecology department, government hospital (21) 
A prevailing culture of "listening in" and not observing personal privacy was also reported as a 
contributing factor in failing to ascertain total confidentiality. 
272 Respondent 20; Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
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You see, a nonnal OPD is crowded.... I've noticed one interesting thing 
that mostly the patients who even listen to it, don't consider it to be 
taboo, they don't feel that "Doctor Saab is looking at a patient, so lets 
stand away". The other patients never shun them and that is not an issue. 
Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital (23) 
There is no respect for the individual. If I am sitting in this room and 
talking to you and he is sitting in the front, he is my secretary, and he is 
not supposed to listen to me but no, he will listen to me! That is the kind 
of country we are in. This is our culture. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (29) 
Added to these factors, the requirements of co-workers and the involvement of families and 
spouses in patient care all added to the difficulties of ensuring strict confidentiality. In such a 
context of shifting circumstances and varying requirements of actors, doctors often responded by 
adjusting to the needs of the situation, rather than enforcing policies uncompromisingly. 
We are trying to keep it confidential. At times I see the residents talking 
loudly and I tell them, don't talk loudly ... at times in the rounds other 
patients are also there, and if we mention that she is a positive patient, 
they will be staring ... so we say, be a bit careful about this. 
Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital (22) 
I think, because we know that we are not able to maintain confidentiality, 
so we take it loosely ... and in the West they are able to maintain, so they 
feel that it should be done ... 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
While a number of respondents were broadly in favour of its principles, "strict confidentiality" 
was often regarded as a target to strive toward rather than a basic standard of quality to be ensured 
on every occasion. 
5.5.7 Confidentiality: summary 
A number of doctors across all sectors said that they valued the importance of confidentiality in 
their dealings with patients. In some institutions, special procedures had been instituted to 
safeguard the confidentiality of HIV positive patients. However some doctors perceived flaws in 
the text of government policies, and were of the opinion that HIV status should have been 
available to all health workers, in order for them to avail of protection from procuring the 
infection. 
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Most doctors reported that they strived to ascertain a standard of confidentiality at most times. 
However there were many instances where it was reportedly difficult to prevent particular 
individuals from accessing knowledge of the patients' HN status (and even expedient to permit 
them to do so). 
As such, confidentiality and disclosure of HN test results to third parties was an aspect in which 
doctors were most liable to exercise discretion. The close involvement of a number of actors -
spouses, families and health workers - with individually varying roles and requirements, 
contributed to unique and changeable environments for each patient. Doctors were faced with 
plural and simultaneous concerns of expediting immediate patient care, being mindful of their 
long term well-being, recognizing health workers' needs, and complying with institutional and 
professional norms. 
Explanations 
Doctors' explanations for their response to confidentiality policies are listed below. 
Reasons For Following Policy Reasons For Not Following Policy 
- Compliance with official norms 
-
Health workers' right to knowledge of patient status, to 
- Maintaining profeSSional standards of 
enable self-protection 
secrecy 
-
Logistical difficulties of hiding reports from health 
workers, and family 
-
Usefulness of health worker "grapevine" in normal 
hospital functioning (Private hospital) 
-
Inadequate space and resources (Govemment 
hospitals) 
-
Expediency of involving family in patient care and 
hospital errands 
Table S.10 Reasons For Following / Not Following Confidentiality Policy 
Discussion 
Policies for strict confidentiality of HN test results, as stated in the national policy, are in tune 
with, and may have reinforced, orthodox norms of professional secrecy. However phobias around 
acquiring HN among the medical practitioners sometimes led them to make an exception by 
permitting intra-hospital dissemination of patients' HIV status. HN testing also brings with it the 
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added requisites of the disclosure of HIV test results to spouses and families to prevent further 
spread of HIV and facilitate their involvement. Practitioners were not always mindful of, or 
equipped to deal with the delicacy of these decisions and their potential for adverse social 
outcomes for patients. 
The widespread ease of access to patients' status and test results for different groups of 
individuals within the hospital, and the resultant likelihood of stigmatization and discrimination of 
patients with HIV, is a concern that bears addressing in all sectors of hospitals. At the same time, 
practitioners need to be better supported in making enlightened discretionary decisions around 
disclosure of test results to spouses and family. 
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Chapter 6. Medical Practitioners' Accounts: Interface with Other 
Groups 
Medical practitioners' accounts of their interactions and relationships with different groups of 
policy actors are presented in this chapter, drawing on the interviews with practitioners from all 
nine hospitals. Data from Key Informant interviews was also used to provide contextual 
information. 
6.1 GROUPS FORMALLY CHARGED WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
6.1.1 Institutional administration 
Hospital administrators 
In government hospitals, there was little recognition by practitioners of any role of hospital 
administrators or superintendents in either propagating or enforcing HIV testing policies. Issues 
around HIV testing were sometimes characterised as being of a day-to-day nature, and not 
suitable for the attention of Medical Superintendents or Deans. 
The [Head of Institute] will give him maybe a piece of his mind, but then 
will forget this. It is not possible for the [Head] to tag behind why this 
guy is not doing that cholecystectomy [on a patient suspected of having 
HIV]. 
Physician, 8 years experience, government hospital (16) 
This is a [matter of] day-to-day running ... whether you are marking your 
beds or whether you are whispering about your patients, announcing it, 
who is to check? It may not even reach the MS [medical superintendent] 
Key informant 
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The hospital administration was not associated with a monitoring and supervision role, but more 
of a refereeing role for complaints and problems ('if something going wrong with HIV care',273 
'if somebody raises an issue about pre-surgical testing,274), to adjudicate disputes and enforce 
discipline.275 The Superintendents were also perceived in a protective role for practitioners, and 
were seen as a buffer from complaints and demands of patients, NGOs and pressure groups. 
In the private hospital the hospital management was seen as being more closely involved in issues 
around HN care and testing. When the administration attempted to introduce consent procedures 
and outlaw mandatory HIV screening, many doctors - especially surgeons - had resisted. It was 
apparent that the management eventually prevailed and hospital policies were modified 
accordingly. However, in spite of the hospital's fonnal adoption of policies in line with national 
guidelines, many doctors did not appear to be constrained by these requirements, and continued 
their digressive practices unhindered.276.277 
In one charitable hospital, respondents related that hospital policies were created by the 
administration following protracted discussions between practitioners and administrators. The 
policies were broadly in line with national policies in promoting infonned consent and 
confidentiality; however they differed in the key respect of pennitting pre-surgical screening. 
The administration had to take a clear policy stand on the issue. But it 
reflected lot of tension - tensions and demands and a lot of negotiation 
which will never be stated in the policy. 
Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital (65) 
There was a free exchange of views in this hospital between practitioners and administrators, even 
on contested policy issues such as pre-surgical testing. Practitioners broadly expressed their 
confidence in institutional policies. One physician claimed: 'It is better to have an institutional 
policy... because that is what people will follow. It is more relevant to you in your 
workplace ... ,.278 Compliance with institutional policy was reported to be high. 
273 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
274 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
275 Key Infonnants 
276 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
277 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
278 Respondent 17: Physician, charitable hospital 
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HIVIAIDS committees and departments 
Although they did not seem aware whose role it was to ensure infection control, many 
government hospital practitioners complained about shortage of protective equipment and lack of 
post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP). 
The question is, have they given every one these visors? Have they 
given enough gum boots? If the answer is no, then the hospital should be 
shut down. Or we should test [pre-surgical HIV screening]. They are 
just moralising, you ask them, these are all the things required for 
universal precautions, they don't have them ... 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
In some of the government hospitals, there were separate departments dedicated to infection 
control and safety, which were responsible for administering many HIV related policies and 
programmes. The authority and role of the infection control department, and in some instances 
even its presence, was not acknowledged by many practitioners.279 280 
Unlike in the government hospital, in both the private and the charitable hospital, HIV 
committees were regarded as being closely linked to the hospital administration. 
Intra-departmental authorities 
Within different clinical departments of government hospitals, it was reported that there was some 
discussion but little consensus on appropriate HN testing practices. Department heads were 
generally not regarded as enforcers of policies.281 There was a particular air of secrecy and little 
open discussion within departments around contentious issues like mandatory testing. Said a 
microbiologist, 'I don't know why we are not openly discussing this issue,.m 
Within clinical units however the story was usually one of close knit teams and compliance to the 
dictates of seniors or the unit Head. In surgical departments, some units actively adopted a policy 
around mandatory testing which was contrary to national guidelines. However the practice had 
only tacit and unofficial pennission from Heads, which allowed them to disown responsibility in 
case the practices were exposed. 
279 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
280 Respondent 32: Junior surgeon, government hospital 
281 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
282 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
159 
CHAPTER 6. MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS' ACCOUNTS: INTERFACE WITH OTHER GROUPS 
The Unit Head does decide, but generally Heads will not take matters 
into their own hands, because if somebody raises an issue at any time, 
then they will not like to expose that they have been getting 
investigations [pre-surgical HIV tests] done [against official policy]. 
Junior surgeon, government hospital (32) 
In the private hospital, certain surgical departments practiced pre-surgical testing, but there was 
no indication that this was a resulted of concerted decision-making within departments or units. 
Frequently, there were claims by doctors in private hospitals that all such decisions were made on 
an individual basis. 
In the charitable hospital, departmental meetings and discussions within clinical teams on the 
subject were common, even on contentious issues. Departments and teams were seen as 
instrumental in propagating institutional policy, and training of junior staff on HIV care included 
instruction on the hospital policy. Active policy decisions however appeared to be deferred to the 
hospital administration. 
Interface with institutional administration: summary 
The institutional context is clearly an important one, however with regard to HN testing, the 
participation of institutional agents in setting and implementing policy appeared to be variable. 
In government hospitals, the central administration were not seen to be major actors in 
implementing HIV testing policies, regarded as having the role of overseers and adjudicators, 
rather than supervisors. The role of infection control departments was barely acknowledged. 
Intradepartmental decisions and discussions aroWld these issues were not common, and Heads of 
Departments were not seen as being influential in enforcing policies. Unit Heads sometimes 
dictated policies around contentious issues, but did not openly acknowledge their positions. 
In the private hospital, the administration's role in changing policies to meet national standards 
was resented by many doctors. However doctors often continued to practice autonomously and 
contrary to hospital policy. Department Heads were not cited as being influential, however strong 
team affiliatioI:1S may have existed within surgical units. 
In the charitable hospital, the hospital administration's role was seen as a strong central one. 
Hospital policies which were enacted through the mediation of department heads and units, and 
widely followed by the practitioners. This hannonious equation in implementation was possible 
as a result of the participatory nature of policy-setting, given the active involvement of 
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departments in hospital-level decision-making, and the fact that hospital policies had been 
modified to accommodate practitioners' interests. 
6.1.2 Government and legislature 
Perspectives of practitioners on the role of government health authorities, on relevant laws 
promulgated by the national government and on prospective laws around HIV I AIDS are 
presented. 
Government health administration 
Many practitioners did not necessarily interact actively with representatives of the health 
administration and the role of bureaucratic I administrative bodies were seldom cited specifically. 
They were not regarded to have any connection with specific issues such as HIV testing.283 
However, the construction of "government", an entity regarded as being on a higher plane than 
institutional employers or the workspace, or the conception of being in government employ (for 
government doctors) was often cited as a context or an explanation for behaviour or actions. 
Some government doctors referred to being part of a chain of command under the government as 
part of their professional identity, regarding it as a framework for their actions: 'we are all bound 
by the government's directions which we receive' said one gynaecologist.284 For government 
doctors, following government policies were widely recognized as being a norm, even if the norm 
was not always adhered to.285•286 Paradoxically though, the emphasis on HIV/AIDS was often 
described as being foreign to, and a distorting influence on government service values. Taking an 
interest in activities around HIV I AIDS was sometimes regarded as superficial or meretricious.287 
Among private sector providers however, there was a widespread conception that they were not 
accountable to the government in their practices. The government was also described as being 
unsupportive of their initiatives and unresponsive to their needs. 
283 The nomenclature of government health administration here is applicable to the Department of Health 
under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare at a national level; and state Departments of Health at 
state level. Technically, NACO and national and state medical councils are also part of the governmental 
health administration machinery, but they have autonomous and semi-autonomous status, and hence are 
dealt with separately. More details of the organization of government health machinery is presented in 
Chapter 2 (2.1.2) and Chapter 7 (7.1.1) 
284 Respondent 19: Gynaecologist, 15 years of experience, government hospital 
285 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
286 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
287 Respondent 66 Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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The private sector has no help from the government, has no help from 
any religious body, has no help from any corporate. They are existing on 
their own, and they have to grow. 
Senior surgeon and administrator, private hospital (26) 
There are [training] programmes for the government sector doctors, but 
they don't make any effort to involve us. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
In private hospitals, some doctors were aware ofthe government's stance on HIV testing and care, 
but the policies were not regarded as binding or compulsory in any way.288.289 
In the charitable hospitals, the principles of government policies were generally recognized, but 
there was no indication that these were considered to be binding. 
Consumer laws 
The inclusion of medical services under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) in 1995 meant that 
doctors could be prosecuted in consumer courts, purportedly faster and more convenient than civil 
and criminal courts. Among doctors in government hospitals, there was a mixed response to the 
spectre of litigation in consumer courts. Some expressed their apprehensions29o, while others said 
that they felt immune to prosecution since consumer action was only applicable for paid services, 
whereas their services were provided free.291 ,292 
Even though the trends of clients actually taking legal action are not well known, many doctors in 
both sectors, but particularly in private hospitals had strong feelings about the threat of litigation. 
288 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
289 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent, private hospital 
290 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist, government hospital 
291 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
292 This is accurate but not a widely known fact among government hospital practitioners. According to 
Bhat (I 996), the Supreme Court ruled that the CPA is applicable to paid medical services. Hence 
Government services would typically be exempt, except in instances (in some states and municipalities) 
where user fees are charged. 
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I think the need of the hour is awareness. But with awareness, comes the 
problem of half knowledge. These days there are so many cases in the 
consumer courts. There are many of these cases against our clinic. These 
patients are not really aware of the issues. They don't really know what 
medical negligence is. They just know that one can go and file a case 
against doctors. They are just going to the court, and filing the case. And 
then the doctor has to go to the court, and maaro chakkars [run around]. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
HIVIAIDS Bill 
While the HIV / AIDS Bilf93 did not represent an actual but only a potential policy influence, 
doctors' marked response to it was an indicator of their attitudes and response to legal reform for 
greater regulation of their practices. According to a key informant, legal reform was likely to 
have a partial deterrent action on practices which violated the NACO policies. Some doctors 
thought it was important to stay on the right side of the law, even if unwillingly so. 
Let the legislation come, and then we will see. I am a law-abiding citizen. 
If the legislation says that I shall not go to bed with my wife, then I shall 
not. There is nothing I can do ... the government is supreme. They are the 
Rajas, the Maharajas. They want to introduce the legislation and revert 
that. How can you do anything about it? You cannot do anything. 
Senior surgeon and administrator, private hospital (26) 
There was a widespread feeling of apprehension with relation to the Bill?94 Legal sanction for 
HIV testing policies was felt to be unjust in the context of imperfect environments for complying 
to them, and the existence of more basic issues around lack of regulation. 
I think it would need to be opposed by doctors. You are introducing so 
called accountability for these things ... there are so many more problems 
in the country where accountability should be much much more. 
Senior gynaecologist, government hospital (21) 
[Quacks] are glVlng out prescriptions everywhere. What is the 
government doing? Nothing. So when we make a law only one sincere 
person will be sued by somebody, and he will have to pay through his 
nose. 
Senior physician, government hospital (37) 
293 See Chapter 2 (2.1.3 Relevant Acts and legislations) 
294 Several respondents (24, 41, 21) 
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A HIV/AIDS Law would only, it was felt, lead to subversion or defensive practices, felt one 
physician.29S Others felt that it would create a 'panic situation,296, that laboratories might hesitate 
from doing the tests, and physicians may be less likely to treat people with HIV I AIDS.297 A 
government surgeon pointed out numerous ways of subverting the law, by taking advantage of the 
fact of patients' deference to doctors' orders. 
There are many answers for this. For example just like we outsource the 
sanitation, we will ask the patient that go and get the investigations done 
[from a private diagnostic laboratory outside the hospital]. We will tell 
them by mouth, we wont write it down. If I don't want to follow, there 
are so many ways of subversion. I will write it on a blank piece of paper. 
But if you see below, there is no signature. You tell him, get the test 
done, and he will get it done. 
Senior surgeon, government hospital (31) 
Yet others felt that the law could play an educative function and provide guidance on complex 
ethical decisions. However this was an atypical response and, almost universally, fear and 
apprehension characterized doctors' responses to the idea of legal reform. 
Interface with government and legislature: summary 
Interactions with government health authorities were very limited in all instances. Government 
doctors were conscious of their identity as public servants, in which context government policies 
were seen as nonnative. Private doctors perceived no such sense of accountability and regarded 
government as being largely unsupportive. Consumer laws were regarded to have significant 
'nuisance' value by doctors from private and government sectors. The possibility of legal reform 
through the submission of a HIV I AIDS Bill evoked universally strong responses, with many 
doctors voicing apprehensions. It was widely felt that a law regulating HIV/AIDS practices was 
unrealistic in the context of imperfect environments for adhering to policies, and would lead to 
defensive and subversive practices. 
295 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
296 Respondent 14: Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
297 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
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6.1.3 The HIV/AIDS programme 
The National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) 
In the government hospitals NACO policies are widely acknowledged and followed, at least 
nominally, with some exceptions. Partially this was a result of VCTCs and ART centres (which 
are part of the HIV I AIDS programme298) being physically located in the hospitals, and being 
important sites for HIV testing and care provision. NACO are responsible for instituting and 
funding VCTCs and ART centres and, through the State AIDS Control Societies, provide 
equipment and salaries for their upkeep.299.3oo 
The procedures instituted in the VCTCs and ART centres, such as consent fOnDS and reporting 
mechanisms, and the presence of trained programme staff, act as guides on NACO's policies for 
doctors when performing HIV tests. In exchange, a measure of accountability was required, 
through means of record keeping and reporting of data to NACO: 'Every month we have to send 
data, how many walk-ins, how many referred, how many positive,.30) Supervisory visits were 
conducted by the programme, and deficiencies and divergences were highlighted by these 
inspectors. Respective Department Heads were generally held accountable for these divergences 
by programme officials?02.303 
Broadly NACO was seen by government practitioners as a multi-functional agency. Apart from 
being resource providers for HIV / AIDS care and propagators of norms of practice, they were also 
regarded as a nodal research body for HIV/AIDS (conducting surveillance).304 Many doctors 
tended to view their relationships with NACO and SACS as research collaborations. Professional 
relationships and acquaintances with particular individuals in the HIV/AIDS programme were 
often cited, who may have been important in the development of these collaborative 
relationships.305.306 
Doctors had a number of concerns and reservations over the content of NACO's policies or over 
their application, as has been discussed in the previous chapter. In some instances, the doctors 
had attempted to feed back these concerns to programme authorities, but perceived that they were 
298 The distinctions between government health "programmes" and the government health administration 
are discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
299 Respondent 02: Senior physician, government hospital 
300 Respondent 16: Physician, 8 years experience, government hospital 
301 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
302 Respondent 02: Senior physician, government hospital 
303 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
304 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
30S Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
306 Respondent 33: Senior physician, government hospital 
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not responsive to suggestions. One physician felt that 'NACO does not take any suggestions from 
us because they are guided by the US,.307 Another government physician recounted his 
experience of seeking clarifications over the infonned consent policies, with NACO officials. 
Why do you have to do this? Why do you have to take written informed 
consent before doing a test? I asked everyone in the hospital, everybody 
knew that there is this policy but nobody knew where it has come from. 
And they all agreed with me - they said yes, there is no reason for it. I 
visited people in NACO ... Nobody could tell me where this has come 
from. Finally [a NACO officer] agreed - they have this, but they don't 
know where it has come from. He just said "its there" 
Senior physician, government hospital (33) 
Hence NACO officials were unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the contents of their own 
policies, in spite of the efforts of this respondent. In other instances however, doctors did not 
challenge the policies and instead sought more specific or comprehensive guidance from NACO 
on issues around testing and care. One gynaecologist felt that there was a need for more written 
policies and 'clear-cut listed guidelines'. 308 A venereologist reported uncertainties around the 
correctness of certain day-to-day aspects of clinic functioning, and felt that more detailed 
guidance from NACO would be appropriate. 
When you put a patient in the ward and he is HIV positive should you 
label it or not? What is the policy of NACO in that? Should we write in 
the case sheet? Ideally you should not but if we don't there could be a 
chance of mishandling... NACO policies, do they clearly say that in a 
ward setting, should we write "HIV +" on the case sheet? 
Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital (23) 
In private hospitals, broadly there was little recognition of NACO's authority, and it was 
generally regarded as another organization with which collaborations could be undertaken.309.310 
For some, NACO's role was perceived to be one of public health education, rather than of agenda 
and policy setting.311 Even in some instances where there was awareness of NACO's policies 
against pre-surgical screening, compliance was not felt to be feasible, in the face of other pressing 
concerns such as physical protection from infection and the costs of universal precautions to 
patients. 
NACO is advising us to do tests only for diagnosis. It's not possible! 
These are practical things which don't change easily. They are saying 
that practice universal precautions, but how is that possible for everyone, 
307 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
308 Respondent 22: Gynaecologist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
309 Respondent 08: Senior physician, private nursing home 
310 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
3JJ Respondent 35: Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital 
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there are a lot of costs involved. As an idea, it's okay. [But] Especially in 
the private sector, we have to think about costs to the patient. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
Meetings on the implementation of HN testing policies were reported to have taken place 
between representatives (administrators and medical staft) of a private hospital and HNIAIDS 
programme officials. These meetings failed to reach a resolution, purportedly because of a 
fundamental difference in perspective: programme officials regarded the discussions as an 
opportunity to enforce their policies, whereas the doctors viewed it as a process of negotiation 
towards deciding a mutually acceptable position. 
They said that there is no question of any consensus statement, because 
we are representatives of the government. We already have our own 
position on it. What position it was we never knew because they had left. 
Its so stupid. Its like many Indian government attitudes. 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (25) 
If I am your wife, and you're my husband, there is no communication, 
what can came out of it. We had a consensus opinion about it of our own, 
without their participation. 
Senior surgeon and administrator, private hospital (26) 
Respondents from the charitable hospitals did not mention any exchanges or interactions with 
NACO. 
State AIDS Control Societies (SA CS) 
In government hospitals, State AIDS Control Societies (SACS) were viewed as conduits for 
NACO, being operationally responsible for providing funding and material support for VCTCs 
and ART centres, paying salaries, instituting procedures, and collecting reports. 
They provide us with the [HIV testing] kits. The ELISA reader is 
provided by them, CD4 counter is provided by them, the refrigerators, 
the rotators for VDRL - we get a lot of support from them. The staff is 
ours ... some staff is also provided by them, the counsellors, the 
technicians. We have to give our data and figures to SACS they send it 
on to NACO. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
There was a measure of accountability of hospital departments to the SACS in the areas in which 
support was received from them. Beyond this, although they were more proximate to the 
hospitals than NACO, the SACS appeared to have little role in monitoring the HN testing 
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practices of physicians in HN testing. The role of the SACS was seen - by doctors - as that of an 
external donor, facilitator and collaborator (even as for counsellors and technicians 312 they were 
immediate employers). 
Doctors from private and charitable hospitals revealed little, if any intercourse with the SACS. 
Interface with HIVIAJDS programme: summary 
NACO and the SACS were responsible for setting up and supporting HIV -related work in 
hospitals, and within the ambit of VCTCs and ARTCs the programme may have had an influence 
on field-level activities. Outside of these activities, the HIV/AIDS programme agencies were 
seen as potential research partners and collaborators. In instances when doctors challenged the 
rationales of NACO's policies, their response was felt to be unsatisfactory, and they were widely 
regarded to be unresponsive to feedback on contentious issues. In some instances a need for more 
detailed guidance from NACO on correct ethical practices in HN care was expressed by doctors. 
The jurisdiction of HIV programme authorities was not recognized in private hospitals, and their 
attempts to impose their noons on the hospitals were widely opposed. 
6.1.4 Professional regulators 
Medical councils found little mention as being influential among doctors in any sector of 
hospitals. Frequently, councils' roles were discussed in the context of regulating medical 
education, but not medical practices. A number of doctors and key informants were of the 
opinion that medical councils did have the power to influence doctors' practices, but took little 
initiative in that regard. One surgeon from a private hospital felt that 'if the State Medical 
Councils say, the doctors will follow (policies),.313 Medical councils had the nominal power to 
revoke licences, but due to their inaction, had 'rendered themselves toothless', according to a key 
informant.314 
312 These staff were employed on a contractual basis, and several operational problems were reported in the 
timely disbursement of their salaries. 
313 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
314 Respondent 45: Key Informant 
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6.2 EDUCATIONAL AND ACADEMIC PLATFORMS 
Formative education 
Undergraduate medical education and work cultures in teaching institutions were cited as 
formative influences on the behaviour of doctors. Areas such as interpersonal communication, 
and ethics which are important in the context of HIV testing were considered non-technical and 
were traditionally given less importance.31S 
When did we as students ever get trained, or train students in 
interpersonal communication and skills? .. Most of the people have been 
trained in the government set-ups and in the government set-ups nobody 
ever had the time. And the inclination was also possibly poor. Anybody 
who is more sensitive possibly feels a little more .... anybody who does it 
spontaneously, does it on their own, otherwise they don't do it. They 
have never been made to think: about it that way. 
Senior gynaecologist, head of department, government hospital (21) 
A key informant was of the view that teaching institutions promoted the concept of a 'sanitary 
inspector' approach to public health problems, particularly communicable diseases, focused on 
active case finding and a utilitarian ethic: 'Locate the carriers, isolate them, cure them,.316 
According to him, this shaped attitudes among many medical providers, particularly doctors in 
government hospitals. 
In-service training 
Government doctors were exposed to formal training programmes to a limited extent within their 
own institutions. These workshops were conducted either by the government or by technical 
agencies partnering the government, such as the WHO. Respondents from government hospitals 
had mixed feelings about these programmes, expressing scepticism about the imposition of alien 
''western concepts", but also a keenness to learn new concepts and skill-sets such as counselling 
and interpersonal communication.317,318 
Among private sector doctors, perspectives vis-A-vis continuing education were quite different. 
Doctors from the private nursing homes rued the lack of opportunities to update their knowledge 
on emerging areas such as HNIAIDS. In this context, doctors highlighted the importance of 
31S S everal respondents (21, 67, 39) 
316 Respondent 48: Senior consultant to UN technical agency 
317 Respondent 37: Senior physician, HIV specialist and administrator, government hospital 
318 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
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personal initiative in identifying opportunities to expand their knowledge and identify training 
opportunities. 
There are many programmes which are available to government persons 
[doctors], but for the private [doctors], there are not many options ... 
There is no effort to involve us. I have been looking for a training 
opportunity in HIV for the past year. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
There are no regulations which allow me to learn about HIV. The major 
flaw in our medical profession is that there are no regulations for post-
training. ... so whatever doctors are learning, they are learning on their 
own. 
Senior physician, private nursing home (08) 
The few HIV training programmes that were available to doctors in the private sector were run by 
a variety of different agencies. Typically, such programmes were collaborations between a 
funding partner - such as a major international donor, and a technical partner - a medical 
association or a teaching institute or university. Experiences of training programmes -
particularly of the intensive, practically-oriented type - were almost uniformly positive for 
practitioners. Respondents spoke of experiences of professional growth, transfonnation of 
preconceptions, and of the value of such programmes in creating career avenues and openings for 
future collaborations. 
I was keen to know more about HIV. I wanted a career option, which I 
could take further, and which not a lot of other people were doing ... 
Then I joined this programme [an intensive training course on HIV 
medicine] I have done a M.D before, but we never did anything like this, 
how to plan and programme... The main thing is, that we have learnt to 
implement things, not just receive knowledge. Now I am very keen to 
develop the services in our hospital. 
Physician, private nursing home (67) 
However good quality training courses focusing on HIV / AIDS issues may have had limited reach, 
and many in the private sector remained unexposed to newer concepts in HIV care. According to 
the same respondent, ' ... not a lot of people (colleagues) know what is VeT ... Those who are 
working in the field know about it. Those who are not, don't'. Technical training and CME 
programmes were available to some extent for doctors in private hospitals, but were said to give 
little attention to HIV / AIDS related issues and may even, as in one programme in which pre-
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surgical screening was recommended, have included instructions which were contradictory to 
national policies.319 
Apart from the residual influences of formative medical education, and references to the 
West for guidance (see section 6.3), what were the sites of development of professional 
culture for these doctors? From respondent's accounts, there were few indications of the 
influence of shared profeSSional cultures or norms of work in the medical fratemity, or of 
organized discourse on a cross-institutional scale, on their practices. Key informants felt 
that the sites for exchange of knowledge and ideas - journals and fora such as medical 
aSSOCiations were deficient in discourse on serious academic subjects.32o Particularly, 
discourse on ethics and rights was felt to be lacking. According to one informant, in the 
absence of widespread discourse or exchange across the medical fratemity. individual 
workplace cultures often tended to have a dominant impact on practices.321 
Doctors (or departments) in govemment hospitals sometimes undertook collaborative 
research and educational projects in conjunction with peers in other institutions and with 
national and international donors such as the SACS and NACO. and WHO and UNAIDS. 
In many instances collaborations with intemational agencies were linked to the provision 
of aid and materials through the mediation of the HIV/AIDS programme.322 These 
collaborations contributed to doctors' academic environment. 
Box 6.1 Limited Opportunities of Academic Excbange 
Educational and academic platforms: summary 
Most doctors from all sectors had been trained in government medical colleges and the culture of 
those institutions, characterized by the focus on clinical tasks and neglect of areas such as 
interpersonal skills training, was said to have a lasting influence on practice cultures. The 
conflation of clinical service delivery roles with public health roles (maximising case detection) -
a culture among government doctors - may also have been ingrained in medical educational 
institutions. 
Training programmes were relatively easily available to doctors in government hospitals, and 
were important avenues for the transfer of policies and ideas. The doctors' acceptance of these 
programmes was mixed. Since their undergraduate or postgraduate medical education, 
319 Respondent 35: Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital 
320 Respondents OS, and 52: Key infonnants 
321 Respondent 45: Key infonnant 
322 Respondent 02: Senior physician, government hospital 
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opportunities for discourse outside the workplace sphere were few and far between, particularly 
for doctors in the private sector. Private doctors found it difficult to access training on areas 
around HIV I AIDS since these were usually initiated by development agencies and tended to 
preferentially admit govenunent doctors. However their experiences of such programmes were 
positive in tenns of professional development. 
For practitioners working in environments deprived of avenues and cultures of serious discourse, 
the benefits of professional interactions ran deeper than the matter of adherence to policies. For 
many practitioners, establishing contact with peers and people in related disciplines, through 
training programmes, research projects and collaborations represented unprecedented 
opportunities for self-actualization and professional growth. The HIV I AIDS movement in 
particular may have exposed a number of doctors to ideas and concepts which were not otherwise 
given importance in their formative education. 
6.3 OTHER KEY INTERACTIONS 
6.3.1 International organizations 
Technical guidelines published by such agencies as the World Health Organization or the Centers 
for Disease Control, Atlanta, were sometimes followed by doctors in government and private 
hospitals. While these were regarded as being markers of high technical standards, there was no 
indication that they were considered to be binding.323 Organizations like the WHO had little 
direct contact with doctors, other than through sporadic collaborative projects and training 
programmes. 
Another important point of reference for doctors in govenunent and private hospitals was the 
concept of the "West", as a place of training, the point of origin of normative ideas and principles, 
or of technical guidance. Many doctors compared their conception of practices in the West with 
those in their own workplaces.324,32s Some respondents had received training in Western countries 
on aspects of HIV I AIDS care, which they applied to guide their practices in India 
323 Respondent 67: Physician, private nursing home 
324 Respondent 16: Physician and HN specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
325 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
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I went to [a USA based technical institute326]. I was there for a month, 
there was an elective. There was a course on diagnosis. Under that, they 
taught that you can't forcefully impose mandatory testing. It will be 
violation of human rights. 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
Some of us had gone abroad and got trained in all these things, so we 
were convinced that all these things we were talking about: universal 
precautions, improved cleanliness and hygiene etc. 
Medical superintendent, private hospital (38) 
Often the HN testing policies were categorized as being of 'Western' origin,327,328 and 
international organizations, and civil society organizations were regarded as conveyors of these 
ideas. Opinions on the application, in practice, of the "Western ideas" that HIV counselling and 
consent represented, was divided. Some respondents pointed out how the policies did not 
necessarily translate well in local settings. 
Once some people [international experts) had come to check the 
counselling centre. "Is there an AC329, toys for the children, cold water to 
drink, did the counsellor wish you when you entered?". [laughing] It is 
hilarious. Conceptually, it is a wonderful idea. In a society where they 
have come to an advanced stage, they are well-to-do, resourceful, it 
might be OK. But in our set up, the technicians are overloaded with the 
work. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
Others were of the opinion that exposure to these concepts was beneficial, and could be adapted 
for local application. The West appeared to have a conflicted position in the collective psyche of 
doctors. On the one hand, exposure to training in Western countries represented opportunities for 
exposure to new ideas, and Western-derived ethical frameworks provided a useful framework 
within which to articulate their own practical dilemmas. At the same time, there was considerable 
resentment and frustration at the prospect of following "imported" ideas and policies. 
326 Name of institute not revealed to protect identity of respondent. 
327 Respondent 37: Senior physician and administrator, government hospital 
328 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
329 Air-conditioner 
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6.3.2 Civil society organizations 
Activist NGOs 
In government hospitals, as described before, patients tended to be docile and generally accepting 
of doctors advice or edicts, and correspondingly doctors approaches tended to be directive. 
However there were some reports that patients were increasingly active in asserting their rights in 
the context of interactions with providers. This was especially so in the context of HNIAIDS 
movements with their focus on human rights. The emergence of People Living with HN I AIDS 
(PLHA) support networks and groups may also have helped in engendering this newfound 
assertiveness. Some doctors felt that this assertiveness was a sign of exceptional importance to 
HIV over other diseases. 
I used to do counselling with Leprosy patients in 1970s. Leprosy patients 
were grateful, that you are doing their tests, the Lepromin test. But the 
HIV patient is God. On their own basis, or NGOs basis, they demand. 
There is nothing wrong with it. Let me give you analogy of a dog and a 
cat. The dog says that my master is my God, he looks after me, and he 
gives me food, generally affectionate and devoted. The cat on the other 
hand says: I am God. There were some cases when HIV patients would 
pick fights with me. Sometimes, my crude thoughts used to say "you 
brought the disease here, and you became God?" But on the face of it, I 
never lost my temper. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
NGOs and community based organizations sometimes played a role in speaking for the rights of 
PLHA in healthcare settings. Fear and distrust marked doctors responses to the interventions of 
these civil society organizations. It was suggested variously that these actors (which included 
human rights advocates, philanthropic and religious groups, social workers and legal activists) 
were unsympathetic to doctors perspectives, influenced by alien concepts, or publicity-hungry. 
Sometimes these people I meet in meetings, I feel they have no 
experience in HIV, they talk as though they have been sent by God, and 
they are the last word. Some of these people, especially from NGOs, they 
can be very critical. It is so easy to criticise the system, but try to be in it, 
change it, in whatever way you can. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
So when patients are not objecting [to mandatory testing] then why are [a 
NG0330] making a big deal out of it, maybe under the pressure of USA or 
some international agencies. 
Senior physician, and administrator, government hospital (37) 
330 Name withheld for confidentiality 
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Whenever I used to go to meetings with [Mr. A33\], I used to have acute 
panic! I used to feel that these are the people who are doing some good 
for the society by coming out with legislations, and awareness etc. But I 
also have an innate feeling that these people are in it for the limelight. I 
am scared of them, frankly. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
Pressures from PLHA groups and NGOs may have made doctors more aware of issues around 
HIV testing, and even had an impact on their practices. NGOs were reported to have acted 
through various means to correct doctors' practices. They had publicized instances of policy 
infringements in the media, and influenced politicians and bureaucrats to take cognizance of these 
shortcomings. They also had representation in various committees and consultations of the 
government health services and the HIV/AIDS programme. Some practitioners mentioned that 
hospital administrators played a buffering role, typically protecting them from the ire of activists. 
In private hospitals however, the activist interventions of NGOs had little impact, and were 
viewed by practitioners as little more than an opportunity to update their knowledge.332 
Respondents from charitable hospitals did not recount any interactions with activist groups. 
Care provider NGDs 
Many grassroots NGOs assisted doctors in government and charitable hospitals in caring for 
patients. The relationship with them is collaborative, although not typically formal. 333 Doctors 
widely encouraged the efforts of NGOs to take on responsibilities of patient care that they were 
incapable or unprepared to handle.334 Being involved in this supportive capacity enabled NGOs 
to also have an influence on doctors' practices. 
Because the NGOs are involved, NGOs are ensuring compliance. So, 
they may be a bad thing for the government set up, but they are the right 
thing for the society, because they look after the other side [non-technical 
aspects of care of HIV / AIDS patients]. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
331 Name withheld for confidentiality 
332 Respondent 40: Counsellor, private hospital 
333 In some instances NGOs formally collaborated with government hospitals by offering staff or services. 
But usually, these associations were at an informal level. 
334 S everal respondents (02, 28, 32, 70) 
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Reformer NGOs 
In one instance, a project was initiated'as a partnership between a local and a international NGO 
to reform doctors' practices, with an interventional objective to develop and implement hospital 
HIV policies. The response from doctors was lukewarm, and the programme was not sustained. 
When they made the presentation, HODs were not present, barring 3 or 4 
people. So if so few HODs were there, you can imagine what must have 
been the seriousness of the [response to] presentation, the project. 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
In the private hospital too, attempts to refonn practices around HIV care, on the part of 
international agencies and NGOs did not meet with a positive response from the doctors. 
Interface with civil society organizations: summary 
Doctors in government hospitals faced a limited amount of pressure to change their practices, 
from increasingly aware and assertive HIV positive patients, backed by NGO supporters and 
PLHA networks. The influence of NGOs was perceived to be fairly strong, given their access to 
the press and policy decision-makers. Grassroots NGOs provided support to doctors, particularly 
in government and charitable hospitals, in caring for their patients, and were a source of exposure 
to non-clinical aspects of HIV care. Doctors in all hospital sectors were generally resistant to 
attempts of civil society collaborators to actively refonn their practices. 
6.3.3 Professional associations 
Medical associations had apparently little influence on HIV testing practices of physicians either 
in the private or public sectors. 'The associations have very little involvement or work on HIV' 
said one physician from a government hospital.33S Associations were widely regarded as 
representing the interests of private practitioners. The little involvement that associations had in 
respect to HIV I AIDS care was to conduct occasional sensitization programmes.336,337 
335 Respondent 02: Senior physician, government hospital 
336 Respondent 69: Senior official, medical association 
337 At the time of conducting this study, the Indian Medical Association were about to initiate a 
collaboration with the William Clinton Foundation to conduct HIV sensitization programmes for a large 
number of private practitioners across the country. 
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6.3.4 Quality assurance and accreditation bodies 
Schemes and programmes for ensuring technical standards and quality included governmental 
schemes such as the External Quality Assurance Scheme (EQAS) for laboratories and 
accreditation by National Accreditation Boards, and schemes of independent standards agencies 
such as the ISO. Government hospitals were active participants in the EQAS scheme, which 
however only addressed the technical quality of tests, and did not account for human aspects and 
procedures around the test such as counselling and consent-taking. 
The private hospital had received accreditation from an international body, which required it to 
comply with national guidelines for mv testing. Consent procedures had been formally instituted 
as a result of this requirement. 
6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Interfaces with implementation systems differed for practitioners from different types of hospitals 
- government, private and charitable, as a result of the presence of different contiguous policy 
structures and actors. 
Government hospital practitioners 
Government doctors were widely influenced by their identities as government servants, in which 
context they regarded adherence to mv testing policies propagated by a government department 
(NACO) as being nonnative. Some of NACO's policies were institutionalized through the 
presence of VCTCs in hospitals and a regularized informed consent procedure. Hence the 
policies were synonymous with organizational rules or norms in these respects, and breaching 
policies involved breaching organizational (hospital) norms, since diverging from the policies 
would entail not using these routinized mechanisms, or subverting them. 
However paradoxically there was also a widespread perception that mv policies did not represent 
organizational goals, and were imposed by influences from outside the hospital. Non-institutional 
actors appeared to be as instrumental in enforcing policies as institutional mechanisms such as 
departmental and hospital management. Officially, local representatives of the programme 
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supervised mv policy implementation in hospital departments, and unofficially, activist NGOs 
may have played an active part in monitoring doctors' compliance to policies. 
Given the deficiencies of formative medical education in addressing areas around ethics and 
interpersonal communication, collaborative projects with international organizations, with the 
HN / AIDS programme, and with peers in other institutions represented opportunities for 
exchange of knowledge on relevant topics. Informal associations with local NGOs may have 
heJped in orienting doctors towards a broader understanding of mv I AIDS care. 
The threat of legal action, while not representing an active concern, was a latent source of worry 
for doctors. The doctors did not appear to be widely concerned with formal channels such as 
institutional disciplinary procedures or medical council regulation. 
Private hospital practitioners 
Private hospital practitioners widely regarded themselves as independent agents when it came to 
practices around mv testing. The hospital administration's attempts to introduce a policy on the 
lines of national policy were initially opposed, and the policies when introduced were only 
partially followed. Influences cited as being conducive to implementation of HN testing policies 
included training in Western countries and the requirements of accreditation agencies. 
Other than this however, doctors did not appear to have significant avenues for academic 
discourse on HN / AIDS, or exposure to ethical issues and concerns. Hospital training in the 
large private hospital tended to be oriented around specific technical skills. The government was 
perceived to be unsupportive in regard to offering training opportunities to private doctors. 
Medical associations were seen to be involved mainly in protecting private doctors' political and 
financial interests, not in academic development. 
There was a largely latent perception of threat from the likelihood of a law for HIV/AIDS, and 
from consumer litigation. There was little recognition of the role of government, HIV / AIDS 
programme authorities, medical councils or civil society organizations in policy implementation. 
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Charitable hospital practitioners 
In contrast with the government and the private hospitals, the hospital administration in one 
charitable hospital had taken a particularly active stance in formulating and propagating hospital 
policies around HN testing. The influence of this policy was regarded to be pervasive: its 
implementation involved the cooperation of departmental heads and there was widespread 
compliance, attributed to the participatory process through which it was formulated. The hospital 
policy diverged from government policy in allowing pre-surgical screening. 
Apparently there was an active culture of discourse on ethical issues and HIV I AIDS within the 
hospitals. However there was little interaction and few avenues for academic exchange with other 
organizations in the public or private sectors, other than with local care provision NGOs, and 
occasionally through collaborations with international organizations and universities. The 
practitioners largely sympathized with the government's position built on principles of public 
service and welfare, however did not consider themselves directly accountable to government 
departments, such as NACO. There was little indication of a role of medical councils, nor a 
perceived threat of the law. 
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Chapter 7. Other Policy Actors: Roles and Interrelationships 
The fIrst section (7.1) of this chapter outlines the putative roles of different groups of policy 
actors (other than medical practitioners), in implementing policies. The remainder of the chapter 
(sections 7.2 - 7.10) elaborates these actors' accounts oftheir (and their respective organizations') 
actual participation in implementation processes and interactions with other groups of actors, 
drawing from depth interviews.338 Data from key informant interviews add relevant contextual 
knowledge. In line with recommendations of the LSHTM ethics committee, particular care was 
taken to exclude details about interviewees which may have allowed them to be identifIed. 
7.1 PUTATIVE ROLES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS 
The putative or "expected" roles of different policy actor groups are presented in this section. 
Hospital authorities and members of various government institutions and bureaus are the groups 
formally charged with roles in policy implementation. A number of other agencies and groups are 
potentially influential in the process of implementation of policy guidelines, even if they are not 
formally instrumental in ensuring implementation, and their "expected" roles too are described. 
The information presented in this section was derived mainly from documentation obtained from 
site visits and from the respective offlcial websites of the different organizations (for details of 
data collection methods, see sections 4.3.3, on page 75). Contextual information on putative 
organizational roles was also obtained from discussions with key informants and interviews with 
the respective policy actors. 
338 See Chapter 4 for details of selection of study participants and data collection methods. 
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7.1.1 Groups formally charged with implementation 
Hospital authorities 
Within different hospitals, it is likely there are different styles of marIagement arId accountability. 
The administrative structure in terms of departments arId units represents a system of 
accountability, in that Heads of departments/units are arIswerable for the services provided by 
doctors in their department/unit. Superintendents are the ultimate authority and hence also 
ultimately responsible for staff behaviour. Cadre-based accountability is often practiced in which 
appointed chief staff of nurses, paramedical and non-medical workers supervise their respective 
subordinates. Particular departments may have specific areas of authority, for instance a 
department of infection control may be required to ensure that all staff in the hospital adhere to 
norms for waste disposal, hygiene, safety and personal protection. 
Formal mechanisms for accountability include continuous supervision and monitoring of task 
performance, periodic inspections and reviews, maintenarIce and audit of medical records, 
arbitration and disciplinary procedures, and redress of complaints and grievances.339 Some 
government and private hospitals have grievance cells and public relations offices, to address 
patients' concerns with the quality of care. 340 
Governmental authorities 
Departments of Health Services (DHS) and of Medical Education and Research (DMER) at the 
Centre and in the respective States are entrusted with the implementation of relevant laws and 
regulations. The standards cited in these Acts and regulations are typically broad, and do not 
address specific areas such as the actual quality of care provision, or adherence to policies by 
practitioners. There is little information in the public domain about accountability mechanisms 
between government health administration and (government or private) hospitals, or within 
hospitals. Government hospitals, in the position of being financed by health departments, are 
officially under their direct scrutiny. Typically, government health officers' functions in 
government hospitals involve periodic inspections of facilities, focusing on physical and technical 
339 Several respondents: physicians and administrators in government hospitals. 
340 In a survey of health care facilities in Andhra Pradesh 96% of public sector hospitals and 84% of private 
hospitals reported that they kept medical records (Mahapatra 2003). Misra's study on consumer redress 
facilities in 81 hospitals found that 33% of private hospitals and 22% of government hospitals had 
complaint boxes or books, although fewer than these (17% private and 15% government hospitals) had 
guidelines for reviewing and processing complaints (Misra 2000). 
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standards and documentation.341 Officially, many accountability functions, such as the handling 
of grievances and complaints are decentralized to the level of the respective hospital authorities 
(GNCro 2007).342 
HIVIAIDS programme organizations 
The National AIDS Control Organization is the government's nodal agency for HIV/AIDS 
control. NACO's stated objectives are to "bring about HIV prevention" and "provide treatment to 
people living with HIV/AIDS" (NACO 2007f). According to the official website of the 
organization, it was constituted in 1992 with the purpose of implementing and steering a 
nationwide programme for HNIAIDS control- the National AIDS Control Programme. (NACO 
2007a). 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 
------~,------------
r " 
Department of Health Other Departments 
----------~------------------~ r , 
NACO Nodal bodies for 
other Health 
Programmes 
Other Offices, 
Agencies 
Figure 7.1 NACO's Official Position in the MOHFW343 
Some of NACO's core activities include HIV surveillance and research, infrastructure 
development for blood banks, STI clinics, VCTCs and ART Centres, and conducting Targeted 
Interventions (TIs) for high-risk groups focusing on behaviour change communication 
(undertaken with the help ofNGOs). In the context ofHIV/AIDS care in hospitals, NACO's role 
341 Several respondents: physicians and administrators in government hospitals. 
342 The website of the directorate of health services of the State of Delhi outlines the following procedure 
for complaints and grievances: "If patients have any complaint/grievance, they should approach: 
For (Government) Hospitals - The Medical Superintendent of the concerned hospital. 
For Private Hospitals & Nursing Homes - Medical Superintendent of Nursing Home conducts a preliminary 
enquiry. If allegation substantiated in preliminary enquiry, a report is sent to conduct for necessary action 
(sic)." (GNCTD 2007) 
343 Adapted from Gupta and Sood (2005) 
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appeared to be mainly focused around setting up VCTCs and ARTCs in government hospitals,344 
and supplying human resources and materials towards running them. There is also mention of 
advocacy for sensitization of healthcare providers and prevention of discrimination in healthcare 
settings among other settings, in the national AIDS prevention and control policy of 2003. 
NACO also publishes and promulgates policies and guidelines for various aspects of HIV care 
and control. Relevant sections of the guidelines for HIV testing are paraphrased in Chapter 1 
(1.2). Programme documents do not specify the adoption (by NACO) of any regulatory role, 
although in the national policy (NACO 2003b) there is advice to State Governments to "adopt 
legislative and other measures to ensure that private hospitals and nursing homes conform to the 
national policy and guidelines relating to HIV testing." 
NACO is supported fmancially in its activities by a number of donor agencies (see Table 7.1). 
The World Bank and bilateral agencies are the major donors, and there is also a significant outlay 
from the Government of India toward the NACP. 
Donor Agency Funds Earmarked (In Millions of Rupees) 
1 World Bank 9590 
2 DFID 4874 
3 USAID 2306 
4 Government of India 1960 
5 Global Fund 1227 
6 CIDA 378 
7 AusAlD 247 
8 UNDP 65 
Total 20647 
Table 7.1 Funding of the National AIDS Control Programme Phase-II (1999-2006)345 
NACO is headed by a Director General who is drawn from the bureaucratic cadre - the Indian 
Administrative Services (lAS). There is an extensive organizational structure with an Additional 
Project Director, a Director of Finance, and seven Joint Director positions with such portfolios as 
Basic Services, Treatment Care and Support Monitoring and Evaluation and Administration and 
Procurement. In addition, there are numerous subordinate positions. Functionaries are appointed 
344 At the time of writing, the majority of VCTCs were instituted in medical colleges and teaching hospitals 
(NACO 2007e). 
34S From NACO (2007j) 
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to various positions based on their qualifications and technical expertise (Gupta and Sood 2005 
p.lll; NACO 2007k). 
The operations of the National AIDS Control Programme are partially decentralised, in most 
instances to State level, and in some instances to District level. The State AIDS Prevention and 
Control Societies (SACS) are set up as autonomous registered societies with "functional 
independence to upscale and innovate", but are also mandated to implement all aspects of the 
HN / AIDS programme at State level. Each SACS has a governing body headed by the State 
minister or chief secretary, and constituted of representatives of stakeholders including other 
government departments, NGOs, PLHA networks and private sector (NACO 2007i). 
The SACS receive funds from NACO and have partial discretion to utilize these toward 
supporting NGOs for programme activities, and for equipment and contingencies (Gupta and 
Sood 2005 p 6.31). In matters of dealing with hospitals including administering VCTCs and ART 
Centres, they can be said to represent operational arms of the National AIDS Control Programme. 
The SACS are headed by a Project Director who is usually from the administrative civil service 
cadre, at par with the Director General of NACO. The recommended organizational structure for 
SACS includes six Joint Director positions and 15 Assistant Directors in charge of different 
aspects of the programme, including for Integrated Counselling and Testing Centres (ICTC) and 
for ART (Gupta and Sood 2005 p.lll, NACO 2007g). 
Professional regulators 
The Medical Council of India (MCl) and state medical councils are the only agencies with a 
unequivocal mandate of regulating the behaviour of allopathic medical practitioners in India. The 
MCI is the body which officially confers allopathic doctors with the right to practice medicine, 
once they have graduated. The MCI was formulated in 1934 on a model of professional "self-
regulation", along the lines of the General Medical Council of Great Britain. Near the time of 
independence in 1947, the Bhore Committee report of the Government of India recommended the 
continuation and strengthening of this model. However subsequent national-level deliberations 
led to certain modifications in the rules, notably those relating to the constitution of the Councils 
(Iyer and Jesani 1999 p.5). Membership and leadership of Councils is partially decided 
democratically through election, ensuring representative participation from different states, and 
there is also a minority presence of nominated members and government representatives (GOI 
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1956). A recent Bill has suggested further modification in composition of the MCI, and greater 
control by, and accountability to the central government, but is yet to be passed (GOI 2005a). 
The Councils are intended to function autonomously and have quasi-judicial disciplinary powers. 
They are financially supported through funds from the Government of India. The Medical 
Council of India (MCI) was originally constituted with the responsibility of maintaining unifonn 
standards of medical education and to secure international recognition of Indian medical degrees 
(Madan 1980 p.21). The Indian Medical Council Act of 1956 fonnallyexpanded the scope of 
duties by charging the MCI with the responsibility of regulating standards of medical education, 
the professional conduct of medical providers, and maintaining an Indian Medical Register of 
physicians. Minor amendments were made to the Act in 1993 and 2001, which did not alter the 
MCl's core mandate. A notable addendum to the 1956 Act was the enunciation of Code of Ethics 
Regulations in 2002, which outlined in detail: a Code of Medical Ethics, duties and 
responsibilities of physicians, definitions of unethical acts and misconduct, and guidelines for 
punitive action (MCI 2002).346 The National Health Policy of 2002 reiterates some points from 
the original Act of 1956, and advises that: "a contemporary code of medical ethics should be 
notified and rigorously implemented by the Medical Council of India" (GOI 2002). 
However, the official website of the MCI does not cite the implementation of the code of ethics or 
regulation of professional conduct among its functions. The "Functions and Objectives" column 
includes only recognition and de-recognition of medical colleges and individual medical 
qualifications, inspection of medical educational institutions, registration of degrees, and 
maintenance of the Register (MCI 2006). 
From a perusal of the official web-pages of some state medical councils however, it is apparent 
that the task of regulating professional conduct is recognized as a core function. For instance, the 
self-professed functions of the Delhi Medical Council include, among others: 
- Prescription of a Code of Ethics (along the lines of the MCI Regulations) 
- Receipt and processing of complaints against misconduct or negligence by a medical 
practitioner, and related disciplinary actions 
346 The Code of Ethics Regulations do not explicitly refer to informed consent for diagnostic tests or 
confidentiality of medical conditions. However they do stress aspects such as the maintenance of secrecy 
and delicacy in dealings with patients (section 2.2 of the regulations), and the paramount importance of 
benefit to the patients in every consultation (section 3.2). Other relevant sections of the Regulations include 
"No physician shall arbitrarily refuse treatment to a patient (such as might be linked with the practice of 
mandatory testing)" (section 2.1.1) and "They should co·operate with the authorities in the administration 
of sanitary/public health laws and regulations." (section 5.1) (MCI 2002). 
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Disciplinary actions include reprimanding the practitioners, and suspension or deletion of 
registration (DMC 2008). Role delineations of many other State Councils are similar. In some 
instances State Acts have been promulgated which detail the role of the respective Medical 
Council (DMC 2008, GMC 2006). 
7.1.2 Other influential groups 
International organizations 
The number of international organizations involved in various aspects of health in India are too 
numerous to enlist. In its capacity as a global centre of technical excellence, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has a prominent role in policy formation - in guiding the fonnulation of 
national policy guidelines in many aspects of public health, including HN testing. The WHO 
has a supporting role in the implementation of national policies. According to the vision 
statement of the WHO's office in India, the organization's main role is in providing technical 
expertise to partners in national, state and local governments, civil society and other partners 
(WHO India 2008). Relevant focus areas in which the WHO aims to provide technical support 
are: 
- Providing leadership in "setting norms and standards" and "developing health systems to ensure 
equity in health" 
- "Mobilizing, developing and optimally utilizing human and financial resources" 
The mandate of the Joint United Nations Programme on HNIAIDS (UNAIDS) is to coordinate 
the response to HNIAIDS and provide a platform for advocacy. Working with its co-sponsors, 
and with NACO, the SACS, civil society organizations and academia, UNAIDS aims to promote 
strengthened leadership at all levels, enhanced human resources, a stronger evidence base for 
policy, a focus on rights, and sustainability of existing programmes (UNAIDS 2008). 
The World Bank is an important actor in health policy in India, providing funding support to 
numerous government projects and programmes in various areas. The Bank is the leading donor 
partner of the National AIDS Control Organization and the programme (See Table 7.1). Although 
it does not officially play a direct role in implementing the policies of NACO, its close 
associations with NACO and the government, and its involvement with health systems across the 
country through other programmes makes it a potentially influential actor (World Bank 2008). 
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Other important bilateral organizations are the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the 
Canadian International Development Association (CIDA), who are important donors and 
contributors to the National AIDS Control Programme (See Table 7.1). The Indian offices of 
USAID and DtID also support many independent research, training and capacity building projects 
in hospitals and NGOs. A prominent philanthropic organization is the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation which supports an independent HIV prevention initiative Avahan, working closely 
with the Government of India and with NACO (BMGF 2008). Some agencies whose work has 
addressed the issue of HIV care in the hospital sector include the William J Clinton Foundation, 
the Population Council and Population Services International (PSI). The Clinton Foundation was 
involved in a countrywide HIV sensitization and training programme for private practitioners in 
collaboration with the Indian Medical Association (WJCF 2008). The Population Council has 
conducted intervention-cum-research programmes in government and private hospitals with the 
aim of reducing stigma and discrimination (Mahendra et al. 2006). PSI undertakes social 
franchising programmes among private practitioners to promote evidence-based STI care (PSI 
2008). 
Civil society organizations 
Apart fonn the important involvement of non-governmental organizations as care providers in 
their own right, numerous agencies are also involved in activities which impinge on the 
implementation process. Various groups are involved in promoting civil and human rights and 
the rights of clients and consumers of medical care. Others are specifically engaged in activism 
around HIV/AIDS. There are several networks of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) in 
India. A prominent network is the Indian Network for People living with HIV I AIDS (INP+) 
(Ratnathicam 2001). INP+'s mission statement and objectives are oriented mainly towards 
community based support and mobilization of PLHA, and broad goals of preventing transmission. 
"protection of human rights" and "improved access to quality services" are two strategic 
objectives which are relevant in the context of hospital based HIV testing. PLHA networks have 
had a role in taking up concerns of discrimination or unresponsiveness in healthcare settings with 
authorities, and through public channels such as the media and internet fora (INP+ 2008., .(\IDS-
INDIA 2008). 
Consumer rights agencies play a supportive role in educating clients about their rights and 
advising them on legal matters, and some have also taken on policy advocacy roles at national 
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level. Two prominent non-governmental consumer agencies are the Association for Consumer 
Action on Safety and Health (ACASH) and the Voluntary Organization in the Interest of 
Consumer Education (VOICE). A prominent group of legal activists, the Lawyers Collective 
HIV/AIDS Unit have been active in advocating legal reforms around HIV/AIDS, and were 
responsible for drafting the HIV/AIDS Bill (2005) for consideration by Parliament (Bhardwaj and 
Divan 2005). The Bill has not yet been passed as of the time of writing in June 2008 (see details 
on page 31). 
Medical associations 
Medical Associations are voluntary professional organizations of medical professionals, which 
enjoy a large membership and a popular following among the community of Indian doctors. 
Being voluntary bodies, medical associations do not typically have a clear or uniform mandate of 
implementing national policies. While there are numerous associations in India, some catering to 
doctors from different systems of medicine, the most prominent association for allopathic doctors 
is the Indian Medical Association (IMA) with a national membership of more than 130,000 and 
over 1600 regional and local chapters (Jeffery 1988 pI76-178, IMA-MW 2008). The IMA's 
stated objectives are as follows (IMA 2008): 
- Promotion and advancement of medical and all related sciences 
- Improving public health and medical education in India 
- Maintaining the honour and dignity of the medical profession 
The IMA publishes an internationally indexed journal, the Journal of the Indian Medical 
Association (JIMA), and is involved in some research programmes, in advocacy activities and in 
certain relief and public health programmes. The IMA is also active in conducting sensitization 
programmes and seminars, mainly aimed at doctors in the private sector (Park 2005 p.702). A 
major recent initiative is the undertaking by the IMA to train private practitioners nationwide in 
issues around HIV care, in collaboration with the William Clinton Foundation (WJCF 2008). 
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Accreditation agencies347 
The National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers (NABH), a constituent 
board of the Quality Council of India, is an autonomous body set up to establish and operate a 
system of voluntary accreditation for hospitals. The basic guideline for accreditation is a set of 
standards for hospital quality, the elements of "quality" including such topics as Care of Patient, 
Patient Rights and Education, Human Resource Management and Information Management 
Systems each with numerous objective criteria which would be relevant in the context of 
following policies for HIV testing.348 The accreditation process as outlined by the NABH is a 
multi-step process in which the hospital is advised on the improvement of various parameters. 
The NABH is supported financially by various donors from industry and government, and 
through user fees. Since its institution in 2004-05, 69 hospitals countrywide have applied for 
'accreditation, and 14 are presently accredited (QCI 2008). The National Accreditation Board for 
Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL) is an autonomous body under the aegis of 
Department of Science & Technology, Government of India, which offers voluntary accreditation 
to different types of laboratories including medical diagnostic laboratories. NABL standards are 
primarily oriented around technical quality. However their criteria for accrediting for medical 
laboratories include compliance with any existing national policy guidelines (NABL 2008). 
Few hospitals have formal accreditation in India. Accreditation has recently come to greater 
prominence in the health arena and is still regarded widely as an alternative rather than a 
mainstream approach. 
Figure 7.2 summarizes the putative roles of different groups and organizations in implementing 
public health policies such as for HIV testing. 
341 Since accreditation boards are autonomous agencies, they have been discussed here, rather than under 
formal channels of implementation. 
348 Relevant criteria in the NABH booklet include: PRE. I. The organization protects patient and family 
rights during care, PRE.2. The patient and family are involved in decision-making processes, PRE.3. A 
documented process for obtaining patient consent, COP.I. Uniform care of patients is guided by the 
applicable laws and regulations, HRM.7, A grievance handling mechanism exists in the organization 
(NABH 2005). 
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7.2 VIEWS OF HOSPITAL AUTHORITIES 
Each hospital was organized into administrative levels represented by officers such as Medical 
Superintendents or Deans; Department heads; and Unit or team heads. Many of the larger 
hospitals had specially appointed HN nodal officers or teams to address HIV -specific 
administrative issues. This section is based on the views of these hospital authorities. 
7.2.1 Government hospital Heads of Department (HOD) 
The two sets of institutional actors who were closely engaged with issues around HIV testing in 
government hospitals were Heads of Departments (HOD), and Infection Control Officers (lCO). 
This section is based on interviews with a representative selection of Heads of clinical 
departments. Respondents frequently remarked that the quality of care in their departments was 
contingent on availability of time and human and material resources, which were insufficient to 
cope with the overwhelming burden of patients. In this environment of insufficiency, team 
leaders and HODs claimed that optimal allocation of time and resources was a perpetual 
preoccupation for them. 
Some [patients] may need more time while some may not. You can give 
more attention to the few who really require it. .. this dilemma between 
quantity and quality, it is a permanent question, a permanent problem. 
We may be not looking at it with that perspective, but we do need to. 
Head of gynaecology department, government hospital (2 I) 
Heads of clinical departments are medical practitioners in their own right, and broadly shared the 
value orientations and role perceptions of the other doctors. Their role identities were typically 
focused around clinical care, departmental coordination and teaching duties, and other tasks 
including HIV policy implementation were often seen as secondary to these core 
responsibilities.349 
349 Respondent 12: Head of medical department, government hospital 
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Relationships with practitioners 
When queried closely, there was little indication of HODs exercising any actual role in enforcing 
HN testing policies among their colleagues and subordinates. At most, there were reports of 
informal discussions within the department about the appropriateness of particular practices or 
policies.35o It was evident that in practice HODs often encouraged or supported practitioner 
discretion rather than uniform compliance to policy.3S1.3S2 Apart from their natural leanings 
favouring autonomous decision-making by doctors, HODs also cited solidarity with staff (in 
matters of protection from HIV infection) as explanations for lack of involvement in enforcing 
policies. 
There are senior doctors, junior doctors, nursing staff and everybody 
would like to know about the patients' status and probably it would not 
be fair if I knew and I did not tell my junior doctors, or I did not tell my 
nurse, because that means I am taking the precautions and she is not. 
Head of gynaecology department, government hospital (21) 
HODs' relations with their colleagues were often delicate. One Head mentioned reporting their 
own staff to authorities rather than taking corrective action to control discriminatory practices. 
They [colleagues] used to send this report with a red stamp, for which I 
had to fight and fight and tell them, in fact I used to tell NACO, because 
why should I fight with my professors unnecessarily. So I have written to 
NACO that this is what is happening and there itself there is 
discrimination. 
Head of medical department, government hospital (37) 
Relationship with HIVIAIDS programme authorities 
For HODs, the HIV/AIDS programme's authority appeared to stem largely from its role as 
resource providers to their departments. When specifically questioned, most Heads of 
Department (HOD) admitted that they were supposed to implement NACO policies, but only in 
the context of tasks associated with the HIV/AIDS programme. Implementing policies was seen 
as a reciprocal act in exchange for receiving resources (drugs, reagents, some staft) from the 
programme.3S3•3S4 
350 S everal respondents (21, 23, 27) 
35\ Respondent 02: Head of medical department, government hospital 
352 Respondent 21: Head of gynaecology department, government hospital 
353 Respondent 02: Head of medical department, government hospital 
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To account for use of funds and technical support from the programme, HODs were required to 
furnish data to the SACS using a regular reporting format. One HOD said that they were often 
busy with the submission of reports and fulfilment of formalities. Tasks of HN I AIDS-related 
documentation were reported to be exacting and subject to greater scrutiny by authorities. 
We are accountable to NACO, in that we have to give them all the 
information. . . how many walk-ins, how many referred, how many 
positive etc. We have give our data and figures to SACS, they send it on 
to NACO. 
There is lot of accountability for this. If a sputum sample is not cultured 
nobody will hold me responsible, but if something goes wrong with the 
HIV care, the kind of hype there is, the higher authorities and everybody 
seems to give a lot of importance to HIV, so if you go wrong in 
something with HN ... 
Head of microbiology department, government hospital (24) 
Departments were sometimes inspected by HNIAIDS programme officials. One department 
head recounted two separate visits coordinated or undertaken by the HN / AIDS programme. 
Sometimes the inspectors had international connections ('foreign experts'3SS, 'expert from NACO, 
trained abroad).356 While these international experts observed digressions from recommended 
standards, there was reported to have been a certain amount of complicity between other (local) 
programme officials and department Heads to conceal these deficits, and 'present a good face' of 
the programme. 
I told [the HNIAIDS programme officials] that if you are sending 
somebody, you should let me know one day in advance or at least give 
me two hours time. Of course, [the programme officials] would only 
show them the suitable boys ... we would have to present a very good 
face. 
Past head of microbiology department, government hospital (66) 
Other interactions 
As discussed earlier, hospital administrators (superintendents) were not reported to play a 
proactive role in implementing HN testing policies, but were regarded by the doctors (including 
by HODs) more as referees for complicated issues, and as buffers against external criticism. 
Apart from their relationships with their staff, hospital administrators and the HIY I AIDS 
programme, some HODs reported influential interactions with peers from other institutions, 
3S4 Respondent 24: Head of microbiology department, government hospital 
3SS Respondent 02: Head of medical department, government hospital 
356 Respondent 66: Erstwhile head of microbiology department, government hospital 
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usually in the context of organizing training and research programmes around HIV/AIDS.3S7 
Notably, interactions with government health departments, state medical councils, and hospital 
infection control departments (all of which are officially mandated to regulate practices) were 
rarely cited in the context of implementing policy. Interactions with government health 
departments were cited only in the context of broad administrative and financial matters such as 
audits, infrastructure development and procurement of instruments.3S8 The role of institutional 
infection control officers was barely acknowledged by some HODs, when probed.3S9•360 See 
Figure 7.3 for a construction of Heads of Departments' web of relationships in the context of 
policy implementation. 
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Figure 7.3 HODs' Interactions in the Context of Implementing PoUcies 
Summary: Government hospital Heads of Department 
HODs were obliged to the HIV I AIDS programme for the support they received in material 
and human resource tenns. In exchange, HODs complied with programme/ormalities such as 
maintaining documentation and reporting back to the HIV / AIDS programme 
HODs were not equally active in taking steps to actually change HIV testing behaviour 
among their staff of practitioners. Complicity between HODs and some HIV / AIDS 
357 Respondent 33: Head of medical department, government hospital 
3S8 Respondent 66: Erstwhile head of microbiology department, government hospital 
3S9 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
360 Respondent 66: Erstwhile head of microbiology department, government hospital 
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programme officials to hide field-level problems and maintain 'a good face' may have 
reduced the efficacy of supervision by the HN / AIDS programme. 
Broadly the performance of their roles was skewed toward interactions with authorities, not 
with subordinates; and they appeared to emphasise paperwork, over the communicative 
aspects of implementation. 
HODs reported minimal interactions with other policy actors, save with collaborators in other 
institutions. 
7.2.2 Government hospital Infection Control Officer (lCO) 
As noted before, some of the government hospitals had independent departments dedicated to 
infection control and safety. which were also mandated with the responsibility of administering 
some related policies and programmes. The prescribed roles of these departments included 
ensuring that policies around HIV care were followed, and providing personal protection to 
practitioners and equipment for waste management. 361 An Infection Control Officer from one 
government hospital was interviewed. 
The ICO reiterated what was evident in interviews with government doctors: that policies were 
often not followed "in spirit" even though all supporting paperwork and procedures were in place. 
For the officer, his relatively junior position and the non-clinical nature of his work prevented him 
from exercising authority over doctors. The officer expressed frustration at the dismissive 
attitudes of doctors, particularly of surgeons, and the obstacles this posed for him in executing his 
prescribed duties. 
It is very difficult to make people understand. Specially the medical 
conununity ... if you don't belong to that community, it is impossible. If 
you go to a professor. [they say] kal ka bachcha [you spring chicken]. 
where have you come from? You have come to me, will you tell me what 
to do? 
The surgeons are the most badmash [scoundrels]. Sorry to use that word, 
but they think they are the bosses. They try to dictate. They never asked 
reasonably: "we want this, we want that." Instead, halla macha denge 
[they will raise a ruckus]: "We don't have this, we don't have that." 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
361 Respondent 68: Infection control officer, government hospital 
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Hospital administrators were also reported to be unsupportive in these endeavours of the ICO. 
According to the ICO, administrators may not have been cognizant of the need to budget for non-
material aspects of running an infection control programme (such as educational and promotional 
interventions), and not have prioritised these aspects in their mix of tasks, an observation that was 
also shared by key informants.362 The ICO contended that public health and preventive tasks were 
generally regarded as peripheral and unimportant in hospitals. In this discouraging environment, 
the officer felt inhibited in initiating interactions with staff and undertaking innovative activities, 
and instead tended to focus more on his routine and clerical tasks. 
AU these things are not on the priority list of administrators. They are all 
thankless jobs. Nobody will be given credit. .. there is no culture of this. 
Here, public health people are not well recognised... you do whatever 
you like, but the main question is, the person should be given recognition 
by the people who are around. 
Infection control officer, government hospital (68) 
The officer reported that there was no significant interaction of the department with the 
HN I AIDS programme, or with the SACS-instituted VCTC and treatment centre in the hospital. 
In summary: 
The Infection Control Officer reported gaps between his prescribed and actual role in policy 
implementation. 
Answerability to hospital administrators tended to be focused around management of 
materials, and not around improving communications with practitioners. 
Practitioners generally rejected the authority of the ICO, and the officer did not find it viable 
to pursue an agenda of behaviour change or reform. 
The ICO was isolated and felt disempowered due to his weak relationships with both 
administrators and practitioners. 
7.2.3 Private hospital administrators 
In contrast to government hospitals, administrators363 in the private hospital were closely involved 
in issues around HIV testing. The administrators were active in instituting and supporting a HIV 
nodal group in the hospital, which created policies and instituted procedures such as consent 
362 Key Informant 6 
363 Precise designations are not revealed, to protect anonymity. 
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fonns for HIV testing, arrangements for post-exposure prophylaxis and universal precautions, and 
pre-test and post-test counselling. This section is based on interviews with administrators and 
members of the HIV nodal group in the private hospital. 
Relationship with practitioners 
The introduction of HIV testing policies in the hospital was opposed by the hospital doctors, 
particularly the surgeons, but eventually the administrators prevailed and the policies were 
introduced.364 
The senior consultants were up in arms and they said that: "what about 
us? We would like to fmd out what is the [HIV] status [of surgical 
patients]. Since then a lot of water has flown under the bridge ... Finally 
everybody agreed [to introduce policies prohibiting pre-surgical 
screening]. I mean, we bade them to agree. 
Medical superintendent, private hospital (38) 
While these written policies did exist, along the lines of national guidelines365, there was 
considerable leniency in the way they were practically implemented. It appeared that the 
administration and the hospital HIV committee preferred to take an approach of persuasion rather 
than enforcement, and often made accommodations towards the demands of practitioners, for the 
sake of smooth day-to-day functioning. 
We thought, let us start with consent, and we keep putting the pressure, 
gradually. Once consent fonns come into line, then we will put some 
pressure for pre-test counselling. So, slowly it will be streamlined. 
Member, HIV committee, private hospital (40) 
Ensuring convenience for doctors' and staff in the context of day-to-day operations was an 
important priority for hospital administrators. 
Relationship with government and the HIVIAIDS programme 
It appeared that the adoption of HIV testing policies for the hospital was prompted in part by 
pressures from the HIV I AIDS programme, requiring the hospital to be more accountable in tenns 
ofHIV care.366.367 These interactions with the HIV/AIDS programme were reported to have been 
364 This is corroborated separately by doctors and administrators 
365 Not made available to me 
366 Respondent 35: Physician, 12 years experience, private hospital 
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fractious, and the hospital administrators generally held a poor opinion of programme officials 
and of the role of government authorities in guiding HIV / AIDS care. Some critical remarks 
directed at the HIV/AIDS programme authorities by the respondents included: 'typically stupid ... 
like Indian government attitudes,368 and 'a lost organization ,369. Respondents also repeatedly 
emphasized that they were not accountable to government. However, in spite of their absence of 
regard for government authorities, the administration did choose to adopt their HIV policies in the 
hospital. The reasons cited for this were twofold. 
Firstly, this was a gesture aimed at enhancing the reputation of the hospital, and secondly the 
administrators foresaw the value of adopting procedures such as consent, and their utility as a 
protective measure against litigation. The administrators identified themselves strongly in the 
role of institution-builders, and stressed on the value of an adaptive and open-ended style of 
hospital management, with the eventual goal of 'growth of the hospital' . 
We should have the ability to evolve and adopt whatever is new. If we 
have too rigid structures, too many sanctions, then nothing happens. 
Medical superintendent, private hospital (38) 
According to respondents this style of management was encouraged and enabled by the presence 
of strong leadership at the level of the board of trustees of the hospital. 
Summary: Private hospital administrators 
Administrators of the private hospital were actively involved in issues around HIV testing. 
In spite of their oppOSitional relationship with government officials, government policies were 
nominally adopted by the hospital 
The actual enforcement of the policies among their staff of medical practitioners was pursued 
by administrators largely as per convenience, and not seen as an imperative. 
Hospital administrators' participation in processes of implementation of HIV testing policies 
were characterised by negotiation and adaptation to the positions of other stakeholders 
(government programme, staff, clients), and overall were seen as secondary to the larger goal 
of institution-building. 
367 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent, private hospital 
368 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
369 Respondent 38: Medical superintendent, private hospital 
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7.3 VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH AUTHORITIES 
Officials of the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) were not available for interview, in spite of 
repeated attempts to organize appointments. A telephonic interview was eventuaily organized 
with one official. He indicated that the involvement of the Directorate in monitoring medical 
provider behaviour was limited, and they were not specifically engaged with micro-level issues 
such as the quality of HIV testing, corroborating the similar observations of government hospital 
staff70 and key informants.371 Recent activities of the directorate had included monitoring and 
introducing legislations for broad-based quality criteria such as facility registration and ensuring 
qualified staff.372 
7.4 VIEWS OF HIV/AIDS PROGRAMME AUTHORITIES 
This section is based on interviews with officials from the National AIDS Control Organization 
and from a State AIDS Control Society.373 
7.4.1 National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) officials 
The two senior NACO officials interviewed were both of the view that in practice the HIV / AIDS 
programme was primarily focused on developing and expanding existing services, rather than 
regulating them (also supported by the SACS official - see following section). Information 
gathering, by way of data on numbers of HN positive patients and their response to ART, was 
another important activity of programme officials at a national level. 
Role ambivalence 
Even as NACO's formal stance was to support the strengthening of regulations for HIV testing by 
legal means374, the officials' attitude towards changing medical provider behaviour was focused 
370 Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist and erstwhile head of department, government hospital 
371 K . fi ey m onnants 6 and 9 
372 Respondent 56: Official, state directorate of health services 
373 The state is not identified for purposes of anonymity. 
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around supportive interventions, such as educational progranunes and improvement of universal 
precautions and post-exposure prophylaxis in government hospitals. One of them also opposed 
the institution of laws around HN testing, in contradiction of NACO's official stance. 
This [infringement of policies by doctors] is being addressed basically 
through the mechanism of education... My opinion is that we have a 
lacuna in that we have not been able to take the message to our doctors. 
So if we educate and try to train them, I think that will have some impact. 
Frankly speaking if you put some kind of regulatory mechanism, at least 
in India I think, that approach may not serve the purpose... I think 
because it is a democratic state, you know. If we keep insisting on an 
HN law, every hospital should have this, should have that, then people 
will come out with their own ways ... 
Senior official, NACO (55) 
This respondent expressed disagreement with some of his organization's policies and approaches. 
Being a physician himself, there were strong overtones of empathy in his discussions of doctors' 
positions, around such issues as personal safety and routine testing of clinically suspected 
patients. 
Their doubts are absolutely valid, and whatever practices they are doing, 
they have a reason, it is not unnecessary. Either we [should] convince 
them or we [should] modify the policy. 
Senior official, NACO (55) 
Although the NACO official himself claimed to have an insight into practitioners' perspectives, 
he felt unable to highlight them in official circles, because of the unwillingness of practitioners 
themselves to communicate these divergent perspectives in formal fora. 
You know these people [practitioners] don't come out in front and say 
these things. They come to meetings but they don't say. Otherwise if you 
talk to 100 doctors, 80 will say that way. But if this can be documented 
properly, it will be good food for thought. 
Senior official, NACO (55) 
The other official also indicated the difficulties of regulation of practices in the private sector, and 
detailed NACO's strategies for working with private medical providers, which included 
partnership with the William Clinton Foundation to sensitize private practitioners around HIV 
care, and the promotion of voluntary accreditation initiatives.37S 
374 NACO's policies advise governments to adopt "legislative and other measures" to ensure conformity to 
testing policy. The HIV/AIDS Bill 2005 which would bring about legal sanction for HIV testing policies 
around consent and confidentiality enjoys the official support of NACO. See Chapters 1 and 2 for details. 
375 Respondent 04: Senior official, NACO 
200 
CHAPTER 7. OTHER POUCY ACTORS: ROLES AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
Relationship with WHO 
In spite of holding a fairly important position in the hierarchy of the NACO, one official appeared 
to regard certain policies as evolving through means beyond his control or influence. The World 
Health Organization and other international agencies were cited as an influential source of 
guidance in respect to policies for HIV testing. 
I think provider initiated testing should be encouraged, and I think. WHO 
is also promoting this idea. But somehow it is not getting into practice. 
Senior official, NACO (55) 
Yes, quite a few of them [policy guidelines) are imported. Well, they are 
not directly implanted. We borrowed a lot of policies ... our PEP 
guidelines are from CDC guidelines ... because we never had guidelines, 
so we had to take from somewhere. Quite a few of our treatment training 
progranunes are from WHO. 
Senior official, NACO (04) 
The lack of leadership and capacity at national level to determine unified policies for the whole 
country as an explanation for the adoption of international policies, was also offered by other 
respondents including a key informant. 376 
Summary: NACO officials 
The officials felt that the primary role of the programme was to prioritise the expansion and 
development of the lUVI AIDS programme. Their practical approach favoured supportive and 
educational interventions over regulatory functions, in interactions with medical providers. 
There were indications that the organization's policies were adopted from international 
agencies, and poorly informed by the experiences of field-level practitioners. An official 
remarked on the reluctance of practitioners to highlight their own concerns in formal fora. It 
was not apparent that active efforts were made to solicit these perspectives. 
In spite of holding prominent decision-making posts, the officials appeared to lack ownership 
of the policies, and agency in determining the policies promulgated by their own organization 
(NACO). 
376 K . Ii eym onnant4 
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7.4.2 State AIDS Control Society (SACS) official 
Role ambivalence 
The senior SACS official who was interviewed was ambivalent about the actual role of the 
organization in implementing national policies. Initially the respondent indicated that the SACS 
was 'into [implementing] all the policy and programmes, different components of the National 
AIDS Control Programme,.377 Subsequently in the interview, reflecting on his practical 
experience, he admitted that 'we are more of an advocacy agency than an implementation 
agency'. The respondent placed a high value on the role of the SACS as a resource provider, and 
felt that it was not feasible or desirable to combine this with a policing role. 
People may not take it that sportingly if we are trying to be some one 
who is enforcing, and trying to police them. We would prefer it to be as it 
is, more of advocacy than enforcement. 
Senior official, SACS (46) 
The organization's role in training medical providers in different aspects of HIV care was 
particularly emphasized. The official denied that there were widespread infringements of HIV 
testing policies in government hospitals, and insisted that the existence of consent forms in public 
hospitals and procedures instituted in the VCTCs and ART centre were sufficient to ensure 
compliance to NACO policies to a great degree. 
Relationship with government hospital providers 
The SACS official said that there were certain problems in programme implementation at the 
level of hospitals, since many of the designated implementers of the HIV / AIDS programme in 
hospitals (department Heads, ARTC in-charges, VCTC in-charges) were regular employees of the 
State Health Department, and not of the SACS (see Figure 7.4). 
Though we have designated VCTC and ART in-charges378 [in hospitals], 
they don't get any salary for that. This is extra responsibility for no extra 
remuneration. These people are employees of State Government, of the 
health department, they are doctors. So they have other duties to perform. 
If you have extra responsibilities or extra burden, you tend to neglect 
some aspects. If he is managing 100 outpatients, and gets additional 
charge of VCTC, or ART, it will be difficult for him. The importance 
377 Respondent 46: Senior official, State AIDS Control Society (SACS) 
378 These were typically doctors (often Heads of Department) from a relevant clinical speciality department 
such as Internal Medicine or Venereology. 
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that this [the HIV/AIDS] programme should carry is not reflected in the 
implementation. 
Senior official, SACS (46) 
Other than the regular hospital staff, there were also some programme workers (including 
administrative staff, counsellors and technicians) who were hired on a contractual basis by the 
SACS. The SACS official explained that these short-tenn programme staff faced difficulties in 
integrating unfamiliar emphases such as mv -specific infonned consent, in hospital environments 
in which there were established cultures focused mainly around clinical task perfonnance. See 
Figure 7.4 for a representation of this web of relationships between the HIV/AIDS programme 
structure and government general health services, as seen by the SACS official. 
State Health 
Department 
Employment, 
answerability 
for other tasks 
GOVT. 
HOSPITAL 
Regular Hospital Staff 
(doctors with additional 
charges of ARTC I 
VCTC coordinator) 
Poor 
'Integration' 
SACS 
Employment 
(contractual) 
and answerability 
SACS Staff 
(technicians, 
counsellors) 
Figure 7.4 Health Department and HIV/AIDS Programme - Parallel Structures 
Relationship with state health departments 
According to the SACS official, they (the SACS) received no financial assistance from State 
Government, and that SACS were part of an autonomous administrative structure parallel to that 
of the State government's health and hospital administration. A key infonnant reported how there 
were frequent frictions and tensions between these two parallel structures, as a result of the HIV 
programme being relatively better endowed financially than the general health systems.379 In 
some states however, higher functionaries of the SACS were also senior officials of the State 
health administration, which allowed them to exercise their authority over hospital staff. In these 
379 Key Informant 6 
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instances, said the SACS official, 'the integration is happening at the top most leveL.and the 
work gets ... more by force, than by motivation' .380 
Relationship with private sector providers 
When asked about the private medical sector, the official explained that the enormity of the task 
of regulating private providers' practices was beyond the means of the SACS. The official 
assumed a conciliatory approach to their infringement of NACO policies. 
We can't control them. It is only a part of advocacy, a part of 
motivation ... I understand that some of private doctors do test patients 
without consent before surgery ... [But] it has not corne to us through any 
source which has a strong base ... written complaints have not come. 
Senior official, SACS (46) 
The SACS' involvement with private medical providers was very limited overall, and the official 
confirmed the claims of private doctors that most of their training programmes were aimed only at 
government doctors (see Chapter 6). 
Relationship with NACO 
In spite of its autonomous status as a registered society, the SACS official interviewed clearly 
perceived the SACS as an operational ann of the National AIDS Control Organization or 
Programme. 
All these activities we do are NACO exercises ... We have many 
partners, but as far as donor partner is concern, we have a single donor. 
All the money is coming from NACO. 
Senior official, SACS (46) 
The official focused strongly on the SACS' function of helping to expand NACP services and 
frequently cited statistics of numbers of patients who had been counselled and tested, or received 
care under the programme, as signs of the success of the programme. 
380 Respondent 46: Senior official, SACS 
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Summary: SACS official 
The SACS official generally prioritised the aspect of expansion and development of the 
HN / AIDS programme, over concerns of regulating the practices of medical providers. 
The official appeared to perceive ambivalence around multiple roles: as resource providers, 
advocacy campaigners, and policy implementers. He felt that in practice, their role as 
advocates and resource providers was incompatible with, and took precedence over their role 
as implementers of policies, a contradiction of the SACS' written constitution. 
In operational terms, the official perceived significant obstacles in the implementation of 
policies in hospitals. The programme functioned as a parallel administrative structure 
distinct from the general health services and as such, lacked true authority over government 
hospital practitioners. 
Further, there were frictions between the SACS and state health administration, and 
programme staff experienced problems in the integration of HIV -specific objectives into the 
regular functioning of government hospitals. 
The SACS official completely abdicated responsibility for policy implementation in the 
private sector, claiming that it was beyond their means. 
In spite of their autonomous status as registered societies, the SACS were perceived 
universally as operational arms of NACO. 
7.5 VIEWS OF A PROFESSIONAL REGULATOR 
Interviews with an officer from a State Medical Council (SMC)381 form the basis of this section. 
Regulatory role 
The SMC officer described the Council as being 'an autonomous body under the State 
Government' with 'quasi-judicial functions', and having the primary role of regulating the 
standards of medical practice of allopathic doctors in the State. When asked about the nature of 
the council's regulatory role, the officer focused his responses mainly on the Council's efforts in 
381 Name of state not divulged to protect identity of respondent. 
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promoting continuing medical education (CME) for doctors in government and private 
institutions, and on recent efforts to link re-registration of doctors to a system of CME credits. 
The disciplinary functions of the Medical Council, which have a prominent position in the written 
constitution of the Council, were not mentioned by the respondent initially. However when 
probed, the respondent elaborated on the disciplinary role of the Council and the constitution of 
the disciplinary committee as follows: 
We have got a disciplinary committee, I forgot to mention, and we also 
maintain a code of ethics, maintenance of ethical practices. Disciplinary 
committee has a chairperson who is a senior medical practitioner; there is 
a member who is a reputed person. As of now, [a prominent journalist) 
382 is a member, but has not turned up for any meeting. There is one legal 
person, a practising lawyer, and one MLA. But none of them turn up. 
Senior official, State Medical Council (58) 
Asked about the procedures of the disciplinary committee, the respondent said that the process 
was initiated on receipt of complaints, which could be from an aggrieved individual (typically), or 
from the government or another agency. The arbitration procedure consisted of preliminary 
screening of the complaint, followed by a hearing with both parties present. After this, the 
disciplinary committee held consultations and passed judgment. The officer said that the number 
of complaints lodged had increased in recent years. When asked about their role in the 
implementation of HIV testing policies, the official indicated that violation of government 
policies could putatively be a matter of arbitration for the Council. 
In all these issues [HIV testing, counselling, consent), there are definite 
rules, conventions, and procedures of the government. So everybody has 
to follow that. If they do not follow, they [the government] take a course 
of action. They also intimate us so that we can take action against them. 
Any violation of any rules and regulations is also taken as medical 
negligence and we take action on that. 
Senior official, State Medical Council (58) 
There was no instance however of government or any other party lodging a complaint with 
councils on the basis of non-adherence of practitioners to HIV testing policies. In fact the officer 
related that, in total, punitive measures had been taken against no more than 'three or four 
doctors' who had been found guilty on charges of medical negligence in the past year. These 
measures included reprimands, and suspension of the right to practice for between three and six 
months. 
382 Name withheld for confidentiality 
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Additional roles 
The officer also mentioned some additional roles and functions of the SMC, which revolved 
around protecting the rights of doctors and maintaining the sanctity of the profession.383 
Whenever there is a need, we provide them with protection. We take up 
their issues with the concerned authorities, within the ambit of existing 
rules and norms 
(Investigator: How would such a case come to your notice?] 
The doctor informs us. Or we may take suo motu action if we come to 
know about some oddity. 
Senior official, State Medical Council (58) 
In one instance the Council had played an proactive role in petitioning the government against 
wrongful legal action taken on a doctor. Another important focus area, according to the 
respondent was the eradication of quackery, for which the Council had instituted special 
procedures and committees for investigation. 
In contradiction of the organization's primary official role of regulation of practices, the 
respondent explicitly indicated his disinclination toward the use of force to change practices of 
doctors. Deficiencies in medical care were discussed in sympathetic terms, as lack of awareness 
on the part of practitioners, to which an approach of patience and forbearance was advocated. 
All these things will take a little time. People have to be informed about 
it. In the course of time, everybody will be doing it [following policies]. 
We cannot do everything by danda [the stick]. We have seen for the last 
56 years since independence, how many ill effects there have been by 
[the use of] danda. 
Senior official, State Medical Council (58) 
When queried about the violation of NACO policies around mandatory pre-surgical testing, the 
official was disinclined to believe that such violations took place in government hospitals. 
Relationships with other groups 
Medical associations had some representation in the SMC, with elected posts in the Council being 
reserved for members of the local chapter of the Indian Medical Association. The disciplinary 
383 These functions were not mentioned in the official webpage of the SMC at the time of the interview, nor 
were they part of the constitution of SMCs as indicated in the MCI webpage. When asked about this, the 
respondent said that they were recent additions to the constitution. 
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committee too had representation from the Medical Association. Reportedly, representatives of 
the Association were important and active participants in Council proceedings. They may have 
had a dominant role in the Council, particularly in the context of other committee members often 
being absent. 
The officer indicated that the SMC had few practical interactions with the Medical Council of 
India, except to contribute to the national register of doctors, maintained centrally. The roles of 
the State and National level councils were reportedly complementary, the two levels being in 
charge of regulating standards of medical practices, and of medical education respectively. There 
was no indication of any substantive interaction with government health departments. 
Summary: Professional regulator 
The SMC official appeared to be less focused on the core tasks of the organization of 
regulating medical practice, and more on routine documentation and educational initiatives. 
It was evident that the council did not play a proactive role in preventing or identifying 
instances of misconduct, and were reliant on aggrieved clients or other agencies for initiating 
complaints. As such, their practical role in matters such as implementation of HIV testing 
policies may have been limited. 
The council was apparently dominated by interests from the medical profession and 
representatives from voluntary Medical Associations were prominent members of Council 
committees. 
A high value was placed on actions undertaken by the council toward protecting and 
promoting the interests of medical professionals, including campaigns against quackery. On 
the other hand, the value of regulation of doctors' practices was underplayed by the officer. 
7.6 VIEWS OF CME EDUCATORS 
A number of programmes for HN / AIDS training for in-service doctors exist in India. These are 
diverse and can be categorised on criteria such as their duration, which sector of doctors they are 
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available to, whether they are voluntary or part of a compulsory requirement, or the type of 
training imparted.384 A typology of training programmes is presented in Box 7.1. 
- Aimed at govemment doctors or private doctors or both 
- Short-term (days or weeks) or longer duration (months) 
- Voluntary or mandatory 
- With or without practical component 
- One-off or repeated exposures 
Box 7.1 Types of Training Programmes 
Training initiatives are financially supported and administered by different government and non-
governmental agencies, including some by international NGOs and bilateral agencies. The actual 
training may be conducted by hired trainers or by dedicated staff. Trainers are often drawn from 
medical colleges or institutes where they hold regular teaching or research positions. 
The section is divided into two parts, the first part (7.6.1) looks at sensitization programmes and 
workshops, which were of a short duration (a few days or weeks). The second subsection (7.6.2) 
focuses on longer term training programmes with an inbuilt practical component. Educators and 
administrators from four different training programmes were interviewed. 
7.6.1 Managers and trainers: short-term sensitization programmes 
Educators from two different types of short term educational programmes were interviewed. The 
first was a mandatory refresher workshop for government doctors, and the second was a 
sensitization programme for private sector doctors, coordinated by an international NGO. 
A government educator recounted that many of the participants in these refresher workshops were 
not very interested in learning about HIV, and were present only because it was a compulsory 
requirement of their government jobs. 
Just because there is an order from the government these people come 
here but they are not interested. Some circular goes to different medical 
colleges, the professor of medicine, professor of paediatrics, doctor blah 
384 Several key informants 
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blah should go and attend this. They are reluctant. Nobody has taken 
their consent: are you willing to work in HIV? 
Senior physician and trainer, government hospital (37) 
The other example of short tenn training programmes, a HIV sensitization initiative for private 
practitioners utilised a standard curriculum of instruction which had been developed with a 
specific focus on NACO guidelines for HIV testing and management. The programme was being 
carried out on a countrywide scale with the help of local chapters of a medical association, had 
official support from the HIV / AIDS programme, and the Medical Council of India, and financial 
assistance from major international bilateral agencies. 
Administrators and educators employed by the programme themselves expressed reservations 
about its effectiveness in changing the behaviour of private medical providers.38s.386 According to 
one of the educators interviewed from the programme, the training programmes was unlikely to 
lead to significant attitudinal and behaviour change, since it was not linked to an active 
programme of skill development. She also expressed doubts about the response of doctors to the 
instructional approach adopted in the programme. 
If someone comes to you, as a doctor, and tells you "do it like this" or 
"do it like that", how would you react? But these people [colleagues] 
seem quite optimistic that it will create some change. 
Senior educator and consultant to training 
programme for private physicians (50) 
However, the educators asserted that the main expectation from the programme was simply to 
sensitize doctors to new concepts. A key informant also endorsed the utility of such short tenn 
training initiatives, in creating awareness of policies and issues where there was none. 
These medical doctors, through a process of attrition, they lose what they 
have learnt during their medical college years. The value is in making 
them aware of what is going on. 
Key infol1Ilant 6 
Some characteristics of such programmes and their potential impact on practices, according to 
respondents, are listed in Table 7.2. 
38S Respondent 44: Manager, short tenn HIV training programme for private physiCians 
386 Respondent 50: Senior consultant to HIV training programme for private physicians 
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Duration and frequency Short term (days), single exposure 
Style of training Instructional 
Focus of Content Policies, general information 
Desired outputs Knowledge of, adherence to policies 
Cost per capita Low 
Alignment of behaviour with policies Variable (non-contentious aspects) 
Alignment of behaviour with policies Poor (contentious aspects) 
Table 7.2 Characteristics of Short-Term Sensitization Programmes 
In summary: 
The trainers and administrators were not universally satisfied with the quality of interactions 
with their trainees in short term programmes. However they recognized the utility of short 
tenn training in effectively sensitizing practitioners to newer concepts, which included 
national policies. 
In the instance of the HIV / AIDS programme for private doctors, the educators were sceptical 
about the effectiveness of their programme's instructional approach, and did not expect it to 
have an immediate impact on aligning practitioners' practices with policies. 
The programme for private physicians was weJJ supported by donors, which was attributed by 
respondents to political support, and to the low per capita cost of such initiatives. 
7.6.2 Managers and trainers: intensive training programmes 
The two longer tenn HIV training programmes for mid-career doctors were located in 
(respectively, one government and one private) medical colleges, and conducted by their teaching 
faculty. Both were available to doctors working in any sector, following a competitive entrance 
process, and included a practical training component and repeated contacts over a year-long 
period. The programmes were popular and regularly oversubscribed. Respondents from both 
programmes stressed the importance of repeated educational inputs in engendering change in 
practices. The effectiveness of practical exposure and sensitization to new concepts through 
practical work, in changing attitudes and behaviour, was also emphasized. 
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The need of the hour is not just education but continuous education. 
Exposure and sensitisation leads to a gradual change in practices... the 
more number of cases you see, the more your attitude changes. 
Senior educator and training coordinator (70) 
One respondent described how students readily adopted concepts such as consent and 
confidentiality in their practice, but not when these conflicted with their own wishes to undertake 
pre-surgical HN screening. 
You have surgeons who want to advocate pre-operative testing. I don't 
think that all the education and all the discussion really facilitated 
addressing that stalemate. Different people are using the inputs of the 
course in various ways. 
Medical educator, 20 years experience (15) 
The focus of the programme however was not specifically on adherence to policies, but on the 
capacity development of practitioners at a broader level. In fact, one objective of the training was 
to help students to develop their own workplace policies and standard operating procedures.387 
Training programmes of long duration and with a practical component are very 
expensive, and mayor may not have brought about changes in behaviour as expected. 
Often such interventions encouraged independent thought and led to practitioners 
making autonomous decisions which may have been at odds with national policy 
guidelines. The benefits of such programmes lay deeper - In creating exposure to new 
concepts and career paths, and engendering peer intercourse and collaborations. 
Training will bring about a change; you are sowing seeds for 
change. That is all that will happen. If I say that I can change 
it within a year, you will not find any Significant change. But 
to some of the people who are a little involved in their 
practices, it may make a difference. There will be some who 
are enlightened to see the logiC and rationale of training. And 
many will not. 
Key Informant 6 
It Is like nurturing a baby. I will not say these are students but 
they are like future collaborators. It Is a real experience ... 
you know everyday we start with looking forward to what Is 
going to happen next. It Is a very pleasant experience. 
Senior educator and training coordinator (70) 
Box 7.2 'Sowing Seeds': Immeasurable Gains of Intensive Training 
387 Respondent 70: Senior medical educator, coordinator of intensive training programme in HlV 
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For the educators, the training programme also represented an opportunity to 'network' with 
peers, students and trainers hired from other institutions. Arrangements were worked out to share 
resources for training across institutions, and the local SACS was also involved in providing 
technical expertise.388 Some characteristics of intensive training programmes and their potential 
impact on practices, according to respondents are listed in Table 7.3 
Duration and frequency long term (months), multiple exposure 
Style of training Educational 
Focus of Content Skills, concepts 
Desired outputs Clinical skills, knowledge, cognizance of ethical principles, capacity for decision-making, other 
Cost per capita High 
Alignment of behaviour with policies Good (non-contentious aspects) 
Alignment of behaviour with policies Variable (contentious aspects) 
Table 7.3 Characteristics of Intensive Training Programmes 
The idea of supporting such intensive training programmes with their high per capita costs and 
indefinable outputs may not have been attractive to funding agencies with a short-term vision for 
change. In spite of the popularity of the programmes, respondents indicated that the withdrawal 
of donors was threatening their continuation. 
In summary: 
The educators saw their programmes as a channel for communicating knowledge and ideas 
and imparting skills and concepts. Practical exposure and experience of working with HIV 
positive patients was felt to be particularly important, and was linked to attitudinal changes. 
It was widely acknowledged that the education did not necessarily result in the alignment of 
practices with national policies, especially when the content of instruction conflicted with 
other interests and priorities. 
388 Respondent 70: Senior medical educator, coordinator of intensive training programme in HIV 
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Intensive training presented opportunities for personal development for trainers and trainees 
alike. Participation was seen by educators as an opportunity for innovation; and a platfonn for 
engendering professional relationships across institutions. 
The "output" of intensive training was a small numbers of trainees at a very high cost which 
may have explained the reduced interest of donors in these programmes. 
7.7 VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
7.7.1 Office-bearers: United Nations agencies 
United Nations (UN) agencies, the WHO and UNAIDS are authors of global guidelines which are 
often a basis for national policies and as such have a potential role in shaping how policies are 
implemented. Both organizations have country offices in India, and interviews were held with a 
representative selection of officials from these offices. 
Role in implementation 
Neither organization was officially responsible for policy implementation. The UNAIDS 
secretariat, as 'the joint voice of the UN,389 on HN I AIDS issues, was charged with coordination 
between different agencies and for advocacy. The WHO office's putative role was to provide 
technical support to the government. According to one respondent from the WHO office, theirs 
was not officially an advocacy role, but practically involved 'a lot of lobbying and advocacy,390 
around their core areas of technical contribution.39t 
The primary mode of involvement of UNAIDS and WHO in field level processes was in helping 
central and state governments develop and promote programmes for training and capacity 
development, and for accreditation. At an organizational level, there were limited practical means 
available to them to playa role in enforcing compliance to policies. 
389 Respondent 03: Mid-level official, United Nations technical agency 
390 Respondent 47: Officer in UN technical agency, 7 years in the UN, recently deputed to India 
391 These areas of technical support reportedly included surveillance and an initiative to decentralize HIV 
treatment, care and prevention, known as the IMAI (Integrated Management of Adult Illnesses) initiative. 
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Value orientations 
Nevertheless, the respondents tended to place a high value on compliance and on streamlining the 
practices of doctors to meet national standards. When asked about their organizations' position 
on implementing policies, officials generally felt that it was important to enforce uniform 
standards in regard to issues such as consent and confidentiality, which they considered to be 
universal principles. 
According to most of the respondents, doctors' explanations for infringements of HIV testing 
policies had little foundation. They clearly valued the principles of universalism that were 
enshrined in the WHOIUNAIDS policies. Their arguments were generally predicated on a strong 
conception of the importance of personal autonomy in medical care interactions. 
Not just for HIV, but for all other health problems, there should be 
confidentiality; there should be systems of counselling, or informing the 
patient. Even that is not happening here. Why? I am sure you have seen, 
in the West, people really make sure that you are the one who decides. 
The doctor is not the one who decides. He tells you these are the options 
available for you, you decide what you want. 
Officer in UN technical agency, recently deputed to India (47) 
One respondent regarded the policies for voluntary testing and specific informed consent as a 
signifier of future directions for health systems in India, stating that 'we are a little bit ahead, but 
this will be a path-finder for other systems as well,.m He drew on examples from Western health 
systems to envision a future in which patients in India would exercise greater autonomy. 
'Eventually in India, people will demand that you treat me with decency, that you treat me with 
respect', he felt. The advantages of adopting consent procedures were explained by some 
respondents in terms of the legal protection they gave to both parties involved, patients and 
doctors. 
Linking global and national policy 
Shortly before the interviews took place, a joint WHOIUNAIDS global policy statement had been 
published promoting routine offer of HIV testing by practitioners in healthcare interactions, in 
recognition of the need to scale up HIV testing - an approach termed "provider-initiated testing 
392 Respondent 03: Mid-level official, United Nations technical agency 
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and counselling" (PITC) (WHOIUNAIDS 2006).393 One of the officials described the problems 
of communicating the recent policy changes to HN I AIDS programme and government officials. 
This whole policy statement caused a lot of confusion, because instead of 
"routine offer" it became "routine testing". There is a very delicate line 
you have to draw, and people easily tend to say "oh yeah, WHO says 
routine testing, we should just test every one". For people to understand 
the difference between routine testing and routine offer is going to be 
very difficult. 
Officer in UN technical agency (47) 
The official emphasised that he had some concerns about the new approach and hence had not 
"pushed it" in discussions with NACO officials. The official HIV testing policy in India retained 
its focus around the VCT approach and the central role ofVCT centres. 
Summary: UN agency officials 
The officials from UN agencies did not perceive a significant role for their organizations in 
enforcing policies at field level, being more focused on their supportive role to governments. 
Nevertheless, they did tend to place a strong emphasis on standardization of practices and 
compliance to global guidelines (developed by their organizations). 
The officials significantly valued principles of universalism in medical care, giving particular 
importance to personal autonomy. Greater expression of autonomy on the part of patients 
was seen as a future ideal of Indian health systems. 
The officials also experienced difficulties in communicating the principles of HIV testing 
policies to HN I AIDS programme officers and government departments. 
7.7.2 Donor agency official 
I interviewed a representative from the country office of an international donor agency, one of the 
major financers of the National AIDS Control Programme (see Table 1.3). According to the 
respondent, the organization had no specific role in implementation or field level processes. They 
were involved mainly at the level of financing the Government of India, and activities revolved 
around deciding budgetary allocations. From a financer's perspective, fund utilization by 
supported projects was cited as an important yardstick of successful implementation. 
393 Also see Appendix 1 (AI.S Recent shifts in policy) 
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The official indicated that her major struggle in making flnancial decisions was to identifY core 
problems, given the multiple perspectives of different stakeholders in a complex field such as 
HIV/AIDS. Referring to the act of reaching policy decisions on the basis of stakeholder 
consultations, the respondent felt that 'it was an amazing challenge to extract a common 
outcome'. 
Where everyone wants to be touchy-feely, and "this is all about people" 
and things like that, we have to define fairly narrowly what we are going 
to do, and how we are going to do it. 
HIV/AIDS department in-charge, major donor agency (54) 
The respondent felt that non-state actors such as civil society organizations had a particularly 
strident voice, which she regarded to be a distraction for the HIV/AIDS programme from 
pursuing their core public health functions. She reiterated the 'need to define things tightly in 
sectors like ours' (i.e. the health or HIV/AIDS sector). 
In summary 
As financers of the National AIDS Control Programme, the donor agency official was mainly 
concerned with issues such as fond utilization, which was regarded as evidence of programme 
implementation. 
The respondent placed a high value on the importance of a streamlined approach to 
implementation, especially in the context of diverse voices and perspectives that populated the 
HIV I AIDS world. 
7.8 VIEWS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS 
7.8.1 Consumer rights advocates 
According to a representative of a consumer rights organization, the focus of activity for the 
organization was threefold: on improving formal modes of redress for consumers of medical 
services, better clarification of standards of medical care, and greater consumer awareness of their 
rights. These approaches all have potential, if indirect relevance for the implementation of 
existing polices, such as for HIV testing. The consumer advocate emphasised the value of the 
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Consumer Protection Act394 in adding legitimacy to the consumer movement. He felt that the Act 
had been a 'good weapon' and over the past two decades, had been effective in engendering 
awareness and making medical professionals 'conscious towards their roles and 
responsibilities' .395 The organization's contemporary approach, said the respondent, was to shift 
the focus away from litigation and more towards voluntary and internal regulatory mechanisms 
such as accreditation. 
Over the past two decades, the medical fraternity have had mixed reactions to the consumer rights 
movement. The respondent narrated events from 1995, when medical associations protested a 
Supreme Court order sanctioning the inclusion of medical services in the Consumer Protection 
Act (CPA) (see section 2.1.3). 'They went on the street, they demonstrated', he reported. 
However he felt that in the past few years, the associations' antagonism to inclusion under the 
CPA, and to the consumer movement in general, had decreased considerably. 
Recognizing the expediency of involving medical interests, rather than antagonising them, the 
organization had admitted them as partners in new initiatives for accreditation of medical 
facilities. According to the respondent, 'we wanted to make sure that if (the medical associations) 
have to say something, talk about it right now, before we move further.' 
In summary, 
The consumer advocacy group had a potential role in influencing processes of policy 
implementation, by raising consumer awareness of their rights, and by their role in 
facilitating legal redress. 
In recent years however, they appeared to favour communication and collaboration with 
powerful medical interests, in contrast to the former emphasis on legal avenues to challenge 
their dominance. 
7.S.2 Legal rights activists 
A sub-sample of respondents from a prominent groups of legal activists, engaged in drafting new 
laws against HIV I AIDS related discrimination, were interviewed. Policy advocacy and litigation 
were two prominent areas of work in HIV/AIDS for this NGO, according to one respondent. 
Litigation relating to violation of HIV testing policy was improbable, said a respondent from the 
394 See Chapter 2 (2.1.3) 
39S Respondent 53: Head, consumer rights organization 
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organization. Patients may have got upset or angry at instances such as mandatory testing, but 
they would consider formal action only if there was a 'bigger repercussion', such as loss of 
employment. 396 She reported one instance when a patient was tested without consent and 
approached the organization's legal unit with the grievance. The problem was resolved by a 
phone call discussion with hospital authorities. 
One of the organization's major advocacy initiatives involved preparing a Bill for Parliament 
aimed at protecting the human rights of people with HIV/AIDS. The Bill had been prepared 
following consultations with numerous stakeholder groups. At the time of the interview, it was 
undergoing revisions by National AIDS Control Programme authorities. The Bill addressed many 
areas which coincided with national HIV testing policies, including requirements of informed 
consent, confidentiality, etc. One of the respondents reported that doctors widely opposed the Bill 
on various grounds, but largely dismissed the arguments posed by doctors as invalid.397 
In response to the suggestion that the Bill (if passed) would promote unnecessary litigation, 
respondents played down this possibility, given the difficulties involved for complainants. 
Its very difficult to get to the court, you need a good lawyer, money, 
resources ... three years is a long time. That's how long it takes to file 
motions, get evidence, deposition, hearing, final case disposal ... 
Junior member, legal rights group with focus on HIV / AIDS (51) 
Instead they emphasised the role of the law as a deterrent to discriminatory practices. The Bill 
also contains provisions for strengthening grievance redress mechanisms at hospitals and at 
district level, and the respondent emphasised the importance of these non-litigious mechanisms in 
addressing deficits in the quality of care: 'we would rather have these informal mechanisms, and 
we are trying to convey this to the health care providers. ' 398 
In summary, 
Legal rights activists pictured their involvement in policy implementation mainly as 
facilitators of legal reforms for HIV I AIDS care, for which they had nominal support from 
NACO. 
Paradoxically even though they supported the creation of new and powerful laws, respondents 
played down the importance of litigation as a means to regulate doctors' practices. Instead 
396 Respondent 51: Junior member, legal rights group with focus on HIV/AIDS 
397 Respondent 49: Senior member, legal rights group with focus on HIV/AIDS 
398 Respondent 49: Senior member, legal rights group with focus on HIV/AIDS 
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they emphasised stronger institutional mechanisms, and saw the role of law mainly in terms of 
enhancing awareness of problems and deterring discriminatory practices. 
Their relationship with the medical fraternity was vexed over conflicts around the content of 
the Bill. 
7.8.3 NGO advocacy project 
I interviewed representatives of a NGO partnership who had been involved in an intervention 
project to reduce stigma and discrimination against PLHA in urban hospitals. The project was a 
partnership between an international and a local NGO. 
Role and motivations 
One respondent spoke about how she and her colleagues were motivated to initiate the project by 
the knowledge of discriminatory practices in hospitals emerging from research studies throughout 
the country. 
How long can you just keep documenting [discriminatory practices], we 
know this exists, but isn't there a way to do something about it? 
Member ofNGO with focus on HIV/AIDS (64) 
The aim of this project was to change and standardise practices, and their interventions largely 
supported the implementation of NACO's HIV testing policies, focused as they were on issues 
such as consent and confidentiality and ensuring an ethical process of advising HIV tests. 
Activities conducted as part of the project included an evaluation of discriminatory practices, 
training workshops and helping hospital authorities develop standard institutional guidelines and 
operating procedures. 
Interactions with hospital administrators 
For the NGO workers, the process of engaging decision-makers in the hospitals in this process 
was a long and painstaking one, involving numerous meetings and seminars, over a period of 
more than a year. Endorsements from official bodies such as the SACS or NACO were often 
required to gain access to both government and private hospitals. A number of hospitals were 
approached and some refused to participate in the project. 
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In some instances the NGOs had to actively make concessions in their stance in order to be 
accepted by hospital authorities. For instance, in a private hospital the guidelines had to be 
modified to allow for compulsory pre-surgical HIV testing and routine testing of pregnant 
women. 
Interactions with medical practitioners 
Introducing a project on stigma and discrimination to doctors, who are often counted among 
perpetrators of discriminatory practices, required a high level of diplomacy on the part of the 
NGO workers. To make the interactions more palatable to doctors, they tended to assume 
sympathetic positions to doctors' perspectives on personal safety, and framed issues in tenns of 
scientific rationales. 
Doctors are accepting of scientific rationales. When we take the 
approach of infection control, universal precautions, and not necessarily 
point at stigma and discrimination which is the other side of the same 
coin, I think that helps you in getting entry into hospitals, and health care 
professionals are much more open in to talking to you. 
Senior member ofNGO with focus on HIV/AIDS (62) 
"We are not just talking about protecting patients, but also about 
protecting you, because you are the ones who will eventually protect the 
patient" When you go in with that attitude, then at least you have this 
common ground. 
Member ofNGO with focus on HIV/AIDS (64) 
The outcome of the intervention was that attitudinal and behavioural changes were observed in a 
few aspects of medical practice, in the post-intervention assessment. However to a large extent, 
the project failed to meet its initial objectives of standardizing practices across different 
departments and hospitals. The NGO workers were largely phlegmatic about these failures, and 
tended to focus on the achievements of the project, in sensitizing practitioners to human rights 
concepts. 
Viewing day-to-day hospital processes first-hand gave the NGO workers new insights and 
transfonned some of their preconceptions on stigma and discrimination. 
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When we first went in, we were like "this is absolutely stigma, this is 
absolutely discrimination, and they are perpetuating it and doing it. .. ", 
but it changed our perspectives to go in and work with them, that maybe 
this isn't actually stigma or discrimination ... 
We had this experience with patients that they would narrate to us 
incidents of their interactions with the health care system which were 
stigmatizing or discriminatory, but they didn't see it as that. 
MemberofNGO with focus on HIV/AIDS (64) 
The respondents emphasised their own experience of learning from their interactions with 
healthcare staff in the hospitals, including appreciation of the difficult working conditions in 
government hospitals, a greater understanding of doctors' apprehensions, and recognition of 
doctors' good intentions in most cases. 
Summary: NGO advocacy project 
The intervention project was initiated by a NGO as a result of strong belief in universal 
ethical principles, and perceptions of responsibility to act on their principles. 
The NGO underwent considerable difficulties in gaining access to hospitals for which they 
required official endorsement from the HIV I AIDS programme. In some instances had to 
compromise their positions on appropriate HIV testing policies. They had to exhibit 
considerable diplomacy and empathy towards doctors, to obtain their attention. 
Eventually the project had a limited impact, restricted to sensitization of doctors, and not 
resulting in substantive behavioural change or in the adoption of guidelines by departments. 
Strong themes of learning emerged in the accounts of the NGO respondents. First-hand 
experiences of hospital functioning and access to the perspectives of practitioners and patients 
transfonned some of their preconceptions on stigma and discrimination in healthcare settings. 
7.8.4 PLHA network 
The head of a network of People Living with HIV I AIDS (PLHA) was interviewed for his 
perspectives on their role in implementation of policies. 
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Roles and values 
The network's major activities in this context included building the capacity ofPLHA to enhance 
their decision-making roles in clinical settings. Another important initiative for the PLHA 
network was the creation of a network of doctors, to facilitate care for PLHA, provide a platform 
for the exchange of knowledge and views and address doctors' apprehensions around caring for 
PLHA. According to the respondent, 'providers have their own problems around HNIAIDS. 
This would give a platform for doctors to discuss it. ,399 In an early survey and pilot initiative, 
there had been a positive response from doctors in both private and government hospitals, and the 
respondent was optimistic about the success of the project. The initiatives of the organization to 
build the capacity of PLHA and build a network with local doctors represented a grassroots or 
bottom-up approach toward addressing their concerns. 
We liked that idea, that rather than trying to change the whole system, we 
can target individuals to change, and through that we will be able to 
change the system 
Head, PLHA network (07) 
Hence a philosophy of change through individual engagement was favoured by the respondent. 
He did not however rule out the value of initiatives at 'a legal and policy level', although these 
conventional approaches had their considerable limitations, in his opinion (see below).4oo 
Relationships with donors: inflated expectations 
Donor agencies had also shown an overwhelming interest in some of the organizations' projects, 
and a consultative team had been formed for one of their projects comprised of representatives 
from WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF, the National HIV/AIDS Programme, the Directorate of Health 
Services, the local Municipal Corporation and others. There was also reportedly interest in 
funding the project from the World Bank and the Global Fund. The respondent ironically 
remarked: 'I have been told that this is the only time that all these major groups, WHO, UNAIDS 
etc are together' . 
399 R espondent 07: Head, PLHA network 
400 The respondent confirmed that the legal route for redress of problems was rarely resorted to by PLHA. 
Reportedly the prolonged nature and expenses of court proceedings, even in consumer forums, was a 
deterrent, as also were PLHA's feelings of obligation toward their doctors. 
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The respondent felt that PLHA groups often suffered from the inflated expectations of policy-
planners, and that the trend of showcasing PLHA groups' role in effecting change at field level 
was not something that was always reflected in practice. 
There are pressures from abroad, global standards, pressures which have 
come on the government and higher organizations to show that change is 
being achieved [by PLHA groups], but it is a different matter whether 
this is being implemented properly. 
Head, PLHA network (07) 
The respondent rued that PLHA networks in the country had not, in his opinion, succeeded in 
establishing united and coherent advocacy platforms. 
Disenchantment with policy shifts 
The respondent was also unhappy with what he perceived as the dynamics of governmental and 
international policy reforms around HIV testing and care. 
These policies should reach lay people and they should know what 
should happen, what should not happen. But there is no concept that if a 
certain direction has been given, it should be maintained. There is often a 
change in decision-makers, and this lead to greater problems. 
Head, PLHA network (07) 
According to him, policy initiatives at the high echelons lacked momentum due to frequent 
changes in ideas and personnel, and were hence unable to permeate to the level of the community. 
He questioned the sincerity and patience of planners in sustaining efforts to provide better care. 
Summary: PLHA network 
The PLHA group had a role in influencing implementation processes from a grassroots 
perspective, by sensitizing PLHA to their rights and informing them about what to expect in 
the course of clinical encounters. They had also made efforts to educate doctors and engender 
mutual understanding with them by means of a collaborative project. 
The PLHA group was at the receiving end of significant attention and expectations of 
partnership from international and national agencies and funding bodies. This was 
symptomatic of pressures to playa greater role in policy advocacy on PLHA groups. 
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There was considerable disenchantment with repeated policy changes at national and 
international level, and the respondent was unconvinced that policy changes would lead to 
improved health care for PLHA. 
7.9 VIEWS FROM A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION 
A highly placed officer of the Indian Medical Association was interviewed. 
Limited role in implementation 
The Indian Medical Association is a voluntary body and has no particular role in enforcing 
government policies, a view that was corroborated by the office-holder. 
We keep telling our doctors that "don't do it yaar [friend]". Still there 
may be some people who continue to... [practice against policy 
guidelines] You can't have a policy to catch hold of their necks. 
Senior official, medical association (69) 
Much of the IMA's interests seemed to be concentrated on lobbying and advocacy to protect the 
economic interests of their members (most of whom work in the private sector and constitute a 
large proportion of India's registered doctors40I). The officer said however that the IMA 
undertook a number of educational programmes, and were about to initiate a large-scale 
programme to sensitize private practitioners on HIV/AIDS, in collaboration with the Clinton 
Foundation. 
Core role: popular representation 
Part of IMA's modus operandi for protecting doctors interests, was identifying policy changes 
which could have an impact on their members' (usually financial) welfare, and opposing them. 
See Box 7.3 for major ongoing campaigns undertaken by the !MA, toward protecting their 
members' interests. 
401 15-20% according to IMA and Mel documentation 
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- Contesting the reduction of autonomy of medical councils 
- Opposing the application of criminal codes to cases of medical negligence 
- Opposing aspects of Clinical Establishment Acts for the regulation of standards of 
medical establishments, in various states 
Box 7.3 Medical Associations' Ongoing Campaigns to Protect Members' Interests 
The IMA has also traditionally opposed the inclusion of medical services under the Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA), however this stance has softened in recent years, said the respondent, on 
the basis ofa low incidence of Consumer Forum rulings against doctors. 
I think CPA has made us more careful and wiser. Initially we thought 
that it was not a good thing. But now we realize that it is OK ... the rate 
of rulings against doctors is very low. 
Senior official, medical association (69) 
It appeared that the IMA decision-makers' logic in opposing any efforts which would lead to 
greater control or regulation of medical practices in the private sector, was based around a 
populist agenda. The officer took great pride in the IMA's demographic strength and at one point 
drew parallels with their grassroots organizational presence, and that of India's two leading 
political parties: 'They say that there are three offices to be found in every district - Congress 
Committees402, RSS403, and IMA.,404 
Relationships with other groups 
The IMA's only active relationship was with the Clinton Foundation, to organize a sensitization 
programme on HN I AIDS for private practitioners. Other than this, the official repeatedly 
emphasized the autonomous status of the IMA, and iterated that they had no official relationships 
with any arms of Government or medical councils. 
402 Local wings of the National Congress Party 
403 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangb - volunteer organization with political links to the national Bharatiya 
Janata Party 
404 Respondent 69: Senior official, medical association 
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Summary: Professional association 
The IMA had a limited role in the implementation of HN testing policies, which was linked 
to participation in sensitization programmes. The officer indicated that the Association had 
little inclination to act to ensure that government policies were followed. 
Furthermore, the IMA appeared to be involved in specifically resisting attempts to increase 
regulatory control over the actions of private sector doctors. 
In doing so they almost had the mindset of a political party, following a populist agenda in 
protecting the interests of their members (mainly private practitioners). 
7.10 VIEWS OF ACCREDITATION OFFICIALS 
Official representatives of national level accreditation agencies for hospitals and for diagnostic 
laboratories were interviewed. 
7.10.1 Official: hospital accreditation agency 
According to its official web-page, the hospital accreditation agency was 'an autonomous body 
supported by industry' under the auspices of a department of the central Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (QCI 2008). The board was constituted of representatives ofa variety of stakeholder 
groups including consumer bodies, industrialists, insurance regulators, educational institutions, 
government scientific departments and hospital administrators. 
According to the official interviewed the aim of the organization was to 'improve the overall 
quality of the health sector', and he stressed that following proper management procedures was a 
basic criterion for hospitals to receive accreditation.405 Accreditation was voluntary and available 
to both private and government hospitals. Accreditation followed a stepwise process with an 
initial self assessment by the hospital, followed by a preliminary assessment by the accreditation 
team, and finally a full-fledged assessment. Continued compliance was assessed through periodic 
monitoring visits. 
40S Respondent 59: Senior official, accreditation agency 
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At the time of the interview, the agency was in nascence, and very few hospitals had yet 
undergone accreditation. The organization was attempting to gain acceptability among hospitals, 
and also establishing its position in the existing governmental machinery. This involved 
coordination with other ministries to avoid duplication of tasks: 'We are trying to talk to the 
ministries, that if their hospitals are accredited by us, then they don't need to go for inspections 
and visits'. 
In summary, 
The role of this agency was yet untested. The role in implementation of testing policies 
would be limited to the hospitals which chose to seek voluntary accreditation. 
As a new organization in a complex policy environment, the agency had to negotiate their 
position and define their role, in the context of tasks undertaken by other organizations. 
7.10.2 Official: laboratory accreditation agency 
Role in policy implementation 
The laboratory accreditation agency was similarly autonomous, but nominally attached to the 
central Ministry of Science and Technology. It dealt with accreditation for a range of different 
types of scientific laboratories of which medical laboratories were one type. Hence the focus of 
their attention was clearly on the technical quality of tests conducted, and not as such on human 
interactions and procedures. However, the official interviewed said that compliance to 'national 
laws and regulations', including NACO's policies around HIV testing was one of the 
requirements from medical laboratories, in order to receive accreditation. 
We have stated very clearly that all labs doing HIV testing will have to 
comply with NACO guidelines ... Whatever we can do in implementing 
necessary guidelines, we do ... We are insisting that any lab which has 
walk-in clients have to provide pre and post-test counselling, even if that 
sort of thing is not our main area of work. 
Senior official, accreditation agency (61) 
Accreditation for laboratories was entirely voluntary, and available at a cost to the laboratory. 
The accreditation process involved initial inspection and certification followed by continuous 
supervision. This agency was much older than the hospital accreditation agency, and a number of 
medical laboratories had received certification from them throughout the country. However the 
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official interviewed stressed that coverage was very inadequate, in the context of the vast number 
of medical laboratories in the country. 
You will find only 65 accredited medical labs. To put this in prospective, 
I understand that there are over 3000 pathology labs in Delhi alone. So 
our accreditation has not even scratched the surface of testing 
laboratories in India. I always say, it is not one agency who can tackle 
this load. We are the only national accreditation body for labs. Our core 
staff is quite small and we have part time inspectors and officers. 
Senior official, accreditation agency (61) 
Relationships with other groups 
From the respondent's accounts, it appeared that accreditation agency functioned in an uncertain 
policy terrain. The organization seemed to continually struggle to define their broader role, their 
identity and even the legitimacy of their work. Some examples of these struggles are presented in 
Table 7.4. 
Dealing with multiple authorities 'We are dealing with 26 states, and more Union Territories and each is 
going to have its own authority, its own setup ... we are not dealing with 
one central authority, well-defined authority. Because of the number of 
players, each with their own rules ... When it comes to accreditation of 
medical labs, the picture is very complex.· 
Defining legal basis for work "In the state of Deihl, there Is no licensing mechanism for medicai labs. 
There is a bill, but it has not yet been passed. In Maharashtra, registration 
of the pathology labs comes under the Shop Act. So it is so undefined ... 
We had to ask lawyers what we should accept as a proof of legal identity." 
Defending "non-profit" identity "Once we started charging labs, we had to fight with the Revenue 
department; they wanted us to pay service tax. We convinced them that 
accreditation is like an educational service - it gives you a degree. It's 
recognition like universities give. So you don't charge universities service 
tax, so don't charge us either." 
Table 7.4 The Accreditation Agency's Struggles to Define their Role406 
In this uncertain and shifting environment, the official stressed on the importance of learning and 
adaptability. 
We are educating ourselves, because we don't want to walk into grey 
areas where it becomes difficult for us to defend ourselves ... We are 
learning all the time and evolving with the changes. 
Senior official, accreditation agency (61) 
406 Respondent 61: Senior official, accreditation agency 
229 
CHAPTER 7. OTHER POLICY ACTORS: ROLES AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
Summary: Laboratory accreditation official 
The accreditation body was promoted by various government bureaus as an alternative to 
conventional regulatory systems which were widely seen to be failing. They had a limited 
role in implementing HIV testing policies, since they were confined to the small numbers of 
laboratories who sought voluntary accreditation. Within this small cohort however, they were 
active in ensuring that NACO policies were followed. 
The agency had its origins in a non-health ministry, of Science and Technology, and was not 
primarily involved in serving the health sector. The health-related functions were 
complicated by presence of multiple health authorities in each state with different rules and 
regulations.407 
The policy environment was complex and uncertain for the agency. There was a lack of 
clarity around their official functions and even the legal status of their work was open to 
challenge. In this context, organizational status and growth (and possibly even survival) 
appeared to be linked to their ability to adapt to prevailing demands and requirements of 
different government departments. 
407 Since Health is a State subject in the federal constitutional structure. 
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Chapter 8. Unifying Themes 
This chapter synthesizes analytical themes arising from respondents' accounts in the previous 
three chapters. Section 8.1 focuses on understanding doctors' actions in the context of 
implementing HIV testing policies, including their decision-making processes and reasons and 
contexts for their actions. Section 8.2 examines why other groups of actors diverge from their 
expected roles in policy implementation. The third and fourth sections analyse the nature of 
interactions between groups of actors, respectively focusing on functional and ideational 
interactions. The final section is a summary of the key fmdings of the study. 
8.1 UNDERSTANDING PRACTITIONERS' ACTIONS 
To start with, the spectrum of medical practitioners' actions in implementing the policies. and 
their internal processes of taking decisions around action are described (Vickers 1965), from their 
accounts. It is apparent that practitioners' actions in the context of implementing HIV testing 
policies span the full range of possible responses to recommended national policy guidelines, i.e. 
compliance, partial divergence, or total contravention. Reasons and contexts for practitioners' 
divergent actions can be classified broadly on the basis of 1) conflicting perceptions of their roles 
or rationales of practice (Hjern and Porter 1981), 2) their divergent values and goals, and 3) their 
judgements of situational realities and constraints (Vickers 1965),408 and are elaborated as such in 
the following sections. 
8.1.1 Action decisions 
The range of medical practitioners' behaviour in implementing the policies. and their internal 
processes in taking decisions around action are described. 
408 See Chapter 3 (3.2.2) for Vickers' model of decision-making in policy 
231 
CHAPTER 8. UNIFYING THEMES 
Compliance 
In many instances medical practitioners did comply with national testing policies. Some 
practitioners indicated that they broadly shared the values of the HIVIAIDS programme, and 
hence were led to follow the policies. The practitioners who emphasised shared values were 
typically individuals who had had exposure to training on HIV I AIDS or otherwise regarded 
themselves as HIV specialists. Belief in certain values such as non-coercion, general informed 
consent and patient confidentiality, part of a larger medical professional identity, were cited 
widely by different doctors, including non-HIV specialists. 
Working in government hospitals led medical practitioners to follow government procedures, and 
obedience to this organizational rationale was often put forward as an explanation of compliance. 
In many instances compliance happened by default, since informed consent procedures were 
institutionalized in most of the larger hospitals. In several instances, doctors complied with 
policies in spite of their explicitly stated disagreements with, or non-comprehension of the 
rationales or values on which HIV testing policies were founded. Typically this was a response to 
pressures from the hospital authorities to comply with policy recommendations. In these cases 
the aim was usually to assure necessary paperwork, without an integral engagement with the 
principles of the procedure. 
We have always taken informed consent. How much infonnation the 
clients have understood is a separate issue. How do we validate or verify 
that? Humne to bata diya [We did what was required]. Now how much 
they have ingested, understood, we can't say that, we can't guarantee 
that. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (24) 
This theme was particularly evident around the practice of specific written infonned consent for a 
HIV test. Written informed consent for a HIV test was seen as an inadequate signifier of the 
quality of the interaction. Patients could easily be coerced or pressured into signing consent, they 
felt, which made the process liable for misuse by providers to safeguard their own position. 
Doctors were widely unconvinced or unclear about the rationale of the process, yet often adhered 
to the formalities of the procedure. 
In some instances, doctors recognized the utility of written informed consent as a legal safeguard. 
As a HIV specialist said: 'there have been suicides after HIV diagnosis, and without specific 
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informed consent, the onus is yours. So why do that?'.409 Hence doctors may have chosen to take 
informed consent on the basis of protecting their own interests. 
Flexibility 
In most instances, medical practitioners' actions actually approximated a point between total 
compliance and total contravention of policies. For instance, practitioners sometimes treated the 
consent procedure as one of inducing the patient to take the test, or otherwise gave it less 
importance than is recommended. Others adopted a strong, even coercive approach to persuading 
patients into signing consent, in an effort to expedite the care process. 
In the context of the likelihood of patient's dropping out, physicians reported that they tested 
some of their patients without undertaking a formal consent procedure: 'If a patient is too anxious, 
we can maybe just do a HIV and see what happens. ,410 A subjective assessment of the patient 
guided these decisions and the respondent stressed the importance of discretion in this regard. 
Numerous respondents indicated the importance of provider discretion, given that different 
patients had vastly differing needs and expectations. Judgments around involving patients' 
families and spouses in caring for them were felt to be particularly important. Discretion also 
determined doctors' decisions around involving patients' families and spouses, and their 
interpretation of which health care staff were adequately closely involved in patient care to be 
allowed to access their HIV test results. 
Frequently policy violations were not the result of active decisions taken by doctors. Other 
patients in the consulting room often listened in on consultations, something doctors ascribed to 
culture as much as to overcrowding. Patients' relatives were often closely involved in care, and 
no steps were taken to prevent their knowledge of patients' HIV status. Co-workers' grapevines 
allowed them to have prior information about HIV status of patients when reports were released. 
A venereologist reported instances of breaches of confidentiality by nursing staff, and in another 
instance that patients listened into another patient's consultations. Some efforts were made to 
redress these problems, but at the same time reflexively, concessions or adjustments were made to 
the situation, in the interests of harmony, productivity and the continuation of the core activities 
of the organization. When faced with conflict, practitioners adjusted their behaviour by 
reorienting their positions vis-a-vis various involved actors - administrators, co-workers and 
409 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
410 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
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patients. These pragmatic adjustments were usually immediate and reflexive responses to specific 
situations, and seldom the result of a deliberative process. 
Varying considerations of patients, co-workers, and authorities, and situational constraints of time 
and resources represented the reality environment for doctors. In this context, neither strict 
adherence to policies nor to personally held values was always possible, and adaptability was 
often regarded as a necessity, even a virtue. For a large part, these actions of medical 
practitioners corresponded with Lipsky's construct of the street-level bureaucrat, well-meaning 
and seeking to reconcile service ideals411 with circumstantial constraints (Lipsky 1980). The 
practitioners sought to extract some value from the interaction even if they were not able to 
entirely comply with policies. Circumstantial uncertainties may have influenced practitioners' 
perspectives of the significance or the meaning of policies. Said a government hospital 
gynaecologist: 'because we know that we are not able to maintain confidentiality, so we take it 
loosely ... ,412 Particularly in government hospitals following confidentiality policies was an ideal, 
not necessarily a regular practice: 'these are ideals which have to be attained, not necessarily to be 
achieved', said one government microbiologist.413 
Outright contravention 
Policies for infonned consent and confidentiality were violated in some instances. However, pre-
surgical HIV testing was the commonest example of outright contravention of policies by doctors. 
The perception of risk around acquiring HIV infection from surgical patients was the core 
consideration which led doctors to consciously contravene national and (in the case of 
government hospitals) organizational policies. Other reality and value considerations were 
involved in deciding to do mandatory testing.414 In the context of pressure from hospital 
authorities, government surgeons could not use the formal hospital channels to conduct 
mandatory tests, and instead resorted to subversive means such as sending their patients to nearby 
private laboratories to be tested, or by conspiring with hospital microbiologists to perfonn the 
411 However it is to be noted that medical practitioners' own service ideals, predicated more on the lines of 
an organizational rationale, did not always correspond with programme rationales on which the policies 
were founded, as discussed earlier. 
412 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
413 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
414 The "appreciative" mix involved in conducting mandatory tests included reality judgments around the 
inadequacy of protective equipment, demands of co-workers, and the compliant nature of patients; 
combined with values around co-workers rights and the economy of the testing procedure compared to 
purchasing expensive protective equipment. In some instances it was linked to a rationale of scientific 
thoroughness and professionalism. 
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tests unofficially. Hence there was an "underground" aura around pre-surgical testing in 
government hospitals. As noted before, the general secrecy around pre-surgical testing did not act 
in favour of good follow up and care, if a patient was found to be HIV positive.415 
8.1.2 Role and rationale conflicts 
Ambivalences in roles and rationales for action were a common context for providers' divergent 
actions. 
A mix of roles 
Primarily, most doctors perceived themselves in the role of providers of clinical services. In 
many instances, their conceptualization of the healers' roles was focused on the goal of the patient 
leaving the hospital in a well state, and not on further ramifications and repercussions around the 
spread of the disease or of psycho-social considerations of a stigmatised disease such as HIV.416 
In the case of surgeons their role perceptions were even more narrowly focused on the specific 
task of completing the surgical act successfully.4t7 The clinician's role was linked closely to 
workplace expectations and cultures, which in turn were oriented toward a similar definition of 
care provision restricted to hospital boundaries. Hence doctors' identities were shaped by their 
organizational roles as much as by membership of the medical profession. 
In government hospitals, doctors more specifically linked their status of employment as 
government servants to their performance of roles. A perception of a public health rationale was 
also projected by some practitioners as being motivational for them. Some doctor repeatedly 
stressed on the importance of detecting as many cases as possible. Government hospitals' 
traditional roles as surveillance centres may have influenced doctors to order HIV tests 
indiscriminately, even though contemporary policies required greater selectivity on their part.418 
The clinical instinct to diagnose patients, especially those belonging to a scientifically 
"interesting" category such as HIV / AIDS may also have led to a greater propensity for advising 
415 In one charitable hospitals and the private hospital, however, the decision to undertake mandatory testing 
was not discretionary. Institutional authorities had regularised pre-surgical testing and as part of the same 
policy had assured continued care for patients diagnosed with HIV. See Chapter 5 (5.3.8). 
416 S ee Chapter 5 (5.2.4 and 5.4.5) 
417 See Chapter 5 (5.3.4 Primacy of the surgical act) 
418 See Chapter 5 (5.2.6) 
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HIV tests.419 Hence doctors' role identities as scientists also influenced their behaviour in 
implementing testing policies. A few doctors among the selection regarded themselves as HIV 
specialists. They perceived that they were more emancipated than other doctors, especially 
around their recognition of PLHA' s non-clinical needs and ethical requirements such as consent 
and confidentiality. This segment of doctors avowedly subscribed to the human rights rationales 
and principles that corresponded with national HIV testing policies. 
Reconciling organizational and programme rationales 
One doctor from a government hospital remarked, '[In the hospital] HIV does not have more 
importance than others [diseases] ... only as a part of the government programme.'420 The most 
apparent dilemma for doctors in implementing HIV testing policies was in reconciling the 
organizational (Le. hospital) rationale421 and the HIV/AIDS 'programme rationale' (Hjem and 
Porter 1981). The hospitals' role as an organization in its broader environment was to ensure the 
provision of care, strongly determined by concerns such as efficiency in ensuring patient wellness 
and turnover of patients, whereas the HIV I AIDS programme mainly required doctors to be 
cognizant of human rights principles through the enactment of specific procedures. As translated 
into guidance for action on the ground, these two rationales variously converged and diverged. 
8.1.3 Practice values and goals 
Practitioners' values, beliefs and goal orientations often differed from recommended policies, and 
led them to take divergent courses of action. 
Quality values 
Doctors' emphasis on clinical outcomes and cure represented the value placed on expediting 
clinical tasks with efficiency and (in government hospitals) economy. The first of these tasks was 
diagnosis and in this context, procedures such as consent for a HIV test were sometimes seen as 
unwelcome obstacles. The impulse to diagnose a patient was also indicative of the high valuation 
419 See Chapter 5 (5.2.4) 
420 Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
421 The organizational rationale, according to Hjem and Porter (1981), is a synthesis of the values and goals 
of its constituent programmes (of which the HIV programme would be one) and the niche of the 
organization in its environment. 
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of the scientific challenge of the clinical procedure. Doctors fresh from training in HIV / AIDS 
care appeared to particularly cherish this aspect of their learning experiences. Different 
diagnostic tests were ordered to maximise knowledge about a patients' condition, to create a 
mental picture of the patient's condition: 'knowing where we stand' in order to be able to 'take all 
the measures' for further management.422•423 In some instances, the inclination to investigate may 
have overridden concerns such as specificity in testing, and the autonomy of the patient in 
choosing to be tested. 
In some instances pre-surgical testing was regarded as an essential part of a thorough clinical 
work-up for patients. It was advocated in private hospitals as part of a package of infection 
control interventions, and was seen as a signifier of quality in the workplace, and linked to 
professional values around hygiene and safety.424 
Equity values 
In managing patients in hospitals, doctors appeared to follow unwritten rules of equitable 
allocation of time and resources among patients. Prioritisation was done on the basis of the 
seriousness of patients' condition and the capabilities of the doctors and the resources to remedy 
it. One gynaecologist described the struggle to ensure good care for a large number of patients as 
'the permanent dilemma between quantity and quality' .42S In general hospitals with patients with 
a wide range of serious illnesses, the needs of patients with HIV / AIDS were often not the most 
imminent, and non-clinical and extra-clinical arguments in favour of HIV "exceptionalism" 
(specific consent, counselling etc.) did not have significant evocation for medical 
practitioners,426.427 and many would have preferred to 'treat it like any other disease,.428 
Beneficence I paternalism 
Doctors generally approached problems from the position of belief in the innate beneficence of 
medical interventions, including diagnostic interventions. As one venereologist remarked. 'the 
422 Respondent 34: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
423 Respondent 39: Microbiologist, 13 years experience, Private hospital 
424 See Chapter 5 (5.3.3 Pre-surgical testing and professional values) 
42S Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
426 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
427 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
428 See Chapter 5 (5.4.4) on HIV exceptionalism 
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smallest possible effort in India can help a person'. 429 This belief is an important argument for 
doing more mv tests, especially in the modem context of availability of HAART. The notion of 
informed consent for a mv test, which is based around the possibility of a maleficent act 
(discrimination or stigmatization) on the part of the doctors, challenged this core belief, an many 
doctors had problems in comprehending this rationale. Asking for consent from a patient for an 
essential good service provided to them presented as a contradiction in terms. A related theme is 
that doctors saw diagnosis as a duty toward patients, and part of their embedded functions within 
healing institutions. In government hospitals, this was underlined by the awareness of the 
difficulties that poor patients underwent in accessing the free care that was available, and the 
conception of the duty to ensure good clinical outcomes. 
Relationships between patients and medical practitioners were often fundamentally asymmetric, 
and patients frequently asked doctors to make their decisions for them. While this may have been 
contrary to the reciprocal logic of informed consent procedures which required patients and 
doctors to both be autonomous and mutually aware of their rights, it was seen by a number of 
doctors as a sign of essential trust, and valued greatly by them. Typifying the views of many 
respondents, one surgeon from a private hospital remarked: 'I think you have to be paternal in 
your attitude to patients ... ,430 It is debatable whether the value ascribed by doctors to paternalism 
is a reality judgement (appreciation of social inequities, patients' rejection of autonomy) or a 
value judgement (valuing role of specialized knowledge, valuing dominance). Plausibly, it was a 
manifestation of doctors recognition of the positive social role of specialized knowledge ('he has 
come to you for help,431) in a society with strong asymmetries of knowledge ('many a time the 
patient's general intellect is not enough,432).433 A number of respondents remarked on the 
personal validation perceived from being responsible for clients' well-being. 
They all say, well doctor if it is your child what will you do? What ever 
you would do for your child do the same we leave it to you. So there is a 
different relationship. That's one of the great things of working here [in 
India]. 
Senior surgeon, private hospital (25) 
In the words of a physician from a government hospital: 'tomorrow my client and his well-being 
depends on me and it is a great feeling,.434 He expressed regret that many doctors utilized this 
429 Respondent 14: Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
430 Respondent 25: Senior surgeon, private hospital 
43( Respondent 33: Senior physician, government hospital 
432 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
433 This is an example of overlaps between reality and value judgements that were often apparent. 
434 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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privileged position for self-aggrandizement. Beyond the egoistic gratification gained from the 
dominance of the paternalist position, there appeared to be a more complex value orientation. 
Patients' attitudes allowed doctors to serve unilaterally, to effect cure and relief to the suffering 
without contestation of the essential benevolence of their actions, and unadulterated by the doubt 
and confusions that underlie a reciprocal relationship. This privileged and possibly illusory 
position of unconditional giving was highly prized by them. 
Rights of medical practitioners 
Lastly, a key value consideration upheld by doctors was that of teamwork and solidarity between 
co-workers. The rights of all health workers to optimal protection from infection were invoked 
in defence of practices of mandatory testing. Fairness in allowing all health workers access to 
patients' HIV status was a consideration which contradicted confidentiality policies. 
8.1.4 Judgements of 'reality' 
Practitioners' assessments of situational factors and constraints or "reality judgements" (Vickers 
1965), including shortages of time and resources and relationships with different workplace 
actors, emerged as important contexts of divergent practices. 
Resource lack and deprivation 
An important "reality" for doctors was the risk of infection by a HIV positive person through the 
medium of needle stick injuries or in the course of surgical procedures. Although the likelihood 
of their being infected in scientific terms was very low, the fear of infection was considerable 
among most doctors, and particularly surgeons, and motivated indiscriminate HIV testing by 
doctors, especially pre-operatively by surgeons. The perception that routine protective equipment 
available to prevent cross-infection was inadequate also led surgeons to pre-emptively test their 
patients for HIV. In some hospitals, there were actual shortages of gloves and protective 
equipment. However, in other instances, administrators claimed that protective facilities were 
adequate, and further that surgeons were widely misguided in assuming that advanced protective 
equipment was required to protect themselves, whereas in actuality simple practical measures 
could be taken to prevent infection. They (administrators) described this as a symptom of a sense 
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of deprivation that prevailed among doctors, comparing their conditions against an imagined ideal 
of standards of facilities in Western countries. 
Apart from a shortage of resources, doctors described their constraints in terms of lack of time and 
manpower and of excess of patients. For instance the idea of strict confidentiality in a crowded 
consulting room with large volumes of patients and limited hours was described as 'completely 
impractical', by one gynaecologist in a government hospital.43S In other instances, shortages of 
counselling staff were reported to limit the number of patients who could be offered tests.436 
Given a low staff to patient ratio, relatives of patients were usually co-opted to perform various 
basic tasks of care provision, in the context of which confidentiality of patients' HIV status was 
highly improbable. In this environment of constraints and contingencies, a gynaecologist 
underlined the vulnerability of doctors to appraisal against unreachable standards: 'first these 
unrealistic polices are made, then you will criticize the doctors that they are not measuring up to 
the standards they are supposed to be following. ,437 
Relationships with patients 
Patients' actions and attitudes were key reality considerations for doctors. The attitudes of 
patients in government and private hospitals were widely reported to be inconsistent with 
autonomous decision-making. There were reports of patients not appreciating the consent 
procedure, and deep-rooted problems of comprehension of the information imparted around HIV 
testing, particularly in the case of poor, illiterate patients attending government hospitals.438 
Reportedly patients often approached the clinical encounter trusting the doctor to make the best 
decisions for them, and hence asking for written consent represented a rejection of that 
expectation.439 
Further, patients' expectations were said to be usually oriented around receiving care for their 
complaints. In this context, formal procedures for consent and counselling were seen as time 
consuming diversions, especially when they required going to a separate room or department. In 
government hospitals there were fears that patients would abscond when asked to consent and be 
counselled prior to a HIV test. In the private sector, often, introducing procedures such as specific 
consent and counselling around the HIV test was seen to be potentially offensive to patients, and 
435 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
436 Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
437 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
438 See Chapter 5 ( 5.4.6) for details on practitioners' problems in conveying information to patients. 
439 S h ' ee C apter 5 (5.4.7) 
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hence antithetical to the aim of retaining patient custom. Retaining patients' custom was a key 
consideration of doctors in both private and public sectors. 
Relationships with co-workers 
In some instances, staff who worked in operation theatres with surgeons clearly expressed their 
objections to participating in surgery on HIV positive patients. Supporting staff are vitally 
important in the successful undertaking of surgical procedures, and their perspectives were given 
considerable importance by surgeons.440 
Concerns around the risk of HIV infection through needle-stick injuries for nurses, paramedical 
staff and hygiene workers were voiced by doctors in all sectors of hospitals. Health workers 
widely felt that they needed to know which patients were HIV positive, and resorted to infonnal 
'grapevines' and devices such as labelling of case files or beds. Such practices were widely 
tolerated by doctors with a sympathetic perspective of the needs of their co-workers. 
8.1.5 Understanding practitioners' actions: summary 
Policies were typically "taken loosely" or flexibly by doctors, who followed logics of discretion, 
maintenance of harmony and adaptation to the needs of situations and of other stakeholders, 
addressing value considerations where possible. Outright contravention was seen in some 
instances, particularly in the context of pre-surgical HIV screening, and was marked by a sense of 
secrecy. In a number of instances doctors did comply with policies, motivated by shared values 
with the HIV / AIDS programme, or by a sense of obedience to institutional or governmental 
norms. In some instances, practitioners complied with policies in spite of not comprehending, or 
disagreeing with the principles on which they were based. 
A mix of role perceptions, value orientations and pragmatic 'reality' considerations which 
conflicted with compliance to the policies underlay practitioners' divergent practices (see Figure 
8.1). Themes around reality judgements and value orientations often resonated similarly among 
public, charitable and private sector doctors. 
440 See Chapter 5 (5.3.5) 
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Role I rationale 
ambivalences 
Reality 
judgements 
conflicting with 
compliance to 
polley 
Value 
orientations 
conflicting with 
compliance to 
polley 
Conflict between roles: 
- Clinical service provider 
- Scientist 
- Government servant (G) 
- Public health worker 
Conflict between organizational rationale 
and programme rationale 
Risk of infection 
Context of lack and deprivation (G, C) 
Patient actions and attitudes 
Co-worker needs 
Clinical efficiency 
Economy (G, C) 
Scientific challenge of diagnosis 
Equitable treatment of patients in the 
hospital (G, C) 
Professional thoroughness (pre-surgical 
screening) (P) 
Essential beneficence of medical 
encounter 
Duty to diagnose (G, C) 
Trust and paternalism 
Rights of medical providers 
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Action Judgements 
Flexibility I discretion 
Contravention 
Superflclal compliance 
Figure 8.1 Explaining Medical Practitioners' Divergent Actions441 
8.2 UNDERSTANDING ROLES OF OTHER ACTORS 
Like medical practitioners, the actions of many other actors too diverged from their expected roles 
in policy implementation processes (see detailed accounts in Chapter 7). Analytical themes 
derived from the accounts of these other actors (administrators, regulators, private sector actors, 
international actors and independent groups) of their actions in the context of policy 
implementation and their explanations for these actions, are presented in this section. Like with 
medical practitioners, their explanations can broadly be understood in tenns of role perceptions, 
reality judgements and value judgements (Hjem and Porter 1981 Vickers 1965) 
441 (G) refers to government hospital practitioners, (C) to charitable hospital practitioners and (P) to private 
hospital practitioners 
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8.2.1 HIV/AIDS programme and public functionaries: a double role 
For a number of public servants, including institutional functionaries in government hospitals, 
HIV I AIDS programme officials, and the State Medical Council officer, there appeared to be 
significant discrepancies between their expected and actual roles in implementing policies. 
Typically, in practice, public servants relatively neglected their tasks towards ensuring the 
implementation of policies. Programme officials disavowed their regulatory functions, instead 
focusing on supportive interventions and institution-building activities. Hospital functionaries 
typically did not enforce policies among hospital staff. Medical councils adopted a passive role in 
enforcing disciplinary standards, tending to focus on continued education and efforts to protect 
the interests of medical professionals. Government general health departments are occupied with 
the management of broader structural and financial issues, and do not concern themselves with 
regulating medical providers' behaviour. 
However, in official terms, symbolic acts signifying the completion of regulatory tasks were often 
adhered to. Public officers often concentrated their energies on the fulfilment of formal and 
documentary tasks, rather than on their actual roles in ensuring policies were implemented. 
Resultantly they tended to assume different public and private visages around their roles in 
implementation. For example, hospital functionaries maintained a fa~ade of compliance with 
policies, by engaging in complicated acts of subterfuge and complicity with colleagues and 
supervisors from the HIV/AIDS programme, to ensure that infringements of policy did not reflect 
in official documentation or in inspectors' reports.442t.443 
Public functionaries also experienced ambivalence around core roles and rationales for action. 
Hospital functionaries were often conflicted between organizational and HIV/AIDS programme 
rationales (Hjern and Porter 1981), programme officers' identities were divided between a 
entrepreneurial rationale of programme expansion involving extension of support to medical 
providers (preferred by them) and a policing rationale towards ensuring the quality of 
implementation. In the case of the Medical Council, it is likely that medical interest groups had 
so dominated its functioning that the functionary's perception of core roles was subverted toward 
protecting doctors and presumptions of the sanctity of the medical profession, rather than 
regulating their behaviour. Evidently, most of these Government functionaries perceived more 
442 See Chapter 7 (7.2.1) 
443 The functionaries did not appear to be conscious of the separation of actual tasks and documentation 
formalities, until it was pointed out to them. One government hospital Department Head, in response to my 
queries around compliance to policies, said: "what you are making us accept is that there is a policy and we 
are not following it - that is difficult for us to do" (24). 
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meaning in efforts to expand the scope of their activities and support frontline medical providers, 
than in regulatory tasks. 
Lack of conviction about the appropriateness of the policies was a common theme among 
government officials, even paradoxically among HIV/AIDS programme officials444, who were 
ostensibly owners and promulgators of the policies. This was representative of an essential 
dichotomy between their beliefs and their official behaviour, analogous to what was observed 
among medical practitioners in government hospitals. Frequently also, the functionaries' 
departure from regulatory tasks was explained by their incapacity to perform these tasks, in the 
face of situational constraints. Lack of true authority over the behaviour of medical providers, 
particularly private providers, was a resonant theme among HIV I AIDS programme officials. 
Department Heads and Infection Control officers in government hospitals too perceived a lack of 
acceptance of their regulatory functions, by staff and administrators. 
In summary, varied explanations for divergences from recommended roles emerged from the 
government functionaries' narratives. Like medical practitioners, public functionaries' 
divergences from expected roles can be understood in terms of conflicting role perceptions, reality 
appreciations, and value judgments (See Table 8.1). Public functionaries' actions were 
particularly marked by dichotomies, between actual and publicized behaviour, in the essential 
perception of roles and rationales, and between their feelings and their official actions. 
444 See Chapter 7 (7.4) 
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Heads of Infection Control HIVIAIDS programme State Medical Council 
Department, Officer, Officials Official 
Govemment Govemment 
Hospital Hospital 
Role Pre-eminence Primary role of resource Largely passive 
orientations of role of provider approach to regulatory 
and coordinating Regulatory role perceived role preferences clinical tasks to be incongruent with Reorientation of role 
service development around protecting 
ethos more than policing 
medical practitioners 
Reality Delicate Indifference of Lack of capacity to Dominance of medical 
judgements relationships staff, lack of regulate interest groups in 
conflicting with staff support from Problems in integration of disciplinary committee, with expected administrators non-participation of 
roles HIVIAIDS programme other members 
with general health 
services in hospitals Few instances of 
complaints against 
doctors 
Value Solidarity with Engagement with Preference for 
orientations the medical programme expansion, supportive I 
conflicting practitioners' over regulation educational-type 
with expected concerns Lack of conviction of engagement with roles 
content of pOlicies medical providers 
Preference for 
supportive-type 
engagement with medical 
providers 
Table 8.1 Explaining Public Funcdonaries' Divergent Actions 
8.2.2 Private sector actors 
Administrators of the private hospital valued their autonomy and freedom from government 
interference. However, they were preoccupied with an institution building role. which involved 
developing their scope of activities and improving the public image of the hospital. In this 
context, adopting governmental policies for implementation in their hospitals represented an 
opportunity to further the image of the hospital. In actuality however, these policies may not have 
been implemented rigorously. 
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Private hospital administrators' narratives highlighted a double role in policy 
implementation, similar to that of many govemment functionaries. When faced with 
pressure to adopt national HIV testing policies, these were nominally adopted on paper to 
appease HIV/AIDS programme authorities but were generally not enforced among staff, in 
practice. It is likely that there was a distinct set of policies for ·intemal" use, which 
endorsed the practice of pre-surgical testing. Hence, although private hospital 
administrators are not public Officials, they similarly may have tended to separate public 
and private behaviour, in response to pressure from the state. 
Box 8.1 Private Hospital Administrators' Response to State Polley 
Discussions with the official from the Medical Association revealed the organization's self 
perception as representatives of private medical practitioners, and guardians of their interests. In 
this context, medical associations often actively opposed government's attempts to regulate the 
practices of private practitioners. Hence other than their engagement through educational 
programmes, their role in implementation of national policies may have been largely 
counteractive. 
8.2.3 International actors 
International organizations, although not formally having a role in implementation, appeared to 
play a role of guiding policy decisions and monitoring the implementation of policies by the 
national HIV / AIDS programme. 
UN officials placed a strong emphasis on individual rights and values of personal autonomy, 
which they regarded as universal principles. They also placed considerable importance on 
coherence and conformance in the execution of policies. These value considerations combined 
with their intellectually dominant position over passive HIV/AIDS programme authorities 
contributed to their perceptions of roles as overseers of national policy formulation and 
implementation. 
8.2.4 Independent groups: exploring niches 
NGOs addressing consumer rights, human rights and PLHA rights were actively involved in the 
process of policy implementation. The involvement of these independent agencies in the 
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implementation process was typically voluntary or a result of being commissioned. and they were 
typically motivated by impulses for completing tasks left unfulfilled by overburdened public 
institutions. The goals of these organizations were broadly oriented around public welfare. 
however their respective approaches toward achieving these goals were varied and differed from 
those of public health institutions. NGOs were variously involved in seeking to correct the 
practices of medical providers, or lobbying for legal and policy reforms. Accreditation 
organizations are autonomous bodies which had affiliations to Government ministries. but largely 
operated on independent terms, by advertising their services to hospitals. 
The roles of these autonomous groups in the broader policy environment were often unclear and 
undefined. In order to identify meaningful niches for themselves these organizations had to 
actively engage and negotiate with other stakeholders to define their roles better.445 Their 
relationships with other public and private groups were marked by challenges to their legitimacy 
and status, and also by opportunities for collaboration and learning. 
8.2.S Understanding roles of other actors: summary 
The actual roles of different groups differed widely from those prescribed in their 
constitutions. Government functionaries, including programme officials and hospital 
administrators did not fulfil their prescribed roles in implementing policies. These divergent 
actions were explained on the basis of values such as the preference for developmental 
activities and supportive engagement with medical providers; and on reality judgements such 
as the lack of actual capacity to regulate, particularly in the private sector. 
The roles of private sector actors were complex, and their actions ranged from counteracting 
efforts of government to enable implementation to collaborating with the HIV / AIDS 
programme; depending on how their broader purposes were served. 
International organizations and NODs played 'supporting' roles in monitoring and 
invigilating policy implementation, even as they are not formally mandated to do so. Their 
participation was broadly influenced by value considerations around coherence of policy 
responses to problems, and concerns over human rights, respectively. 
44S These actors accounts are presented in detail in Chapter 7 (7.8 and 7.10) 
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8.3 FUNCTIONAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GROUPS 
Analytical themes from respondents' accounts of their interactions with other groups in the 
context of implementing policies are synthesized here, drawing from the detailed narratives in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
8.3.1 Medical practitioners' interface with authorities 
Hospital authorities 
Medical practitioners' interrelationships with hospital authorities, including department heads and 
institutional administrators are the most proximate link to field level practices, in the 
implementation chain. In government hospitals, hospital and departmental-level administrators 
had a largely passive role in policy implementation. Even as the administrators appeared to have 
some notional authority over hospital functioning, they generally did not exercise tight control 
over the behaviour of their staff (practitioners) in matters such as HIV testing. In this, HODs and 
superintendents were influenced by their delicate relationships with the practitioners.446 In many 
instances they sympathised with the practitioners' viewpoints against national policies, and 
doctors even perceived hospital authorities as being protectors against external criticism for not 
following policies. In an instance where an Infection Control Officer attempted to ensure 
implementation of policies, his authority and efforts were rejected by the doctors. Some doctors 
were openly indifferent to the value of administrative and coordinative tasks. 
Administrative control over policy implementation in the private hospital was also passive and 
notional to a large extent, and there was little ~dence of active enforcement of HIV testing 
policies. In the charitable hospital, there was a stronger influence of institutional mechanisms to 
ensure compliance, as a result of agreements on hospital policy between practitioners and 
administration. However the hospital's policies were not entirely congruent with national 
policies. 
Other regulatory influences 
Doctors, especially those in the private sector, reported feeling threatened by the possibilities of 
litigation on the basis of malpractice, in consumer and civil courts. However this threat 
446 See Figure 7.3 on page 194 
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perception was largely latent, and not reflected in the numbers of doctors who are actually sued. 
Agencies involved in legal advocacy supported this view and felt that HIV testing was not 
typically regarded as an area which would lead patients to take legal action. 
The threat of disciplinary action from medical councils was perceived to be negligible by doctors. 
The accounts of the medical council official too revealed minimal actual attention to disciplinary 
tasks. State health departments appeared to have no role in handling issues of such specificity (as 
the implementation of HIV testing policies by doctors) themselves, nor in actively ensuring that 
hospital administrators ensured implementation. 
8.3.2 Other key interactions 
HIVIAIDS programme officials and government hospital authorities 
The next link in the chain of implementation - the interface between institutional functionaries 
(department heads of government hospitals) and HIV/AIDS programme officials was similarly 
complex. In spite of the presence of a clear regulatory component in their constitutional 
functions, the programme officials rejected this role altogether in its practical application. In 
practice, their relationship with hospital functionaries could be said to be broadly lateral or 
collaborative, rather than vertical. Hospital functionaries in charge of policy implementation 
(typically heads of clinical departments) were employees of government health services and not of 
the SACS, and hence there was little opportunity for the SACS to exercise the hierarchical 
authority which accompanies a relationship of financial dependency.447 Contractual employees of 
the SACS who were placed in hospitals (such as technicians and counsellors) did not have the real 
authority to playa monitoring role on practitioners actions. It was also apparent that enhancing 
the acceptability of the programme was an important goal for the HIV I AIDS programme officials, 
hence their preference for supportive and educational approaches. Furthermore programme 
officials were usually physicians themselves and professed empathy with hospital functionaries. 
Nevertheless, fotmalities of documentation of HIV/AIDS programme activities in hospitals were 
adhered to on a strict basis, and the smokescreen of a supervisory relationship was maintained 
through this process. This conscious or unconscious agreement broadly worked to protect 
hospitals from external criticism, or appraisal by representatives of international agencies, or even 
447 See Figure 7.4 on page 203 
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HIV / AIDS programme-appointed inspectors with "international" credentials, who were not 
expected to have the commensurate insight or sympathy into the functioning of public systems. 
Government and private sector actors 
From the accounts of representatives of regulators and HIV I AIDS programme officials, it was 
apparent that there was a virtual abdication of particular aspects of their duties, particularly 
around engaging with private providers. The official from SACS commented on the difficulties 
of attempting to regulate private providers. On their part, private doctors tended to make a virtue 
of their independence from governmental control, even as they paradoxically voiced resentments 
over the government's lack of support, particularly academic support, and the absence of efforts 
to involve them in public health initiatives (see discussion in section 8.4.3). 
Administrators of private hospitals and officials of medical associations - self-proclaimed 
representatives of the interests of private practitioners - repeatedly emphasised their autonomy 
from any form of government control. Meetings between HIV/AIDS programme officials and 
private hospital administrators were particularly fractious in one instance where the administrators 
resisted the programme's attempts to impose policies. The fallout of these interactions was 
marked by feelings of low mutual esteem and imputations of bad faith. The official of the medical 
association too had a jaundiced view of government's efforts to increase regulatory control over 
medical practice, which he broadly described as ploys of politicians with vested interests. The 
association often assumed pre-emptively oppositional positions to such initiatives of government. 
However private actors were not entirely averse to collaborations with government. Engagement 
with government and with programmes seen to be in the public interest had the value of 
conferring legitimacy on their activities or otherwise contributing to a benevolent public image. 
UN organizations and HIVIAIDS programme authorities 
The UN agencies' role was ostensibly to provide technical support, including inputs in 
determining the content of policies. Their dominance in setting standards for HIV testing was 
largely unquestioned by other stakeholders. In practice UN organizations actual roles appeared to 
extend, from the basis of their intellectual ascendancy, to the more instrumental role of 
monitoring standards in the national HIV I AIDS programme. Inspectors from international 
organizations were influential in identifying and highlighting gaps in the implementation of 
policies at hospital level. 
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HIV I AIDS programme officials appeared to perceive little agency on their own part in 
detennining policies, and simply deferred to UN agencies.448 However they (programme 
officials) may have partially resisted this domination in passive ways by acts of omission and 
subversion. For instance, they were cautious in their uptake of suggestions by UN officials for 
repeated changes in national policies, to keep up with frequent shifts in stances within the UN. 
The programme officials may also have colluded with hospital authorities to cover up breaches of 
policies in hospitals, from UN inspectors. 
8.3.3 Stronger controls over implementation? 
Evidently, even as HN I AIDS programme and hospital authorities exerted a notional control over 
the doctors' actions in regard to policy implementation, the actual ability (and inclinations) of 
these authorities to exert power over doctors in correcting instances of non-compliance was 
limited. However, there were indications that hospital authorities were under increasing pressure 
from different sources to emphasize their role in implementing policies and streamline practices 
of their staff in accordance with national policies. These pressures reportedly came from the 
higher echelons of the HIV I AIDS programme and from international agencies and non-
governmental organizations. 
Increased administrative control over policy implementation represented a tightening of policy 
requirements which doctors had previously 'taken loosely,.449 Doctors' resented the idea of 
greater administrative control on the basis of the injustice of being culpable for something which 
they felt was not within their control. Policies were ideals which they tried to 'measure up' to in 
the face of practical constraints, and a regulatory approach would, it was felt, emphasize the 
deficiencies in their practices rather than their efforts to improve.450.451 
The accordance of legal status to the HIVIAIDS policies - the acme of increased regulatory 
control452 - was perceived as a significant threat. On their part doctors agreed that the enactment 
of the Bill would partially have the effect of streamlining practices in accordance with national 
policy. However they also felt that it would urge many doctors to think foremost ·about their own 
interests, rather than the patient's, and even deter medical providers from undertaking to treat 
HIV/AIDS patients. 'You are promoting defensive medicine', said one physician from a 
448 See Chapter 7 (7.4.l) for HIVIAIDS programme officials' account. 
449 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
450 Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
451 Respondent 29: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
452 As postulated in the HIV/AIDS Bi1l200S - see Box 2.1 
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government hospita1.4s3 Plausibly, the emphasis on policy implementation may have had the 
effect of orienting medical practitioners away from a values-based logic of practice toward a logic 
based on the perpetuation of their interests, i.e. the legal protection gained from written consent 
procedures. Hence, in spite of value conflicts, medical practitioners' may have adjusted their 
practices toward adopting informed consent in the light of possible benefits or safeguards for 
themselves. Lipsky emphasizes that the street-level bureaucrat's (SLB) response to the 
imposition of greater administrative control is often a greater tendency to stereotype, at the 
expense of regard for the needs of patients (Lipsky 1980). Analogous in this study was the 
tendency of medical practitioners to follow the formal aspect of policy without attention to the 
values and meaning of the process, or in other words to separate their actions and their beliefS, 
when faced with pressure from authorities to implement policies. In the case of policies for 
infonned consent, it appeared that the policy symbolized a transactional and autonomy-oriented 
logic to define the patient-provider relationship, in contrast to the beneficence-orientation that 
they valued in their encounters with patients. It is worth noting, as one physician pointed out, that 
even as the doctors' conceptions may have altered, many patients' conceptions may have 
remained oriented around logics of trust and paternalistic asymmetry.454 
Stronger control over implementation of unwanted policies would also lead to more subversive 
practices, according to many respondents. A surgeon pointed out that there were numerous 
practical ways of subverting the law by exploiting asymmetric power equations with patients: 
'We will ask the patient that go and get the investigations done (from outside). I will write it on a 
blank piece of paper. But if you see below, there is no signature. You tell him, get the test done, 
and he will get it done. ,455 Mandatory testing by such subversive means could be said to represent 
a distorted version of the culture of maintenance of harmony already described, in which medical 
practitioners tended to adjust their actions to the demands of different stakeholders to ensure 
uninterrupted functioning of the day-to-day business of the hospital. Since administrators 
represented authority figures, and good relations with co-workers were important for practitioners, 
the weakest or most compliant links in the chain were usually patients. The pressure to comply 
with policies in this instance may have emphaSised rather than corrected this disequilibrium by 
encouraging ''underground'' mandatory testing, with patients more likely to be at the receiving 
end of adverse unaccounted outcomes. 
453 Respondent 30: Senior physician, government hospital 
454 Respondent 65: Physician, 15 years experience, charitable hospital 
4SS Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
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8.3.4 Functional interactions between groups: summary 
Even as the written constitutions of particular groups may have contained rules for their 
involvement in policy implementation, in actuality interactions between groups were shaped 
more by informal relationships - detennined by the actors' value systems, goals and mutual 
power dynamics. For instance, although fa~ades of hierarchical authority was maintained, 
HIV/AIDS programme authorities were reluctant to play an enforcing role with hospital 
authorities, and likewise hospital authorities did not insist that their staff follow policies. 
Governmental regulatory authorities did not feel that they had the capacity to regulate private 
hospitals, and hence tended to be inattentive to the aspects of their duties involving working 
with the private sector. In spite of no formal mandate to implement policies, a widespread 
perception of their intellectual dominance allowed UN agencies to play an influential role in 
monitoring HIV/AIDS programme performance. Hence living relationships and equilibria 
between groups of actors, as much as written rules, influenced whether (and how) policies 
were implemented. 
Efforts to modify "written constitutions" (Hjern and Hull 1982) to emphasise greater control 
over policy implementation, such as the move to introduce laws for HIV I AIDS, do not 
account for the prevailing dynamics of living relationships between different groups, 
according to respondents. Hence even as these measures might increase instances of policies 
being followed "on paper", they may also simultaneously encourage specious behaviour on 
the part of public functionaries and medical practitioners based on assuaging supervisors and 
completing formalities rather than on carrying out core tasks, including (in the case of 
medical practitioners) serving patients. 
8.4 MOVEMENT OF IDEAS 
The interactions and relationships between different groups in the process of instrumentation of 
tasks towards implementing policies have been discussed in the previous section. As important -
although less apparent to an external observer - are ideational processes, such as the conveyance 
of meanings contained within the HIV testing policies and the uptake of alternative ideas. 
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8.4.1 Ideas contained in national policies 
The contents of the national HIV testing policies were developed around ethical considerations 
toward safeguarding the rights of people who undergo testing. Individual rights and autonomy 
are particularly prominent themes underlying policies for specific informed consent and 
confidentiality. Ethical foundations of the different aspects of the policy are discussed in detail in 
Appendix 1. 
Perpetuating policy ideas 
The prominent role of UN organizations in originating and promoting existing HIV testing 
policies was apparent. ill the perception of a UN official, prevailing policies were meant to be 
passed down from actor to actor, originating from themselves and being communicated to and 
adopted by the programme at national level and state level, being enforced by hospital 
functionaries, and being enacted by medical practitioners in hospitals.456 
Nationwide efforts were ongoing to create a programme structure around the ideals contained 
within HIV testing policies, including the institution of hundreds of VCTCs. However, even as 
the HIV / AIDS programme perpetuated the symbols and terminology of the policies (Rein and 
Schon 1993) - slogans such as "consent" , "confidentiality" and "counselling" - the ethos of free 
choice and autonomy envisioned by policymakers was often reported to be deficient in VCTCs 
and hospitals.457 Given programme officials' own problems of comprehension of policies, it is 
likely that there may have been significant gaps in the programme's ability to communicate policy 
ideas to implementers at street-level (see below). 
fustead, civil society organizations may have had a prominent role in sustaining the emphasis on a 
rights-based policy orientation, typified by their roles in initiating legal reforms, and voluntary 
roles in invigilating medical providers' practices. 
Although fonnative medical education had not equipped doctors to address some contemporary 
issues, in-service HIVIAIDS trainz'ng programmes served the important purpose of increasing 
awareness to HIV / AIDS policies. Participation in such programmes did not always engender 
straightforward compliance to policies, but addressed deeper purposes of professional growth and 
fulfilment, and confidence in personal experience and values. Training in Western countries was 
often cited as being useful in endowing doctors with awareness of contemporary concepts. 
456 Respondent 47: Officer in UN technical agency, 7 years in the UN, recently deputed to India 
4S7 Several respondents (12, 15,22) 
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Problems in communicating the ideas 
Problems in communication of policy ideas were experienced at various levels, including the 
highest- between UN officials and NACO. A UN official indicated that it was difficult to 
communicate the concept of "routine offer of testing" to programme officials, and that this was 
widely misunderstood to indicate an endorsement of mandatory testing. 458 
It was apparent that the value considerations underlying specific infonned consent were complex 
and not easily comprehensible to many actors. The rights-oriented rationales on which many HN 
testing policies are based were often not well understood. It was particularly remarkable that 
HN / AIDS programme officials did not appreciate, and downplayed aspects of the national 
policies they were themselves involved in propagating. In one instance a government doctor 
described the inability of programme officials to explain the rationale of their own policies for 
infonned consent. Medical practitioners' problems with appreciating the principles of national 
policies have already been described in detail (see section 8.1.3). 
Frequent shifts and changes in policies at the highest levels may also have prevented ideas from 
penneating to the community and having a sustained impact, according to a PLHA activist.459 
8.4.2 Alternative ideas 
As has been discussed in the previous section, there were frequent conflicts between the 
requirements of HIV testing policies, and doctors' "appreciations" of situations they faced on the 
ground based on value and reality considerations. Some of these alternative ideas or appreciations 
are presented in Box 8.2, below. 
458 Respondent 47: Officer in UN technical agency, 7 years in the UN, recently deputed to India 
459 Respondent 07: Head, PLHA network 
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Value of discretion over standardized approaches, given the differing needs of 
patients 
Importance of justice in managing patients equitably in hospitals, as opposed to 
HIVexceptionalism 
Arguments in favour of pre-surgical HIV screening, given the risks to health 
workers 
Virtues of patemalistic approaches as being closer to many patients' expectations 
Importance of flexibility in interpretation, regarding policies as Ideals (rather than 
norms) in the face of situational constraints. 
Box 8.2 "Alternative" Ideas of Medical Practitioners 
However, these "appreciations" or ideas of doctors were often privately contained and not widely 
communicated to other policy actors with whom they came in contact. In medical practitioners' 
inte~ctions with other groups, these alternative ideas were dominated by the rights- and 
autonomy-based arguments posed by international and civil society actors. Concepts such as 
informed consent and strict confidentiality, which are a part of formal policies, were accorded an 
ideal status, and the "practical ethics" that characterized doctors' own adaptive responses were 
generally seen - by the practitioners themselves and by other actors - as dilutions of these high 
standards. 
Practitioners' lack of discursive skills and confidence 
For medical doctors, ethics was not really a major area of discourse, and medical knowledge for 
them was largely synonymous with technical and scientific knowledge. As a result of this general 
priority for technical aspects of medicine, they lacked the discursive skills (and also the platforms) 
to articulate the ethical themes on which their alternative "appreciations" were based. Linked to 
this linguistic incapability was the lack of confidence to imagine that personal experiences could 
be worthy of valuation, over enshrined universal and Westem-derived principles. 'The general 
interpretation of the personal opinion is that you are doing something irrational', said one 
government physician.460 Furthermore since particular practices such as pre-surgical testing were 
illegal in government hospitals, discussing it with authorities would have amounted to admission 
of an illicit practice. 
460 Respondent 16: Physician and HIV specialist, 8 years experience, government hospital 
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Stasis of ideas 
From all accounts, ideas which arose from the experiences of field-level practitioners were 
usually static and not transmitted beyond limited institutional or professional boundaries. 
Medical practitioners often did not have the confidence to openly pit their own appreciations 
against recommended guidelines. On occasion however, doctors claimed they did attempt to 
communicate these ideas to HIV / AIDS programme officials or to higher echelons. 
Government doctors claimed that to a large extent these efforts were not well received.461 
Conversely, a NACO official pointed out that hospital functionaries were often reluctant to share 
perspectives which were divergent from national policy recommendations, when given the 
opportunity.462 In the charitable hospitals, there was relatively freer discourse around concerns of 
HIV testing within the hospital, i.e. between the medical practitioners and the hospital 
administrators. Contested aspects were freely debated, supported by an internal culture of ethical 
debate; and concessions were made toward the perspectives of doctors. However the exchange of 
ideas was limited to the institutional boundaries, and there was little evidence of discourse with 
government or other groups on these issues. 
In the private hospital and nursing homes, practitioners particularly appeared to experience a 
phenomenon of intellectual isolation, both within and outside their institutional spheres. There 
was little academic engagement with other institutions, public or private, or with civil society 
organizations. Discussions with the HIV / AIDS programme were unsuccessful. There was little 
culture of debate around HIV / AIDS related issues in private hospitals, and the emphasis of 
internal training tended to be very technical. Private physicians who were interested in expanding 
their scope of interest to include HIV care had limited opportunities. 
8.4.3 Platforms for exchange of ideas 
Opportunities for the exchange of knowledge and views between groups of actors and within 
institutional boundaries were often deficient, particularly in the case of private sector actors. 
Within private hospitals academic support was insufficient, and opportunities to pursue scientific 
and professional career interests (other than monetary interests) were rare for doctors in the 
private sector. Larger private hospitals provide few opportunities for academic intercourse for 
their medical staff, and doctors working in smaller private practices and nursing homes were 
461 Respondent 37: Senior physician, HIV specialist and administrator, government hospital 
462 Respondent 55: Senior official, National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) 
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particularly isolated from meaningful peer interactions. Government doctors had relatively more 
opportunities for academic exposure and intercourse. 
CME programmes with a public health focus presented opportunities for the exchange of ideas 
and rationales among practitioners, but were focused mainly on government doctors and only 
sparingly available to private doctors. These were often used as avenues for the promulgation of 
standard policies, but intensive educational programmes also encouraged medical practitioners to 
think independently in deciding appropriate approaches for care. Given the inadequacy of 
conventional medical education in aspects of ethics and interpersonal communication, it is likely 
that such intensive training programmes may have been important platfonns for expression and 
interchange of ideas, and for the development of discursive skills and intellectual confidence, on 
the part of doctors. However, intensive educational programmes were under fmancial pressure, 
given the lack of interest from donor agencies. 
Collaborative projects, such as one initiated by a NGO with the aim of refonning discriminatory 
practices in hospitals, also engendered free exchange and discourse between the NGO workers 
and hospital practitioners, and mutual exposure to each other's "appreciations" or rationales.463 
8.4.4 Movement of ideas: summary 
In addition to functional gaps in enforcing policies, there are also gaps in communicating the 
values and principles contained within policies. The external symbols and tenninologies of 
HN testing policies such as "consent" and "confidentiality" may be used to shape the 
structure of care delivery in hospitals, but the core principles that underlie these symbolic 
expressions are not equally transferred. 
The rationales of individual rights and autonomy that find reflection in the policies were not 
well understood by implementers, including programme officials and medical practitioners. 
Such ideational gaps had an insidious impact on how policies are implemented. Even while 
medical practitioners may have complied with policies, their compliance may have been 
superficial, and not accompanied by integral engagement in the principles that the policies 
were meant to represent. 
463 See accounts ofNGO workers' experiences of interacting with doctors in Chapter 7 (7.8.3) 
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Medical practitioners' own appreciations and solutions (for field-based problems around 
HIV testing, distinct from those reflected in national policies) seldom found expression 
beyond the confines of their immediate peers or hospitals. 
Educational programmes and collaborative projects represented the limited opportunities to 
exchange ideas and engage in discourse available to medical practitioners, and other groups. 
8.5 KEY DIAGNOSTIC FINDINGS: SUMMARY 
Gaps are identified as being located in different parts of the policy-practice continuum. 
Medical practitioners' actions in HN testing widely diverge from policy recommendations. 
Administrators, regulators and HIVIAIDS programme officials do not perform many of their 
putative functions (particularly regulatory functions) in facilitating the implementation of 
public health policies which are assigned to their respective offices. Interactions between 
different groups involved in implementation frequently do not correspond with expected 
norms. 
Diagnostic findings explaining the existence of policy-practice gaps and the contexts in which 
they exist, are as follows: 
Medical practitioners' divergent actions are explained by 1) their divergent values and 
rationales for action, which conflict with those suggested by compliance with the policies; and 
2) the particularities of their inter-relationships with co-workers, administrators and patients, 
and their perceptions of situational constraints. Role ambiguities and varying orientations of 
purpose and values often underlie the divergences of administrators, health programme 
officials and regulators from their expected roles. Actors from international organizations 
and NGOs widely identify with purposes in attempting to perfonn some functions of 
government implementing agencies. 
Medical practitioners and other groups involved in policy implementation inhabit different 
appreciative 'frames' or systems a/meaning, and are guided by different senses o/purpose in 
their actions in the context of implementing policies. A major area of conflict in different 
actors' senses of purpose is between a focus on performance - the accomplishment of core 
tasks and projects, and on conformance - involving the regulation and limitation of activities 
to align with written policy (Barrett and Fudge 1981). The experiences of medical 
259 
CHAPTER 8. UNIFYING THEMES 
practitioners and government functionaries are characterized by continual adjustment and 
adaptation in order to continue perfonning particular core tasks in a context of circumstantial 
and relational uncertainties. Their experiences of implementing HN testing policies are often 
marked by unexpressed contradictions and dichotomies between officially recommended 
behaviours and their own appreciations or beliefs. 
Actual interactions between different groups of actors are different from expected, and often 
not commensurate with a "rational" process of implementation of policies from the top down. 
Living relationships and existing balances of power often do not correspond with the 
enactment of putative roles in policy implementation, in spite of which facades of rational 
implementation are often maintained by the involved actors. The influence of these living 
. relationships on the respective performances of actors' roles is demonstrated. There are also 
significant problems in the communication of ideas and meanings contained within policies 
between the groups of actors, which are a critical factor in their non-implementation. Other 
than the definitions and solutions of field level problems offered by international 
organizations, alternative ideas - notably those of medical practitioners - have limited 
circulation. Strengthening of administrative and regulatory control over implementation of 
the policies potentially increases outward compliance, but may also lead to implicit shifts 
away from belief-motivated to interest-motivated actions and more instances of subversive 
actions by the implementers. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I discuss this study and its findings in the context of other studies relating to 
policy-practice gaps in public health in India, and identify the contributions of the study to a 
broader understanding of the implementation of public health policies in developing countries. I 
then focus on strategic questions outlining approaches and opportunities for different actors to 
contribute in bridging policy-practice gaps. Recommendations to policy-planners are outlined, 
and I conclude with some reflections on future directions in the implementation of public health 
policies. 
9.1 DISCUSSION 
9.1.1 Accounting for differing meanings and perspectives 
The main contribution of this thesis is in understanding health policy implementation in India 
from the "emic" perspectives (Charmaz 2000, Yanow 2000) of the various participant actors. In 
Indian and other developing country contexts, medical practitioners and other health systems 
actors have largely been viewed in tenns of their instrumental roles in the implementation of 
public health policies, and there are very few examples of studies which explore their perspectives 
- particularly their ideational capabilities and purposive natures. Walker and Gilson's study 
(2004) on the perspectives of South African primary care nurses implementing a new set of 
policies elaborates how their interpretations of policies to be implemented are infonned by their 
views and values. Hawkes et a1. (2004) have highlighted the importance of accounting for the 
perspectives of stakeholders, including policy decision-makers, programme managers, service 
providers and recipients of services, in the context of implementing global policies for antenatal 
syphilis control. 
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In this study, Vickers' model of "appreciations", seen to be fonned by a combination of 
judgements around values and realities,464 proved useful in elaborating the complex of meanings 
which actors referred to in making decisions around action. Values-based and practical 
explanations were not always distinct, but sometimes overlapped dialectically in respondents' 
narratives - perceptions of realities often determined what actors ascribed greater value to, and 
conversely values shaped their perceptions of reality.46s Hence the rationalizations or 
explanations for actions that were cited often took the fonn of an appreciation - an amalgam of 
. philosophical and pragmatic considerations. 
Medical practitioners' perspectives 
The value orientations which variously influenced doctors' actions included clinical efficiency, 
scientific challenge, professionalism, equity, sense of duty to treat, and paternalism (see the 
previous chapter: 8.1.2 and Figure 8.1). Practical considerations or 'reality judgements' (Vickers 
1965) included the nature of relationships with co-workers and patients and cognizance of 
problems of resources, time and space, large patient loads and systemic unresponsiveness. These 
considerations combined as appreciations or meanings that doctors functioned by, which differed 
from and sometimes conflicted with the principles contained within the policy guidelines. 
Miljeteig and Norheim (2006) have addressed similar themes in their study of neonatal care in an 
Indian government hospital, reporting that the doctors referred to ethical frames in making 
decisions which differed from accepted Western bio-medical ethical norms.466 Apart from this 
there are no known instances in the literature of the exploration of Indian doctors' systems of 
values and meanings from an emic perspective. 
Doctors' senses of purpose were shaped by a composite of interests in the perfonnance of healing 
functions, in the science of medicine, and in the fulfilment of organizational and social roles.467 
As noted before, doctors tended to focus more on performance of core tasks - mainly clinical 
tasks such as ordering investigations as part of clinical management, and perfonning surgery -
than on conformance with policies (Barrett and Fudge 1981). 
464 See Chapter 3 (Box 3.1) 
465 For instance, cognizance of deep asymmetries of knowledge was linked to the value that practitioners 
ascribed to paternalism; knowledge that patients often 'drop out' when faced with lengthy consent and 
counselling procedures may have led doctors to value patient retention over the importance of taking 
consent. 
466 See Chapter 2 (2.2.1) for more details on Miljeteig and Norheim's observations. 
467 Additionally, issues involving overt self-interests and the protection of self-interests were usually 
discussed by doctors in tenns of invocation of their rights - the rights to safety, and to financial and job 
security. 
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Practitioners from government and charitable hospitals cited a range of motivations for 
performance, identifying with roles as healers and as scientists, and also by a strong recognition 
of their respective hospitals' roles as sources of good quality, affordable health care in a society 
with high levels of poverty. Doctors in private hospitals were somewhat more narrowly focused 
on addressing their individual healing functions, and to some extent in the scientific aspect of HIV 
care, and unlike charitable and government hospital practitioners, did not cite broader social roles 
and developmental concerns as being addressed through their work. The sense of purpose 
exhibited in the accounts of most of the doctors (private and public) contradicts the hypotheses of 
some authors of a generalized moral and ethical disengagement with their work on the part of 
Indian doctors, typically ascribed to overriding commercial concerns (in the private sector) or 
indifference (in case of government practitioners) (Das and Hammer 2004, Baru 2005, Jesani 
1997). 
There is little other writing on the nature of purposive engagement of Indian doctors in their work. 
Bhat and Maheshwari have reported high levels of motivation and good "affective commitment" 
to their profession and organization among government doctors in Chhattisgarh state (2005). 
Among private practitioners, the phenomenon of lesser identification with socio-<ievelopmental 
roles may be understood in the context of their relative isolation, an explanation which was also 
advanced by Jeffery (1988) and Madan (1972, 1980). Many private practitioners, removed from 
meaningful exchanges with peers, with public health systems, and from most substantive 
interactions except with patients, tended to perceive themselves in the narrow role of care 
providers, and less as contributors to social goals (or as "modernizers", a term used by Madan 
(1980». 
Public functionaries' perspectives 
Officials of governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, including some government hospital 
authorities, HIV/AIDS programme officials, and the State Medical Council official all tended to 
favour aspects of their roles which they perceived to be more meaningful. Hospital authorities 
were generally sympathetic with the perspectives of their subordinate staff of doctors, and 
favoured the efficient completion of clinical tasks over onerous responsibilities of enforcing 
policies. HIVIAIDS programme officials preferred to emphasise their roles in expanding their 
projects and facilities, and in training and educating medical providers, rather than in regulating 
practices. This preference was borne partly out of a system of values favouring development and 
growth more than regulation and limitation, and compounded by their lack of conviction about the 
content of the policies; and partly out of pragmatic considerations - the basic lack of capacity to 
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regulate and the difficulties of combining regulatory and emancipatory roles in their interactions 
with practitioners. 
The medical council official who was interviewed revealed a similar inclination for a supportive 
rather than disciplinary approach toward doctors' behaviour. This perspective of the official was 
also reflected in a change in the official constitution of the council to include a new function of 
protecting the rights of doctors. Since quasi-judicial disciplinary functions (requiring a high level 
of neutrality) are central to the existence of the self-regulatory councils, this may represent a 
major subversion of the organization's core regulatory function. Gonsalves (1997) has 
commented similarly on the subversion of the roles of medical councils in India. 
Summarizing, public functionaries who are charged with implementation appeared to find more 
meaning in supportive and developmental activities, than in regulatory functions. Like medical 
practitioners they appeared to value performance and accomplishment - what Barrett and Fudge 
call "getting things done" (1981) - over conformance. The relative neglect of their roles in 
enforcing and regulating standards was also linked to overriding pragmatic considerations such as 
the nature of relationships with practitioners and lack of basic capacity to regulate. The 
perspectives of Indian public health functionaries have largely not been explored in the literature. 
Perspectives of other actors 
Representatives of international technical agencies and donors perceived their own purposes, and 
those of their organizations, as standards-setters and overseers rather than as facilitators of 
processes of implementation. They particularly valued conformance with universal policies, and 
favoured the streamlining of systems to promote such conformance. These perspectives are a 
counterpoint to the performance-oriented inclinations of the government actors involved in 
implementing the policies (see above). Since these international organizations are often 
influential in determining measures of programme success (to which funding support is linked), 
their ways of seeing problems and solutions are critical in determining the tenor of the response of 
local health systems to health problems. Top-down public health policies of international 
organizations focused mainly on health worker conformance and achievement of targets have 
been criticized by several authors (Rennie and Behets 2006, Kippax 2006, Schneider and Stein 
2001, Porter and Ogden 2001), on the grounds that they are often removed from local realities of 
health systems and needs of communities. The roles that international technical and donor 
organizations can play in the context of working with complex local health systems represents an 
important area for further exploration. 
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'Civil society organizations' is probably the most internally diverse of all the groups considered in 
this study, and is made up of several distinct 'communities of meaning' with differing values and 
foci of action (Yanow 2000). Ideologies of individual human rights represented an important 
frame of reference for the NGO workers interviewed, and respondents were variously motivated 
by the need to perform altruistic social functions or to correct perceived inadequacies in 
government health systems. Sharma and Bhatia in 1996 identified key strengths of the voluntary 
health movement in India in terms of its closeness to communities and their needs, and the 
integration of health concerns with other aspects of community development. While such 
'grassroots' themes did reflect in the accounts of some of the civil society actors,468 others were 
focused more exclusively on rights-based ideologies and specific topics such as HN / AIDS, 
possibly representing a narrowing focus of interests, or a greater specialization, among civil 
society actors. On the other hand, the prominent role of NGOs in health policy and legal 
advocacy activity represents the emergence of newer roles and functions of the Indian voluntary 
health sector. 
Administrators of the private hospital which was part of the study were preoccupied mainly by 
goals of growth and development of the hospital, including promoting its reputation as a centre of 
excellence. This interest in image-building influenced them to collaborate with the HIV / AIDS 
programme and implement national HIV testing policies in the hospital. Hence contrary to the 
claims of some authors (Muraleedharan and Nandraj 2003), commercial interests of private 
hospitals may not preclude their engagement in public health, an observation that is also the 
foundation of various voluntary initiatives such as social franchising (Mavalankar 2008, 
Gopalakrishnan 2008), accreditation initiatives (Nandraj et al. 1999) and field-level public-private 
partnerships (Rangan et a1. 2003). 
The beliefs and motivations of the medical association officer who was interviewed were 
essentially political. His perspectives mirrored the official positions of the association, and their 
emphasis on a populist approach to protecting the interests of private practitioners, rather than on 
promoting a greater level of engagement with scientific or public concerns. These empirical 
findings broadly support historical analyses by Maru (1985) and by Jeffery (1988) which have 
reflected on predominantly political, rather than developmental, roles of medical associations 
through Indian history. 
468 See Chapter 7 (7.8.4) 
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Summary 
This study contributes to the empirical knowledge on the ways of meaning (Yanow 2000) and 
differing senses of purpose of different actors in the health policy-practice continuwn in India. An 
important observation is that all the actors revealed their desire for, and pursuit of, meaning in 
their work, even if these pursuits often took them in directions which differed from expected 
norms in the context of policy implementation. 
Porter et a1. (1999) writing on infectious disease policy have emphasised the need for greater 
attention to and reflection on the visions, practices and purposes of public health organizations 
and systems. A better appreciation and understanding of the different ways of meaning and acting 
of all the groups of actors involved in implementation processes (including designated policy-
planners) can help in a critical engagement with their functions and purposes, and contribute to a 
fuller realization of their potential in promoting good health. 
9.1.2 Relational themes in implementation of public health policies 
The thesis also contributes to an understanding of policy implementation in tenns of interactive 
processes between relevant groups of actors. In an international context of developing countries, 
there are a few studies which have explored relational themes between policy actors. Schneider 
and Stein (2001) have looked at implementation of HIV/AIDS policies in post-apartheid South 
Africa, observing breakdowns in cooperation and trust within government and between 
government and civil society actors, and advocating greater cognizance of existing situational 
constraints and possibilities for the involved actors. Gilson and colleagues (2005) have also 
examined relational themes in an empirical study of trust between actors in a South African 
primary care context. They hypothesise that trust in employee - health worker relations may be 
linked to the quality of relationships between health workers and patients. In the Indian context, 
this approach is poorly explored, which is surprising given the multitude of actors who are 
involved in different ways in health policy implementation processes, and the fundamentally 
relational nature of health care activity. 
In this study, doctors in both the private and public sectors were observed to have complex 
relationships with various groups and organizations involved in implementing policies. They 
were generally resistant of administrative and regulatory control over their actions, and 'were 
often able to protect or manipulate their interests in different ways, sometimes entailing 
subversion or disregard of existing policies. These findings correspond broadly with perspectives 
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of Bhat and Maheshwari (2005) and Das Gupta et al. (2003) on the ineffectiveness of mechanisms 
of governance and accountability in the Indian public health sector. However, the same level of 
autonomy and assertiveness of practitioners did not appear to apply in the intellectual dimension 
of interactions. Privately (in the course of the interviews) practitioners expressed numerous 
ethical and practical arguments which contradicted or conflicted with known policies (Box 8.2), 
but they lacked the confidence or conviction to defend or propagate these perspectives in public 
fora. It would not be inaccurate to say that doctors were largely intellectually disempowered in 
the context of public health and ethical discourse even though they were politically powerful in 
terms of resisting administrative and regulatory pressures. Themes of lack of intellectual 
engagement and opportunity for doctors in India have also been identified historically by Madan 
(1980) and Jeffery (1988) and more recently by Ramachandran (2006) and Ravindran (2008). 
Another set of relationships that calls for better understanding, in the light of widespread concerns 
around the problems of regulating the Indian private sector (Nandraj 1994, Yesudian, 2001, Bhat 
1996b, Muraleedharan and Nandraj 2003), is that between government and private actors. The 
findings from this study broadly support the observations of Vyas et al (2003) and De Costa et a1. 
(2008), on themes of prejudice and mistrust between private medical providers and government 
actors, particularly in the case of organized interests such as medical associations who 
fundamentally opposed government intervention. 
Private doctors have widely been characterized in the literature in terms of the excessively 
commercially driven (even corrupt and venal) nature of their practices (Das and Hammer 2004, 
Jesani et a1. 1997). Some researchers have acknowledged private doctors' vulnerability to patient 
agency in the context of highly competitive markets (Kielmann 2005, Kamat 2001, Madan 1980). 
A poorly explored aspect however is their vulnerability as a result of lack of support from 
government and the public health system. Private doctors in this study rued the lack of 
opportunity to pursue meaningful career interests (other than monetary interests), and voiced 
resentments over the government's lack of support to them, particularly academic support, even as 
they paradoxically tended to make a virtue of their independence from governmental control. The 
neglect of the private sector is also apparent from the accounts of public functionaries - educators, 
regulators and HIV I AIDS programme officials. Jeffery, albeit in 1977, has also discussed similar 
themes of the isolation and vulnerability of the average Indian practitioner.469 
469 ~effery characterized this as a phenomenon of "deprofessionalization". claiming that the way the medical 
sector was organized in India largely did not correspond with criteria of cohesiveness and integrity that 
defme a professionalized sphere. 
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Another important relationship is that between international organizations and the national 
HIV / AIDS programme. Relationships between international actors and national governments in 
the context of the ''transfer'' of public health policies have been examined in some detail in the 
existing literature. Lush et a!. (2003) have documented how WHO explicitly disseminated 
syndromic management guidelines to national governments of lower income countries in the 
1990s, a process which received the support of major international donors such as the World 
Bank. Many of these governments took up the guidelines in spite of the absence of local 
epidemiological evidence to support their utility (ibid.). Similarly Ogden and colleagues (2003) 
report that DOTS was aggressively marketed by WHO and the World Bank as the solution to TB 
control, and transferred to national and local governments globally. Making a distinction between 
voluntary and coercive transfers of policy, they observe that coercive transfers lead to national 
policies without national ownership, which can lead to deficits in implementation. Strongly 
convinced as they were about the efficacy of DOTS as a tool for global TB control, the 
proponents of DOTS policies were reported to be autocratic, sometimes linking governments' 
uptake of DOTS to loans and funding support (ibid.). Cliff et a!. (2004) have reported how 
legitimacy in a global context and implications for future funding were important factors guiding 
the Mozambican government's decisions to adopt global policies for SII and TB control. 
While these studies have looked at the perspectives of the international actors, there is still little 
empirical documentation of the responses of the national governments, and the processes of their 
uptake of the guidelines. In this study, there was a unanimous agreement among all groups of 
actors that the UN technical agencies - UNAIDS and WHO - were largely responsible for 
developing the content of the policies in question. The response of national HIV/AlDS 
programme officials tended to be complex, mixing passive acceptance with acts of subversion. 
There were apparent problems in communicating the underlying principles of the policies 
between international and national-level actors, and some national programme officials expressed 
(privately in the interviews, but not publicly) their disagreement with these principles, a finding 
which supports Ogden et a!. 's hypothesis (2003) around non-ownership of transferred policies 
(see above). 
Other notable findings included little evidence of coordination and communication between 
different public functionaries who shared implementation functions, supporting Bennett and 
Muraleedharan's assertions on the same lines (1998). State health departments and SACS 
reportedly tended to function as parallel administrative structures with limited overlaps (see 
Figure 7.4). 
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This study also contributes knowledge in the understanding of relationships of civil society 
organizations with other policy actors in the Indian context, which otherwise have found no place 
in the literature. It is observed that civil society advocacy groups in the field of HIV / AIDS 
typically had oppositional, sometimes fractious relationships with doctors, but closer associations 
with international technical agencies, whom they helped to propagate and promote rights-based 
policies. They also played a role in lobbying international donor agencies and national 
government for change in policies and legal frameworks. Grassroots NGOs on the other hand 
often worked in close collaboration with doctors in the care of patients. 
9.1.3 Concept of a health policy ecosystem 
The neglect, in the literature, of perspectives of participating groups of actors, and of their living 
interrelationships, is indicative of the dominance of a top-down conception of the policy-action 
relationship among analysts, centred on assumptions of the existence of a unitary decision-making 
entity (typically "government") that would hypothetically receive and interpret research 
knowledge and execute relevant policies mechanistically (Ouggal 2001, Peters 2003). This 
conception limits the extent and nature of strategic engagement by analysts - which usually takes 
the form of a set of recommendations aimed at policy-planners, and is typically focused on the 
goal of greater streamlining and rationalization of implementation processes.470 Furthermore, as 
in the Indian context, there may be significant flaws in the top-down model as a description of 
health policy implementation processes. 
Firstly, it is apparent from the fmdings of the study that government, traditionally assumed as the 
locus of important decisions, is not one consolidated entity. There are complex vertical and 
horizontal balances of power, conflicts and disconnects in the relationships between the different 
organs in the public sector including hospitals, public health programmes, departments of health 
and quasi-governmental professional regulatory councils. Datye and colleagues (2005) have also 
reported that policy decrees on the same issues sometimes emanate simultaneously from different 
organs of the government and legislature, and may conflict. Secondly, apart from government, 
other groups such as international agencies,471 particularly major donors such as the World Bank 
or, in public health contexts, UN technical agencies, are also identifiable as important policy 
decision-makers, particularly in detennining policy content. The compass of actions of these 
470 See Chapter 2 (2.2.4) for examples (in the Indian public health literature) of analysts' engagement with 
strategic themes. 
471 More accurately speaking _ the branches ofintemational agencies located within the country. 
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bodies however is limited since they have little direct influence over the processes of 
implementation, and the implementing actors. Finally, discretionary decisions addressing diverse 
goals and functions are exercised variously by the organizations and individuals involved in 
implementation processes. 
Due to the multiple loci of decisions and the lack of overt definition and clarity in the 
configuration of health systems, most evident in vertical processes requiring concerted action 
(such as the implementation of disease control policies), Indian health systems have often been 
written off as being chaotic and irrational, leading to calls for better oversight and streamlining 
(Peters 2003). Amid these rationality-oriented prescriptions, it is important to realise that action 
in health care - even collective, sustained action does take place, propelled as much by the 
discrete pursuits of the different organizations and individuals constituting health systems and 
their variable interconnectivities, as by attempts at streamlining (peters and Muraleedharan 2008). 
To address these varied potentialities, the public health policy-practice continuum in India may be 
more usefully characterized as an ecosystem of variously interconnected and interdependent 
decision-makers, than in terms of divergence from a rational top-down model. A relational 
perspective on policy implementation, and appreciation of the different systems of meaning and 
purpose of involved actors represent potentially critical areas of attention and further exploration, 
and also permits a wider-ranging engagement by analysts in strategic change than a top-down 
view. 
9.2 ENVISIONING CHANGE IN A COMPLEX ECOSYSTEM 
The previous analyses have shown that in the complex Indian health sector, different groups of 
actors inhabit differing "frames" or systems of meaning which guide their behaviour and which 
suggest sometimes conflicting courses of action. Particularities of interrelationships with other 
groups of actors (which often do not conform to a linear "rational" implementation process) and 
inconsistencies in the communication of ideas have an influential role in shaping the actions of 
those involved in implementing policies. In these uncertain and highly contingent real-life 
contexts that characterize the Indian health sector, how can collective action be better organized 
so as to further the goals of better care for HIV/AIDS in the short term and long-term? An 
understanding of positive change and planning based on principles of communicative rationality 
is suggested. 
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9.2.1 The communicative rationality approach 
Drawing from formulations developed by the philosopher Jiirgen Habermas and applied in the 
policy sciences by Healey (1993), and by Fischer (2003) among others, an approach of 
communicative rationality' is used to identify opportunities for change.472 Communicative 
rationality offers a framework for the concerted articulation of long-standing concerns around a 
process-orientated perspective of change, and is an alternative standard to dominant technical-
rational norms.473 This understanding of rationality is not based on natural science-derived 
conceptions of individualised objective reasoning and formulation of technical solutions, but on 
"reaching understanding between subject and subject in a social context" (Healey 1993 p.237), or 
what can be described as "being reasonable" in common parlance. In a world of differences, the 
effort of constructing mutual understanding - of making sense together - represents the locus 
of reasoning activity, according to Healey (ibid. p.240). 
Communicative rationality is founded on a recognition of the existing human condition of "living 
together but differently", i.e. living in shared time and space and having collective concerns, but 
occupying different appreciative frames474 or systems of meaning (Healey 1993 p.237). The 
communicative perspective emphasises positive or productive power in the hands of actors, to 
"organize action through consensual communication" (Fischer 2003 p.35). Key features of 
"rational" communication in this approach are enlisted in Box 9.1. 
Acknowledgement of the possibility of legitimacy of alternative "frames' 
Effort to bridge communicative divides by conveying ones own and listening to the 
other's perspectives 
Deliberation and debate of differences in rationales for action 
Openness of the deliberations 
Inclusion of different participant actors in deliberations 
Box 9.1 Features of a 'Radonal' Communicative Approach 
472 Since implementation has been examined in terms of being a communicative process (Yanow 2000), 
communicative rationality suggests itself as a framework for prescribing change. Strategizing change on 
the basis of a communicative rationality perspective also represents a natural progression from an 
interpretivist approach to diagnose gaps through actors' internal processes and appreciations, since it 
ascribes value to intent and effort on the part of participant actors, not to externally contingent parameters 
such as health outcomes. 
473 See also Chapter 3 (3.3) for a more detailed discussion of the role of 'rationality' in prescribing change 
474 See Chapter 3 (3.2.2) for discussion on frames, appreciations and meanings 
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Acknowledging the possibility of legitimacy of an alternative frame is a prereq,uisite to 
establishing understanding, even if that alternative frame is not immediately appreciated or 
understood. The challenge of communication lies in finding bridges between these different 
frames, in order to act towards addressing collective concerns (ibid.). This can be achieved 
through communicative effort, involving listening, conveying, and seeking "translative" 
possibilities between different frames (Forester 1993, Geertz 1983). A desirable state is the 
attainment of a workable level of understanding to pursue a specific task which is of common 
concern, even as actors should be consciously aware of areas where understanding is not (yet) 
attained (Healey 1993). 
Healey (1993) also identifies exteriorization - active discussion, argumentation and debate; and 
openness in conducting such debate, as defining features of communicative rationality.m.476 
Good communicative processes are inc/usionary and seek to offer all actors opportunity to 
participate (and also to learn to participate) in policy discourse (Fischer 2003).477 
9.2.2 Applying the communications lens 
A lens of communicative rationality was applied to processes of interaction between actors. The 
presence or absence of the communicative criteria listed in Box 9.1 were assessed and used to 
comment on the rationality of the processes. The purpose here is to uncover the influences that 
are shaping "irrational" or (in Habennas' terms) "systematically distorted" communication478 
(Fischer 2003); and to use this knowledge to identify strategic opportunities for change. First, the 
types of distortions in communications that were observed in this study are summarized in Box 
9.2. 
47S Exteriorization indicates that the communicative process should be explicit not implicit. Openness 
implies that the discursive exchange between two actors is not secretive but available to external observers. 
476 Additionally, Healey paraphrases Habermas in recommending that discursive processes should be 
subject to a constant process of reflexive internal critique. Habermas' original criteria to assess arguments 
were: comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy and truth (Healey 1993) 
477 Proponents of communicative rationality have differing views of the place of an model of ideal 
communication. Fischer harkens to a conception, proposed by Habermas, of "ideal speech"- an end state of 
unconstrained exchange of ideas, with equal participatory opportunities for all actors (Fischer 2003 p36). 
According to Healey, the integrity of different systems of meaning is important, in which context 
communicative rationality should be focused on translation between different systems, and not seek a 
"fully inclusionary consensus" (Healey 1993, p 239-240). Nevertheless the authors are agreed that effort 
towards establishing mutual understanding is the primary focus of communicative rationality, not the 
existence (or otherwise) of an ideal end state. 
478 It should be noted that the appellations of "distorted" or "irrational" communications are used 
prOvisionally, in order to guide strategic concerns, and do not constitute an evaluation or appraisal of actors' 
performances. 
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Non-deliberation of differences of opinion 
Passive or subversive expressions of dissent 
Non-acknowledgement of the possible legitimacy of altematlve perspectives 
Pre-emptive mistrust and assumptions of bad faith 
Active disrespect in mutual exchanges 
Renunciation of mandated tasks involving interactive effort 
Box 9.2 Types of "Distorted" Communlcadons between Actors in tbis Study 
Illustrative examples are provided to highlight instances of these systematic distortions (examples 
1-8), and also instances of rational communicative processes (examples 9-12): 
1. An archetypically distorted or irrational process was that of secretive mandatory pre-surgical 
testing performed by surgeons in government hospitals, either by sending patients to nearby 
private diagnostic laboratories, or by colluding with in-house microbiologists to perform 
''unofficial'' HIV tests. The tests were conducted secretively and official documentation 
(representing the avenue of communication with HIV/AIDS programme supervisors) was 
manipulated. Pre-surgical testing in general was an underground practice, the rationale of the 
process was known only to the surgeons themselves, and the issue was not widely discussed. 
Surgeons were able to exploit the compliant nature of patients, and there was little 
accountability for continued care in case they were found to be HIV positive. 
2. Instances of collusion between HIVIAIDS programme officials and Heads 0/ Department in 
government hospitals in order to conceal certain divergent practices from external 
inspectors479 were similarly founded on secretiveness and the obstruction of open 
communication, founded on distrust of external observers. 
3. Doctors seldom brought up their objections to NACO's guidelines in available fora. In many 
instances, their responses to ethical dilemmas and conflicts with policies in the workplace 
were passive. When confronted with day-to-day dilemmas around maintaining confidentiality 
in ward settings, doctors had a preference for silently subverting or adapting their practices. 
or de/erring to authorities, rather than confronting and deliberating on these issues. The 
reasons for this were manifold including the lack of confidence in the value of personal 
appreciations weighed against globally accepted guidelines, and lack of discursive skills and 
platforms in general. Typically also, the emphasis on technical-clinical knowledge was such 
479 See Chapter 7 (7.2.1) for detailed account. 
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that ethical and administrative concerns were not regarded as worthy of discussion. Doctors 
may have been further inhibited by experiences of the unresponsiveness of HN I AIDS 
programme officials to suggestions. 
4. A meeting between doctors from a private hospital and HNIAIDS programme official 
appeared to end unsuccessfully because of non-reconciliation of the frames of action of either 
group of actors (the programme seeking to regulate, and the doctors seeking to collaborate).48o 
The doctors' views on the process were marked by statements of poor regard for the 
programme officials, indicating the inability to appreciate the legitimacy of their (programme 
officials ') perspectives. In spite of these instances of poor communication, eventually a 
collaborative relationship with the HIV I AIDS programme was established by the hospital 
administrators, following subsequent dialogues. 
5. Certain international actors and civil society actors had a strong belief in the universality of 
ethical principles enshrined in the HIV testing policies, which led them to reject the 
possibility of legitimacy of alternative frames for appropriate action, such as those suggested 
by medical practitioners.481 
6. HNIAIDS programme authorities tended to adopt policies endorsed by international 
organizations unquestioningly, in spite of having reservations over their content. Dissent was 
expressed in passive or silent ways - by taking suggestions selectively, or by colluding in 
policy subversion with hospital authorities - rather than through open deliberation. Notions 
of the intellectual supremacy of international organizations, and the unfonnulated nature of 
alternative arguments contributed to this passivity. 
7. Medical Associations' strategic frame for political action, as self appointed guardians of the 
interests of private practitioners, was oriented around the identification and pre-emptive 
opposition of government's efforts to regulate practices in the private sector. This 
considerably limited their opportunities to engage constructively or build true consensus with 
govemment.482 
8. HIV/AIDS progranune authorities and Medical Council official renounced some interactive 
aspects of their roles, citing practical difficulties and lack of capacity. The task of interacting 
with private sector providers to regulate their practices was considered too difficult to 
undertake. 
480 See Chapter 7 (7.2.3) for detailed account. 
481 See Chapter 7 (7.7.1) for UN agency office-bearers' detailed views. 
482 See account in Chapter 7. 
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On the other hand in a number of instances, distinct instances of positive communicative effort 
were also observed, corresponding with criteria of good communicative practices (Box. 9.1). 
9. A physician from a government hospital spoke to various authorities in an effort to gain an 
understanding of the rationale of NACO policies for specific infonned consent. In spite of 
many enquiries, a satisfactory explanation could not be obtained. One HIV I AIDS programme 
official admitted that the reason for adoption of the policy by the HN I AIDS programme was 
unclear.483 
10. In charitable hospitals, there was reported to have been active, sometimes conflict-ridden 
negotiation and debate toward developing hospital policies for HIV testing. This involved 
the explication of respective positions on the part of the medical practitioners and the 
administrators, which led to the creation of mutually acceptable hospital policies, which 
assured care for patients who were found to be HIV positive. These deliberations although 
explicit, were not open, and the perspectives of other actors, notably of PLHA groups and of 
the HIV I AIDS programme were not included. 
11. International actors attempted to communicate the rationales of newer policies to HIV I AIDS 
programme officials, often without success. Differences in interpretation of language were 
explained to be the cause of this communication gap. International actors' exact articulation 
of terminologies was not well appreciated by programme actors, who reportedly conflated the 
meanings of similar-sounding terms ("routine offer" and "routine testing"). 
12. A NGO attempted to refonn discriminatory practices in hospitals by working closely with 
doctors and engaging them in debates around ethics. In the process, NGO workers learned 
about doctors' and patients' perspectives, recognized their validity, and reconsidered their 
own preconceptions around stigma and discrimination. However, doctors did not reciprocate 
the communicative overtures of the NGO. HODs of government hospitals were reported to 
have absented themselves from important meetings with the NGO, rendering communicative 
exchange unviable. 
No particular group was found to be intrinsically more "rational" than others, although particular 
groups' focuses around secrecy or exclusivism (surgeons in the case of mandatory testing, 
medical association representatives), or around the intrinsic superiority of particular viewpoints 
(international organization representatives, some civil society actors), tended to reduce the 
opportunities for rational communications. 
483 Doctors' accounts of interactions with the HIV I AIDS programme detailed in Chapter 6. 
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Processes, and not actors, are rational or irrational, and the same actors engaged in rational and 
irrational interactions in different instances with different groups of actors. Sometimes the same 
interactive process was found to have rational and irrational aspects. Communicative efforts were 
often unidirectional in that they were exerted by one group of actors but not reciprocated by the 
other. Communicative efforts were sometimes fractious and conflict-ridden, and did not 
necessarily lead to mutually satisfactory outcomes in the short term. However they represented a 
step towards achieving mutual understanding for a joint course of action. 
9.2.3 Identifying bridging opportunities 
The conceptual basis of communicative rationality provides broad guidance for policy actors to 
orient their actions around a systematized logic (see criteria in Box 9.1). The core message is that 
actors should be mindful of how they communicate with other actors as much as what they 
communicate, and that they should fmd ways of orienting these communications to maximise the 
likelihood of establishing mutual understanding. 
In some instances in which actors were strongly influenced by fixed value systems or by political 
concerns to protect their interests, the possibility of appreciating an alternative system of meaning 
was inimical. Such positions as those occupied by international and civil society actors (see 
example 5: page 274), and medical associations (example 7: page 274), appeared intractable. 
However, Healey informs us that apparently fixed interests and preferences can be altered 
through articulation and sharing - the communicative process itself holds the potential of 
reformulation of actors' appreciations (1993). Communicative exchange promotes reflection 
about individual and organizational action and purpose (Fischer 2003). What appear to be two 
irreconcilable positions may be bridged through persistence of communicative effort. In example 
12 (page 275), a representative of a NGO explained how the effort undertaken by observing 
doctors practices and interacting with them in their habitats led to an re-examination of strong 
preconceptions around stigma and discrimination. In example 4 (page 274) apparently 
irreconcilable differences between the HIV/AIDS programme officials' and private hospital 
doctors' frames were overcome and collaboration was established. In this instance, private 
hospital administrators eventually recognized that there were other benefits of associating with the 
HIV I AIDS programme, and overcame the initial resistance of their staff of medical professionals 
to interference by the programme. Hence opening communicative channels, even (or especially) 
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in the apparent absence of common ground is a vital step in moving towards mutual 
understanding. 
Respectful overtures are critical in ensuring the possibility of a constructive response from other 
actors. Curtailing overt disrespect, such as that evidenced by private doctors' expressions of poor 
regard towards the HNIAIDS programme (see example 4: page 274), and in other instances 
between an Infection Control Officer (leO) and surgeons in a government hospitaI484, would be 
an important step in moving toward addressing common concerns. 
Doctors' blind deference to directives of HNIAIDS programme officials (see example 3: page 
273), and similarly HIV/AIDS programme officials' unquestioning acceptance of UN policies 
(example 6: page 274), represents conscious or unconscious forsaking of the responsibility to 
make "official" decisions. From doctors accounts it is clear that they often made complex ethical 
decisions, but did not 'see it that way,485 i.e. they did not regard the ethical issues they dealt with 
daily as potential subjects of discourse. Undertaking deliberative discursive practices on relevant 
topics emerges as an opportunity for doctors to learn the language of discourse and present their 
workplace dilemmas within a communicable framework. The physician in example 9 (page 275) 
was an exception to the nonn of silent deference. In spite of considerable efforts to communicate 
with HIV/AIDS programme authorities he was not successful in achieving his aims. 
This example highlighted that inter-discursive communication (i.e. the conveyance of meaning 
across different perceptual frames) is often very difficult, as is evidenced in example 11 (page 
275) which highlights the problems in communicating policy messages at the highest echelons. 
Here it is important to understand here that the non-distinction between "routine offer" and 
"routine testing" may not have represented intellectual deficiency on the part of programme 
officials, but their occupation of a different frame for action, in which the wording of policy was 
not a matter of prime significance. HIV/AIDS programme officials may hence have adopted the 
tenninology of policy, but since there was little engagement in the actual meaning of the 
policymakers' frames, the words were easily confused. This illustration is indicative of the 
difficulties of establishing understanding, which sometimes caused actors to abdicate particular 
communicative functions altogether - see example 8 (page 274). It is vital in such instances to 
emphasize the criticality of effort of communication toward achieving workable, context-specific 
understanding, even in the face of systemic problems or wider ideological divides486, since the 
484 See Chapter 7 (7.2.2) for ICO's accounts of interactions with doctors. 
48S Respondent 21: Senior gynaecologist and head of department, government hospital 
486 A conceptual transcendence is required in order to achieve fuller understanding of another actors' frame, 
which according to Geertz (1983) is rarely achieved. It is not required that each actor attempts such 
conceptual transcendence. It is only necessary to seek "the opening of windows to what it means to see 
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process of communication contains its own potentialities for idea generation and facilitation of 
consensual action. In the words of an officer of the state health department: 'our responsibilities 
will not go away by saying that there is too much work to be done,.487 
Openness in communicative processes has a potentially demystifying impact (Healey 1993). 
Existing subterranean dynamics are brought to light as participants are required to make explicit 
their arguments and motivations. Oppressive or exploitative processes can be checked, and 
alternative avenues of action can be created through consultation. In the charitable hospital for 
example, it was demonstrated that communicative effort and struggle between hospital 
administrators and surgeons eventually materialised in a consensus which reduced the likelihood 
of exploitation of patients, and also alleviated the anxieties of surgeons (see example 10 above: 
page 275). Contrarily, un-deliberated concerns of government hospital surgeons were linked with 
underground exploitative cultures of mandatory testing (see example 1: page 273). 
9.2.4 Recommendations to government planners and donors 
Communicative rationality does not necessarily contain a specific "blueprint" for action, yet it 
may in particular contexts be used to plan and strategise (Fischer 2003). Where opportunities for 
communication are absent, it provides a practical basis for the creation of new discursive 
structures. Where existing structures are deficient or are constrained by conventions and norms 
which do not support open deliberation, they can be reoriented to enhance their communicative 
potential. Existing communicative platfonns may be strengthened and built on. Government 
planners and donors can playa specific role in building the capacity of under-involved groups for 
deliberating on relevant subjects, and encouraging more equitable intellectual participation of 
different groups in policy-relevant discourse. In order for this, it is necessary for planners to 
accept broader conceptions of success of public health programmes, incorporating long-tenn 
goals of learning, emancipation and development of intellectual capital, not just short-term targets 
predicated on mechanistic confonnance on the part of constituent actors (Connelly and Emmel 
2003, Porter and Ogden 2001). 
In the previous chapter I have outlined how the implementation of existing policies was 
constrained by problems in communicating their underlying rationales and principles (see page 
255). The increase in administrative control through legislative and regulatory means is typically 
things differently" (Healey 1993 p 240), not the attainment of "complete" consensus or conversion (of self 
or other) to a singular viewpoint. 
487 Respondent 56: Official, state directorate of health services 
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proposed as a solution for divergent practices, but it is evident that this is of limited value, and can 
even be detrimental to patients' interests unless accompanied by concurrent educational and 
capacity-building interventions for medical practitioners around HIV / AIDS care.488 
Educational programmes oriented around transferring existing knowledge on HIV/AIDS, 
including infonnation on policies and ethics have the value of injecting new ideas into the 
existing appreciative mix of doctors beliefs' and perceptions. However, such instructional 
approaches have their limitations in bridging policy practice gaps, since they are not centred on 
many of the concerns that medical practitioners face in their practices. Since they are supported 
and perpetuated by existing institutional structures, they have the potential of domination, in 
"crowding out" these less well-articulated but equally valid appreciations, yet at points where the 
instructions conflict with practitioners' interests, in practice they are often ignored or subverted.489 
Hence it is also vital for health systems to take account of, and process knowledge which evolves 
from the experiences and values of field-level actors. This requires the institution of channels for 
listening to field-level actors, for ideas to feed ''upwards'', for the HIV/AIDS programme and 
policymakers to learn from the perspectives of implementers, and adapt policies accordingly. 
Doctors' appreciations, like other forms of local knowledge are often not well structured or 
articulated (Yanow 2000), and often do not conform to widely recognizable "frames" (such as the 
individual rights and autonomy frames around which HIV testing policies are founded). In the 
first place, an approach toward inclusion of local knowledge requires a conceptual widening of the 
scope of what constitutes valid knowledge as a basis for planning action. Healey, paraphrasing 
Habermas, suggests that this includes such knowledge fonns as practical sense, lived experiences 
and accumulated moral and cultural knowledge (Healey 1993). 
How could different types and forms of knowledge be sourced, in practice? The creation of 
inclusive fora for the discussion of policy problems is suggested, which would enable exchanges 
between different groups who engage collectively in the project of policy implementation yet 
have potentially different perspectives. Hypothetically, the aims of such fora or meetings would 
be to invite representatives of various groups490 to explicate their positions and appreciations 
around a particular policy problem, and to attempt to establish mutual understanding of each 
others' respective positions around the problem (following the principles of rational 
488 See Chapter 8 (8.3.3) 
489 See Chapter 7 (7.6.2) 
490 Such as medical practitioners, administrators, Programme officials, involved government bureaus, 
international organizations, professional associations, and civil society organizations. 
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communication - see Box 9.1 ).491 In addition to deliberatively including new {onns of knowledge 
and perspectives from groups who do not nonnally contribute to policy discourse, such fora 
would have the added potential of generating new ideas for action.492 
It is also vital to develop the deficient discursive skills of groups such as field-level medical 
practitioners, to help them to articulate their perspectives and enable their inclusion in policy 
discourses. The experience of students and teachers in intensive long term training programmes 
with practical exposure revealed that these programmes were not simply instructional but were 
transformative: in enabling access to new knowledge systems, ethical frameworks and career and 
collaborative opportunities, and liberating in helping the students (medical practitioners) to better 
articulate, and to learn to value their own appreciations.493 The prioritization (by donors and 
government) of support to intensive or depth-oriented educational and academic opportunities 
which engender and promote new forms of discourse among medical practitioners is hence 
suggested. It was notable that in spite of the various benefits to all participants, such existing 
intensive training programmes faced financial difficulties due to their high cost per student 
trained, which was not attractive to donor agencies. 
A number of voluntary collaborations and programmes for care provision exist in India, which 
involve field-level partnerships between (variously) government departments, private medical 
providers and NGOs (Murthyet a1. 2001, Gopalakrishnan 2008, Rangan et a1. 2003, PSIIAvahan 
2007).494 From a communicative perspective, such programmes have significant benefits, over 
and above the goals of improving programme outcomes, in facilitating intellectual exchange 
between relevant actor groups, and exposure to alternative ideas and perspectives in immediate 
practical contexts. Support for such programmes can enable critical learning processes for the 
actors, and contribute to a better understanding of avenues of collective action. 
In summary, government and policy planners can make clear contributions towards ensuring 
wider participation of all actors in discourse on policy-relevant themes, and in improving the 
capacity of these actors, particularly medical practitioners to engage in such discourse. Specific 
measures which can be taken include: 
49\ The aims of such meetings should not be to establish what constitutes a "right" or "wrong" approach, 
and even if consensual solutions for problems are arrived upon, it should be understood that they are 
changeable through further deliberation, or in different contexts. 
492 According to Healey, discursive interaction between and within different groups generates new 
knowledge. A communicative approach to knowledge production maintains that "knowledge is not merely 
a pre-fonnulated store of systematized understandings, but is created anew through exchanging perceptions 
and understandings" (Healey 1993. p 241). 
493 See Box 7.2 
494 See Chapter 2 (2.2.4) for detailed examples. 
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Balancing increased regulatory measures with commensurate efforts to convey the principles 
of existing policies to memca} practitioners, through training progranunes. 
Support for intensive and participatory educational and academic programmes which help to 
develop the discursive capabilities of medical practitioners. 
In order to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and the creation of understanding across 
different "frames" or systems of meaning: the institution of participatory fora for the 
deliberation of policy questions, accommodating a wide range of forms of knowledge 
including pragmatic and field-level considerations. 
Further support to and encouragement of partnerships and programmes for care provision 
which are centred on human interaction and exchange between mfferent stakeholders is also 
proposed. 
9.3 TOWARD 'REGIMES OF RESPECT'? 
Communicative practice in implementation 
How can systems for the implementation of policies for HIV/AIDS (in public health policies in 
general), involving a mix of actors with differing perspectives, be oriented so as to permit 
alternative beliefs and purposes and allow them to find expression, yet ensuring that essential 
tasks are performed cohesively and policy objectives are accomplished? Quoting one of the 
participants of the study, 'what is needed is the creation of regimes of respect' .495 To move 
towards such regimes or cultures, it is not necessary for existing systems and hierarchies to be 
dismantled, or for policy content to change (unless appropriate), but for the interactions between 
different groups of actors to be oriented more towards good communicative practices - involving 
acknowledging the possible legitimacy of other actors' views, listening to these views, and 
conveying their own (Healey 1993).496 
In a regime of respect, it is envisioned that the perspectives of all actors are acknowledged. While 
doctors' values are important, so are those of policy planners who would seek to see systems 
495 Respondent 54: HIV / AIDS department bead, major donor agency 
496 The term "communication" has often been used euphemistically to refer to a one~way mechanism of 
persuasion of frontline providers to comply with approved norms (Peters 2002). Healey (1993) emphasizes 
however that listening to, and accounting for alternative perspectives is an equally critical component of 
communicative practice. 
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being more efficient in accomplishing what is planned, and of civil society actors who wish to see 
the cessation of discriminatory practices. Each actor brings a different set of ideas and meanings 
to the milieu, which potentially represents the collective values and interests of the societies they 
belong to (Lasswe111936 cited in Parsons 1995). 
Critically, the different groups who are engaged in the collective enterprise of working towards 
the care and control of HN/AIDS (or another health problem or disease) must necessarily find 
ways of conveying their perspectives to each other. Policy planners have the responsibility of 
conveying the rationales of their policies to groups who are designated to implement them. If 
implementers (medical practitioners, administrators, programme functionaries) seek to diverge 
from their designated roles on the basis of alternative rationales or ideas that they possess, they 
have the responsibility of communicating these rationales to policy planners openly, through 
deliberation and debate (and also the right of being heard). It has been observed that divergences 
contain innovative potential, and that deliberative processes can generate new ideas for policy. 
Also, the openness of deliberations has the virtue of making actors' concerns, needs and interests 
transparent, and hence has the potential of curtailing the abuse of existing asymmetries of power. 
Hence respectful relationships are a template on which perspectives can converge and eventually 
be shared, but also a framework for the permission of divergence and innovation. Only in an 
environment of mutual respect between authorities and functionaries, can concerns of 
accomplishment and accountability be addressed concurrently with "bottom-up" values of trust, 
choice and learning (Lane 1987). 
Re-imagining convergence 
Members of some groups, notably medical practitioners and programme officials appeared to lack 
the confidence in the value of their own appreciative abilities, when weighed against globally 
recognized policies. This was the basis of dichotomies in their experience of implementing the 
policies, acting privately on the basis of their own beliefs and judgements of reality, but 
maintaining facades of policy compliance. These internal ambiguities and dichotomies were also 
observed in the accounts of other implementers (hospital administrators, HIV/AIDS programme 
officials, regulators) when faced with conflicting messages from policies and from their lived 
experiences. Wider participation in collaborative and discursive activities can help these actors to 
enhance their capabilities towards engaging in deliberations with other groups, and encourage 
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them to acknowledge the intellectual value of their own appreciations. Recommendations around 
the role of planners in improving such opportunities have been discussed (section 9.2.4). 
Street-level implementers are a key link that systems and programmes have with the recipients of 
services, and hence it is particularly important not to allow their perspectives to be neglected 
(Lipsky 1980). In health policy, accounting for the values of care providers is particularly critical 
because the central act itself is predicated on an affective value orientation that pre-dates health 
policies, health systemS, hospitals, and most social structures as we know them today - insight 
into the suffering of fellow beings and the impulse to resolve it. This human impulse has 
historically been institutionalised as the profession of medical practice, and health providers 
placed within structures such as hospitals and public health systems which should enable the 
impulse to be expressed optimally. However observations from this study and of other authors 
indicate that such supporting structures and institutions sometimes take directions which repudiate 
this lineage of values (Freidson 1986, lllich 2000, Jesani et al. 1997). Hence it becomes necessary 
to re-emphasise the role of core values of empathy and succour (Batmanabane 2008), and sustain 
these emphases as a constant reminder of the purposes of health systems. 
In health policy implementation, this emphasis can be made by re-imagining the core concern of 
convergence not simply as the outward similitude of policy guidelines and the actions of frontline 
providers, but in tenns of the possibility of the confluence of policies, actions of the individuals 
implementing policies and their values. It is desirable that the actors involved in the 
implementation of policies should have the opportunity to practice what they believe in, openly 
and without resort to subterfuge. 
In conclusion, it is not a system which has attained external convergence between written policies 
and outward practices, but one which contains the possibilities of internal convergence (of beliefs 
and actions) for participant actors, possibilities predicated on their uptake of responsibilities, and 
sustained respectful communicative exertion, that presents itself as a future ideal. The precise 
parameters of such future systems cannot be presumed or predicted, since they will be defined and 
redefined by the actions and deliberations of the involved actors themselves. The emphases on 
respect and deliberative communication offer a foundation to address present concerns by 
reorienting policy action in a way that is "future seeking but not future-defining" (Healey 1993, p 
247). An important challenge that lies ahead is of enfranchising voices which are not included in 
policy discourse - to bring to light the perspectives of silent participants in the policy process and 
to help them develop their own capacities to deliberate appropriate courses of action on the basis 
of their values and lived experiences. 
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Annexures 
ANNEXURE 1. INTERVIEW TIMELINE 
SN Date Interview Venue"'" Re.pondent-
1 August 18, 2005 Key intonnant's workplace Key Intonnant 1 
2 August23,2005 
Respondents' consulting room In Senior physician, govemment hospital hospital 
3 August30,2005 OffIces of the UN agency 
MId-level official, United Nations 
technical agencv 
4 August 30, 2005 NACO offices 
Senior official, National AIDS Control 
Oraanlzatlon (NACO) 
5 September 8, 2005 Key intonnant's workplace Key Intonnant 2 
6 September 10, 2005 Key intonnant's workplace Key Intonnant 3 
7 September 10, 2005 OffIce ot the PLHA network Head, PLHA network 
8 September 11, 2005 
Respondents' consulting room In Senior physician, private nursing home hospital 
9 September 11, 2005 Hospital outpatient department Junior physician, private nursing home 
10 September 16, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Surgeon, 10 years experience, 
charitable hospital 
11 September 24, 2005 Key intonnant's workplaca Key Intonnant 4 
12 October 13, 2005 Teacher training centre Senior physician, govemment hospital 
13 October 13, 2005 
Respondent's consulting room In Senior physician and HIV speclal/st, 
hosoital aovemment hospital 
14 October 14, 2005 Teacher training centre 
Venereologist and HIV specialist, 7 
vears experience Qovemment hosoltal 
15 October 16, 2005 Teacher training centre 
Medical educator and practitioner, 20 
vears experience 
16 October 16, 2005 
Respondent's consulting room In PhYSician and HIV specialist, 8 years 
hosoital experience aovemment hosoltal 
October 18, 2005 Office In administrative block In Physician and administrator, charitable 17 hospital hospital 
18 October 19, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Venereologist, 18 yearB of experience, 
charitable hospital 
19 November 16,2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Gynaecologist, 15 years of expertence, 
govemment hospital 
20 November 16, 2005 
Gynaecology ward In Junior gynaecologist, govemment 
resoondent's hosoltal hOSDltal 
21 November 16, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Senior gynaecologist and head of 
deoartment aovemment hospital 
22 November 16, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Gynaecologist, 8 yearB experience, 
govemment hosoltal 
23 December 3, 2005 Teacher training centre 
Venereologist, 10 yearB expertence, 
aovemment hospital 
24 December 6, 2005 Coffee shop In hospital 
Senior microbiologist, govemment 
hospital 
25 December 11, 2005 Respondent's consulting room Senior surgeon, private hospital 
497 Interviews took place in 5 cities. However the city names are not revealed, to protect respondent 
confidentiality. 
498 See next annexure for details about key infonnants. 
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December 11, 2005 Office in administrative block In Senior surgeon and administrator, 26 hospital private hospital 
27 December 16, 2005 Doctors' common room In hospital 
Junior trainee venereologist, 
Qovemment hosDltal 
28 December 16, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Senior venereologist, govemment 
hospital 
29 December 16, 2005 Respondent's consulting room Senior surgeon, government hospital 
30 December 17, 2005 Respondent's consulting room Senior physician, govemment hospital 
31 December 17,2005 Respondent's consulting roorn Senior surgeon, government hospital 
32 December 17, 2005 
Preparation room of operation Junior surgeon, govemment hospital theatre 
33 December 23, 2005 Respondent's consulting room Senior physiCian, government hospital 
34 December 24, 2005 Respondent's consulting room SenIor surgeon, private hospital 
35 December 24, 2005 Respondent's consulting room 
Physician, 12 years experience, private 
hospital 
36 December 26, 2005 
Respondent's hotel room during a Senior phYSician, charitable hospital 
conference 
December 28, 2005 Respondent's consulting room Senior physiCian, HIV specialist and 37 administrator, government hospital 
January 12, 2006 Office of the superintendent in the Medical superintendent (and 38 hospital phySician), private hospital 
39 January 12, 2006 Microbiology laboratory 
Microbiologist, 13 years experience, 
Private ho~ltal 
40 January 12, 2006 Counselling centre Counsellor, private hospital 
41 January 14, 2006 Respondent's consulting room 
Venereologist, 15 years experience, 
private ho~ital 
January 14, 2006 VCTC attached to hospital Counsellor, government voluntary 42 testing and counselling centre (VCTC) 
43 January 28, 2006 My residence Key Informant 5 
44 February 3, 2006 
Offices of the donors supporting Manager, short term HIV training 
the educational prOQramme programme for private phvslclans 
45 February 3, 2006 Key informant's workplace Key Informant 6 
February 6, 2006 Office of the SACS Senior offiCial, State AIDS Control 46 Socletv (SACS) 
47 February 8,2006 Offices of the UN agency 
Officer In UN technical agency, 7 years 
in the UN recently deputed to India 
February 15, 2006 Offices of the UN agency Senior consultant to UN technical 48 agency 
49 February 16, 2006 
Offices ofthe legal rights Senior member, legal rights group with 
advocacy aroup focus on HIVlAIOS 
Offices of the donors supporting Senior medical educator and February 20, 2006 consultant to HIV training programme 
50 the programme for Drlv8te Dhvslclans 
51 February 20,2006 
OffIces of the legal rights Junior member, legal rights group with 
advocacy group focus on HIVIAIDS 
52 February 23, 2006 Key Informant's workplace Key Informant 7 
53 March 1, 2006 
Office of the consumer rights Head, consumer rights organization organization 
54 March 2, 2006 Office of the donor agency 
HIVIAIDS department head, major 
donoraaencv 
March 3, 2006 NACO offices Senior offiCial, National AIDS Control 55 Oroanlzatlon (NACO) 
April 17,2006 Telephonic Interview Official, state directorate of health 56 services 
57 April 17,2006 Key Informant's workplace Key Informant 8 
58 April 17, 2006 
Office of the State Medical Senior olTiclal, State Medical Council Council 
59 April 19,2006 Office of the accreditation agency Senior official, accreditation agency 
60 April 20, 2006 Key Informant's workplace Key Informant 9 
61 April 25, 2006 Office of the accreditation agency Senior offiCial, accreditation agency 
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April 26,2006 Office of the NGO Senior member of NGO with focus on 62 HIV/AIDS 
63 April26,2006 Respondent's consulting room 
Gynaecologist, 10 years experience, 
charitable ho~ital 
May 4, 2006 Office of the donors supporting Member of NGO with focus on 64 the NGO project HIV/AIDS 
65 May 4, 2006 Respondent's consulting room Junior physician, charitable hospital 
Senior microbiologist and erstwhile 
66 
May 6, 2006 Coffee shop in hospital head of department, govemment 
hospital 
Residence of the respondent, Physician, private nursing home and May 19, 2006 trainee in Intensive HIV educational 
67 neighbouring the nursing home I)l'OQramme 
May 26, 2006 Office of the infection control Infection control officer, govemment 68 officer in the hospital hosoftal 
69 June 20, 2006 Medical association offices Senior official, medical association 
June 21,2006 Education department of hospital Senior medical educator, coordinator of 70 Intensive training programme in HIV 
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ANNEXURE 2. LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS 
Key informant 1 Senior public health manager with experience in govemment and voluntary sectors 
Key informant 2 Medical ethicist and civil rights activist 
Key informant 3 Senior scientist in government HIVIAIDS research institute 
Key informant 4 Head of major intemational donor agency with more than 20 years of experience of projects in India 
Key informant 5 Medical ethicist specialising in issues around regulation 
Key informant 6 Senior public health educator and programme manager In the public sector 
Key informant 7 Senior academician with major Interest in medical providers and institutions in India 
Key informant 8 Senior scientist in govemment communicabie diseases research Institute 
Key informant 9 Senior health economist with experience in HIV/AIDS issues 
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ANNEXURE 3. TOPIC GUIDE FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS 
Name: Sex: 
Designation and Department: 
Hospital: 
Years of experience: Other relevant details: 
1. Clinical duties and responsibilities in the clinic I hospital 
2. Position in the clinic hospital- role, supervisors, subordinates. 
3. Experience ofHIV/AlDS management 
4. Experience of HI V testing 
5. Specific issues I concerns in HIV testing? 
6. Institutional norms, or policies for HIV testing, if any 
7. Experiences of implementing policy guidelines in practice 
Selectivity in testing 
Informed Consent 
Mandatory testing 
Confidentiality 
8. Relevance of policies for HIV testing 
ANNEXURES 
9. Experiences of interface with the following, with respect to implementation of HI V testing policies 
Institutional Administrators 
Government and Legislature 
mv I AIDS programme 
Educational and Academic Platforms 
International Organizations 
Civil Society Organizations 
Professional Associations 
Accreditation Agencies 
Field Notes and Observations: 
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ANNEXURE 4. TOPIC GUIDE FOR OTHER ACTORS 
Name: Sex: 
Designation: 
Organization: 
Years of experience: Other relevant details: 
I. Duties and responsibilities within organization 
2. Work of organization in HIV/AIDS and I or public health 
3. Expected role of organization in implementation of policies 
4. Experiences of implementation of policies, in practice 
5. Relevance of the policies 
6. Experiences of interface with the following, with respect to implementation of HIV testing policies 
Medical Practitioners 
Hospital Administrators 
Government and Legislature 
HIV/AIDS programme 
Educational and Academic Platforms 
International Organizations 
Civil Society Organizations 
Professional Associations 
Accreditation Agencies 
Field Notes and Observations: 
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ANNEXURE 5. INFORMATION SHEET FOR RESPONDENTS 
This sheet was presented to respondents and read out verbatim, prior to obtaining verbal consent 
for interviews. 
INFORMATION SHEET 
HIV Testing in Urban Indian Hospitals: a Study of PoUcy.Practice Relationships In the Formal 
Medical Sector 
HIV/AIDS is an important public health problem in India, and HIV testing is an important aspect of HIV 
care. There are guidelines for testing, around subjects such as mandatory testing, informed consent, re-
confrrmation of results, counselling, confidentiality and assuring follow-up. For various reasons, these 
guidelines have been contested by some physicians. 
We need to create policies for HIV testing which are appropriate, and also practical to implement. For this 
we need to know more about the circumstances of doctors and patients in HIV testing, and also understand 
the perspective of policy-makers and administrators. In this research study, I am trying to understand more 
about: 
Experiences of doctors around HIV -testing 
Existing means of implementing HIV testing policies 
The roles of different agencies in implementing the policies 
I will ask you some questions to start the discussion. Please answer frankly and freely. You are also free 
not to answer any questions if you wish. In the course of the interview, please feel free to indicate if you do 
not wish a particular statement or statements to be quoted. The interview is entirely confidential. Only the 
principal researcher will have access to the transcripts of the interview, which will be password-protected. 
The information you provide will be used only for research purposes. You will not be identifiable in any 
processed versions of the research such as theses, and research papers. For example, if something you have 
said is cited, the quote will be attributed to: "Dr XY, senior/junior doctor working in a public/private 
hospital" 
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If you would like more information about the study. please feel free to contact me. Contact details are 
given below. 
Thank you for your help. 
This research project has been approved by review committees of the Sexual Health Resource Centre 
(SHRC). Delhi, and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). 
Contact details: 
Dr. Kabir Sheikh 
Sexual Health Resource Centre, W -113, Greater Kailash - I, New Delhi 110048 
Email: kabirsheikh@hotmail.com. Telephone: 9810953885 
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ANNEXURE 6. ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
Text of email from chair of the local ethics conunittee instituted by the Sexual Health Resource 
Centre, New Delhi: 
The ethics committee recommends that: 
A draft consent letter covering the required ethical issues should be prepared and approved by all the 
committee members. The researcher should give an undertaking that this letter would be 
read verbatim to each respondent and also the meaning of the contents would be explained to each of 
the respondent before canvassing the questionnaire. With this undertaking the researcher may take 
verbal consent of all the respondents. 
The names of hospitals! respondents should be strictly kept in confidence and nowhere in the research 
findings, that should be reflected. Names of hospitals etc could be given with letters like A,B, or C 
hospital. 
The draft fmdings should be shared with the respondents' groups and with other stakeholders for 
feedback. The researcher is expected to take the feedback seriously in terms of fair representation of 
the respondents' views and for reconsidering his interpretation of the data. But divergent views are in 
no way binding on him. 
The ethics committee grants unconditional clearance to this research proposal. 
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ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
Application number: 2073 
Name of Principal Investigator Kabir Sheikh 
Department Infectious and Tropical Diseases 
Head of Department Professor Hazel Dockrell 
Title Implementation of HIV diagnostic testing policy In India: a study 
of policy-practice links In the urban formal medical sector. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1. DEBATES AROUND HIVTESTING POLICY 
In this appendix, ongoing ethical debates around the different aspects of HIV testing policy are 
elaborated, with a focus on the Indian context. A literature search was undertaken on internet 
database PubMed and Google Scholar, using keywords "infonned consent", "routine testing", 
"mandatory testing" and "confidentiality" respectively, using the operator AND in conjunction 
with "HIV". For India-specific articles, the search was repeated with an additional keyword 
"India". Underpinnings of the national policy approach on the different aspects ofHIV testing are 
described, and some key debates and variations of views on these topics are summarized in the 
following sub-sections. 
A1.1 Selectivity in testing 
The selectivity or specificity exercised in deciding which patients should be tested is an aspect 
which has been the subject of much debate. All national level policy and programme documents 
advocate caution on the part of health care providers in advising the test, and stress on the client's 
role in the decision to be tested.499 
The themes of selectivity and caution in the national policies derive partly from the conception 
that knowledge of HIV status could not always be linked to a constructive outcome in terms of 
continued healthcare for the patient. In 1993, in the early years of the concerted response to 
HIV / AIDS, Lal and colleagues, officials of the National AIDS Control Organization wrote in a 
special issue of the Journal of the Indian Medical Association (JIMA) that 'It is better to avoid 
testing unless a rational utilization of the test result is envisaged. HIV testing procedure must be 
supported by ... means and skills for intervention, and otherwise not done' (Lal et al. 1993). 
The overtones of caution in HIV testing are also linked to philosophies underlying the Voluntary 
Counselling and Testing (VCT) approach and its origins in civil rights movements which 
originated in the USA and UK in the 1980s, as a resistance to draconian and discriminatory 
policies of HN testing and widespread occurrences of HIV -linked stigmatization and 
499 See Chapter 1 (1.2.5) for recent policy developments. 
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discrimination in health care settings (Danziger 1996, Gostin 2006). Voluntary Counselling and 
Testing was based on the right of individuals to seek and gain knowledge of their own HIV status, 
and the role of the medical provider in this process was relatively de-emphasized. vcr was 
legitimized worldwide as part of global policy for HN I AIDS, and adopted as national policy by 
many governments including India (10 et aI. 2006, Coovadia 2000). Special institutions (vcr 
Centres) were instituted, where clients would be assured of a supportive and stigma-free 
environment. Although VCT Centres were conceived as community-based institutions, in India 
they are frequently physically located within hospitals, which paradoxically leads to their being 
used mainly as HIV diagnostic centres for provider-advised referrals (NACO 2007e). 
The recommendations may also have been aimed at deterring indiscriminate testing by medical 
providers for reasons not intended exclusively for the benefit of patients, e.g. to deny them 
admission, refer them to other providers or avoid perfonning invasive procedures on them. 
The message of high selectivity in advising HIV tests on the grounds of inability to assure 
continued management is increasingly being seen as outdated. Treatment quality has improved 
vastly in the past decade and ART has become more accessible and affordable in many parts of 
the world. According to advocates of the expansion of HIV testing, stigma around HIV testing 
has decreased, and the benefits of treatment opportunities available to patients after testing 
positive outweigh the problems of stigma and discrimination (Steen et a1. 2007). It is perceived 
by some commentators that special procedures and centres for HIV testing (signifying what some 
regard as "HIV exceptionalism" (Bayer 1991» actually tend to foster a destructive secrecy, and 
increase rather than reduce stigmatization (De Cock et al 2002). 
Globally, opinions have been voiced in favour of encouraging medical providers to advise more 
HIV tests. As part of efforts to expand access to HIV testing, influential commentators called for 
the promotion of "offer of routine testing" to all patients, particularly in populations with high-
level epidemics. Prevention of the spread of the disease was an important factor cited in favour of 
expanding the scope of HIV testing (De Cock et al 2002, Bayer and Fairchild 2006). Of late, 
"routine offer of testing" has become part of the vocabulary of WHO's policies for HIV testing 
(see below AI.S), and has been adopted as a comprehensive national policy by the Government of 
the USA (Branson et al 2006). These approaches are often regarded as being at odds with 
erstwhile "rights-based" philosophies, and have been criticized for their potential of impinging on 
clients' liberties and reducing their (clients') roles in accessing HIV testing (Kippax 2006, Rennie 
and Behets 2006). 
310 
ApPENDICES 
In the Indian context, a government programme has been instituted to provide free ART across 
the country (NACO 20071). However Grover points out that the government had not met its 
targets of distributing fIrst-line ARV drugs, and less than a tenth of the people in need of ART in 
India have access to affordable treatment, hence it can hardly be argued that the context of 
accessibility has changed significantly for a large portion of the population (Grover 2006). 
Furthermore, simple initiation of ART does not equal access to treatment; there are numerous 
obstacles to access including discontinuities in medical care and human resource shortages 
(Sheikh 2004, Solomon et al 2006). Incidences of stigmatizing and discriminatory practices in 
healthcare settings persist (see section 1.3 for details). 
In an operational sense however, the prospect of advocating caution in HN testing to medical 
practitioners in India would seem incongruous to many, given a strong culture of use of laboratory 
investigations to support clinical decisions and a thriving market of available diagnostic 
technologies (Vazirani 2007). As described earlier in section 1.3, routine and in some cases 
indiscriminate HN testing is common in many government and private hospitals. Tests are also 
often conducted for reasons other than of aiding in the treatment of patients, an aspect which is 
discussed in detail in the following section on "Mandatory Testing". 
A1.2 Mandatory testing 
Well known instances of institutionalized mandatory testing include HN testing as part of 
immigration policy, before joining employment, particularly in the armed services, and before 
marriage as mandated by some states in India (Asthana 1996, Jayaraman 1998, Grover et al. 2000, 
Tandon 2002). In most cases, the mandatory test is not conducted with the purpose of benefiting 
the person being tested, but for the requirements of the individual or group who order the test, 
although in some instances the person being tested may subsequently receive care if they test 
positive (Agarwal 2002). In hospital settings, mandatory testing usually refers to patients being 
required to submit to a test before they are admitted to a facility, or before an invasive procedure 
or surgery is performed.soo The result of the test or refusal to be tested may influence the 
availability, quality or cost of care provided to the patient .sOl (pandya 1997a, Abraham 2002, Rao 
et a1. 2004, Kurien et a1. 2007). Considerations of individual rights are cited as the basis for 
NACO's stance of opposing mandatory testing in any fonn (NACO 2003a). 
SOO This type of "mandatory testing" is not identical to simple absence of consent, since the patients may 
knowingly agree to being tested. Hence there may be informed - if not free - consent in cases of 
mandatory testing. 
SOl Typically costs of extra protective equipment for surgeons may be borne by HIV positive patients, or 
those who refuse testing. 
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Doctors' arguments in favour of mandatory testing before surgery tend to focus on their 
perception of high risks of transmission of HN infection from patients to operating surgeons. In 
this context, surgeons' right to safety and protection from infection is often cited as the reason for 
pre-surgical HIV screening (Meadows et al1995, Danziger et al. 1996, Orji and Ogunniyi 2001). 
According to some doctors, mandatory testing spares the need to use enhanced protection against 
HIV in all surgical procedures, which in turn significantly reduces expenses for themselves and 
for patients (Viswanathan 2002, Kurien et al 2007). Another argument in support of mandatory 
testing is that knowledge about HN status aids in continued medical management of patients 
(Viswanathan 2002; Dutta 2003). 
There are some question marks over the validity of these arguments. While the frequency of 
injury to surgeons intra-operatively are relatively high, the documented risk of transmission of 
HIV infection is reported to be very low, and it is likely that surgeons apprehensions in this regard 
are overstated (Mathiharan 2002, Narain et al 1993). Doctors in India are also reported to be 
poorly informed about measures of risk prevention including universal precautions and post-
exposure prophylaxis (PEP) (Kurien et al 2007, Chogle et al 2002). The possibility of a patient 
being in the "window period" when HIV infection cannot be detected through routine tests. 
diminishes the value of pre-surgical testing as an effective infection control technique (Pandya 
1997a). Furthermore, according to a study by Lawrence e~ al (1993), there is apparently no 
significant benefit in terms of costs, of adopting routine pre-surgical HIV testing over using 
universal precautions. 
Al.3 Specific informed consent 
The rationale of NACO's requirement of specific informed consent for HIV testing is based on 
principles of individual rights and autonomy of choice for people, which the programme regards 
as being inseparable from long-term public health goals (NACO 2003a). 
According to Kalantri - himself a physician - writing about other doctors' perspectives on 
consent in the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics - many doctors oppose the idea of taking consent 
from patients, and regard it as an onerous formality. Their arguments against consent procedures 
tended to be framed around logics of paternalism - taking decisions in clinical settings was seen as 
a responsibility, and something which patients often expected of them (Kalantri 2000). Consent 
procedures, predicated as they are on autonomy and doctor-patient equality, were regarded as 
theoretic and superfluous by Kalantri's doctors, in the context of the essential inequality of 
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relationships between patients and doctors (ibid). It is also reported however, that these doctors 
did little to discourage this relational imbalance, which the author (Kalantri) regards as a sign of 
doctors' desire for dominance. 
Consent procedures and formats for written consent have sometimes been criticized on the 
grounds of being too complicated or technical, or for not serving their intended purpose of 
providing optimal information for patients to make decisions. It is well known that a majority of 
patients attending free govenunent and charitable hospitals are poor and underprivileged, and 
illiteracy can be high as reported among attendees of a HIV testing centre in a government 
hospital in West Bengal (Joardar et al 2006). Sastry et aI. maintain that the length and 
technicalities of standard consent procedures can be intimidating and lack meaning for individuals 
who live in societies where literacy and awareness of rights is low. Based on an intervention 
among pregnant women attending ante-natal clinics in Maharashtra, India, they relate the success 
of innovations in the consent process (such as the use of visual aids) in increasing clients' 
comprehension (Sastry et a1. 2004). 
Even in developed country contexts, standard informed consent forms have sometimes not been 
perceived to be helpful, by patients. A common perception among patients at an English hospital 
was that consent forms are primarily meant for the legal protection of hospitals, or for the transfer 
of power and control to doctors (Akkad et al 2006). In India, good acceptance of written consent 
procedures by doctors has been linked to its perceived value as a safeguard against litigation 
(Shenoy 2002, Kalantri 2000). 
Some commentators and physicians object to the specific requirement of consent for a HIV test. 
According to Mathan, the decision by a patient to seek help at a health care facility "implies his or 
her consent to undergo the necessary diagnostic tests as ordered by, and at the best clinical 
judgement of the healthcare worker" (Mathan 1993). Other diagnostic tests usually do not require 
specific consent of the patient, and in this context HIV "exceptionalism" was the target of 
criticism from doctors (Dutta 2003). This view is rebutted by civil rights activists who point out 
that the HN test is still more liable than others to be misused by practitioners and be linked to 
discrimination and adverse outcomes for patients (Rennie and Bchets 2006). According to 
Grover, principles of consent are not strongly rooted in practice in Indian health care settings, and 
rescinding written consent policies could be seen by practitioners as encouragement to conduct 
mandatory tests (Grover 2006). 
Advocates of elimination of written consent feel that it is a burdensome procedure which can 
impede the expansion of access to HIV tests (Baycr and Fairchild 2006). Of late, global policies 
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have moved away from written consent requirements in the context of HIV testing in healthcare 
settings (see below Al.S) 
Al.4 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is widely regarded as a cornerstone of public health strategies for HIV I AIDS, 
deriving from core ethical principles of autonomy and privacy and from concerns of 
discrimination against individuals with HIV (Abraham et al 2000). National and global HIV 
policies both have consistently emphasised the importance of confidentiality (UNAIDSIWHO 
2004, WHO 2007). Opposition to strong emphasis on confidentiality has come from 
commentators on the grounds that it fosters a general environment of secrecy which eventually 
prevents the nonnalization of HIV as a health problem (De Cock et al 2002). There is also 
criticism that the pedantic application of confidentiality norms poses an impediment to equally 
essential infonnation-gathering functions of health systems, such as surveillance (Verity and 
Nicoll 2002). 
In India, debates around confidentiality in clinical settings have centred around two areas: the 
extent to which a patients HIV status should be advertised to health workers, and the involvement 
of families. The prominent labelling of patients' case-papers or beds in hospitals to indicate their 
HIV positive status is commonplace in many Indian hospitals. Pandya reports that the 
explanation offered by doctors is that all healthcare staff need this infonnation so that "they can 
take necessary precautions (to protect themselves from infection)" (Agarwal 2002, Pandya 
1997a). It is likely however that knowledge of a patient's HIV status is often a cause of 
insensitive and discriminatory behaviour of care providers, and that it may often be available to 
individuals other than the care providers themselves (Pandya 1997b, Pandya 1 997c). 
Involving families in disclosure of diagnostic test results is reported to be common practice in 
many healthcare settings in India. Families are reported to be important sources of social and 
financial support, and of continued care to HIV positive patients (Ratnathicam 2001; MAAS-
CHRD 2003). Conversely there are instances of families being instrumental in the persecution 
and abandonment of people diagnosed with HIV, notably of women more than men (Sharat and 
Aggleton 1999). 
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National Policy stance Areas of Debate 
(2003) 
Selectivity in Testing Caution and discrimination in Enhanced availability of ART obviates need for 
prescribing test caution? 
Other opportunities for care, prevention of spread 
Strong prevailing culture of, and markets for 
diagnostic testing 
Mandatory Testing Forbids use of test as Health workers right to protection 
precondition for service Effectiveness as Infection control technique 
Test only for patients' benefit Cost effectiveness vs. universal precautions 
Specific Informed Autonomy paramount, Patemalism valued by doctors and some patients? 
Consent consent to be specific, Procedure regarded as mechanical and ineffectual, infonned, written problems of comprehension for some clients 
Regarded as helpful for doctors, not patients 
Objections to HIV specificity, exceptionallsm 
Confidentiality Strict confidentiality in clinic Rights of, and convenience for health care workers 
settings Conflicted role of families 
Partner and family 
involvement with patient 
consent 
Table A.I National Policies for HIV Testing and Related Debates 
A1.5 Recent shifts in policy 
In the recent past (after the fieldwork for this study was completed). certain changes in the official 
positions of national and global policymakers have taken place. Some of these revisions are 
outlined here. 
The World Health Organization has introduced separate policies for what is teoned "Provider-
Initiated" Testing and Counselling (PITC), while retaining its strong focus on Voluntary Testing 
and Counselling (VTC) initiatives. The PITC policy model is aimed at diagnostic testing in 
healthcare settings and recommends an "opt-out" approach. in which medical providers are 
encouraged to offer the HIV test to patients on a routine basis502• and the patient has the 
opportunity of granting or withdrawing consent (WHO 2007). Depending on local conditions, it 
S02 In WHO's guidelines for provider-initiated testing. medical providers are advised to offer the test 
routinely to all patients with clinical presentation suggestive of HIV infection, and in regions with 
generalized HIV epidemics, to a/l patients irrespective of presentation (WHO 2007). 
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is recommended that pre-test infonnation, not counselling be provided to a group or individual, 
and consent be obtained privately but verbally. 
The previous emphasis on specificity and caution around advising a HIV test is absent in NACO's 
new Guidelines for HIV Testing. In the 3rd phase of the National AIDS Control Programme, the 
appellation of Voluntary Counselling and Testing Centres in official documentation has been 
changed to Integrated Testing and Counselling Centres, in recognition of their dual role as 
hospital-based diagnostic centres for provider-initiated referrals and testing centres for individuals 
independently seeking knowledge of their HIV status. In other respects, national policy 
documents on HIV Testing are marked by contradictions. The Guidelines for HIV Testing make 
no mention of "opt-out" approaches and do not advocate routine testing in any context. The 
Guidelines reiterate the emphasis on specific written informed consent for a test. Paradoxically, 
the Operational Guidelines for ICTCs (published within 4 months of the Testing Guidelines) are 
inconsistent with Testing Guidelines in this regard, and do not indicate requirement of written 
consent from provider-referred patients. Routine offer of test to patients with signs of HIV and 
ante-natal clinic attendees, with the option to "opt out" is recommended in the Operational 
Guidelines (NACO 2007c, NACO 2007h). 
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APPENDIX 2. CLIENTS' MOVEMENTS AROUND HIV TESTING 
This section is based on respondents' accounts about their clients' experiences and their 
movements outside and within the hospital while accessing HIV diagnosis. 
A2.1 Movements before diagnosis 
Approach to HIV diagnosis 
Counsellors in government and private hospitals reported that there was a growing trend of walk-
in clients, who come to the Hospital VCTC with the primary aim of getting tested for HIV."o3 
With rising awareness about HIV, people were reportedly increasingly coming forward 
specifically to seek confirmation of their status. However, patients have had differing 
motivations in seeking care, of which the desire for HIV diagnosis may not always have 
predominated. One physician described a typical scenario of a HIV related consultation: 
The usual thing that happens, a sick man comes to our clinic, with a 
woman, his wife standing next to him, and a baby in her lap. My concern 
is always: am I dealing with one patient or three? ... Often, when I asked 
the asymptomatic wife: what about you? And they say: this is my report. 
Then I ask: you know what is wrong? She doesn't understand the 
implications of being HIV infected. Her concerns are basically for her 
husband. He is sick, if he dies, she is going to probably be kicked out of 
his family. In-laws often turn violent, if the husband dies. So these big 
social issues are there. 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (13) 
The woman's relative lack of concern around her own HIV status, combined with the presence of 
potentially three patients in a single consultation reflect some of the complexities of health care 
interactions in these settings. This physician felt that some of these issues challenged the 
boundaries of his role as a care-giver, and sought help from other sources. 
Being a physician, of course it's not within my realm, my capacity to 
deal with these things. That's why I always try to network with PLHA 
support groups, or CBOs or NOOs who are supporting PLHA 
Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital (13) 
S03 Respondent 42: Counsellor, government hospital VCTC 
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According to a number of doctors, among the patients who consulted them for the first time, 
illness episodes were usually the precipitating event which led patients to seek care in hospitals, 
more than simple awareness of HIV status. Reports of patients often coming in advanced, 
symptomatic stages of the disease supported this view. S04.S0S Some patients even considered the 
procedures around HN testing to be a distraction from their immediate needs of receiving 
treatment for a problem. 
There is always fear of drop out... If he feels that '" he will not get 
treated for what he has come for, instead he is just being tested for HIV, 
then he may not come back. 
COWlsellor, government hospital vcrc (42) 
Reportedly, patients' often had feelings of secrecy and denial around their HIV status. 
Respondents said that many patients were not keen to divulge or confirm their status, and actively 
resisted the idea of HIV testing.506 
Previous testing and referral 
Other than the hospitals, respondents' accounts revealed that there are two other types of facilities 
typically involved in patients accessing HIV diagnosis - primary care providers (most often 
private practitioners) and private diagnostic laboratories. 
Figure A.I Clients' Movements in Seekins HIV DlalDosls 
504 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
:: Respondent 41: Venereologist, 15 years experience, private hospital 
Several respondents (23, 34,40) 
.. 
318 
ApPENDICES 
Patients frequently access different practitioners and get tested in different laboratories, before 
(and after) they consult doctors in the larger general hospitals. Typically patients would have 
been tested at a private laboratory or laboratories, at the behest of a private practitioner. 
According to a number of practitioners from each type of hospital, many of their HIV positive 
patients had already been tested elsewhere, at the time of coming to the hospitals.507 '70 to 80% 
of patients come to us with already HIV positive reports' said one private physician.50B 
The availability of better care for HIV related illnesses, and more specifically the availability of 
ART were cited as reasons why primary level providers and private practitioners refer patients to 
general hospitals.509•slO However, it is not possible to say definitively that patients' movements 
between providers are always results of directed referrals from medical providers. Fonnal 
referrals may not always be made and patients may not always be supported to understand the 
procedure of referral, or be made to perceive a sense of continuity in moving from one medical 
provider to another. In some instances the ''referral'' may be a form of shunting out a patient -
denying care when it is discovered that they are HIV positive.m .m According to some 
practitioners, many patients exercised their own choices in accessing different providers: 'They go 
on repeating the testing from other private clinics and laboratories' said one government 
venereologist. 513 
In summary, many patients have visited other facilities before, seeking HIV diagnosis and care, 
but some patients may also access the hospitals as first points of care. 
A2.2 Movements during diagnosis 
Following consultation with a doctor in the hospital, a decision may be made to conduct a HIV 
test. Even after such a decision is made, a number of steps present themselves before a HIV 
diagnosis is completed. 
1. Decision to test 
2. Consent and pre-test counselling 
3. Sampling and testing 
507 Several respondents (09,13,14,16,17,18,19,21,27,28,30,37,40) 
508 Respondent 09: Junior physician, private nursing home 
509 Respondent 14: Venereologist 7 years experience, government hospital 
510 Respondent 28: Senior venereologist, government hospital 
SI\ Respondent 09: Junior physician, private nursing home 
512 Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
513 Respondent 14: Venereologist, 7 years experience, government hospital 
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4. Disclosure of results and post-test counselling 
5. Referral for further advice and management 
To undertake these different steps, patients are referred to different sites or locations either within 
the hospital complex or, in the case of nursing homes without testing facilities, to private 
diagnostic laboratories nearby. In hospitals with testing laboratories and vercs or appointed 
counsellors (4 government, one charitable and one private hospital), there are three official sites 
or locations involved where the patient undergoes the processes of HN diagnosis: the consulting 
clinic of the doctor, a counselling centre or VCTC and a testing laboratory. 
2 
Doctor's Clinic --. Counselling centre 
~ IVCTC 
5 
Figure A.2 Expected Movements of Patients in Hospital 
Diagnostic 
Laboratory 
According to respondents, sometimes each of these steps was enacted in a regular order. There 
were also considerable variations in the movements of patients, either as a result of personal 
practices of the doctors, or systemic or institutional factors, or due to patients' actions.Sl4 The 
commonest types of irregularity involved omission of the "counselling" step in one manner or 
other. Pre-test counselling was not offered in some contexts, especially in the case ofpre-surgicaJ 
HIV screening, and in nursing homes and hospitals without counselling facilities, doctors did not 
always counsel their patients or enable access to counsellors. Doctors in government hospitals 
often sent their patients outside the hospital to private laboratories to be tested, again commonly 
in the context of pre-surgical screening. On a number of occasions, patients "dropped out" at 
different stages of the cycle of diagnosis. The phenomena of "outside testing" and drop-out are 
described further in this section (page 322 and 322 respectively). More details of irregularities 
and omissions around counselling will be discussed in later sections on enacting policies. 
Movement between clinical departments 
Patient movement between different clinical departments in a hospital was found to be common, 
even before a decision to test for HN is made. Three departments in the hospitals are mainly 
involved in HN diagnosis and care - Medicine, Venereology & Dennatology and Obstetrics & 
Si4 S 
everalrespondents (02, 12, 13. 16, 17, 18, 19,23,24,28,30,40) 
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Gynaecology . Interdepartmental referrals are common in the government hospitals, and 
suspicion ofHIV in one department often leads to diagnosis in another. Doctors in several of the 
hospitals had made attempts to integrate HIV care to some degree, from linking interested 
consultants to form cross-<iepartmental HIV teams, to designating special HIV/AIDS clinics with 
their own timings and multi-speciality staff. Even after entering into the hospital system, in the 
larger hospitals patients may have had to visit several different rooms and departments to fully 
access HIV diagnosis, including variously located clinical departments, counselling centres, 
sample collection rooms and laboratories. 
The role of VCTCs 
VCTCs in hospitals playa dual role of counselling and testing truly voluntary or "walk-in" clients 
as they are sometimes referred to, and providing the same services to patients who are referred to 
them by doctors, following consultation. After testing and post-test counselling they are expected 
to refer HIV+ patients back to the doctor's clinics for further management. VCTCs hence occupy 
an intennediate position between the clinics and testing laboratories. 
According to counsellors working in government hospital VCTCs, they receive considerably 
more "referred" patients than "walk-in" clients. Some respondents felt that VCTCs in hospitals 
tended to assume the role of glorified diagnostic centres, which did not reflect their popular 
characterization as voluntary community-based facilities.515 They expressed some doubts about 
the "voluntary" nomenclature, and about the supposed under-utilisation of VCTCs. 
There is nothing voluntary about it. .. in VCTCs ... they don't have more 
than 2-3 patients in a day, and of those most of the patients are from the 
hospitals, and directed by the doctors. 
Senior physician, government hospital (37) 
Voluntary /cahan hai ji? (how is it voluntary, sir?] Here all the patients 
come from the hospital. 
Senior microbiologist, government hospital (66) 
However, counsellors did report growing numbers of voluntary patients accessing VCTCs, and it 
is possible that doctors may not have been well informed about these trends.sI6 
SIS Respondent 20: Junior gynaecologist, government hospital 
516 Respondent 42: Counsellor, government hospital VCTC 
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'Outside testing' 
'Outside testing' or the practice (in government hospitals) of sending patients to private 
laboratories to be tested was used by some government doctors as a convenient alternative to the 
multi-step procedure of testing within the hospitals. Results of in-house testing were not always 
available on the same day, and there were issues of overcrowding, short opening hours and 
charges of 'official lethargy' which the doctors felt impeded prompt delivery of test results, 
considered essential for patient management.Sl7 Private laboratories were often seen to be a more 
efficient alternative, easily accessible, open for long hours and prompt in returning the results, at a 
cost to the patient. 
Doctors may have also resorted to outside testing when faced with obstacles to ordering pre-
surgical tests in-house, since this was not officially sanctioned by the hospital. In hospitals where 
norms against pre-surgical mandatory screening were in place, there were tensions between 
surgeons, who advised these tests and diagnosticians, who were reluctant to bend the rules to 
perform the tests.518.SI9.520 According to some respondents, pre-surgical patients are often willing 
to forgo the lengthy government hospital procedures and pay for private tests. 
Drop-out 
Clients / patients may drop out at any point of the cycle of HIV diagnosis, a phenomenon 
commonly reported in government hospitals, and also to an extent in the private hospital. At the 
first instance of consultation, the very suggestion of HIV from a treating physician may cause a 
patient to leave: 
Say, if you have a "shady" history from a male who has a genital ulcer, 
and you tell him this, this, and we are going to do HIV, and go and talk to 
those people. The moment some people hear "HN", they just vanish. 
They go out; they go to some other hospital. 
Junior venereologist, government hospital (27) 
Patients also drop out after pre-test counselling sessions, an occurrence so common that much of 
counsellors' energies and attentions are directed towards persuading patients to remain within the 
system. 
517 Several respondents (27, 31,32,42) 
518 Respondent 24: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
::: Respondent 31: Senior surgeon, government hospital 
Respondent 66: Senior microbiologist, government hospital 
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Sometimes it happens that two or three patients are taken together. We 
have to make sure that while we are talking to one, the other does not get 
up and leave, because some how or the other he became ready for HIV 
test, but ifhe feels anything, he may think "forget it, let me go". 
Counsellor, government hospital VCTC (42) 
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A counsellor ascribed frequent dropout to the nuisance of multiple inter-department transfers, 
procedural delays and lack of attention to their primary complaint.521 Even after results are made 
known to the patients, they often drop out, seek second opinions or continue to "shop" for 
alternative diagnoses or treatment. Mistrust and fear of revelation of HIV status or sexual 
indiscretions, common themes in this deeply stigmatized disease, were, also cited as grounds for 
patients' wariness around HIV testing. 522,S23,524 
Omission of counselling step 
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Figure A.3 Patients' Actual Movements during HIV Teatluisas 
W R . 52 espondent 42: Counsellor, government hospital VCTC 
52
2 Respondent 13: Senior physician and HIV specialist, government hospital 
52: Respondent 23: Venereologist, 10 years experience, government hospital 
525 Respondent 40: Counsellor, private hospital 
Dashed lines indicate divergences from expected movements 
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